Title: Ukraine Nuclear Security and Safety Efforts

Description: Under harsh conflict conditions, Ukrainians have struggled
to operate nuclear power plants and to secure nuclear and radioactive
materials from potentially falling into the wrong hands. As part of the
United States's aid to Ukraine, Congress approved millions of dollars to
help Ukrainians address these nuclear security and safety issues. We
learn more about these efforts and the potential fraud risks to U.S.
assistance from GAO's Allison Bawden. 

Related work: GAO-25-108444, Ukraine: DOE Could Better Assess Fraud
Risks and Formalize Its Transition Plans for Nuclear Security and Safety
Efforts

Released: June 2025

{Music}

[Allison Bawden:] There are high risks that a nuclear power plant or a
radiological facility could be hit, causing a dispersal of material.

[Holly Hobbs:] Hi and welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report. Your source for
fact-based, nonpartisan news and information from the U.S. Government
accountability Office. I'm your host, Holly Hobbs.
Under harsh conflict conditions, Ukrainians have struggled to operate
nuclear power plants and to secure nuclear and radioactive materials
from potentially falling into the wrong hands. As part of the United
States's aid to Ukraine, Congress approved millions of dollars to help
Ukrainians address these nuclear security and safety issues. We'll learn
more about these efforts and the potential fraud risks to U.S.
assistance from GAO's Allison Bawden. Thanks for joining us. 

[Allison Bawden:] Thanks for having me. 

[Holly Hobbs:] Allison, maybe we can start with how serious of an issue
is this? What's the concern here? 

[Allison Bawden:] Well, it's a very serious issue because the
consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident in Ukraine are so
serious. There have been, over the years, some instances of kind of
nuclear saber-rattling from Russia with respect to the potential for
low-yield nuclear weapons use. But really, what's concerning is the
potential for either an intentional or unintentional event at a nuclear
power plant or a radiological facility that would cause material
dispersal. There are about 35 facilities in Ukraine that have nuclear or
radiological material, and there have been damage to some of those
facilities since the beginning of the war. Just last week, there was
reporting in the media about gunfire and drone sightings near the
Zaporizhzhia power plant, for example.

[Holly Hobbs:] So what's all being done about this issue and how is the
U.S. helping?

[Allison Bawden:] So the U.S. has a long history of supporting nuclear
and radiological security in Ukraine. But, as the war progressed, the
U.S. really stepped up its support through supplemental appropriations
from the Congress. And between about February 2022 and December 2023,
the Department of Energy alone spent about $161 million on these
efforts. Other departments also provided support. But the support,
especially from DOE, or the Department of Energy, really falls in sort
of three buckets. You can think of them as prevention, detection and
response. So, for prevention work--which is really what was going on in
the Ukraine before any of the hostilities--there was work going on to,
for example, install radiation portal monitors at the country's border
to detect any material that might have been illicitly on the move. Since
the war, prevention has increased, for example, by installing those
types of monitors more in the interior of the country. But also, there's
been a lot of focus on detection and particularly response. So, response
includes training, specialized training for Ukrainian teams to respond
to a nuclear or radiological incident in the hopes of minimizing
consequences. 

[Holly Hobbs:] So you hinted at this, even before the war started, the
U.S. has been helping Ukraine with security. How has that effort changed
since the war?

[Allison Bawden:] So before the war, a lot of the focus was on that
prevention. And this was work and is work that the United States had
done in Ukraine and other former Soviet States, as well as in Russia,
you know, through the 90s and early 2000s. There is now, you know, since
the hostilities began, a greater focus on detection and response. So, in
detection, that might be things like remote sensing to understand
whether an event has occurred. And then in response, really to train
Ukrainian responders to address an incident if one happened.

[Holly Hobbs:] There are plans to eventually transition the
responsibility that some of the U.S. agencies are taking to Ukraine.
What are those plans? 

[Allison Bawden:] Well, some efforts that the U.S. has been undertaking
don't need to be transitioned. For example, there was some emergency
assistance for things like replacing equipment that had previously been
provided and that Ukraine had been sustaining, but that were damaged
during the war. Also, there were other types of emergency assistance,
like backup generators and things like that. The training work is
largely complete. And so, the Department of Energy considers that to
have been transitioned--at the time the training finishes, Ukraine is
able to conduct a response if one was needed. But other types of things
that need to transition are newer equipment provision, like remote
sensing equipment, like other kinds of monitors that have been
installed--and really that can't happen until there's a more secure
situation on the ground.

[Holly Hobbs:] We also looked at how the money that Congress
appropriated is being used in Ukraine. It seems like addressing fraud
risk might be even more difficult in a war zone. What do we know about
the fraud risks here? 

[Allison Bawden:] It absolutely is more difficult in a war zone. In the
case of the Department of Energy spending here, a lot of this money is
going out on contracts and then subcontracts for work on the ground in a
hostile environment and where we really don't have U.S. officials on the
ground to confirm that work has been completed to the terms of the
contract. So that absolutely creates a heightened risk of fraud. In
addition, with the supplemental funds that the Congress appropriated,
those funds had to move really quickly. Much more quickly than the
department might otherwise normally operate. And so that too creates
additional risk of fraud.

[Holly Hobbs:] So what's being done to address these risks? 

[Allison Bawden:] Well, many of the Department of Energy's contracting
officers, who were responsible for executing the contracts to do this
work, did take steps to assess the risk of fraud and in some cases,
either determined that the mitigations that they had in place were
already sufficient or, in a handful of cases, developed additional
mitigations or controls against the potential for fraud risk. 

{Music}

[Holly Hobbs:] So Allison just told us that efforts to improve safety
and security at Ukrainian nuclear sites are increasingly difficult
because of the war, and it's also increasingly difficult to address
fraud risks facing U.S. assistance. So, Allison, what more do we think
needs to be done to address potential fraud issues? 

[Allison Bawden:] So while individual contracting officers, in some
cases, did do that look to evaluate whether the fraud controls that were
in place were sufficient for the conditions on the ground--this wasn't
something the DOE actually required of its contracting officers. And
therefore, there wasn't really a consistent approach across DOE's
programs that were executing this work or the contracts that they put in
place. And that is not consistent with the department's own guidance for
enterprise risk management. 
So we recommended that in cases like this, where there's a heightened
risk of fraud--you know, either because money has to move quickly or
because there's a changing operating environment on the ground--that the
department should require fraud risk assessments of its contracting
officers. 

[Holly Hobbs:] And what about these plans to transition responsibilities
to Ukrainians? What do we recommend there? 

[Allison Bawden:] We recommended that the department really formalize
its transition agreements with its Ukrainian counterparts so that there
is a shared set of expectations around what readiness looks like for the
Ukrainian partners to assume responsibility for this equipment or these
functions. And that would really help protect the U.S. investment.

[Holly Hobbs:] And last question what's the bottom line of this report? 

[Allison Bawden:] The risk environment in the Ukraine is really
substantial with respect to nuclear and radiological security. And the
United States, especially the Department of Energy, have been providing
significant support to Ukraine in that area. But that's also why we
think implementing our recommendations is important--to insure against
the potential for fraud and to also transition the U.S. investment when
Ukrainian partners are ready.

[Holly Hobbs:] That was Allison Bawden talking about our new report on
Ukrainian nuclear security and safety. Thanks for your time. 

[Allison Bawden:] Thank you so much. 

[Holly Hobbs:] And thank you for listening to the Watchdog Report. To
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