Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has caused a devastating loss of life, widespread humanitarian crisis, and other global effects. In response, as of April 2024, Congress has appropriated more than $174 billion to assist Ukraine. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) has obligated funds for security assistance, such as for procuring missiles, ammunition, and combat vehicles for Ukraine and to replace U.S. stocks. Other federal agencies have worked to address the economic and humanitarian needs of people affected by the invasion—including direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, humanitarian assistance within Ukraine and to Ukrainian refugees, and recovery assistance such as repairing the energy grid and improving the country’s health sector.
Examples of Non-Security Assistance Provided to Ukraine
Activities include training first responders and hospital clinicians on the use of protective suits during chemical hazard events (top left), deployment of a mobile pharmacy (top right), and training for anti-corruption training detectives on how to gather intelligence from items discarded by suspects (bottom).
However, there are a number of ways in which federal agencies could bolster oversight requirements, improve the monitoring of weapons’ use, and better track how funding is being used in Ukraine.
For example:
Tracking equipment and training. Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided an unprecedented amount of equipment to Ukraine and coordinated with many countries to provide training to support the Ukrainian armed forces. DOD has been delivering this equipment rapidly, sometimes taking days to complete deliveries that typically take weeks. But DOD doesn't have clear guidance for tracking equipment deliveries, and its delivery data may not be accurate. Also, DOD modified its monitoring approach during the ongoing conflict but has not assessed whether it sufficiently guards against equipment loss or misuse. With respect to training, over 30 countries have helped train more than 115,000 Ukrainians, including about 16% of them who have received training from the U.S. The U.S. collects data on this training, but we found that it was sometimes incomplete or inconsistent.
Tracking funding. The State Department doesn't have a systematic, comprehensive approach to specifically track funding that federal agencies have provided for economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. For example, State provided assistance to other countries affected by the crisis but didn't consistently include this assistance when tracking Ukraine-related funding.
Examples of Weapons Delivered to Ukraine
Effective resource use. DOD's European Defense Initiativehelps boost the military readiness of European allies and deter Russian aggression. Since 2015, the U.S. has spent $35 billion through this initiative on activities like supporting American troop deployments in Europe. Historically, the military services have used their own criteria to decide which activities are funded under the initiative. DOD has recently issued guidance to standardize the services' budget requests and improve accountability for these funds. But DOD has not established performance goals and measures to determine if the resources are being used effectively.
Asset valuation. Presidential Drawdown Authority allows the President to provide defense items such as ammunition and missiles from DOD's inventories to respond to foreign crises. In 2023, DOD notified Congress that it had misvalued items given to Ukraine under this authority in FY 2022 and FY 2023 by about $6.2 billion. The law that includes this authority doesn't clearly define "value" as it relates to the authority. Also, DOD doesn't have valuation guidance specific to this authority, so it can't be assured that it will value these items accurately.
Managing fraud risks. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has standard processes to manage risks to its delivery of assistance in countries worldwide. But in countries affected by violent conflict, such as Ukraine, dangerous conditions can limit USAID's ability to directly oversee its assistance—increasing the risk of fraud or corruption. Despite this, USAID does not comprehensively assess and document relevant fraud risks, including for Ukraine.
Supporting Ukraine’s government. As of May 2024, USAID had obligated $22.9 billion for direct budget support for Ukraine’s government, largely to reimburse the government for eligible expenses, such as salaries for teachers, civil servants, and healthcare workers. USAID has used a layered approach to oversee this funding, with different entities responsible for providing different types of oversight—such as identifying gaps in Ukrainian government processes and conducting financial audits. However, some of these entities’ work has limitations, which affect the level of accountability their oversight provides.
Supporting humanitarian and development needs. The State Department and USAID had 111 implementing partners carrying out humanitarian and development assistance in Ukraine, as of September 30, 2023. The majority of these partners were U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations. When selecting these partners, State and USAID followed their own selection requirements, but some of these requirements could be bolstered to strengthen the processes for screening potential partners.
Recovery assistance. Applying lessons learned from past conflicts could enhance the effectiveness of U.S. recovery assistance to Ukraine. Such lessons include (1) maintaining a clear strategy and financial plan, (2) ensuring political and civil society support, (3) promoting effective coordination, and (4) establishing and utilizing accountability mechanisms.
Donor coordination: At least 30 countries have pledged over $148 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in 2022, which the U.S. has helped to coordinate. This includes $2 billion worth of defense items of U.S. origin—such as missiles and ammunition—that foreign donors requested to transfer to Ukraine. The State Department approves these transfers and DOD is required to monitor the items. However, State hasn’t consistently shared approval information with DOD and neither DOD nor State verify the delivery of these transfers, which hampers monitoring.
Members of Congress, congressional staff, and federal government employees who have the appropriate clearances and an official need-to-know may also request access to the following restricted reports:
Ukraine: European Logistics: DOD Should Identify Army and Air Force Units Needed for Theater Opening and Army Should Reassess Its Sustainment Force Capabilities, GAO-24-105585C. Published June 6, 2024.
Cyberspace Operations: DOD Should Take Steps to Improve Coordination with Foreign Partners, GAO-24-103716C. Published July 25, 2024.
Ukraine: DOD Could Strengthen International Military Training Coordination by Improving Data Quality, GAO-24-106964SU. Published July 30, 2024.
Ukraine Funding: DOD Needs to Improve Its Reporting, Guidance, and Evaluation Efforts, GAO-24-106763SU. Published September 30, 2024.
GAO’s oversight of Ukrainian assistance is being coordinated with federal inspectors general offices and other oversight agencies. Learn more about the work and findings of the federal Ukraine Interagency Oversight Working Group: UkraineOversight.gov