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Open Recommendations (19 total)

Combating Nuclear Terrorism: NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material

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1 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
The Chairman of NRC should direct NRC staff to consider socioeconomic consequences and fatalities from evacuations in the criteria for determining what security measures should be required for radioactive materials that could be used in an RDD. (Recommendation 1)
Open
As of March 2024, NRC continues to disagree with this recommendation. NRC maintains that the current regulatory requirements provide for the safe and secure use of all radioactive materials, regardless of category and there is no technical basis to go back and revisit those decisions. We disagree with NRC's assessment. We continue to believe that by implementing our recommendation NRC would have better assurance that it was considering more likely and more significant consequences of an RDD when establishing its security requirements for this material. We encourage NRC to take action to implement this recommendation.

Combating Nuclear Terrorism: NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material

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2 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
The Chairman of NRC should require additional security measures for high-risk quantities of certain category 3 radioactive material, and assess whether other category 3 materials should also be safeguarded with additional security measures. (Recommendation 2)
Open
As of March 2024, NRC continues to neither explicitly agree nor disagree with this recommendation. NRC is considering strengthen licensing; however, it is not considering requiring additional security measures for high-risk quantities of category 3 materials. We continue to believe that implementing our recommendation would provide greater assurance that NRC's requirements are sufficient to help ensure all high-risk radioactive material are protected from theft and use in an RDD. We encourage NRC to take action to implement this recommendation.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Chairman of NRC should require all licensees to implement additional security measures when they have multiple quantities of category 3 americium-241 at a single facility that in total reach a category 1 or 2 quantity of material. (Recommendation 3)
Open
As of March 2024, NRC continues to disagree with this recommendation. NRC maintains that the issue of aggregation of radioactive material has already been considered and NRC has taken or is in the process of taking actions to clarify relevant guidance and procedures. We disagree with NRC's assessment. We believe that by implementing our recommendation NRC would have better assurance that licensees are not storing multiple quantities of category 3 americium-241 at a single facility that in total reach a category 1 or 2 quantity of material.

Nuclear Security: NRC Has Enhanced the Controls of Dangerous Radioactive Materials, but Vulnerabilities Remain

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1 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not properly handled, NRC should take action to better track and secure these materials and verify the legitimacy of the licenses for those who seek to possess them. Specifically, the NRC should take the steps needed to include category 3 sources in the National Source Tracking System and add agreement state category 3 licenses to the Web-based Licensing System as quickly as reasonably possible.
Open
In October 2016, NRC issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) "Proposed Staff Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Accountability," (SRM-COMJMB-16-0001) and directed NRC staff to take specific actions to evaluate whether it is necessary to revise NRC regulations or processes governing source protection and accountability for category 3 sources. Among other things, this re-evaluation considered GAO's recommendations. In August 2017, NRC staff completed its analysis and provided recommendations to the NRC Commissioners. (Most of this analysis is available on NRC's website.) In its analysis, the NRC staff recommended not including category 3 sources in the National Source Tracking System. They also recommended not adding agreement state category 3 licenses to the Web-based Licensing System. Subsequently, in December 2021, NRC issued SECY-17-0083: Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Security and Accountability in Response to SRM-COMJMB-16-0001. If this SRM is implemented, it would provide an incentive for agreement states to use the Web-Based Licensing System (WBL). According to NRC staff, the SRM will have to go through public comment, and NRC is uncertain when it will be implemented. Furthermore, according to agency staff, NRC has no plans to put category 3 quantities into the National Source Tracking System (NSTS).

Nuclear Security: NRC Has Enhanced the Controls of Dangerous Radioactive Materials, but Vulnerabilities Remain

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2 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not properly handled, NRC should take action to better track and secure these materials and verify the legitimacy of the licenses for those who seek to possess them. Specifically, the NRC should at least until such time that category 3 licenses can be verified using the License Verification System, require that transferors of category 3 quantities of radioactive materials confirm the validity of a would-be purchaser's radioactive materials license with the appropriate regulatory authority before transferring any category 3 quantities of licensed materials.
Open
In October 2016, NRC issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) "Proposed Staff Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Accountability," (SRM-COMJMB-16-0001) and directed NRC staff to take specific actions to evaluate whether it is necessary to revise NRC regulations or processes governing source protection and accountability for category 3 sources. Among other things, this re-evaluation considered GAO's recommendations. In August 2017, NRC staff completed its analysis and provided recommendations to the NRC Commissioners. (Most of this analysis is available on NRC's website.) In its analysis, the NRC staff recommended not requiring transferors of category 3 quantities of radiological material to confirm the validity of licenses prior to transferring any category 3 quantities of these materials. In December 2021, NRC issued SECY-17-0083: Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Security and Accountability in Response to SRM-COMJMB-16-0001. This SRM recommends requiring licensees transferring category 3 quantities of radioactive material to verify licenses through the Licensee Verification System (LVS) or by calling the Agreement State office. If NRC were to take action, it would fully address this recommendation. However, the process must undergo a public comment period and NRC officials are uncertain when the rulemaking will be completed.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially dangerous to human health if not properly handled, NRC should take action to better track and secure these materials and verify the legitimacy of the licenses for those who seek to possess them. Specifically, the NRC should, as part of the ongoing efforts of NRC working groups meeting to develop enhancements to the prelicensing requirements for category 3 licenses, consider requiring that an on-site security review be conducted for all unknown applicants of category 3 licenses to verify that each applicant is prepared to implement the required security measures before taking possession of licensed radioactive materials.
Open
In October 2016, NRC issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) "Proposed Staff Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Accountability," (SRM-COMJMB-16-0001) and directed NRC staff to take specific actions to evaluate whether it is necessary to revise NRC regulations or processes governing source protection and accountability for category 3 sources. Among other things, this re-evaluation considered GAO's recommendations. In August 2017, NRC staff completed its analysis and provided recommendations to the NRC Commissioners. (Most of this analysis is available on NRC's website.) In its analysis, the NRC staff recommended requiring all safety and security equipment to be in place before granting a license to a previously unknown entity. This requirement would apply to all unknown entities applying for a radioactive material license regardless of the quantity of licensed material requested. In December 2021, NRC issued SECY-17-0083: Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Security and Accountability in Response to SRM-COMJMB-16-0001. This SRM recommends requiring that safety and security equipment to be in place before granting a license for an unknown entity in order to address the concern related to obtaining a valid license using a fictitious company or by providing false information. If NRC were to take action, it would fully address this recommendation. However, the process must undergo a public comment period and, as of March 2024, NRC officials were uncertain when the rulemaking will be completed.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NRC Needs to Improve Its Cost Estimates by Incorporating More Best Practices

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1 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
To improve the reliability of its cost estimates, as NRC revises its cost estimating procedures, the NRC Chairman should ensure that the agency aligns the procedures with relevant cost estimating best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and ensure that future cost estimates are prepared in accordance with relevant cost estimating best practices.
Open
NRC generally agreed with the recommendation. NRC updated a draft of its cost estimating procedures in January 2020 to conform with agency-wide directives and provided it to the NRC Commissioners for their review. However, as of March 2024, NRC has not issued the final procedures. To fully implement this recommendation, NRC needs to issue its update to its cost estimating procedures to align with best practices identified in our cost estimating guide. By doing so, NRC will have better assurance that its cost estimates are reliable and that the NRC Commissioners have adequate information on which to base their regulatory decisions.

Preventing a Dirty Bomb: Vulnerabilities Persist in NRC's Controls for Purchases of High-Risk Radioactive Materials

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1 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
The Chairman of NRC should immediately require that vendors verify category 3 licenses with the appropriate regulatory authority. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When the report was issued, NRC stated in their agency comments that they agreed with requiring vendors to verify category 3 licenses with the appropriate regulatory agency and had begun rulemaking that would require such verification. As of March 2024, the rulemaking was with the NRC Commission and agency officials told us that they were uncertain when the rulemaking would be finalized.

Preventing a Dirty Bomb: Vulnerabilities Persist in NRC's Controls for Purchases of High-Risk Radioactive Materials

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1 Open Recommendations
1 Priority
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Priority Rec.
The Chairman of NRC should add security features to its licensing process to improve its integrity and make it less vulnerable to altering or forging licenses. These security features could include multifactor authentication or moving away from paper licenses to electronic-based licensing. (Recommendation 2)
Open
When the report was issued, NRC stated in their agency comments that they agreed with considering enhanced security features in the licensing process. Specifically, as part of their ongoing rulemaking process, they would consider providing guidance to regulators and licensees that would reduce the potential for altered or forged licenses to be used in acquiring category 3 radioactive sources. The NRC staff also explored the security features suggested by GAO as an interim step for licenses for category 3 quantities of material. The NRC evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of features such as two factor authentication, non-fungible tokens, data tokens, and QR codes. Tokenization and QR codes demonstrated the most promise of security improvement within reasonable implementation cost. According to NRC, a path towards adoption of this security feature has been developed, and integration into Web-based Licensing system will begin in 2024.

Nuclear Power: NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Prepare to License Advanced Reactors

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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Sort descending Recommendation Status
Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Chairman of NRC should direct staff to develop procedures for establishing and managing a review schedule for an incomplete application, including applications for first-of-a-kind designs. (Recommendation 1)
Open
In February 2024, NRC stated that it expected it would be very rare to accept an incomplete application. Instead, the agency would begin portions of its review without accepting the application for docketing. Although NRC considers accepting incomplete applications unlikely, we continue to believe that having procedures in place to manage the review schedule for an incomplete application would be beneficial, given that advanced reactor designs may have novel or first-of-a-kind designs. We continue to believe that developing procedures would provide additional clarity to developers preparing to submit applications.