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Collaboration Could Improve Administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill 
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GAO-11-356R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 5, 2011: 

The Honorable Richard Burr: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

Subject: Veterans' Education Benefits: Enhanced Guidance and 
Collaboration Could Improve Administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill 
Program: 

Dear Senator Burr: 

With the passage of the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act 
of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill), Congress created a comprehensive 
education benefit program for veterans, service members, and their 
dependents pursuing postsecondary education.[Footnote 1] Since 
implementation, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has provided 
just over $5.7 billion for the Post-9/11 GI Bill to fund education 
expenses for about 381,000 veterans, service members, and their 
dependents through fiscal year 2010, and estimates it will provide 
almost $8 billion in fiscal year 2011--an amount that would represent 
about 71 percent of all expected costs for education benefits[Footnote 
2]. From the passage of the law to August 1, 2009, the start of the 
first semester in which funds were available, VA had about 13 months 
to implement the program.[Footnote 3] The Post-9/11 GI Bill program is 
substantially different from previously authorized VA education 
benefits or GI Bill programs that characteristically provide monthly 
payments to eligible claimants. The Post-9/11 GI Bill, by contrast, 
includes a more complex payment system that channels funds to both 
students and schools. GAO and VA have reported on various challenges 
VA faced when implementing the new program, including claims 
processing delays.[Footnote 4] 

We were asked to review the progress of the program's implementation 
and answer the following questions: 

(1) What were VA's implementation challenges, the steps taken to 
address them, and any unintended consequences? 

(2) To what extent has VA met its timeliness and accuracy goals for 
processing Post-9/11 GI Bill claims and been responsive to call center 
inquiries? 

(3) What processes, if any, can VA adopt from the Department of 
Education's administration of student aid programs to improve its 
administration of Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits? 

To complete our work, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, 
policies and procedures, and other program documents, as well as 
relevant work performed by VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG), the 
Department of Education (Education), and GAO. We interviewed officials 
from VA and Education, as well as officials from relevant higher 
education associations, postsecondary institutions, and student 
veteran organizations. We conducted site visits at two of the four VA 
regional processing offices (RPO)--i.e., St. Louis, Missouri, and 
Muskogee, Oklahoma. Finally, we analyzed program performance metrics 
for claims processing and the Education Call Center inquiries for 
three academic semesters--fall 2009, spring 2010, and fall 2010. We 
assessed the reliability of VA's data on claims processing and call 
center performance measures by reviewing existing information about 
the data and the systems that produced them and interviewing 
knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data on 
performance measures were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report. See enclosure III for additional details regarding our 
scope and methodology. 

We conducted our work from August 2010 to April 2011 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary of Findings: 

* VA faced several challenges in implementing the Post-9/11 GI Bill 
program, including inadequate information systems, staffing, and 
program guidance. For instance, some schools told us that a lack of 
critical program information, such as information about students' 
eligibility levels and how payments were determined, affected their 
ability to timely and accurately process program benefits. Although VA 
took steps to address these challenges, many remain, and VA 
experienced a number of unintended consequences such as emergency 
payments made to ineligible recipients, increased use of overtime, and 
diverting staff from processing other types of benefit claims. 

* VA has met some of its timeliness and accuracy performance goals for 
processing Post-9/11 GI Bill claims and responding to Education Call 
Center inquiries, but delays continue to occur during peak processing 
times. Although VA has met its accuracy targets for education benefit 
claims, the amount of improper payments for education benefits has 
significantly increased. VA officials have attributed the increase, in 
part, to the higher level of education benefit paid under the new 
program relative to VA's other education benefit programs, as well as 
the fact that some payments--such as tuition and fees--are paid up 
front before courses have been completed. 

* Some of Education's practices for administering federal student aid 
may improve VA's administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program such 
as providing program information including eligibility and benefit 
levels, streamlining how funds are returned, and reconciling payment 
differences. Leading up to program implementation, VA officials 
conferred with Education officials on a limited basis to learn more 
about Education's systems and processes for student aid delivery. 
However, VA did not continue its coordination with Education because 
of the limited applicability of Education's systems and processes, 
according to VA officials. 

We briefed your office on March 29, 2011, and this report transmits 
the results of our work. Enclosure I contains a copy of the briefing 
slides. Enclosure II contains an appendix of supplemental material. 

Conclusions: 

As VA undertook the task of implementing the program, the agency's 
most comprehensive education benefits program to date, it faced 
numerous challenges. As the program progresses through its second 
year, it is important to acknowledge that while VA has undertaken a 
number of efforts to address many of these challenges, several remain. 
Because the new program is more complex than other VA education 
benefit programs and involves new partners--many of which have limited 
familiarity with the workings of VA--VA needs to take additional steps 
to fully communicate to all stakeholders, especially schools, details 
of the program's implementation. Without critical program information, 
such as eligibility for benefits or how payments have been calculated, 
schools will continue to face administrative burdens in administering 
this program. Further, schools play a critical role in helping 
students identify and evaluate the various financial resources 
available to them. Lacking critical program information, schools may 
not be able to help students determine the best options to finance 
their education. 

VA may be able to achieve greater efficiencies by building stronger 
partnerships with schools, Education, and other expert external 
organizations. For instance, Education has learned many lessons and 
overcome some of its management challenges over the years by refining 
its systems and administrative processes for delivering student aid. 
Specifically, Education has gained efficiencies in its processes to 
return and reconcile federal student aid funds. Without leveraging 
Education's experiences and lessons learned, VA may miss opportunities 
to streamline its administrative processes, minimize program 
collections, and effectively safeguard federal funds. 

As VA works to address the challenges we have identified, it must 
simultaneously make changes to its program and meet the increased 
demand for benefits because of recent legislation. Therefore, it is 
critical that VA take steps to achieve program stability and 
efficiency. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve VA's administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program and 
address ongoing challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs take the following two actions: 

* Take steps to provide for schools to receive more critical program 
information such as a student's eligibility for benefits or how 
payments have been calculated, for example, to enable certifying 
officials, financial aid officials, and business office administrators 
to effectively administer the program and deliver benefits. 

* Collaborate with the Department of Education and the higher 
education community, leveraging their experiences in administering 
aid. These collaborations should include assessing the applicability 
and viability of adopting processes and actions taken by the 
Department of Education, where practical, such as returning 
overpayments of program funds or reconciling benefit payments. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Veterans 
Affairs and Education. VA agreed with our recommendations, in 
principle, and provided some additional insights into possible 
limitations that may affect its ability to fully adopt our 
recommendations. VA also stated it has developed plans to address the 
issues we identified in the report. VA agreed with our recommendation 
to provide more critical program information to schools, such as a 
student's eligibility for benefits or how payments have been 
calculated, to improve administration of the program by school 
officials. Although VA provides some information about funds disbursed 
in a weekly student report to schools, school officials told us that 
without formal written information on students' eligibility levels and 
how payments were determined, they were unable to timely or accurately 
certify enrollment and verify tuition and fee payments. VA officials 
noted that privacy laws may limit their ability to provide eligibility 
information directly to schools.[Footnote 5] Because of this, we 
slightly modified our recommendation to recognize that VA may be able 
to provide for schools to receive additional information, without 
specifying that VA provide it directly to the schools, for example. VA 
also agreed with our recommendation to collaborate with Education and 
the higher education community to strengthen their processes, but 
noted several statutory distinctions between itself and Education that 
may limit its ability to adopt some of Education's practices for 
administering its student financial aid programs. However, we do not 
believe that these distinctions preclude VA from adopting some aspects 
of Education's processes for improving VA's administration of the Post-
9/11 GI Bill program. For instance, VA could involve schools in the 
process of recouping overpayments. To address the lack of 
comprehensive, clear, and consistent guidance that we identified in 
this report, VA reported that it is working to standardize school 
reporting processes and has convened a focus group to finalize a 
handbook for schools by May 2011. 

VA's comments have been reprinted in enclosure IV. VA also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated into the report as 
appropriate. 

Education did not provide any comments on our report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs, the Secretary of Education, the Office of Management and 
Budget, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested 
parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on 
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or scottg@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in enclosure V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

George A. Scott: 
Director: 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security: 

Enclosures (5): 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: 

Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Benefits: 

Background: 
	
Definitions Overview of Benefits: 

Institution of higher learning (IHL): An IHL is defined as an 
institution offering postsecondary-level academic instruction that 
leads to an associate or higher degree, licensed by the appropriate 
state education authority or, in the absence of a state education 
authority, accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by the 
Department of Education (Education). IHLs include hospitals offering 
education programs at the postsecondary level and recognized foreign 
education institutions that offer courses leading to a standard 
college degree, or its equivalent.[Footnote 6] Amendments to the law 
have expanded institutional eligibility to take place during academic 
year 2011 to include "institutions other than institutions of higher 
learning," or some non-degree-granting institutions and programs that 
offer certifications and licenses.[Footnote 7]	 

AS many as 8,500 IHLs—-or schools-—may be eligible to participate in 
the Post-9/11 GI Bill program.	 

For more information, contact George Scott at (202) 512-7215 or 
scottg@gao.gov.	 

Overview of Benefits: 

The Post-9/11 GI Bill[Footnote 8] program consists of a complex 
payment system with multiple disbursements to students and to schools. 
[Footnote 9] Existing GI Bill benefit programs provide funds directly 
to students on a monthly basis, while the Post-9/11 GI Bill program 
pays tuition and fees directly to the school, and housing allowance 
and other benefits to the student.[Footnote 10] In-state tuition and 
fees provisions have been amended to cover public schools, and 
payments are capped at $17,500 a year for private and foreign 
schools.[Footnote 11] (For benefits paid directly to students, see 
table 1.) Individuals with at least 90 days of aggregate service on or 
after September 10, 2001, or individuals discharged with a service-
connected disability after 30 continuous days of service, are eligible 
for program benefits.[Footnot2 12] The amount of benefits that a 
student is eligible to receive varies based on the length of service. 
[Footnote 13] For example, a service member who served at least 36 
months would receive full benefits, whereas a service member who 
served at least 90 days would receive 40 percent of benefits. 

Table 1: Maximum Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Benefits Paid to Students: 

Type of payment: Housing allowance; 
Amount: amount varies by locality[A]; 	
Frequency: monthly. 

Type of payment: Books and supplies; 
Amount: Up to $1,000; 
Frequency: annually. 

Type of payment: Tutorial; 
Amount: Up to $100[B]; 	
Frequency: monthly. 

Type of payment: Rural relocation payment; 
Amount: $500; 
Frequency: one-time. 

Source: 38 U.S.C. §§3313(c)(1)(13), 3314(c) and 3318(a). 

[A] This amount is equal to the basic allowance for housing payable to 
enlisted, noncommissioned officers with a military rank no higher than 
E-5 with dependents in the same ZIP code as the school. 38 U.S.C. § 
3313(c)(1)(B)(i). 

[B] Total payments for tutorial assistance cannot exceed $1,200. These 
payments can be allowed if certified as necessary by school officials. 
38 U.S.C. § 3314(b)(2). 

[End of table] 

[End of Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Benefits section] 

Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Administration: 

Background: 

Administrative Offices: 

There are several offices within the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) that are involved in administering Post-9/11 GI Bill program 
benefits. 

* There are four regional processing offices (RPO) responsible for 
processing VA education benefits. As of September 2010, VA employed 
approximately 1,300 veterans claims examiners to administer all 
education claims. 

* VA's Education Call Center telephone representatives are responsible 
for answering telephone calls to VA's toll-free education hotline and 
responding to e-mail inquiries made through VA's Web-based system, 
Right Now Web.[Footnote 14] As of September 2010, the Education Call 
Center employed about 190 telephone epresentatives. 

* VA's Education Service provides schools with policy and program 
guidance on the new program. It also establishes student and 
institutional debts, or overpayments, and resolves any underpayments, 
as necessary. 

* VA’s Debt Management Center is responsible for collecting debts 
established by the Education Service division. 

Advisory Committee: 

Congress revived the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on Education, which 
had expired December 31, 2009. Composed of experts in education, 
labor, and management, including representatives from IHLs, and with 
ex officio members from the Departments of Education and of Labor, it 
has now been authorized through 2013.[Footnote 15] The Secretary of VA 
is to consult periodically with the committee. 

VA Administration of Post-9/11 GI Bill Benefits: 

To receive education benefits through the program, students submit an 
application to VA, schools certify enrollment, and one of the four 
RPOs processes claims and payments (see figure 1 and figure 2). 

Figure 1: VA's Processing of Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Claims and 
Payments: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 
																												
1) Student selects benefit program and submits application to VA. 

2) VA determines student eligibility and provides student with a 
certificate of eligibility, which provides benefit level. 

3) Student enrolls and provides school	the certificate	of eligibility. 

4) School certifies student's enrollment status and sends VA a 
certificate of enrollment.	 

5) VA processes or amends claim and makes benefit payments: 
Benefits paid to schools: 
* Tuition and fees; 
* Yellow Ribbon payment. 
Benefits paid to student: 
* Monthly housing allowance; 
* Books and supplies stipend; 
* Rural Relocation Payment. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA documents. 

Notes: Because veterans themselves are liable for any overpayment, VA 
regulations anticipate that schools will transmit overpayments to 
student veterans. 38 C.F.R. § 21.9695 (2010). However, there	are some 
circumstances in which VA requires schools to return funds directly to 
VA such as if a school receives funds for a student not enrolled at 
the school. 

VA requires each school to designate an individual from one of its 
offices, such as the financial aid office, to administer the Post-9/11 
GI Bill program. These officials may work with other campus officials 
to assist students in making decisions to finance their education. 38 
C.F.R. § 21.4266(c)(2).	 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: RPO Locations, Jurisdictions, and Claims Processing Staffing 
Levels: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

The map depicts the location of RPOs, as well as their areas of 
jurisdiction. 

PRO: Buffalo, New York; 
Claims Processing Staff: 230. 

PRO: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Claims Processing Staff: 204. 

PRO: Muskogee, Oklahoma; 
Claims Processing Staff: 497. 

PRO: St. Louis, Missouri; 
Claims Processing Staff: 358. 

Source: Department of Veterans Affairs. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Administration section] 

VA Lacked an Adequate Information System to Process Claims: 

Objective 1: Implementation Challenges: 
																							
Claims Processing Systems: 

VA had to establish new systems to process Post-9/11 GI Bill claims
because of the complexity of the new program. VA developed and 
deployed an interim claims processing system while simultaneously 
designing its permanent system, the Long Term Solution (LTS). 

LTS has been designed to automate key functions of claims processing.
VA has plans to deploy LTS in five phases and add processing functions 
to the system incrementally with each phase. VA’s general approach is 
to release available functionality at each deadline and include 
functions that were delayed in future releases. 

Implementation Challenges: 

Initially, VA lacked an adequate information system to effectively 
process Post-9/11 GI Bill claims. VA’s interim system, which it used 
until June 2010, had limited functionality, resulting in longer claims 
processing times. For instance, the interim system was not fully 
integrated with other information systems such as VA’s payments 
system, requiring claims examiners to access as many as six different 
systems and manually input claims data. Consequently, claims examiners 
reportedly took up to six times longer to pay Post-9/11 GI Bill 
program claims than other VA education benefit claims. The challenges 
associated with its processing system contributed to a backlog of 
51,000 claims in December 2009. 

While VA has deployed the LTS, a new system with enhanced 
functionality, to help improve the efficiency of processing Post-9/11 GI
Bill claims, some system enhancements are behind schedule (see figure 3)
and additional modifications are needed. According to VA officials,
enhancements such as automatic verification of the length of service 
were delayed because of complexities with systems integration and 
converting data from the interim system. For instance, VA expected to 
deploy an interface with the Veterans Affairs/Department of Defense 
Identity Repository with the first release of the LTS, in March 2010, 
but the interface was not deployed until October 2010. Additionally, 
recent legislative changes to the program required VA to modify the 
system and its deployment schedule. For instance, VA will need to 
modify its system to reflect changes to the way tuition and fees are 
calculated—-an enhancement that officials described as difficult to 
implement. Because of these delays, final deployment of the system is 
now scheduled for the end of 2011-—a year behind schedule. 

Figure 3: Timeline of Scheduled and Deployed Systems Enhancements, by 
Academic Year: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

June 2008: 
Post 9/11 GI Bill legislation enacted. 

November 2008: 
Interim claim processing system developed. 

July 2009: 
VA starts processing claims. 

November 2009: 
Final phase of interim claim processing system deployed. 

March 2010: 
LTS Release 1: Automatic calculation of awards. 

June 2010: 
LTS Release 2: Calculation of amended enrollment awards. 

October 2010: 
LTS Release 3: Interface with systems maintaining institutional and 
service data. 

December 2010: 
LTS Release 4: Interface with VA’s benefit payment system. 

End of year 2011: 
LTS Release 5: Self-service interface for student application and 
enrollment. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of VA Lacked an Adequate Information System to Process Claims 
section] 

VA Faced Challenges in Hiring, Training, and Retaining Staff: 

Objective 1: Implementation Challenges: 

Staffing Model: 

VA uses a staffing model primarily based on claims workloads and 
processing times to determine its staffing levels and allocations to the
RPOs for education programs, including the Post-9/11 GI Bill program. 

Implementation Challenges: 

VA faced a number of staffing challenges, including hiring, training,
housing, and retaining staff. First, VA was unable to adequately 
estimate the number of staff needed to effectively administer Post-
9/11 GI Bill program benefits. The staffing model VA used lacked 
complete information, such as the level of demand for the program and 
the resulting workload. Additionally, because of ongoing changes to its
information systems, officials could not adequately determine the time
staff needed to process claims. VA hired over 750 new staff to process
claims, but these additional staff were not sufficient to meet the 
demand for the program.[Footnote 16] Second, VA had training 
challenges, such as developing an experienced workforce of claims 
examiners, which can take up to 1 year. Many staff received on-the-job 
training or shortened training sessions in order to begin processing 
claims as early as possible. Staff who were trying to quickly gain 
proficiency in claims processing were further challenged by the 
ongoing training associated with each system enhancement. Third, VA 
officials told us VA had difficulty in locating building space to 
house new staff in the 13-month time frame allotted for 
implementation. Finally, staff retention was also a challenge. VA 
officials reported an increased turnover among its claims processing 
staff because of the complexity of the work and the number of hours 
required of employees. 

VA took several steps to address its staffing challenges. VA: 

* mandated a minimum of 24 hours of overtime for processing staff
each month, including weekends and some federal holidays; 

* closed its Education Call Center for 2 days per week to assist in
processing program claims from December 2009 to February 2010; 

* hired a contractor to process over 150,000 other education claims; 

* diverted staff from other VA departments such as Compensation
and Pensions Service to process claims; and; 

* reassigned caseloads from one regional processing office to
another. 

VA officials reported that since the program started, they now have 
better information on demands for the program. However, because VA
anticipates that the automation of its claims processing system will
reduce its staffing needs, the agency will not be able to adequately
determine the appropriate staffing level until final deployment of the 
LTS. As a result, officials report that they plan to continue with 
some of these measures, as needed, such as overtime. 

[End of VA Faced Challenges in Hiring, Training, and Retaining Staff 
section] 

Program Guidance Is Inadequate, despite Efforts to Clarify Some 
Information: 

Objective 1: Implementation Challenges: 

Approach to Guidance: 

VA provides program guidance--including program information and
rules—-to its staff, schools, and students in a variety of ways. 

* To provide guidance to staff and schools, VA has developed nearly 80 
different administrative policy directives. Schools access policy 
directives through a password-enabled Web site. Additionally, VA has
generated guidance in the form of letters and e-mails to revise and 
clarify program rules as needed. Other guidance has been provided via 
presentations given by VA officials at numerous conferences. 

* VA has posted guidance for students on its Web site that includes 
comparisons of the different education programs, a benefits 
calculator, and information on transfers to the Post-9/11 GI Bill 
program. 

Prior Recommendation: 

In our prior report on VA education benefits, we asked that VA provide
more timely, accessible, and comprehensive education program policy 
information. This could include developing and maintaining an online 
policy manual for the Post-9/11 GI Bill and providing email updates to 
school-certifying officials nationwide.[Footnote 17] 

Implementation Challenges: 

VA’s guidance to its staff, schools, and students on the Post-9/11 GI 
Bill program was fragmented, inconsistent, untimely, and unclear. As we
recently reported, school officials we surveyed and VA staff reported
challenges in administering the program because of the lack of a
centralized, comprehensive source of information such as a program
policy manual.[Footnote 18] VA processing staff reported that because 
they had to sift through nearly 80 directives, finding the right 
information was time consuming. Additionally, some schools received 
inconsistent guidance. For example, VA issued debt letters to schools 
for not returning program funds, but later told them to ignore the 
letters because they were generated in error. Moreover, the 
information VA provided was not always timely. For instance, VA took 
several months to develop a policy on processing school checks that 
had been improperly returned to VA because the agency was assessing 
the potential liabilities in accepting them. As a result, many school 
checks expired, and VA had to audit nearly $48 million in transactions 
to inform schools of the appropriate next steps. Further, in some 
cases, school and VA officials reported that the unprocessed checks 
may have resulted in students erroneously receiving debt 
notifications. Finally, officials from schools and associations told us
that unclear guidance led some students to transfer from the Montgomery
GI Bill program to the Post-9/11 GI Bill program and, after doing so, 
they learned that their benefits would have been greater had they not
transferred. 

Although VA has taken some steps to clarify program information, such as
enhancing its Web site, officials we spoke with at schools, 
associations, and VA reported that guidance needs to be more 
comprehensive, and in some cases additional information is needed. For 
instance, while VA has provided more detailed eligibility letters to 
students, school officials reported that students have not 
consistently provided this information to them, as recommended. 
According to some school officials, informal information provided by 
students was sometimes incorrect, and some students incurred school 
debts because they had overstated their eligibility level. Although VA 
provides disbursement information to schools in a weekly student 
report, school officials told us that without formal written 
information on students’ eligibility levels and how payments were 
determined, they were unable to timely or accurately certify 
enrollment and verify tuition and fee payments. Even though privacy 
laws may limit VA’s ability to provide eligibility information 
directly to schools, some school officials we spoke with said that VA
could explore privacy waivers or provide more access to critical
information to certifying officials. VA plans to provide more
comprehensive guidance to schools and staff by developing a handbook
by May 2011 and to update its staff policy manual after deploying LTS. 

[End of Program Guidance Is Inadequate, despite Efforts to Clarify 
Some Information section] 

Actions to Address Implementation Challenges Led to Several Unintended 
Consequences: 

Objective 1: Implementation Challenges: 

Actions to Address Challenges: 

To address its claims processing backlog and delays in issuing 
payments, VA instituted several actions, including the following: 

* issuing emergency, or advance, payments to students participating in 
the Post-9/11 GI Bill program beginning in November 2009 through 
February 2010, with the expectation that these payments would be offset
from future benefits; 

* increasing use of overtime; 

* diverting staff from areas including Compensation and Pensions 
Service (C&P) to assist in the processing of Post-9/11 claims, among 
other divisions; and; 

* suspending compliance audits of schools for 1 year.[Footnote 19] 

Unintended Consequences: 

VA’s actions to address its claims backlog and more quickly provide
payments to students led to several unintended consequences. 

* Some emergency payments issued improperly and millions potentially 
unrecoverable: VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that 
$111 million of the $356 million in emergency payments was awarded to 
ineligible recipients.[Footnote 20] To date, VA reported that it has 
recovered about 76 percent of all emergency payments. However, VA’s 
OIG estimated that VA would be unable to recover a portion-—as much
as $87 million-—of the emergency payments.[Footnote 21] According to 
officials at the Debt Management Center, all emergency payments 
currently represent 35 percent of its education collections workload. 

* Program costs rose because of an increase in overtime usage: 
Although VA officials told us that using overtime is more cost-effective
than maintaining a larger workforce,[Footnote 22] VA expended 
significantly more in overtime funds for the Post-9/11 GI Bill program 
than expected. For instance, VA budgeted $1 million for its education 
programs in fiscal year 2009, but spent three times as much, and in 
2010 VA planned to spend $6 million but actually expended $10 million. 
For fiscal year 2011, VA officials reported expending $3.3 million 
through February 2011. 

* New hires unable to help alleviate C&P claims backlog: Despite
the reported backlog of C&P claims, VA diverted about 10 percent of
the division’s new hires (230 staff) to help process Post-9/11 GI Bill
claims. As a result, the new hires were unable to assist in processing
C&P claims as expected. While new staff returned to C&P in early
2011—-13 months after being trained on education benefits-—they will
be required to undergo up to 2 years of training to process C&P claims.
VA officials could not quantify the impact of diverting staff on C&P’s
workload, but estimated it was minimal. 

* Suspension of compliance audits posed risk to payment accuracy: As 
we previously reported, VA suspended institution site reviews for a 
year because VA reassigned compliance staff to assist with processing 
Post-9/11 GI Bill claims through fall 2010. As a result, VA was unable 
to ensure the accuracy of benefits payments to schools and students, 
as provided under law. VA officials reported that these audits resumed 
in fiscal year 2011. 

[End of Actions to Address Implementation Challenges Led to Several 
Unintended Consequences section] 

VA Has Improved the Timeliness of Post-9/11 GI Bill Claims Processing, 
but Delays Continue: 

Objective 2: Timeliness of Processing Claims: 

Claims Processing: 

* Veterans may apply for education benefits through VA’s online 
application system or by paper. According to VA, since the start of 
the new program, an estimated 60 percent of education applications 
received have been for the Post-9/11 GI Bill program. Since 
implementation, VA has received almost 490,000 online applications for
education benefits, as of December 2010. VA does not track paper 
applications. 

* In fiscal year 2009, VA processed 231,338 Post-9/11 GI Bill claims, 
and about 1.5 million Post-9/11 GI Bill claims in fiscal year 
2010.[Footnote 23] 

* According to VA, its peak claims processing period is typically 
during fall semester—-beginning in August with claims peaking in 
October-—followed by the spring semester.[Footnote 24] 

Performance Measures: 

VA’s performance measures for the timeliness of education claims are
the average days to process original (first-time claims for each benefit
program) and supplemental claims (any subsequent enrollments including 
course adjustments) during the fiscal year. VA’s performance target 
for original claims is 24 days and 10 days for supplemental claims. 

Trends in Timeliness of Claims Processing: 

Figure 4: Average Days to Process Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Claims: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Original target: 24 days; 
Supplemental target: 10 days. 

Date: August 2009; 
Original: 27.9; 
Supplemental: 37.9. 

Date: September 2009; 
Original: 34.6; 
Supplemental: 35.2. 

Date: October 2009; 
Original: 59.2; 
Supplemental: 48.5. 

Date: November 2009; 
Original: 60.5; 
Supplemental: 44.5. 

Date: December 2009; 
Original: 61.9; 
Supplemental: 27.7. 

Date: January 2010; 
Original: 59.2; 
Supplemental: 21.1. 

Date: February 2010; 
Original: 43.2; 
Supplemental: 15. 

Date: March 2010; 
Original: 19.9; 
Supplemental: 12.5. 

Date: April 2010; 
Original: 12.4; 
Supplemental: 9.6. 

Date: May 2010; 
Original: 13.5; 
Supplemental: 9.3. 

Date: June 2010; 
Original: 20.2; 
Supplemental: 10.9. 

Date: July 2010; 
Original: 22.1; 
11.5. 

Date: August 2010; 
Original: 22.7; 
Supplemental: 11.2. 

Date: September 2010; 
Original: 29.2; 
Supplemental: 22. 

Date: October 2010; 
Original: 32.3; 
Supplemental: 23.3. 

Date: November 2010; 
Original: 24.1; 
Supplemental: 15.9. 

Date: December 2010; 
Original: 20.4; 
Supplemental: 11.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

[End of figure] 

VA has improved the timeliness of Post-9/11GI Bill claims processing, 
but delays continue to occur during VA’s peak processing period. (See 
figure 4.) In fall 2009, VA took about as twice as long as its target 
to process original claims and over three and a half times its target 
for supplemental claims. (See table 2.) In spring 2010, VA reduced the 
average national processing time for original Post-9/11 GI Bill claims 
by 19 days and supplemental claims by 23 days. However, claims 
processing times increased during August through October of the 
following fall, VA’s peak processing period. (See appendix I for 
performance variations by RPO.) VA attributed claims processing 
performance shortfalls, in part, to the increased volume of claims and 
the time-intensive manual process for inputting Post-9/11 GI Bill 
claims. To improve production performance, following implementation, 
VA hired additional staff, increased its hours of operation at RPOs, 
and enhanced its claims processing system. 

Table 2: Average Days to Process Post-9/11 GI Bill Program Claims by 
Semester: 

Semester: Fall 2009; 
Original claims: 
Average: 49; 
Low: 28 (August); 
High: 62 (December); 
Supplemental claims: 
Average: 37; 
Low: 28 (August/December); 
High: 49 (October). 

Semester: Spring 2010; 
Original claims: 
Average: 30; 
Low: 12 (April); 
High: 59 (January); 
Supplemental claims: 
Average: 14; 
Low: 9 (May); 
High: 21 (January). 

Semester: Fall 2010; 
Original claims: 
Average: 26; 
Low: 20 (December); 
High: 32 (October); 
Supplemental claims: 
Average: 17; 
Low: 11 (August); 
High: 23 (October). 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

Note: Students may enroll during summer semesters (June through July) 
at many schools. However, because summer semester is typically shorter 
than regular sessions and not considered part of the academic year, 
summer semester data were not included in our analysis. 

[End of table] 

[End of VA Has Improved the Timeliness of Post-9/11 GI Bill Claims 
Processing, but Delays Continue section] 

VA Met Its Overall Accuracy Target of Processing Claims	for Processing 
Claims: 

Objective 2: Accuracy of Processing Claims: 

Quality Assurance: 

VA assesses the accuracy of education benefits claims processing 
through its quality review process. Each quarter of each fiscal year 
(October-September) VA selects a random sample of 125 education 
claims—-25 claims for each of VA’s five education benefit programs—-to
assess the accuracy and verify timeliness of claims at each RPO. In 
determining accuracy rates, VA accounts for differences in workloads 
among each benefit program. 

Performance Measures: 

VA’s performance measure for the accuracy of payments is the payment 
accuracy rate, i.e., claims without payment errors, for all education 
benefits.[Footnote 25] VA’s payment accuracy target was 94 percent 
during fiscal year 2010 and 96 percent during fiscal year 2009. 

Implementation Challenges: 

In fiscal year 2010, VA achieved a payment accuracy rate of about
96 percent for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits, and an overall rate of about
95 percent for all education benefits (see figure 5)-—exceeding its 
accuracy performance target.[Footnote 26] VA reported that its payment 
errors for education benefits were due to administrative errors, such 
as incorrectly calculating service time. In addition, a VA official 
stated that errors are more likely to occur as a result of the new 
program because of heavier workloads and greater numbers of 
inexperienced staff. 

Figure 5: Payment Accuracy Rate by Education Benefit Program: 

Post-9/11 (Ch 33): 
FY 08: N/A; 
FY 09: N/A (target: 96%); 
FY 10: 95.9 (target 94%). 

MGIB (Ch 30): 
FY 08: 96.2%; 
FY 09: 96.7%; 
FY 10: 95.2%. 

DEA (Ch 35): 
FY 08: 95.5%; 
FY 09: 95.5%; 
FY 10: 93.7%. 

MGIB-SR (Ch 1606): 
FY 08: 95.5%; 
FY 09: 92.7%; 
FY 10: 91.0%. 

REAP (Ch 1607): 
FY 08: 95.2%; 
FY 09: 95.8%; 
FY 10: 96.5%. 

Totals: 
FY 08: 95.9%; 
FY 09: 96.1%; 
FY 10: 95.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

Note: Full fiscal year data for the Post-9/11 GI Bill program are not 
available prior to fiscal year 2010 because VA began processing Post-
9/11 GI Bill program claims in July 2009. 

[End of figure] 

[End of VA Met Its Overall Accuracy Target of Processing Claims	for 
Processing Claims section] 

Despite Meeting Accuracy Targets, Improper Payments for Education 
Benefits Have Increased: 
	
Objective 2: Accuracy of Processing Claims: 

Federal Requirements: 

* The term "improper payments" refers to any payment that should not 
have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, any payment to 
an ineligible recipient, any payment for an ineligible service, and 
duplicate payments. This includes both over- and underpayments. 
[Footnote 27] 

* The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as amended, 
requires federal agencies to, on a yearly basis, identify programs and 
activities susceptible to significant improper payments,[Footnote 28] 
estimate the amount of overpayments and underpayments, and report to 
Congress the steps being taken to reduce improper payments exceeding 
$10 million.[Footnote 29] 

Improper Payments: 

Although only 4 percent of all VA’s payments for education benefit 
claims were improper in fiscal year 2010, the amount of improper 
payments for education benefits significantly increased since the 
start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program (see figure 6). VA officials 
attribute the increase in the amount of improper payments to the new 
program, stating that, in addition to increased outlays for education 
benefits, under the new program tuition and fee payments are paid up 
front-—prior to course completion-—for each term and are larger than 
other education benefit payments. VA officials estimate that over- and 
underpayments because of “life events” such as death, dropouts, and 
adjustments to students’ course loads, will generally constitute the 
majority of VA’s reported improper payments.[Footnote 30] Although VA 
included over- and underpayments resulting from life events in its 
improper payments estimate as required, officials stated that they do 
not consider them to be payment errors since the payments were correct 
when processed. VA is developing an automated claims processing 
system—-which will include LTS-—for all of its benefit programs, 
including education. According to VA officials, the new system will 
reduce errors resulting from manual input of claimant information. 

Figure 6: Estimated Amount of Improper Payments for VA’s Education 
Benefit Programs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Year: 2008; 
Total outlay: $2.86 billion; 
Overpayments: $28 million; 
Underpayments: $35.7 million; 
Total: $63.7 million. 

Year: 2009; 
Total outlay: $2.99 billion; 
Overpayments: $29.9 million; 
Underpayments: $56.4 million; 
Total: $66.3 million. 

Year: 2010; 
Total outlay: $8.91 billion; 
Overpayments: $356.4 million; 
Underpayments: $356.4 million; 
Total: $712.8 million. 

Source: Department of Veterans Affairs 2010 Performance and 
Accountability Report. 

Note: Fiscal year estimates based on actual prior year data. 

[End of figure] 

End of Despite Meeting Accuracy Targets, Improper Payments for 
Education Benefits Have Increased section] 

VA Has Not Met Its Education Call Center Performance Targets, but Has 
Improved the Timeliness of Its Responses: 

Objective 2: Timeliness of Call	Center Responses:	 

Performance Measures: 

VA’s Education Call Center performance measures are the rate of 
abandoned calls (calls ended before reaching an agent) and blocked 
calls (caller receives a busy signal). 

* VA’s abandoned call target was 5 percent in fiscal year 2009 and
7 percent in fiscal year 2010. 

* VA’s blocked call target was 10 percent in fiscal year 2009 and
12 percent in fiscal year 2010. 

* VA has not established performance measures for Right Now Web e-
mails.[Footnote 31] 

Trends in Timeliness of Call Center Responses: 

Figure 7: Rate of Abandoned and Blocked Calls to VA’s Education Call 
Center: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Date: August 2009; 
Abandoned calls: 19.9%; 
Blocked calls: 61.7%. 

Date: September 2009; 
Abandoned calls: 19.3%; 
Blocked calls: 76.6%. 

Date: October 2009; 
Abandoned calls: 23.2%; 
Blocked calls: 77.4%. 

Date: November 2009; 
Abandoned calls: 35%; 
Blocked calls: 83.7%. 

Date: December 2009; 
Abandoned calls: 27.2%; 
Blocked calls: 87.9%. 

Date: January 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 20.4%; 
Blocked calls: 84.2%. 

Date: February 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 13.4%; 
Blocked calls: 73.9%. 

Date: March 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 7.2%; 
Blocked calls: 15.6%. 

Date: April 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 7.5%; 
Blocked calls: 2.1%. 

Date: May 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 9.8%; 
Blocked calls: 2.5%. 

Date: June 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 15.4%; 
Blocked calls: 14.0%. 

Date: July 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 22.3%; 
Blocked calls: 23.7%. 

Date: August 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 18%; 
Blocked calls: 43.8%. 

Date: September 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 16.2%; 
Blocked calls: 62.8%. 

Date: October 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 10.3%; 
Blocked calls: 54.8%. 

Date: November 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 5.3%; 
Blocked calls: 12.6%. 

Date: December 2010; 
Abandoned calls: 4.1%; 
Blocked calls: 12.2%. 

Source: GAO analysis of performance data from VA's Education Call 
Center. 

[End of figure] 

Although VA has not met its fiscal year targets for the Education Call 
Center since the implementation of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program, 
[Footnote 32] VA reduced the rate of abandoned calls by nearly 14 
percentage points and blocked calls by about 30 in spring 2010. (See 
figure 7.) However, the number of abandoned and blocked calls 
increased during VA's peak period in fall 2010. According to VA, the 
Education Call Center did not meet its targets because of the high 
volume of calls received,[Footnote 33] coupled with its limited number 
of phone lines and staff. As a result, many callers were unable to get 
through or experienced long wait times. 

To improve the Education Call Center's performance, VA has added 
staff, increased hours of operation, and is adding a new phone system 
with an unlimited number of phone lines. According to VA officials, 
the new system will reduce blocked calls and provide callers with self-
service features such as the option to receive a callback or speak to 
a supervisor. VA has also developed a performance measure to evaluate 
wait times (i.e., average speed to answer calls), with a 160-second 
target. VA officials told us this measure will replace the abandoned 
call measure since VA has little control over caller hang-ups. 

[End of VA Has Not Met Its Education Call Center Performance Targets, 
but Has Improved the Timeliness of Its Responses section] 

Little Is Known about the Accuracy of Call Center Responses, but VA 
Has Taken Steps to Assess Its Performance: 

Objective 2: Accuracy of Call Center Responses: 

Customer Service Standards	 

Executive Order 12,862[Footnote 34] and a related 1995 memorandum 
created several requirements for agencies related to customer service,
including (1) surveying customers to determine the kind and quality of 
services they want and their level of satisfaction with existing 
services, (2) benchmarking customer service performance against the 
best in business, and (3) posting service standards and measuring 
results against these standards. 

In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
requires agencies to develop performance goals and measures to, among 
other things, improve federal program effectiveness and public 
accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, 
and customer satisfaction.[Footnote 35] 

Performance Measures: 

VA has not established performance measures to assess the accuracy of 
the Education Call Center’s responses to telephone inquiries. 

Trends in Accuracy of Education Call Center Responses: 

As we previously reported, little is known about the accuracy of the
Education Call Center’s responses to inquiries because VA has not
established a performance measure for the accuracy of the information
provided by the Education Call Center.[Footnote 36] GAO has 
recommended that VA establish performance measures for the quality of 
information provided by VA’s Education Call Center. VA agreed with our 
recommendation and plans to develop a national standard and policies 
for monitoring the quality of customer service for its education 
benefits programs. In addition, VA has taken steps to assess the 
quality of the Education Call Center’s performance. 

* Employee assessments: Education Call Center supervisors monitor at 
least five calls, which are randomly selected, per telephone 
representative on a monthly basis to assess employee performance and 
identify training needs including, among other things, the accuracy of 
information provided to callers. VA plans to implement telephone 
system upgrades in 2011, which, according to VA officials, will 
provide VA the capability to record calls—enhancing supervisors’
ability to monitor the quality of information provided to callers. 

* Customer satisfaction survey: In October 2010, VA began working with 
a private global marketing information services company to implement a 
survey to assess caller satisfaction. According to VA, the survey asks 
individuals who recently called the Education Call Center to rate 
their satisfaction with customer service elements, including people, 
process, and technology. For example, the survey asks callers to 
evaluate the knowledge and courtesy of the representative, and whether 
the caller’s issue was resolved. Each response is assigned a numeric 
score. According to a VA official, its target is similar to the target 
established by private companies for call center customer satisfaction 
surveys. However, VA officials told us that VA does not benchmark, or 
compare, the survey results against industry performance for call 
customer satisfaction because of the complexity of the issues the 
Education Call Center addresses. During November 2010, the Education 
Call Center exceeded its customer satisfaction target by about 110 
points. VA plans to report the survey results in its fiscal year 2011 
Performance and Accountability Report. 

[End of Little Is Known about the Accuracy of Call Center Responses, 
but VA Has Taken Steps to Assess Its Performance section] 

Education's Approach to Providing Guidance and Information to Schools 
May Improve VA's Delivery of Benefits: 

Objective 3: Comparison of VA and Education Aid Delivery: 
	
Comparison of Programs: 

Although Education processes a higher volume of federal student aid to 
many more students-over $134 billion to over 14 million students and 
their families in fiscal year 2010-—VA and Education share many of the 
same stakeholders, academic timelines, and some processes. 

Prior to program implementation, VA held a few meetings with Education 
to explore some of Education’s aid delivery systems and processes. 
However, according to VA officials, the meetings with Education were 
not continued because of the limited applicability of Education’s 
systems and processes to the new program. 

Education’s Approach: 

Prior to modernizing in the 1990s, Education distributed its guidance
on administering federal student aid to participating schools by 
sending individual regulations to schools through the mail. In 
addition, Education did not always send correspondence to the correct
school official. Education took several steps to improve on these 
inefficiencies and to ensure school officials have the right information
when they need it, such as providing guidance through a centralized 
Web site. Education officials reported that its approach has helped 
ensure that schools efficiently and effectively administer the 
program, since program expectations are clearly articulated. 

Approaches to Providing Guidance: 

As we noted previously in this report, guidance on the Post-9/11 GI Bill
program was inadequate despite VA’s efforts to clarify some information.
By contrast, Education’s approach to distributing guidance provides
critical administrative information to all stakeholders in a manner 
that is clear, comprehensive, consistent, and timely. See table 3, 
which outlines the differences in VA’s and Education’s approaches to 
providing guidance. 
	
Table 3: Comparison of Education and VA's Delivery of Program Guidance: 

Guidance standards[A]: Comprehensive; 
Education: Information for Financial Aid Professionals Website (IFAP) 
compiles all technical guidance on its programs in one place such as a 
comprehensive policy manual. Student Aid Handbook, which is updated 
annually, provides a comprehensive overview of all rules and 
regulations affecting federal student aid programs. The handbook also 
includes worksheets and scenarios to illustrate program rules; 
VA: VA lacks a comprehensive source of guidance for the Post-9/11 GI 
Bill, such as a policy manual. Additionally, VA staff and schools 
reported the mechanisms that VA uses to provide updates on the new
program-—e-mails and conference presentations—-are inadequate because 
they are not always distributed to all schools. 

Guidance standards[A]: Consistent; 
Education: All guidance related to federal student aid is centrally 
reviewed and approved before issuance to ensure consistency; 
VA: Guidance issued for the Post-9/11 GI Bill program has been 
developed by several different offices, sometimes resulting in 
inconsistent interpretation of the same policies. To improve the 
consistency of some information provided to schools, VA plans to 
develop a standardized handbook by May 2011. 

Guidance standards[A]: Timely and clear; 
Education: As part of its formal process for delivering guidance, 
Education provides timely updates and clarification on policy directives
through “Dear Colleague” letters contained at its IFAP Web site. 
Education also uses its IFAP Web site for updating schools on program 
changes, including legislative changes. For example, Education shared 
legislative changes with school officials for grants and loan recipients
displaced by hurricanes; 
VA: In some instances, VA was not able to provide guidance to schools 
and staff in a timely fashion. VA also lacks a formal process to 
clarify guidance for schools. VA has issued clarifying guidance in the 
past, but it was not delivered in a systematic way and may not have 
reached the intended audience. 

Source: GAO analysis of Education and VA data. 

[A] GAO’s guidance on management and internal controls suggests that 
access to timely, continuous, and broad-based information forms the 
basis of sound decision making and contributes to enhanced program 
integrity. “Broad-based” refers to addressing probable issues that are 
raised by audiences known or not—and managed in a way that assures 
continuous, useful, and reliable information. GAO, Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-AIMD-00-21.3.1 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[End of table] 

[End of Education's Approach to Providing Guidance and Information to 
Schools May Improve VA's Delivery of Benefits section] 

Working with Schools to Return Funds May Help VA Streamline Its 
Administration of Benefits:	 

Objective 3: Comparison of VA and Education Aid Delivery: 

Education's Approach:	 

Education requires schools participating in its federal student aid 
programs to return erroneous payments (i.e., overpayments) of program 
funds in a prompt manner.[Footnote 37] This provision increased 
institutional accountability for federal funds awarded to enrolled
students who later withdraw from school or reduce their enrollment 
status. 

The return of funds continues to be a challenge for Education, but its
streamlined approach of collecting funds through schools gives the 
department opportunities it otherwise might not have in collecting 
these debts from millions of students. For example, in its efforts to 
collect Pell grant overpayments in fiscal year 2010, Education worked 
with 6,200 schools rather than 14 million students. Table 4 documents 
the percentage of overpayments for the Pell grant program. 

Table 4: Improper Payment Rates and Total Expenditures for Pell Grants,
Fiscal Years 2008-2010: 

Fiscal year: 2008 
Improper payment rate: 3.69 
Total program expenditures: $17.081 billion. 

Fiscal year: 2009 
Improper payment rate: 3.5 
Total program expenditures: $16.281 billion. 

Fiscal year: 2010 
Improper payment rate: 3.12 
Total program expenditures: $32.215 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Student Aid data. 

Note: These improper payment rates include both under- and 
overpayments. 

[End of table] 

VA’s Current Practices: 

Education’s process of working with schools to return overpayments of
student aid may help VA improve the efficiency of the current process 
and reduce risk to the program.[Footnote 38] Under the new program, 
schools transmit any tuition and fee overpayments to students, and 
students are then expected to return them to VA.[Footnote 39] VA has 
taken this approach because students are liable for overpayments under 
the law.[Footnote 40] However, collecting funds from about 365,000 
students rather than over 8,500 schools is less efficient. (See figure 
8.) Additionally, by placing students in a stewardship role, VA’s 
workload may be increased. Moreover, students may not return the funds 
to VA for various reasons, including not fully understanding their 
responsibilities. While VA does offset all future benefit payments to
recoup funds not returned by students, the success of this is contingent
on a student’s continued enrollment or entitlement to other VA 
benefits.[Footnote 41] VA officials also told us that Post-9/11 GI 
Bill payments represent an increasing part of its education debt. By 
working with schools, Education officials reported it was able to 
contain total Pell grants to be collected to no more than 1 percent of 
the $30 billion it has to collect from schools and individuals in 
fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 42] Given the large amount of funds 
involved, many school and association officials recommended that VA 
adopt a simplified approach, emphasizing a role for schools over 
students. 

Figure 8: Comparison of the Return of Federal Student Aid by VA and 
Education: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Department of Education: 
Tuition and fees sent to schools; 
Schools return overpayments to Education. 

Department of Veterans Affairs: 
Tuition and fees sent to schools; 
Schools return certain overpayments to students, who are responsible for
returning the money to VA. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA and Education documents; GAO (images). 

Note: VA specifies circumstances when schools should return funds to 
them, including when duplicate payments were sent. This guidance 
changed at least twice during the course of our review. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Working with Schools to Return Funds May Help VA Streamline 
Its Administration of Benefits section] 

Working with Schools to Verify the Accuracy of Some Payments May 
Improve Program Administration: 

Objective 3: Comparison of VA and Education Aid Delivery: 
			
Education's Approach: 

To improve program integrity, Education launched an information system 
that enabled it to reconcile student aid transactions electronically 
between schools and the department. In the 1990s, GAO and others 
raised repeated concerns about Education’s ongoing management challenges
with its student aid delivery.[Footnote 43] Some of these challenges 
stemmed from a lack of internal controls to ensure, for example, that 
program funds were awarded to eligible recipients and schools 
appropriately returned overpayments to Education. In response, 
Education implemented practices such as “reconciliation”—-a process 
that allows for a comparison of data on student level between the 
department and schools on a regular basis. Because financial aid 
regulations require schools to maintain a separation of duties between 
offices that authorize funds (such as the business office) and those 
that disburse them (typically, financial aid offices),[Footnote 44] 
Education also encourages schools to have an internal process that 
resolves differences among the financial records of administrative units
involved in aid delivery. 

VA’s Current Practices: 

Education’s approach to reconciliation of student aid transactions may
help VA ensure the accurate delivery of Post-9/11 GI Bill program
payments and provide added transparency and efficiency. Schools
receiving federal student aid from Education are required to 
periodically verify that their systems reflect the same information as 
Education’s. (See figure 9.) This exchange of data provides greater 
assurances that program funds transmitted to schools and/or debts 
assessed to students and schools are accurate. Education officials 
told us that this approach reduced its overpayments and debts 
collected from schools. Although VA’s tuition and fee payments are 
subject to multiple levels of internal review, VA lacks a process at 
the student account level to verify that payments and debts are 
consistent with calculations developed by schools, as well as 
documentation that can show schools why disbursements were adjusted. 
As a result, school officials we spoke with said that they often had 
to “rework their calculations” or call VA to understand its 
adjustments—adding to both VA’s and schools’ workload. VA officials 
told us that VA does not have plans to include this level of 
functionality in its education benefits delivery system. 

Figure 9: Education’s Reconciliation Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Department of Education: 
Student aid data sent to school ($13,625); 
The offices responsible for authorizing and disbursing funds
must reconcile differences: 
Business office: Records show $13,750 received from Education
(missing $125 in cash returns); 
Financial aid office: Records show three payments of $4,500 made
(due to a data entry error). 

After comparing records, the offices agree Education’s student aid 
data are correct and the school sends an update to Education. 

Source: GAO analysis of Education documents. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Working with Schools to Verify the Accuracy of Some Payments 
May Improve Program Administration section] 

[End of Enclosure I} 

Enclosure II: 

Appendix I: 

The Timeliness of Post-9/11 GI Bill Claims Processing Varied across 
RPOs: 

Claims Processing at RPOs:	
	
The number of claims processing staff and claims workload varies among 
RPOs. See table 5.	 

Table 5: RPO Claims Processing Staff and Percentage of Total Education
Claims Workload, Fiscal Year 2010: 

RPO: Atlanta; 
Staff: 204; 
Percentage of workload: 20%. 

RPO: Buffalo; 
Staff: 230: 
Percentage of workload: 20%. 

RPO: St. Louis; 
Staff: 358: 
Percentage of workload: 25%. 

RPO: Muskogee; 
Staff: 497: 
Percentage of workload: 35%. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

Note: Staffing levels are as of September 2010. 

[End of table] 

* As of November 2010, among other claims processing duties, VA had a 
goal for each veterans claims examiner to complete a minimum of 13 
Post-9/11 GI Bill claims per day, an increase of about 7 claims from 
its 2009 goal. 

* There were variations in the timeliness of Post-9/11 GI Bill claims 
processing among RPOs. (See figures 10 and 11.) For example, during 
fall 2009, Muskogee had the lowest processing average for original 
Post-9/11 GI Bill claims (33 days) and Atlanta had the highest (68 
days). VA officials were aware of RPO timeliness variations and 
attributed these variations to factors such as claims examiners’ 
experience, knowledge, and skill levels. However, as of February 2010,
VA had not fully explored the causes of these variations. 

Trends in Timeliness of Claims Processing: 

Figure 10: Average Days to Process Original Post-9/11 GI Bill Claims 
by RPO: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Average processing time in days (Target is 24 days): 

RPO: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Spring semester, 2009: 68.3; 
Fall semester, 2009: 37.8; 
Spring semester, 2010: 32.4. 

RPO: Buffalo, New York; 
Spring semester, 2009: 59.4; 
Fall semester, 2009: 37.8; 
Spring semester, 2010: 30.7. 

RPO: St. Louis, Missouri; 
Spring semester, 2009: 48.8; 
Fall semester, 2009: 23.3; 
Spring semester, 2010: 26.2. 

RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma; 
Spring semester, 2009: 32.9; 
Fall semester, 2009: 18.9; 
Spring semester, 2010: 19.9. 

National average: 
Spring semester, 2009: 48.8; 
Fall semester, 2009: 29.6; 
Spring semester, 2010: 25.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Average Days to Process Supplemental Post-9/11 GI Bill 
Claims by RPO: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Average processing time in days (Target is 10 days): 

RPO: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Spring semester, 2009: 42.0; 
Fall semester, 2009: 12.8; 
Spring semester, 2010: 16.5. 

RPO: Buffalo, New York; 
Spring semester, 2009: 39.9; 
Fall semester, 2009: 15.2; 
Spring semester, 2010: 19.4. 

RPO: St. Louis, Missouri; 
Spring semester, 2009: 37.1; 
Fall semester, 2009: 11.7; 
Spring semester, 2010: 18.8. 

RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma; 
Spring semester, 2009: 34.2; 
Fall semester, 2009: 13.6; 
Spring semester, 2010: 14.8. 

National average: 
Spring semester, 2009: 36.8; 
Fall semester, 2009: 13.5; 
Spring semester, 2010: 16.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Enclosure II] 

Enclosure III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our review focused on the following questions: (1) What were VA's 
implementation challenges, the steps taken to address them, and any 
unintended consequences? (2) To what extent has VA met its timeliness 
and accuracy goals for processing Post-9/11 GI Bill claims and been 
responsive to call center inquiries? (3) What processes, if any, can 
VA adopt from the Department of Education's administration of student 
aid programs to improve its administration of Post-9/11 GI Bill 
education benefits? 

To address each of these questions, we reviewed federal laws, VA's 
regulations, policies and procedures, and other program documents. We 
reviewed relevant literature, including work performed by VA's Office 
of Inspector General and GAO. We interviewed officials from relevant 
higher education associations; postsecondary institutions, also known 
as institutions of higher learning (IHL); and veterans service 
organizations. Associations of higher education and veterans service 
organizations were chosen based on their involvement in VA's 
implementation. We also conducted site visits to two of the four 
regional processing offices that are charged with administering Post-
9/11 GI Bill benefit claims. We selected the offices at St. Louis, 
Missouri, and Muskogee, Oklahoma, based on the number of staff each 
office had and because the Muskogee regional processing office also 
serves as VA's Education Call Center. At the sites we visited, we 
received demonstrations of key processes such as processing claims and 
interviewed VA officials, including claims examiners and 
representatives of local postsecondary institutions including public, 
private nonprofit, and private for-profit institutions. 

We selected eight institutions at which students were receiving VA 
education benefits for our school interviews based on their proximity 
to the St. Louis and Muskogee RPOs and institutional sector and 
control to provide a cross section representation of all institution 
types. We visited a total of five institutions of higher learning 
using semistructured interviews, and accepted written responses from 
another three, using the questions from our semistructured interviews 
(see table 6 for the list of institutions of higher learning GAO 
contacted). Findings stemming from these interviews cannot be 
generalized to the larger population of postsecondary institutions. 

Table 6: Institutions of Higher Learning GAO Contacted: 

School name: St Louis University; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, private, not-for-profit; 
RPO: St. Louis, Missouri. 

School name: Vatterott Colleges, (corporate office); 
Institutional sector: 4-year, private, for-profit; 
RPO: St. Louis, Missouri. 

School name: Harris Stowe State University; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, public, not-for-profit; 
RPO: St. Louis, Missouri. 

School name: ITT Technical Institutes; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, private, for-profit; 
RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma. 

School name: Oklahoma City Community College; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, public, not-for-profit; 
RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma. 

School name: Oklahoma City University; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, private, not-for-profit; 
RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma. 

School name: Cameron University; 
Institutional sector: 4-year, public, not-for-profit; 
RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma. 

School name: Rose State College; 
Institutional sector: 2-year, public, not-for-profit; 
RPO: Muskogee, Oklahoma. 

Source: GAO analysis of institutional data. 

[End of table] 

For the second objective, we also analyzed VA program performance 
metrics for claims processing and call center inquiries for three 
consecutive academic semesters: fall 2009 (August 2009 through 
December 2009), spring 2010 (January 2010 through May 2010), and fall 
2010 (August 2010 through December 2010). We also assessed VA's 
performance objectives and measures related to claims processing and 
responses to telephone inquiries to its Education Call Center against 
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 
[Footnote 45] the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002,[Footnote 
46] and other federal requirements for customer service such as 
executive orders that required agencies to post customer service 
standards and measure results against them. We also analyzed data for 
other VA education benefit programs to provide points of comparison 
and context. 

For the third objective, we interviewed Department of Education 
officials responsible for key processes, such as developing guidance, 
returning funds, and performing reconciliations to obtain their 
perspectives on Education's approach. We identified these 
organizational components from Education based on our analyses of VA 
processes that are a part of their implementation challenges. We also 
reviewed program documents, including Education's Federal Student 
Aid's 2009 Annual Report. Additionally, we reviewed Education's Web 
site, Information for Financial Aid Professionals, to determine the 
types of guidance provided there. We also interviewed VA officials to 
assess their related processes. 

Data Reliability: 

Because external data were significant to each of our research 
objectives, we assessed the reliability of VA's program performance 
metrics. We completed this assessment by interviewing VA officials 
about their data, information systems, and known data limitations. We 
determined the data provided by VA were sufficiently reliable for the 
analytical purposes of this report. 

[End of Enclosure III] 

Enclosure IV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs: 

Department Of Veterans Affairs: 
Washington DC 20420: 

April 19, 2011: 

Mr. George A. Scott: 
Director: 
Education, Workforce and Income Security: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Scott: 

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has reviewed the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, "Veterans Education 
Benefits: Enhanced Guidance and Collaboration Could Improve 
Administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill Program (GA0-11-356), and 
generally agrees with GAO's conclusions and concurs in principle with 
GAO's recommendations to the Department. 

The enclosure specifically addresses GAO's recommendations. VA 
appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John R.Gingrich: 
Chief of Staff: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Enclosure: 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Comments to Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report: Veterans Education Benefits: 
Enhanced Guidance and Collaboration Could Improve Administration of 
the Post-9/11 GI Bill Program (GA0-11-356). 

GAO Recommendation: To improve VA's administration of the Post-9/11 GI 
Bill program and address ongoing challenges, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs: 

Recommendation 1: Take steps to provide more critical program 
information to schools such as a student's eligibility for benefits or 
how payments have been calculated, for example, to enable certifying 
officials, financial aid, and business office administrators to 
effectively administer the program and deliver benefits. 

VA Comments: Concur in principle. We agree that the Department should 
continue to work effectively to provide complete information to 
schools. Each direct deposit payment to a school has an addendum 
identifying the student and term for which the payment is intended. 
Each check payment has a stub with the same information. Also,
VA currently sends each school a weekly VET REP report detailing the 
exact amount of tuition, fees, and Yellow Ribbon payments sent to the 
school for each student. The schools can use this information to 
verify the payments they receive.	VA provides Veterans with complete 
information concerning their eligibility, benefit entitlement, and 
payments. They have the responsibility to share this information with 
their schools. 

VA is working to formally standardize school reporting processes and 
provide clear and consistent guidance to all school certifying 
officials. In March 2011, a focus group meeting was held with 
representatives from the four Regional Processing Offices to create a 
comprehensive, standardized school official handbook. This handbook 
will improve consistency of information available to schools. We 
expect to publish this document in May 2011 and provide copies to the 
schools. 

Recommendation 2: Collaborate with the Department of Education and the 
higher education community, leveraging their experiences in 
administering aid. These collaborations should include assessing the 
applicability and viability of adopting processes and actions taken by 
the Department of Education, where practical, such as returning 
overpayments of program funds, or reconciling benefit payments. 

VA Comments: Concur in principle. In 2009, the Veterans Benefits 
Administration (VBA) met with the Department of Education (ED) and 
determined that ED's model for grants would not meet the statutory 
requirements for Chapter 33. In the ED model, institutions are front-
loaded with estimated funds for a certain time period. When 
eligibility is determined, funds are disbursed to the student or 
organization.	If there are overpayments or changes to student records 
that require debt collection, the institution is required to make the 
Government whole and take collection action against the student. The 
school then reconciles internally and reports back to ED. 

Numerous differing requirements exist between ED and VA statutes. For 
example: 

* In many instances under ED rules, the school is allowed to keep 
money following withdrawal from classes. VA is required to adjust the 
amount due and recoup any and all overpayments. 

* ED funds are needs-based while VA benefits are entitlements. There 
are unique regulations relating to due process, waiver, and 
collections that VA must follow that are different from ED. 

* Under the ED model, schools determine the amount of funds issued to 
the student. VA benefits require a formal determination under VA laws 
and regulations before payment is authorized. Additionally, VA charges 
entitlement for benefits paid. Schools would not have the expertise or 
authority to determine the amount of a Veteran's benefits or the 
entitlement charged. 

* VBA does not have legal authority to provide funding to schools 
based on estimated costs. Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits are based on 
actual net charges. 

* In the majority of the cases when an overpayment occurs, the 
liability is with the Veteran, not the school. 

VA will again contact ED and the higher education community to 
determine the applicability of any of their processes in VA's 
administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill. 

[End of Enclosure IV] 

Enclosure V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

George A. Scott, Director, (202) 512-7215, scottg@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Tranchau Nguyen, Assistant 
Director; Carla Craddock, Analyst-in-Charge; David Forgosh; Amy 
Frazier; Glenn Slocum; David Hong; Gregory Wilmoth; Craig Winslow; 
Brenda Farrell; Susannah Compton; and James Bennett made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of Enclosure V] 

Related GAO Products: 

VA Education Benefits: Actions Taken, but Outreach and Oversight Could 
Be Improved. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-256]. 
Washington, D.C. February 28, 2011. 

Information Technology: Veterans Affairs Can Further Improve Its 
Development Process for Its New Education Benefits System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-115]. Washington, D.C. December 1, 
2010. 

VA National Initiatives and Local Programs that Address Education and 
Support for Families of Returning Veterans. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-22R]. Washington, D.C. October 22, 
2008. 

Higher Education: Veteran Students Received Similar Amounts of Title 
IV Aid as Nonveterans but More Total Aid with GI Benefits. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-741]. Washington, D.C. June 20, 
2008. 

Veterans Affairs: Improved Planning Needed to Guide Development and 
Implementation of Education Benefits System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1045]. Washington, D.C. July 31, 
2007. 

VA Student Financial Aid: Management Actions Needed to Reduce Overlap 
in Approving Education and Training Programs and to Assess State 
Approving Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-384]. Washington, D.C. March 08, 
2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 110-252, tit. V, 123 Stat. 2323, 2357-86. 

[2] In addition to the Post-9/11 GI Bill, VA currently administers 
three other educational benefit programs for veterans: Montgomery GI 
Bill-Active Duty (MGIB, 38 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3036), Montgomery GI Bill- 
Selected Reserves (MGIB-SR, 10 U.S.C. §§ 16131-16137), and the Reserve 
Educational Assistance Program (REAP, 10 U.S.C. §§ 16161-16166). In 
addition, the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance 
Program (DEA, 38 U.S.C. §§ 3500-3566) has been authorized for spouses 
and dependents of service members who have died or are totally and 
permanently disabled because of their military service. 

[3] Congress recently enacted several changes under the Post-9/11 
Veterans Educational Assistance Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-377, 124 Stat. 4106 (2011). Some of the key provisions associated 
with the new law simplify tuition and fee payments and expand 
eligibility to include National Guard members, who, for example, 
served during times of national emergencies (to be codified at 38 
U.S.C. § 3301(1)(C)). According to a recent estimate by the 
Congressional Budget Office, the program is estimated to grow by $2.7 
billion over the next decade because of the legislative changes. 

[4] GAO, VA Education Benefits: Actions Taken, but Outreach and 
Oversight Could Be Improved, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-256] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2011), and VA, Office of the Inspector General, Veterans Benefit 
Administration: Review of Alleged Improper Emergency Payments for 
Education Benefits. 10-01248-249 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2010). 

[5] The privacy of federal records maintained on individuals is 
generally governed by the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 

[6] 38 U.S.C. § 3452(f). 

[7] Post 9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Improvements Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111377, § 105(b) and (d), 124 Stat. 4106, 4113 and 
4117 (2011) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3313(b)). 

[8] The Post-9/11 GI Bill program is commonly referred to as Chapter 
33 benefits. However, for the purposes of this report, we will refer 
to it as the Post-9/11 GI Bill or the program. 

[9] 38 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3324. 

[10] 38 U.S.C. §§ 3014 and 3313. Program benefits are an entitlement. 
38 U.S.C. § 3011(a). When applying for program benefits, eligible 
individuals must irrevocably relinquish their entitlement to other 
education program benefits with the exception of the Vocational 
Rehabilitation and Employment Service under Chapter 31. 38 U.S.C. § 
3001 note. 

[11] Pub. L. No. 111-377, § 102(a), 124 Stat. 4108-09 (2011) (to be 
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3313(c)). Previously, tuition and fees were 
assessed annually on a statewide basis not to exceed the maximum in-
state tuition and fees for a public IHL. This change goes into effect 
August 2011. 

[12] 38 U.S.C. § 3311(b). One component of the program provides 
similar benefits to sons and daughters of active duty service members 
who die in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 3311(f). 

[13] 38 U.S.C. §§ 3311(b) and 3313(c). Service members with at least 
30 continuous days of active duty and discharged with a service-
connected disability are also eligible at the 100 percent level. 
Eligibility lasts 15 years from the last period of active duty. 38 
U.S.C. § 3321(a). Certain service members who remain on active duty 
may transfer up to 36 months of their eligibility to either spouses or 
dependents, or a combination of the two. 38 U.S.C. § 3319. 

[14] Individuals can submit e-mails through Right Now Web to ask VA 
staff questions about education benefits and the status of their 
claims. 

[15] 38 U.S.C. § 3692.	 

[16] Some of these new hires were made as a result of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 124 Stat. 
115. 

[17] GAO, VA Education Benefits: Actions Taken, but Outreach and 
Oversight Could Be Improved, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-256] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2011). 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-256]. 

[19] VA is required to conduct annual compliance surveys of schools 
offering one or more courses approved for enrollment if at least 300 
veterans or others are enrolled in such courses under VA educational 
benefit programs. The Secretary of VA may, however, waive this 
requirement if he determines that it would be appropriate and in the 
best interest of the United States government. 38 U.S.C. § 3693. 

[20] According to an independent auditor (VA, Performance and 
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2010) and a report issued by VA’s 
OIG, VA faced increased program risks in administering emergency 
payments because it lacked guidance for processing these claims
and adequate internal controls to verify eligibility. VA officials 
reported they are developing a database to verify student eligibility. 

[21] As of March 2011, VA reported that just over $84 million in 
emergency payments remained to be collected. 

[22] According to a senior official, VA did not perform a cost-benefit 
analysis comparing overtime usage and long-term hires to process Post-
9/11 GI Bill claims. 

[23] Additional claims may be developed, for example, to transfer 
entitlement or reflect schedule adjustments. 

[24] Academic terms vary among schools. For the purpose of this 
report, the fall semester is from August through December and the 
spring semester is from January through May. 

[25] VBA's finance staff also conducts periodic financial reviews to 
verify the accuracy of fiscal transactions, including Post-9/11 GI 
Bill payments. However, these reviews are not used to determine 
payment accuracy rates. 

[26] According to VA officials, the agency did not include emergency 
payments in its quality review process because they were advanced 
payments and not adjudicated claims. VA's OIG determined the emergency 
payments to have an error rate of about 30 percent. 

[27] Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-300, 
116 Stat. 2350 (as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and 
Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-204, sec. 2(e), § 2(f)(2), 124 
Stat. 2224, 2227 and to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 note). The 
Office of Management and Budget has indicated that this also includes 
any payment for which there is insufficient or a lack of documentation. 

[28] In its fiscal year 2010 Performance and Accountability Report, VA 
identified its education programs, among others, as vulnerable to 
significant improper payments. 

[29] Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350 (as amended by Pub. L No. 111-
204, sec. 2(a)-(d), §2(a)-(e), 124 Stat. 2224 and to be codified at 31 
U.S.C. § 3321 note). 

[30] Authorized benefits are determined, in part, by the number of 
hours of attendance and the length of the academic term. Although the 
original payment may have been correct, VA must adjust the amount of 
payments due as a result of changes because of “life events.” 

[31] VA does not track the timeliness of responses to Right Now Web 
inquiries and has not developed Right Now Web performance measures and 
targets at a national level. As a result, little is known about the 
timeliness and accuracy of VA's responses to these inquiries. In prior 
work (GAO-11-256), we recommended VA develop Right Now Web performance 
measures. VA agreed with our recommendation and plans to develop a 
national standard and policies for customer service for its education 
benefits focusing on timeliness and monitoring quality. 
	
[32] Prior to the implementation of the program in fiscal year 2008, 
VA reported a 5 percent abandoned call rate and 4 percent blocked call 
rate. 

[33] For instance, in fall 2009 about 5.4 million call attempts were 
made to the Education Call Center during business hours. Call attempts 
do not represent unique callers, since a caller may call back multiple 
times if the caller is unable to get through. Of these call attempts, 
1.2 million calls reached VA's automated call distribution system and 
882,000 calls were answered by Education Call Center telephone 
representatives. 

[34] Exec. Order No. 12,862, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,257 (Sept. 11, 1993). 

[35] Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 4, 107 Stat. 285, 286-88. 

[36] GAO, VA Education Benefits: Actions Taken, but Outreach and 
Oversight Could Be Improved, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-256] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2011). 

[37] 34 C.F.R. § 668.22(g) and (j) (2010). 

[38] In a few instances, Education will work with students to return 
funds. This can involve student aid that has not been earned in terms 
of a student’s length of attendance. 

[39] VA began paying students directly as one way to improve program 
integrity by limiting the amount of overpayments that went to schools 
under earlier GI Bills. Congressional Research Service, Educational 
Assistance Programs Administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs, R40723, Washington, D.C., February 2010. 

[40] VA has indicated that it currently has statutory authority to 
seek recoveries directly from schools only in certain cases of 
wrongdoing by them. 74 Fed. Reg. 14,654, 14,656, (Mar. 31, 2009) 
(citing 38 U.S.C. § 3685(b)). 

[41] VA officials also said that they can offset certain federal 
payments such as tax refunds. 

[42] Education’s debt portfolio consists of collections from schools 
and students with the department collecting debts from schools for 
grant funds and from students for loan funds. Collections on loans 
occur after a student leaves college and are usually unrelated to a 
student’s continued eligibility for federal student aid. 

[43] GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 
Education, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-99-5] 
(Washington, D.C.: January 1999). 

[44] 34 C.F.R. § 668.16(c)(2) (2010). 

[45] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. 

[46] Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350. 

[End of section] 

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