GAO Highlights

Highlights of GAO-25-107923, a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

In response to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, DOD has received about \$111 billion for assistance to Ukraine and related activities. DOD used a portion of this assistance to train Ukrainian forces.

GAO initiated this review in response to a provision in Division M of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023. This report addresses (1) processes DOD has used to provide training on defense articles to Ukrainian forces and the associated challenges; and (2) approaches DOD has used to assess the training and share lessons learned, among other issues.

GAO reviewed DOD documents on security assistance processes, examined training assessments and lessons learned results, and reviewed training range and readiness data.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) issue guidance to ensure that combatant commands identify training resource needs when proposing a security assistance package, (2) document the processes to assess training of Ukrainian forces, and (3) ensure that organizations capture and share relevant training observations through the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. DOD agreed with the second and third recommendations, but did not agree with the first recommendation, stating that an existing DOD directive has guidance to identify training needs. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid because DOD's guidance has gaps that hindered DOD's planning for training needs.

View GAO-25-107923. For more information, contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov.

UKRAINE

DOD Can Take Additional Steps to Improve Its Security Assistance Training

What GAO Found

Between February 2022 and April 2024, the Department of Defense (DOD) trained Ukrainian military personnel—mainly at U.S. training ranges in Germany—using various security assistance processes. Much of this training accompanied defense articles that DOD provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). However, the expanded size, scope, and speed of equipment deliveries to Ukraine contributed to training challenges. GAO found that U.S. Army units initially experienced disruptions delivering training due to

- insufficient training equipment,
- limited training preparation time,
- inadequate support resources to repair training equipment, and
- mismatches between Ukraine's training needs and U.S. trainer expertise.

U.S. Army officials told GAO they overcame these challenges by adapting training schedules and obtaining contractor support, among other strategies. By issuing additional guidance to ensure that combatant commands identify training needs when proposing a security assistance package, DOD would be better positioned to avoid challenges that might disrupt associated training. This is especially relevant for future situations that require the rapid execution of PDA.

DOD components that are responsible for overseeing and administering training to Ukrainian forces have used several approaches to assess trends and identify improvement opportunities. However, GAO found that data challenges hindered DOD's assessment approaches (see figure). Providing clear guidance on documenting the approaches used to assess training provided Ukrainian forces would position DOD to make more effective decisions on training in the future.

Data Challenges with DOD's Approaches to Assess Training Provided to Ukrainian Forces Insufficient Inconsistent Incomplete data data collection data methods End of training reports do Training assessment data U.S. units do not fully collection methods have complete end of training not capture objective-by-objective changed with each new report data fields. completion data. training unit.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) information. | GAO-25-107923

DOD components also have not consistently recorded observations from training Ukrainian forces in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, as required by DOD policy. GAO found that this requirement was not reflected in most of the implementing orders that govern the U.S. military's efforts to train Ukrainian forces. As a result, DOD's lessons learned may not be comprehensive or timely, leading to missed opportunities for improvement.

This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in November 2024. It omits (1) sensitive information and data related to the number of Ukrainians that DOD trained, (2) challenges and readiness effects that U.S. Army units experienced when providing the training, and (3) factors that hindered DOD components' ability to assess training provided to Ukrainian forces.