Military Vehicles: Army and Marine Corps Should Take Additional Actions to Mitigate and Prevent Training Accidents
Fast Facts
We reviewed Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicle (e.g., tanks, trucks) accidents from FY 2010-2019, and steps taken to prevent them.
- The services reported 3,753 non-combat accidents resulting in 123 servicemember deaths
- Driver inattention, supervision lapses, and training shortfalls were common causes
- The Army and Marine Corps have practices to mitigate and prevent tactical vehicle accidents, but units don't always use them
- DOD improved driver training, but advanced training experience—e.g., driving in varied conditions—differed across units, leading to uneven driver skills
We made 9 recommendations to DOD to help prevent these accidents.
A rollover accident
Highlights
What GAO Found
The number of serious accidents involving Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicles, such as tanks and trucks, and the number of resulting deaths, fluctuated from fiscal years 2010 through 2019 (see figure). Driver inattentiveness, lapses in supervision, and lack of training were among the most common causes of these accidents, according to GAO analysis of Army and Marine Corps data.
Number of Army and Marine Corps Class A and B Tactical Vehicle Accidents and Resulting Military Deaths, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2019
Note: Class A and B accidents have the most serious injuries and financial costs.
The Army and Marine Corps established practices to mitigate and prevent tactical vehicle accidents, but units did not consistently implement these practices. GAO found that issues affecting vehicle commanders and unit safety officers hindered Army and Marine Corps efforts to implement risk management practices. For example, the Army and Marine Corps had not clearly defined the roles or put procedures and mechanisms in place for first-line supervisors, such as vehicle commanders, to effectively perform their role. As a result, implementation of risk management practices, such as following speed limits and using seat belts, was ad hoc among units.
The Army and Marine Corps provide training for drivers of tactical vehicles that can include formal instruction, unit licensing, and follow-on training, but their respective programs to build driver skills and experience had gaps. GAO found that factors, such as vehicle type and unit priorities, affected the amount of training that vehicle drivers received. Further, licensing classes were often condensed into shorter periods of time than planned with limited drive time, and unit training focused on other priorities rather than driving, according to the units that GAO interviewed. The Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to improve their driver training programs, but have not developed a well-defined process with performance criteria and measurable standards to train their tactical vehicle drivers from basic qualifications to proficiency in diverse driving conditions, such as driving at night or over varied terrain. Developing performance criteria and measurable standards for training would better assure that Army and Marine Corps drivers have the skills to operate tactical vehicles safely and effectively.
Why GAO Did This Study
Tactical vehicles are used to train military personnel and to achieve a variety of missions. Both the Army and Marine Corps have experienced tactical vehicle accidents that resulted in deaths of military personnel during non-combat scenarios.
GAO was asked to review issues related to the Army's and Marine Corps' use of tactical vehicles. Among other things, this report examines (1) trends from fiscal years 2010 through 2019 in reported Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicle accidents, deaths, and reported causes; and evaluates the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (2) taken steps to mitigate and prevent accidents during tactical vehicle operations; and (3) provided personnel with training to build the skills and experience needed to drive tactical vehicles. GAO analyzed accident data from fiscal years 2010 through 2019 (the most recent full year of data at the time of analysis); reviewed documents; and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of units and training ranges selected based on factors, such as locations where accidents occurred.
Recommendations
GAO is making 9 recommendations to the Department of Defense, including that the Army and Marine Corps more clearly define roles and establish procedures and mechanisms to help supervisors enhance tactical vehicle safety; and develop performance criteria and measurable standards for driver training programs. The department concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, should ensure that the Army develop more clearly defined roles for vehicle commanders and establish mechanisms and procedures for tactical vehicle risk management to be used by first-line supervisors such as vehicle commanders. (Recommendation 1) |
Open
The Army concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February of 2024, the Army developed requirements for vehicle commander qualifications to ensure soldiers assigned these responsibilities are aware that they are to ensure safe vehicle operations and manage risks. Secondly, according to the action plan, the Army developed tools and techniques to assist junior leaders and vehicle commanders in dynamic risk management efforts in the field and will continue efforts to include risk management training in all levels of professional development. Third, the action plan says that the Army began to update Army Regulation 600-55 in April 2023. The army officials said that update will include vehicle commander requirements when it is published, which is projected for the end of 2024. Once the Army has taken these actions and updated Army Regulation 600-55 to reflect requirements for vehicle commander, the Army will meet the intent of GAO's July 2021 recommendation.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should ensure that the Marine Corps develop more clearly defined roles for vehicle commanders and establish mechanisms and procedures for tactical vehicle risk management to be used by first-line supervisors such as vehicle commanders. (Recommendation 2) |
Open
The Navy concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February of 2024, the Marine Corps has taken actions to implement this recommendation and has several other planned actions underway. The action plan states that the Marine Corps has already updated key guidance to front-line unit safety personnel, published an order to require the use of a standardized risk assessment tool for units, and has added more specific training activities to improve driving proficiency, among other actions. The corrective action plan states that the Marine Corps is also in the process of updating orders to clarify expectations for tactical vehicle operations and to add inspections to enforce safe tactical vehicle operating procedures. By taking these actions, the Marine Corps will have more clearly defined roles for vehicle commanders and established mechanisms and procedures for tactical vehicle risk management to be used by first-line supervisors such as vehicle commanders as GAO recommended in July 2021.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, should evaluate the number of personnel within operational units who are responsible for tactical vehicle safety and determine if these units are appropriately staffed, or if any adjustments are needed to workloads or resource levels to implement operational unit ground-safety programs. (Recommendation 3) |
Open
The Army concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided us in February of 2024, Army officials indicated they have completed a personnel requirement study of all civilian safety and occupational health professionals. Army officials noted that identifying the requirement for these personnel and resourcing those positions are two separate processes. According to the action plan, the Army will perform further evaluations on additional duty safety officer effectiveness and to develop new training for safety officers to address our recommendation by the end of 2024. By evaluating additional duty safety officer effectiveness and performing personnel requirement analysis on these positions, the Army will be able understand their personnel requirements and make changes to personnel levels, as necessary, as GAO recommended in July 2021.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should evaluate the number of personnel within operational units who are responsible for tactical vehicle safety and determine if these units are appropriately staffed, or if any adjustments are needed to workloads or resource levels to implement operational unit ground-safety programs. (Recommendation 4) |
Open
The Navy concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February 2024, the Marine Corps has taken several actions to implement this recommendation. Specifically, officials briefed the Marine Corps Executive Safety Board about expanding the cadre of safety specialists and surveyed unit leaders to identify vacant safety officer billets with the goal of decreasing those vacancies. The corrective action plan also states that the Marine Corps implemented changes to its Ground Climate Assessment Survey System, a type of safety survey, to better capture unit personnel's perspective on the safety culture promoted by unit safety personnel. By taking this action the Navy will understand if it has enough safety personnel and will be in a position to fill some identified vacancies, as GAO recommended in July 2021.
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| Department of the Army |
Priority Rec.
The Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, should ensure that tactical vehicle driver training programs—to include licensing, unit, and follow-on training—have a well-defined process with specific performance criteria and measurable standards to identify driver skills and experience under diverse conditions. (Recommendation 5) |
Open
The Army concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February of 2024, has already sent out a safety message emphasizing the importance of unit commanders following the standards established in Army Regulation 600-55. The plan further states that the Army intends to take other actions to clarify and improve the implementation of existing guidance to address our recommendation culminating in a progressive driver training model to be implemented by the end of fiscal year 2024. By taking these actions, the Army will have a more well-defined driver skill development process as GAO recommended in July 2021.
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| Department of the Navy |
Priority Rec.
The Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should ensure that tactical vehicle driver training programs—to include licensing, unit, and follow-on training—have a well-defined process with specific performance criteria and measureable standards to identify driver skills and experience under diverse conditions. (Recommendation 6) |
Open
The Navy concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February of 2024, the Marine Corps has already taken a number of actions to address this recommendation, to include holding several meetings to specifically discuss new initiatives to address these challenges. The Marine Corps identified that it is also creating a new Tactical Vehicle Off-Road Instructor Military Occupational Specialty to help manage commands' licensing requirements and driver training needs. The Marine Corps estimates that this action will be completed in June of 2024. By taking these actions the Marine Corps will improve tactical driver training, as recommended by GAO in July 2021.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, should ensure that the Army evaluates the extent to which its ranges and training areas are fulfilling responsibilities to identify and communicate hazards to units. If the responsibilities are not being carried out, the Army should determine if existing workarounds are adequate or if additional resources should be applied to fulfill these responsibilities. (Recommendation 7) |
Open
The Army concurred with this recommendation. According to a corrective action plan provided to us in February of 2024, the Army plans to take several actions to address our recommendation, including emphasizing range hazards in training range curricula, and publishing an execution order that emphasizes hazards and safety when conducting driver training. In preparation, the Army has already assessed that implementing this change will not require additional funding resources. The Army's plan is to complete the training curriculum update by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2024. By taking these actions the Army will improve range hazard communication as GAO recommended in July 2021.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should ensure that the Marine Corps evaluates the extent to which its ranges and training areas are fulfilling responsibilities to identify and communicate hazards to units. If the responsibilities are not being carried out, the Marine Corps should determine if existing workarounds are adequate or if additional resources should be applied to fulfill these responsibilities. (Recommendation 8) |
Open
The Navy concurred with this recommendation. According to an action plan provided to us in February of 2024, the Marine Corps has already taken several steps to implement this recommendation. Specifically, the Marine Corps told us they updated the safety of use memorandum to clarify the responsibility of installation range control officers to communicate maneuver hazards on the ranges and training areas. Additionally, the Marine Corps updated Marine Corps Order 3550.9A to provide standardized checklists that each range control will utilize to promote safety. The Marine Corps will also continue to communicate hazards to units that will use ranges via its Range Facility Management Support System. We are working with the Marine Corps to evaluate these actions to determine if they have met the intent of the GAO recommendation from July 2021 to more effectively communicate range risks to using units.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should establish a formal collaboration forum among Army and Marine Corps range officials that allows them to share methods for identifying and communicating hazards to units with each other on a regular basis. (Recommendation 9) |
Open
The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. In a corrective action plan provided to us in February 2024, DOD stated that, between June 2022 and March 2023 they held three Range Safety Working Group meetings that included Army and Marine Corps officials sharing strategies to resolve range safety hazards. They also noted that they intend to have another such meeting in the near future to ensure that Army and Marine Corps officials can both attend simultaneously. By providing documentation of formal coordination forums where Army and Marine Corps officials discussed identifying and communicating hazards to units as part of the regularly occurring Range Safety Working Group meetings, the Army and Marine Corps will show they are meeting the intent of GAO's recommendation from July 2021, and allow the services to share best practices with each other and improve range safety for units that use ranges to train.
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