Civilian Intelligence Community: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Reporting on and Planning for the Use of Contract Personnel
Highlights
What GAO Found
Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury--use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data shortcomings limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a broad range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the elements' ability to use the core contract personnel inventory as a strategic planning tool is hindered because the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to these types of functions, the eight civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage related risks.
Why GAO Did This Study
The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government's decision making.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in September 2013. GAO was asked to examine the eight civilian IC elements' use of contractors. This report examines (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the eight civilian IC elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a sample of 287 contract records. This sample is nongeneralizable as certain contract records were removed due to sensitivity concerns. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials.
Recommendations
GAO is recommending that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability and transparency and revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Office of the Director of National Intelligence | To improve civilian IC elements' or their respective departments' ability to mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, the Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury should direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to develop guidance that fully addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. |
In providing comments on this report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. ODNI has held roundtables to discuss OFPP PL 11-01 implementation with other IC agencies. ODNI also revised ICD 612 but has not developed implementing guidance for ODNI MSD.
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| Department of Energy | To improve civilian IC elements' or their respective departments' ability to mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, the Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury should direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to develop guidance that fully addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. |
In its letter to OMB and the Congress on its plans regarding GAO's recommendation, the Department of Energy concurred with the recommendation. In July 2015, the agency issued interim guidance, but the guidance does not fully address OFPP Policy Letter 11-01. The agency explained that once the Federal Acquisition Regulation is updated, the agency's acquisition regulation will be updated as necessary to reflect the new guidance. Since that time, no further action has occurred.
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| Department of Justice | To improve civilian IC elements' or their respective departments' ability to mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, the Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury should direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to develop guidance that fully addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. |
In April 2019, the Department of Justice issued acquisition guidance on how to manage the performance of contractors who perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions. The April 2019 acquisition guidance addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. While DOJ did not set timeframes for developing this guidance, we believe that by issuing the guidance, DOJ has met the intent of the recommendation.
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| Department of the Treasury | To improve civilian IC elements' or their respective departments' ability to mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, the Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury should direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to develop guidance that fully addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. |
In its letter to OMB and the Congress on its plans regarding GAO's recommendation, the agency concurred with the recommendation. Treasury issued additional supplemental guidance but did not fully address OFPP Policy Letter 11-01.
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| Central Intelligence Agency | To improve civilian IC elements' or their respective departments' ability to mitigate risks associated with the use of contractors, the Director of National Intelligence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Attorney General of the United States, and Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury should direct responsible agency officials to set time frames to develop guidance that fully addresses the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 11-01's requirements related to closely supporting inherently governmental functions. |
The Central Intelligence Agency did not comment on our recommendation. Please contact Timothy DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov for additional information.
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| IC Chief Human Capital Officer | To improve congressional oversight and enhance civilian IC elements' insights into their use of core contract personnel, when reporting to congressional committees, the IC CHCO should clearly specify limitations and significant methodological changes and their associated effects. |
The agency took action to address the recommendation. Please contact Timothy DiNapoli at (202) 512-4841 or dinapolit@gao.gov for additional information.
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| IC Chief Human Capital Officer | To improve congressional oversight and enhance civilian IC elements' insights into their use of core contract personnel, in coordination with the IC elements, the IC CHCO should develop a plan to enhance internal controls for compiling the annual core contract personnel inventory. Such a plan could include requiring IC elements to document their methodologies for determining the number and costs of core contract personnel and the steps the elements took for ensuring data accuracy and completeness. |
In August 2015, IC CHCO revised Intelligence Community Directive 612 to enhance internal controls for compiling the core contract personnel inventory, including requiring IC CHCO to issue guidance on defining core contract personnel, review the IC elements' methodologies for completing the inventory, and annually review at least two IC elements' inventory submissions for accuracy.
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| IC Chief Human Capital Officer | To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, the IC CHCO should revise the Intelligence Community Directive 612's provisions governing strategic workforce planning to require the IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate workforce mix on a function-by-function basis. |
In August 2015, the IC CHCO removed the provisions regarding strategic workforce planning from Intelligence Community Directive 612. Since then, the IC CHCO has not revised the directive to address the intent of our recommendation.
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| IC Chief Human Capital Officer | To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, the IC CHCO should assess options for how the core contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by contractors when there are multiple services provided under a contract. |
In fiscal year 2014, IC CHCO modified its core contract personnel inventory to require IC elements to identify up to three different functions performed under each of the contracts reported in the inventory. IC CHCO stated that it plans to report the breakout of contractor functions for each IC element in future Congressional budget justifications.
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| IC Chief Human Capital Officer | To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, the IC CHCO should require the IC elements to identify contracts within the core contract personnel inventory that include services that are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions. |
In fiscal year 2014, IC CHCO modified its core contract personnel inventory to require IC elements to identify for each contract whether functions performed by the contractor are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions. IC CHCO stated that it will use this information to report in Congressional budget justifications the IC-wide percentage of core contract personnel performing functions that are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions.
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