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Open Recommendations (22 total)

Department of Homeland Security: Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process [Reissued with revisions on Sep. 4, 2018.]

GAO-18-405
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The Administrator of TSA should monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries (fact finding) and administrative inquiries, and the proposal and decision stages, using case information system data (Recommendation 17).
Open – Partially Addressed
In January 2023, TSA provided a sample report from its new misconduct case management system that tracks the duration of certain case types (e.g., management inquiries) from beginning-to-end by stage. However, the sample report does not show how, if at all, TSA is monitoring the timeliness of all misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries, administrative inquiries, and the proposal and decision stages. To close this recommendation, GAO needs evidence that TSA is using its new case management system to monitor the timeliness of all misconduct cases according to established targets. As of February 2024, we are continuing to follow up with TSA on its actions to implement this recommendation.

Department of Homeland Security: Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process [Reissued with revisions on Sep. 4, 2018.]

GAO-18-405
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2 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The Administrator of TSA should define and document the case management system data fields and methodology to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff (Recommendation 18).
Open – Partially Addressed
In January 2023, TSA completed development of its new misconduct case management system and provided GAO a sample report from the system that tracks the timeliness of certain case types. TSA officials stated they are still working to complete the updated user guide for the new case management system. They stated that the transition to the new system has been a long process, and the guide has to be created from scratch as the new system uses a completely different operating platform. TSA anticipates completion of the user guide by June 2023. As of February 2024, we are continuing to follow up with TSA on its actions to implement this recommendation.
Transportation Security Administration The Administrator of TSA should monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and case type (Recommendation 16).
Open – Partially Addressed
In January 2023, TSA provided a sample report from its new misconduct case management system that tracks the duration of certain case types (e.g., management inquiries) from beginning-to-end by stage. However, the sample report does not track the duration of all case types (e.g., administrative inquiries, investigations) from beginning-to-end by stage. To close this recommendation, GAO needs evidence that TSA is using its new case management system to monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and case type. As of February 2024, we are continuing to follow up with TSA on its actions to implement this recommendation.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Pipeline Security Documents Need to Reflect Current Operating Environment

GAO-19-426
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The TSA Administrator should periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems. (Recommendation 5)
Open – Partially Addressed
As of September 2023, TSA officials reported that they completed a review of the Pipeline Security Incident Recovery Protocol Plan and determined that updates are needed. According to the officials, the Protocol Plan is being revised to bring it into conformity with several national level policy documents, such as the National Response Framework, the National Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan, and the National Terrorism Advisory System. The officials stated that they anticipate completion of the updated Protocol Plan in 2024. Once the updated Protocol Plan is completed, we will review it and determine whether it includes relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to pipeline security, as called for in our recommendation.

Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after Deployment

GAO-20-56
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The TSA Administrator should develop a process to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports. (Recommendation 4)
Open – Partially Addressed
In December 2019, we reported that TSA practices do not ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after they have been deployed to airports. We recommended that TSA develop a process to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports. In May 2020, TSA provided the Post Implementation and Periodic Review Policy (APM-20-031). According to the Policy, TSA will use Post Implementation Reviews (PIR) to explain how screening technology performance, including detection, is to be assessed over time, following deployment. Each technology system is to require its own PIR-or roadmap for reviewing component performance of the detection chain-because each technology has unique logistics data and detection chain. PIRs are to be conducted within 6 to 12 months after initial operation (or as otherwise designated) and are to determine user satisfaction and system performance relative to effectiveness and suitability, among other things. However, timeframes and other requirements for conducting periodic reviews after the PIR are less clear-for example, system performance requirements "relative to effectiveness and suitability" are not specified for post-PIR (periodic) reviews. In May 2022, TSA stated that the timing of periodic reviews is subject to resource availability and the judgment of the management team for that technology, since each technology requires a unique evaluation and timetable for periodic reviews due to differences in component lifecycles. Similar to the PIR, periodic reviews are to prioritize key performance parameters, which are tied to effectiveness and suitability. To fully develop a process for ensuring screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment, TSA policy and guidelines should call for the same requirements for periodic reviews as for PIRs, such as general timeframes for conducting reviews that allow for the individual judgement of the management team , and system performance requirements relative to technology effectiveness and suitability. As of August 2023, we are continuing to monitor TSA's implementation of this recommendation.

TSA Acquisitions: TSA Needs to Establish Metrics and Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes for Screening Technologies

GAO-21-50
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration When performance metrics have been established, the Administrator of TSA should assess gains in efficiency resulting from third party testing. (Recommendation 2)
Open – Partially Addressed
TSA concurred with this recommendation. TSA's Test and Evaluation (T&E) Division assessed security technology qualification testing activities conducted from October 2020 to January 2023 for efficiency gains using the established metrics, the number of retests performed and test cycle duration. As of June 2023, TSA T&E Officials reported that there have been no instances of third party testers used during the assessment period and do not anticipate vendors voluntarily choosing to do so. As such, TSA T&M officials reported no assessed impact of third party testing on the established metrics, and no gains in efficiency resulting from third party testing at this time. GAO will continue to monitor.

TSA Acquisitions: TSA Needs to Establish Metrics and Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes for Screening Technologies

GAO-21-50
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The Administrator of TSA should assess whether third party testing contributes to its goals of increasing supplier diversity and innovation. (Recommendation 3)
Open – Partially Addressed
TSA concurred with our recommendation. Since October 2020, TSA's Test and Evaluation (T&E) Division continues to conduct qualification testing for security technologies. TSA T&E officials reported that during their assessment period, October 2020 through January 2023, no vendors elected to use third party testers. As of June 2023, TSA T&E officials reported that they found no evidence of third party testing contributing to supplier diversity or innovation goals at this time. GAO will continue to monitor.

Surface Transportation Threats: Better Communication with Stakeholders Needed about the Security Clearance Process

GAO-24-106382
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The TSA Administrator, in coordination with DHS I&A, CISA, and DHS's Office of the Chief Security Officer, should implement a communications approach that conveys consistent and accurate information to surface transportation stakeholders about how they access the security clearance application process. At minimum, the approach should aim to ensure accurate information about which DHS entities initiate applications for surface transportation stakeholders, whether there is a maximum number of clearances that could be granted, and what type of employees are eligible. (Recommendation 4)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Could Further Improve Officer Engagement

GAO-24-106052
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2 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Transportation Security Administration The TSA Administrator should identify and implement actions, as appropriate, to address the underlying root causes of TSO dissatisfaction the agency has identified with how TSA manages and recognizes performance. (Recommendation 1)
Open
DHS concurred with this recommendation and said in its comment letter that it would take steps to address it by December 2024. Specifically, TSA reported plans to solicit and use feedback on employees' perceptions of the quality of their performance discussions. In addition, TSA planned to update and provide training for supervisors on performance management, though it was unclear how the training would address the root causes of TSO dissatisfaction. These planned steps could help TSA collect additional information on TSO dissatisfaction and enhance supervisory training. To fully address the recommendation, TSA will need to demonstrate that they have used the information collected, the training provided, or have taken other steps to address the root causes of TSO dissatisfaction. When we confirm what steps DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Transportation Security Administration The TSA Administrator should conduct an analysis to identify the underlying root causes of TSO dissatisfaction with their opportunities for career development. (Recommendation 2)
Open
DHS concurred with this recommendation and said in its comment letter it would take steps to address it by July 2024. Specifically, TSA reported plans to use airports' submitted Local Action Plans to identify root causes on a national level. While the plans could provide useful information for TSA's root cause analysis, it will not provide the complete information TSA needs to obtain quality results if TSA reimplements its Local Action Planning process and analysis carried out in recent years. To fully address our recommendations, TSA's root cause analysis would need to include root causes beyond the control of local airport leadership and better ensure that the local action planning process and subsequent analysis results in underlying root causes rather than problem statements or topics. When we confirm what steps DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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