GAO-10-856, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa


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entitled 'Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan 
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa' which was released on September 30, 2010. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

September 2010: 

Maritime Security: 

Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration 
among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 

GAO-10-856: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-856, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more 
than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small 
number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those 
affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to 
repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) 
developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 
Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, 
disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration 
with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate 
the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and 
any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with 
partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, 
activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed 
industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and 
the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain. 

What GAO Found: 

The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, 
in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates 
have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, 
almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and 
the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or 
effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The 
United States has advised industry partners on self-protection 
measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international 
coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution 
arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit 
collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates’ rate of success in 
boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 
2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the 
total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime 
Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased 
sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden—-
the focus of the Action Plan-—to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action 
Plan’s objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but 
the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is 
unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the 
Action Plan’s implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. 
activities—such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting 
suspected pirates—nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits 
or effectiveness of the Action Plan’s tasks. GAO’s prior work has 
shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to 
evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, 
as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been 
revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses 
the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision 
makers will lack information that could be used to target limited 
resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. 
interests in the region. 

The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry 
partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key 
practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. 
agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. 
government has shared information with partners for military 
coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key 
efforts that involve multiple agencies—-such as those to address 
piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and 
hold pirates accountable—-in part because the Action Plan does not 
designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. 
For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the 
Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead 
responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against 
pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President’s principal arm 
for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, 
could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to 
counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities 
and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement 
their efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan, 
identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 
U.S. counter-piracy activities; and clarify agency roles and 
responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury 
provided comments to clarify facts in the report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] or key 
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
caldwells@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan, 
but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan: 

The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or 
Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or 
Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly: 

U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take 
Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy 
Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Agency Progress in Implementing the 
National Security Council's Action Plan: 

Appendix III: International and Shipping-Industry Partners Involved in 
Counterpiracy Efforts: 

Appendix IV: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Selected Types of Costs Incurred by the U.S. Government to 
Counter Piracy: 

Table 2: International Partners Involved in Counterpiracy Efforts: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Somalia and a Comparison to the Eastern Coast of the United 
States: 

Figure 2: U.S. Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Team Boards a 
Suspicious Boat in the Indian Ocean: 

Figure 3: U.S. Agencies Involved in the Response to Piracy off the 
Horn of Africa: 

Figure 4: International and Industry Partners Involved in the Response 
to Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 

Figure 5: Interagency Progress in Implementing the National Security 
Council's (NSC) Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership 
and Action Plan (Action Plan): 

Figure 6: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa, 2007-2009: 

Figure 7: Total Hostages Captured by Somali Pirates, 2007-2009: 

Figure 8: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

Figure 9: Total and Average Ransom Payments to Somali Pirates, 2007- 
2009: 

Figure 10: U.S. Personnel Respond to the MV Maersk Alabama Incident in 
2009: 

Figure 11: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

Abbreviations: 

Action Plan: Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and 
Action Plan: 

BIMCO: Baltic and International Maritime Council: 

Contact Group: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: 

CPCC: Counter-Piracy Coordination Center: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

INTERCARGO: International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners: 

INTERTANKO: International Association of Independent Tanker Owners: 

ISPS: International Ship and Port Facility Security: 

ITF: International Transportation Workers Federation: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

SIGTTO: Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators 
Limited: 

U.K. United Kingdom: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 24, 2010: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa has been growing in frequency and 
severity over the past several years and threatens one of the world's 
busiest shipping lanes near key energy corridors and the route through 
the Suez Canal. Since 2007, more than 450 ships have reported pirate 
attacks in this area, and Somali pirates have taken nearly 2,400 
hostages and received over $100 million in ransom payments.[Footnote 
1] Although only a few U.S.-flagged vessels--notably the MV Maersk 
Alabama in April 2009--have been attacked, pirates have attacked or 
attempted attacks on chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise 
ships, fishing vessels, and even warships. In addition to jeopardizing 
the lives and welfare of the citizens of many nations, piracy 
contributes to regional instability and creates challenges for 
shipping and freedom of navigation. With Somalia's lack of a 
functioning government, this illicit but profitable activity has 
raised concerns that piracy ransom proceeds may undermine regional 
security and contribute to other threats including terrorism. 

The international community has taken several steps to respond to the 
growing piracy problem. The United Nations Security Council has 
adopted several resolutions addressing an international response to 
piracy off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 2] In 2008, the United States, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, regional 
naval forces, and others began patrolling waters near Somalia. In 
January 2009, a multinational naval task force--Combined Task Force 
151--was established under the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces with 
a specific mission to conduct counterpiracy operations. Additionally, 
in January 2009, a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 
of Somalia (Contact Group) was formed pursuant to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1851 to coordinate international 
counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 3] 

Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic 
security and is a vital national security issue, the United States has 
developed policies and plans to collaborate with its international and 
interagency partners to address piracy off the Horn of Africa and to 
mobilize an interagency U.S. response. In December 2008, the National 
Security Council (NSC) published the Countering Piracy off the Horn of 
Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan).[Footnote 4] This 
plan implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 
2005) and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal 
Acts of Violence at Sea (June 2007) as applied to piracy off the Horn 
of Africa. Consistent with the U.S. policy to continue to lead and 
support international efforts to repress piracy and to urge other 
states to take decisive action both individually and through 
international efforts, the Action Plan seeks to involve all nations, 
international organizations, industry, and other entities with an 
interest in maritime security to take steps to repress piracy off the 
Horn of Africa.[Footnote 5] The interagency initiatives of the Action 
Plan are to be coordinated and undertaken by the U.S. Departments of 
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the 
Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
subject to the availability of resources. 

Over the last few years, we have completed a number of reviews that 
examine issues related to piracy off the Horn of Africa. In December 
2007, we reported that the vast areas at risk for piracy off the Horn 
of Africa combined with the small number of ships available for 
patrolling them make protecting energy tankers and other commercial 
vessels difficult.[Footnote 6] In February 2008, we reported that 
several challenges limit U.S. and international stabilization, 
humanitarian, and development efforts in Somalia and recommended that 
the United States develop a more detailed strategy to address these 
challenges.[Footnote 7] In June 2008, we evaluated the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans and determined 
that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varied. 
[Footnote 8] In September 2009, we reported on the Department of the 
Treasury's collaboration with interagency partners to safeguard the 
financial system against illicit use and combat national security 
threats, and recommended mechanisms to improve interagency 
collaboration.[Footnote 9] Also in September 2009, we reported on the 
key actions agencies need to take to enhance interagency collaboration 
on national security issues.[Footnote 10] A list of our related GAO 
products is included at the end of this report. 

Interested in U.S. efforts to respond to piracy, your offices asked us 
to review the extent to which the U.S. government agencies: (1) have 
made progress in implementing the Action Plan to counter piracy off 
the Horn of Africa and any challenges they face; and (2) are 
collaborating with each other, and with international and industry 
partners to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa. 

To assess U.S. government progress and challenges in implementing the 
Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we reviewed 
the Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and 
other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. laws, and United 
Nations Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program 
documents, analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off the Horn of 
Africa for the years 2007 through June 2010, and interviewed officials 
from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, 
Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as well as component agencies including the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Coast Guard, and National 
Maritime Intelligence Center to discuss implementation of the Action 
Plan and collaboration with partners in counterpiracy efforts. We 
selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan states 
they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in 
accordance with the plan. We also reviewed prior GAO work related to 
results-oriented government and evaluated the extent to which the 
interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group followed select key 
practices for achieving results.[Footnote 11] In addition, we met with 
international and industry partners involved in developing best 
practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the 
international Contact Group, and participating in naval patrols off 
the Horn of Africa. We discussed data-collection methods, processes 
for data entry, and the steps taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of 
the data with both the International Maritime Bureau and the Combined 
Maritime Forces. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of this report. 

To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are 
collaborating with each other, and with international and industry 
partners, we evaluated the extent to which department and agency 
actions incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining 
collaboration on complex national security issues.[Footnote 12] In 
addition, we observed information sharing forums; reviewed program 
documents; and interviewed agency, international, and industry 
officials about collaboration efforts. We conducted this performance 
audit from October 2009 to September 2010 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology 
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I. 

Background: 

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea share the same definition of piracy, 
and, under that definition, piracy consists of any of several acts, 
including any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers 
of a private ship and directed against another ship, aircraft, 
persons, or property onboard another ship on the high seas; or against 
a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
state.[Footnote 13] Additionally, according to both conventions, all 
states have the duty to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in 
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state. Furthermore, both conventions 
authorize states to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of 
pirates and arrest the persons and seize the property onboard, on the 
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
In addition, a single piratical attack often affects the interests of 
numerous countries, including the flag state of the vessel, various 
states of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal 
states, owner states, and cargo owner, transshipment, and destination 
states.[Footnote 14] 

Somali pirates attack and harass vessels transiting the Indian Ocean 
and in the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint that provides access to 
the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and through which over 33,000 ships 
transit each year.[Footnote 15] Pirates operate from land-based 
enclaves along the 1,880-mile coastline of Somalia, which is roughly 
equivalent to the distance from Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida. 
Figure 1 illustrates the vast area in which incidents of piracy are 
occurring, 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia's coast. Figure 1 also 
shows the location of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
in the Gulf of Aden, where coalition forces have established naval 
patrols to help ensure safe passage for transiting vessels. 

Figure 1: Somalia and a Comparison to the Eastern Coast of the United 
States: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 maps] 

First map depicts the coastline around Somalia in the Indian Ocean, 
and specifically indicates the following: 

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor; 
Somalia coastline: approximately 1,880 coast miles; 
Approximate location of a line 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia. 

Second map offers a comparison to Somalia's 1,800 coast miles by 
depicting the East Coast of the United States, where an approximation 
of 1,880 coat miles stretches from Miami, Florida to Portland, Maine. 

Source: GAO (data), Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

To conduct their attacks, Somali pirates generally use small skiffs, 
carrying between four and eight persons armed with AK-47 rifles or 
similar light arms and, at times, with rocket-propelled grenades. Once 
they target a vessel, pirates typically coordinate a simultaneous two- 
or three-pronged attack from multiple directions. Depending on the 
characteristics and acquiescence of the victim vessel, pirates can 
board and commandeer a vessel in less than 20 minutes. Pirate vessels 
usually are equipped with grappling hooks, ladders, and other 
equipment to assist the boarding of a larger craft. Pirate vessels 
vary in sea-worthiness and speed with some able to travel at speeds 
between 25 and 30 knots and operate in high sea conditions, while 
others have more restricted capabilities. According to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, Somali pirates do not typically target specific 
vessels for any reason other than how easily the vessel can be 
boarded. Pirates patrol an area and wait for a target of opportunity. 
Vessels that travel through the high-risk area at a speed of less than 
15 knots and have access points close to the waterline are at higher 
risk of being boarded and hijacked. According to a June 2010 self-
protection guide published by maritime industry organizations, there 
have been no reports of pirates boarding ships proceeding at speeds 
over 18 knots. Figure 2 shows U.S. authorities boarding a suspected 
pirate skiff. 

Figure 2: U.S. Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Team Boards a 
Suspicious Boat in the Indian Ocean: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Unlike pirates in other parts of the world, Somali pirates kidnap 
hostages for ransom and, up to this point, have not tended to harm 
captives, steal cargo, or reuse pirated ships for purposes other than 
temporarily as mother ships. Mother ships are typically larger fishing 
vessels often acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy that pirates 
use to store fuel and supplies, and tow skiffs, which allow them to 
operate and launch attacks further off shore. This "hostage-for-
ransom" business model is possible in part because the pirates have 
bases on land in ungoverned Somalia where they can bring seized 
vessels, cargoes, and crews and have access to food, water, weapons, 
ammunition, and other resources during ransom negotiations. In an 
ungoverned state with widespread poverty, the potential for high 
profits with low costs and relatively little risk of consequences has 
ensured that Somali pirate groups do not lack for recruits and 
support. Moreover, some U.S. and international officials suspect that 
Somali businessmen and international support networks may provide 
financing, supplies, and intelligence to pirate organizations in 
exchange for shares of ransom payments. 

In addition to posing a threat to the lives and welfare of seafarers, 
piracy imposes a number of economic costs on shippers and on 
governments. Costs to shippers include ransom payments, damage to 
ships and cargoes, delays in delivering cargoes, increased maritime 
insurance rates, rerouting vessels, and hardening merchant ships 
against attack. According to officials at the Departments of State and 
Defense, governments incur costs by conducting naval patrols, as well 
as the costs of transporting, prosecuting, and incarcerating suspected 
and convicted pirates. 

The United States' National Strategy for Maritime Security, issued in 
2005, declares that the United States has a vital national interest in 
maritime security. The strategy recognizes that nations have a common 
interest in facilitating the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins 
economic security, and in protecting against ocean-related terrorist, 
hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts, including piracy. The National 
Strategy for Maritime Security also requires full and complete 
national and international coordination, cooperation, and intelligence 
and information sharing among public and private entities to protect 
and secure the maritime domain. The 2007 Policy for the Repression of 
Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea states that it is 
the policy of the United States to "continue to lead and support 
international efforts to repress piracy and urge other states to take 
decisive action both individually and through international efforts." 

In December 2008, the NSC developed the Countering Piracy off the Horn 
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) to implement the 
2005 strategy and the 2007 policy as applied to piracy off the Horn of 
Africa. The Action Plan establishes three main lines of action for 
interagency stakeholders to take to repress piracy in collaboration 
with industry and international partners: (1) prevent pirate attacks 
by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2) 
disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the 
rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and (3) ensure 
that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their 
actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, 
victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United 
States. The NSC--including the Maritime Security Interagency Policy 
Committee--develops policy for the U.S. response to piracy off the 
Horn of Africa. The Action Plan directed the Secretary of State and 
Secretary of Defense to establish a high-level interagency, 
operational task force--the Counter-Piracy Steering Group--to 
coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions centered in the Action 
Plan. In addition, the NSC directed that the Departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury 
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence contribute to, 
coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with the Action 
Plan, subject to available resources. Figure 3 shows the U.S. 
departments and agencies involved in implementing the three lines of 
action contained in the Action Plan. 

Figure 3: U.S. Agencies Involved in the Response to Piracy off the 
Horn of Africa: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organization chart] 

Top level: 
National Security Council. 

Second level, reporting to National Security Council: 
Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee. 

Third level, reporting to Maritime Security Interagency Policy 
Committee: 
Counter-Piracy Steering Group. 

Fourth level, reporting to Counter-Piracy Steering Group (Coleaders of 
the Counter-Piracy Steering Group): 
Department of State; 
Department of Defense. 

Fourth level, reporting to Counter-Piracy Steering Group (Contributors 
on the Counter-Piracy Steering Group): 
Department of the Treasury; 
Department of Justice; 
Department of Homeland Security; 
Department of Transportation; 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Fourth level direct reporting relationships: 

Department of the Treasury: 
* Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence[B]. 

Department of Justice: 
* National Security Division[C]; 
* Criminal Division[C]; 
* Federal Bureau of Investigation[B]; 
* U.S. Attorneys' Office[C]. 

Department of State: 
* Bureau of African Affairs[A,C]; 
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs[A,C]; 
* Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs[B]; 
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs[B]; 
* Office of the Legal Advisor[C]. 

Department of Defense: 
* Office of the Secretary of Defense[A,B,C]; 
* Joint Staff[A,B,C]; 
* U.S. Central Command[A,B,C]; 
* U.S. Africa Command[A,B] 
* U.S. Navy[B]. 

Department of Homeland Security: 
* U.S. Coast Guard[A,B]. 

Department of Transportation; 
* Maritime Administration[A]. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Involved in efforts to prevent pirate attacks. 

[B] Involved in efforts to disrupt acts of piracy. 

[C] Involved in efforts to hold pirates accountable. 

[End of figure] 

The Department of State (State) is involved in efforts to prevent acts 
of piracy and hold pirates accountable, primarily by leading U.S. 
interaction with international partners working through the Contact 
Group, building regional judicial capacity to prosecute suspected 
pirates, and encouraging states to prosecute when their interests are 
involved. Additionally, State is involved in efforts to disrupt acts 
of piracy by tracking ransom payments and following financing issues 
related to piracy. Within Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command 
is involved in prevention, interdiction, and prosecution efforts by 
contributing forces to the Combined Maritime Forces, an international 
maritime coalition. Within the Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task 
Force 151 conducts counterpiracy operations in international waters, 
including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian 
Gulf and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. The 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service supports and assists interdiction 
and prosecution efforts by conducting incident investigations, 
supervising detention of suspected pirates, assisting U.S. and 
international prosecutions, debriefing released crews, and providing 
criminal intelligence information. U.S. Africa Command assists in 
preventing piracy through strategic communication efforts and building 
partner capacity in regional states and would plan and, if authorized, 
conduct any land-based military activities in Somalia to interrupt 
pirate operations. U.S. Africa Command also conducts counterpiracy 
naval patrols and interdiction efforts in its area of responsibility. 
Treasury is involved in disrupting pirates' revenue sources by 
examining pirate financial activity and implementing an executive 
order to block the assets of certain persons. Justice is involved in 
holding pirates accountable through prosecution as well as judicial 
capacity-building in African states. The Coast Guard, under Homeland 
Security, helps prevent piracy through its work with and regulation of 
the U.S. shipping industry and assists in interrupting piracy by 
providing law enforcement units and boarding teams on Navy vessels. 
Transportation's Maritime Administration assists with preventing 
piracy by working with the shipping industry to develop best practices 
for the industry to protect itself from piracy. In addition, within 
the intelligence community, the Office of Naval Intelligence-as part 
of the National Maritime Intelligence Center--provides maritime 
intelligence assistance. 

The international community, shipping industry, and international 
military forces also have been involved in taking steps to prevent and 
disrupt acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa, and facilitate 
prosecutions of suspected pirates. Over the past few years, the United 
Nations adopted a number of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions related to countering piracy in the Horn of Africa region, 
including resolutions 1816 which authorizes states to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia in coordination with the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government, for the purpose of repressing acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to use all necessary and 
appropriate means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery within 
Somali territorial waters.[Footnote 16] In January 2009, the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) formed under 
the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, and 
facilitates discussion and coordination of actions among states and 
organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 
addition, in February 2009 organizations representing the interests of 
ship owners, seafarers, and marine insurance companies worked to 
publish the first version of voluntary commercial vessel self-
protection measures to avoid and respond to pirate attacks, referred 
to as "best management practices." In May and September 2009, 10 
countries signed the New York Declaration, and committed to (1) 
promulgate the internationally recognized best management practices 
for self-protection to vessels on their registry and (2) ensure that 
vessels on their registry have adopted and documented appropriate self-
protection measures in their ship security plans when carrying out 
their obligations under an existing international agreement.[Footnote 
17] 

The United States also has provided forces and leadership to the 
Combined Maritime Forces, which is a coalition of 25 contributing 
nations that are working to conduct maritime security operations in 
the region. In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established 
Combined Task Force 151, a multinational naval task force with the 
sole mission of conducting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. That 
role previously had been filled by Combined Task Force 150, which 
continues to perform counterterrorism and other maritime security 
operations as it has since 2001. There are 11 nations that have 
participated and several others that have agreed to send ships or 
aircraft or both to participate in Combined Task Force 151. In 
addition, the United States has contributed assets to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's counterpiracy effort since its 
inception. Its current effort, Operation Ocean Shield, focuses on at-
sea counterpiracy operations and offers assistance to regional 
countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy 
activities. Moreover, as part of the Combined Maritime Forces, the 
United States also works with the European Union, which conducts 
counterpiracy operations and escorts World Food Programme vessels 
delivering humanitarian aid to countries in the region, as well as 
independent deployers not part of the coalition that escort vessels 
and patrol area waters. 

Figure 4 shows many of the key international and industry partners 
involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa with whom 
the United States collaborates and coordinates. More information on 
international and shipping-industry partners is included in appendix 
III. 

Figure 4: International and Industry Partners Involved in the Response 
to Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Efforts to prevent pirate attacks: 
* Ship owners and shipping companies[C]; 
* Seafarers and vessel operators[C]; 
* Flag state administrators (e.g., Panama, Marshall Islands, and 
Bahamas)[B]; 
* Signatories of the New York Declaration[A]; 
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group 
3)[A]; 
* Industry associations[C]; 
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group 
4)[A]; 
* International Maritime Organization (United Nations agency)[A]. 

Efforts to disrupt acts of piracy: 
* Combined Maritime Forces (Combined Task Force 151)[A]; 
* European Union Naval Forces–Somalia and Maritime Security Centre–-
Horn of Africa[A]; 
* North Atlantic Treaty Organization maritime forces[A]; 
* Independent deployers (e.g., India, China, and Malaysia)[B]; 
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group 
1)[A]; 
* United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (Dubai)[B]. 

Efforts to hold pirates accountable: 
* Countries with prosecution arrangements with the United States 
(e.g., Kenya and Seychelles[B]); 
* Countries independently prosecuting suspected pirates (e.g., France, 
Netherlands, Spain, and Yemen)[B]; 
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group 
2[A]); 
* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime[A]. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Multilateral forums. 

[B] Bilateral relationships. 

[C] Industry partners. 

[End of figure] 

According to officials at State and Justice, the United States will 
consider prosecuting suspected pirates in appropriate cases when U.S. 
interests are directly affected, such as what occurred when suspected 
pirates attacked the U.S.-flagged ships MV Maersk Alabama, USS 
Nicholas, and USS Ashland.[Footnote 18] When suspected pirates are 
captured by U.S. forces and Justice determines not to prosecute the 
case in the United States, the United States works with the affected 
states and regional partners to find a suitable venue for prosecution. 
In January 2006, 10 suspected pirates were captured by U.S. forces 
after they hijacked the Indian-flagged dhow Safina al Bisarat and used 
it to attack the Greek-owned and Bahamian-flagged Delta Ranger. 
[Footnote 19] This was the first incident where U.S. forces captured 
suspected pirates in the region and transferred them into the custody 
of Kenya. As of July 2010, the United States had formalized two 
arrangements with regional states--Kenya and the Seychelles--to 
facilitate the transfer and prosecution of suspected pirates.[Footnote 
20] The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the International 
Maritime Organization, and individual governments have assisted in 
developing the judicial capacity of regional states. 

The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan, 
but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan: 

U.S. agencies have made progress implementing the NSC's Countering 
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action 
Plan) to lead and support international efforts to counter piracy, but 
the effort faces several implementation challenges. The United States 
has made the most progress on working with partners to implement 
efforts to prevent attacks, such as by encouraging the shipping 
industry to transit in areas patrolled by international navies. 
However, the U.S. government has had less success in other areas. For 
example, the United States has not disrupted pirate bases on shore, 
and the international community has made only limited progress to 
disrupt pirates' revenue and prosecute suspected pirates. While many 
stakeholders credit international, industry, and U.S. government 
efforts with contributing to a decline in the percentage of successful 
attacks that resulted in a vessel boarding or hijacking, since 2007 
pirates have increased their total number of attacks, become more 
organized, and greatly expanded their area of operations. Meanwhile, 
the Action Plan has not been updated to address these changes since it 
was published in December 2008, and the U.S. government has not 
evaluated the costs or effectiveness of its counterpiracy efforts or 
reported on the results of the interagency effort. 

U.S. Government Has Taken Steps to Implement Planned Efforts to 
Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute Pirate Attacks but Faces Challenges: 

In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S. 
agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established 
in the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the 
vulnerability of the maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in 
ways consistent with international law and the rights and 
responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) ensure that those 
who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by 
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. The Action Plan 
establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a collaborative one, 
seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry partners with 
an interest in maritime security. For U.S. agencies, the Action Plan 
states that, subject to available resources, the Departments of 
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the 
Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will 
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance 
with the Action Plan. The NSC also establishes some limits to the 
scope of the plan by focusing on immediate measures to reduce the 
incidents of piracy, rather than longer-term stabilization of Somalia 
that the Action Plan asserts is needed to fully repress piracy. 

Our review focused on the steps U.S. agencies have made to repress 
piracy off the Horn of Africa, but given the international nature of 
the issue, our analysis frequently refers to the related efforts of 
international and industry partners. We found that, of the 14 total 
tasks established within the three lines of action in the Action Plan, 
substantial progress has been made in implementing 4 tasks, the 
majority of which are related to preventing piracy. The United States 
has made some progress toward implementing 8 other tasks, including 
all of the tasks involved in facilitating the prosecution of suspected 
pirates. Little or no progress has been made with regard to 1 task 
that relates to disrupting acts of piracy, and we did not assess 1 
task because agencies decided it would duplicate the efforts of 
international partners and should not be implemented. Figure 5 
summarizes the results of our assessment. For more detailed 
information about U.S. agencies' efforts to implement the Action Plan 
and our analysis of their progress, see appendix II. 

Figure 5: Interagency Progress in Implementing the National Security 
Council's (NSC) Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership 
and Action Plan (Action Plan): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime 
domain to piracy: 

Task: Establish and maintain a Contact Group; 
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress; 
Status: U.S. government helped establish in January 2009; Coast Guard 
and Maritime Administration lead working group on industry self-
protection. 

Task: Strengthen and encourage the use of the Maritime Security Patrol 
Area; 
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress; 
Status: U.S. government has made progress working with international 
and industry partners, but has limited influence on commercial vessels 
that are not flagged with the United States. 

Task: Updating ships’ security plans; 
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress; 
Status: Coast Guard has approved piracy annexes to ship security plans 
for 100 percent of U.S.-flagged vessels identified as transiting high-
risk waters, including those in the Horn of Africa. 

Task: Strategic communication; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: U.S. government has issued counterpiracy statements and 
supported international efforts; however, governmentwide plan not 
finalized and lack of U.S. presence on land in Somalia inhibits full 
implementation. 

Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the 
rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states: 

Task: Support a regionally based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center 
(CPCC); 
GAO assessment[A]: Not applicable[B]; 
Status: U.S. government has no plans to support the establishment of a 
CPCC since it would duplicate the reporting and monitoring functions 
performed by other organizations. 

Task: Seize and destroy pirate vessels and related equipment, and 
deliver suspected pirates to prosecuting states; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: U.S. and international forces have seized nearly 100 pirate 
vessels and their related equipment but released 57 percent of 
captured suspects for reasons including difficulties in meeting
evidence standards and/or securing prosecution venues.[C] 

Task: Provide interdiction-capable presence; 
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress; 
Status: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard contribute assets and leadership to 
coalition forces patrolling off the Horn of Africa with an average of 
4-5 ships in the region each day. 

Task: Support shiprider programs and other agreements; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: The United States has supported an arrangement to bolster 
regional capabilities to counter piracy, but U.S. agencies have not 
established shiprider programs because they question the benefits to 
facilitating prosecutions. 

Task: Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore; 
GAO assessment[A]: Little or no progress; 
Status: Action not authorized by the President at this time; lack of 
U.S. presence in Somalia hinders implementation. 

Task: Disrupt pirate revenue; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: In April 2010, President Obama signed an executive order that 
blocks assets of certain designated individuals, including two 
suspected pirates.[D] But, U.S. efforts to track financial assets or 
transactions are hampered by a lack of government and financial 
institutions in Somalia. 

Facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and 
coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to ensure 
that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their 
actions: 

Task: Conclude prosecution agreements; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: U.S. government concluded arrangements with Kenya and the 
Seychelles and is attempting to conclude others; but faces challenges 
in finding additional regional partners that are willing and able to 
prosecute. 

Task: Support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: The United States exercised jurisdiction under the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation to prosecute one pirate in the United States. 

Task: Support the use of other applicable international conventions 
and laws; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: The United States is using other laws to exercise jurisdiction 
and prosecute 11 suspected pirates for attacks on the USS Nicholas and 
USS Ashland. 

Task: Enhance regional states’ capacity to prosecute; 
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress; 
Status: U.S. agencies provide assistance to countries in the region 
for law enforcement and judicial capacity building and reform, the 
focus of which includes, but is not limited to, piracy. Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service special agents have testified in Kenyan courts, 
and provided training and operational support to officials in the 
Seychelles. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] We assessed "substantial progress" for those tasks where all 
components specified by the NSC were implemented; "some progress" for 
tasks where components were partially implemented or agencies had 
taken steps toward implementation; and "little or no progress" where 
agencies had made minimal or no effort toward implementing the 
components of the task. 

[B] We did not rate U.S. government progress on this task because, 
according to Defense officials, there are no plans to establish a 
Counter-Piracy Coordination Center since it would duplicate existing 
international efforts. 

[C] According to the Department of Defense's May 2010 report to 
Congress entitled "Piracy off the Somali Coast and within Somalia" 
U.S. forces have transferred 24 suspected pirates to Kenya for 
prosecution. 

[D] Executive Order 13536 blocks all property and property interests 
within U.S. jurisdiction of persons listed in the Annex to the order 
and provides the authority for the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate additional 
persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, 
including those who support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia. Property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction 
include property in the possession or control of any United States 
person in the United States or overseas. United States person is 
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, 
entity organized under the laws of the United States or any 
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or 
any person in the United States." As of July 2010 this order listed 
two individuals connected to pirate activity. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Agency Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy: 

In collaboration with its international and industry partners, the 
U.S. government has made substantial progress overall toward 
implementing Action Plan tasks aimed at preventing acts of piracy. 
First, the United States has been a key contributor among the 49 
countries participating in the Contact Group, including leading a 
working group on industry self-protection.[Footnote 21] Second, State, 
Defense, Coast Guard, and the Maritime Administration, in 
collaboration with international and industry partners, also have made 
substantial progress on the second task to encourage commercial 
vessels to transit high-risk waters through the Maritime Security 
Patrol Area, which includes the Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor patrolled by international naval forces. Third, the U.S. 
government has made substantial progress to ensure shippers update 
U.S.-flagged vessels' ship security plans to address the pirate 
threat, and in encouraging the crews of commercial vessels to use 
industry-developed self-protection measures to prevent piracy, often 
referred to as "best management practices." These practices include 
adding physical barriers to obstruct pirates from boarding a vessel 
and taking evasive maneuvers to fend off attack.[Footnote 22] 

Despite these and other actions to prevent attacks, U.S. government 
and shipping industry officials stated that ensuring all vessels 
transiting the area implement best management practices remains a 
challenge. The Coast Guard has developed regulations mandating self-
protection measures, but these regulations only apply to U.S.-flagged 
vessels, which comprise a small portion of the total shipping traffic 
transiting the region.[Footnote 23] The shipping industry has 
developed a document outlining self-protection measures, but 
implementation is voluntary. While government and shipping industry 
officials lack data on the extent to which best management practices 
are used, they estimate that about a quarter of the vessels are not 
using one of the easiest and least costly of the best practices, 
registering their passage with a naval coordination center in the 
region, which raises questions about the extent of their 
implementation of the other practices. Coast Guard, the Maritime 
Administration, and shipping industry officials stated it may be 
challenging to find additional ways to encourage the remaining vessels 
to self-protect from attack. 

Regarding the Action Plan's fourth task aimed at preventing piracy, we 
determined that U.S. agencies have made some progress on strategic 
communication, described in the Action Plan as a global information 
campaign to highlight the destructive elements of piracy and the 
international efforts to coordinate a response to the problem. While 
U.S. agencies have taken steps in this area, State has yet to finalize 
a strategic communication plan to coordinate interagency 
communications efforts to counter piracy. Defense officials stated 
that the lack of a U.S. presence in Somalia presents additional 
challenges to efforts to communicate with the Somali population to 
discourage piracy and for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. 
communication efforts. 

U.S. Agency Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy: 

While the United States and its international partners have made 
substantial progress overall on the task of providing forces and 
assets capable of interdicting pirates off the Horn of Africa and have 
made some progress on the tasks related to seizing and destroying 
pirate vessels, supporting regional arrangements to counter piracy, 
and disrupting pirate revenue, U.S. agencies have made little or no 
progress toward implementing the task related to disrupting and 
dismantling pirate bases. We found that the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 
have made substantial progress contributing assets and leadership to 
coalition forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 
According to Defense officials, typically, more than 30 ships from 
coalition, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
independent forces patrol the region at any given time, with the 
United States contributing between 4 and 5 ships per day on average. 
In addition, consistent with the Action Plan, U.S. forces have 
responded to and successfully interdicted pirate attacks. For example, 
in April 2009, U.S. forces successfully terminated the hostage 
situation that occurred when pirates attacked the U.S.-flagged MV 
Maersk Alabama and kidnapped the vessel's captain. U.S. forces 
intervened and freed the captain after killing all but one of the 
pirates conducting the attack. 

However, as pirate activity has expanded to the larger Indian Ocean, 
U.S. and international military officials stated that providing an 
interdiction capable force similar to that provided in the Gulf of 
Aden is not feasible. Though coalition forces developed guidance for 
improving coordination of forces in the Indian Ocean, Defense 
officials emphasized that there are not enough naval vessels among all 
of the combined navies in the world to adequately patrol this 
expansive area for pirates. Moreover, Defense officials acknowledged 
that there are other competing U.S. national interests in the region, 
such as the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as 
counterterrorism missions that require the use of the limited naval 
and air assets that are used to monitor and gather intelligence for 
counterpiracy operations. 

In addition, the U.S. government has made some progress to seize and 
destroy pirate vessels and equipment, and deliver suspected pirates 
for prosecution. For example, U.S. forces have contributed to 
coalition forces that confiscated or destroyed almost 100 pirate 
vessels. However, U.S. forces have encountered more difficulty in 
delivering captured suspected pirates to states willing and able to 
ensure they are considered for prosecution. From August 2008 to June 
2010, international forces subsequently released 638 of 1,129 
suspected pirates, almost 57 percent of those captured, in part 
because of the difficulty finding countries that were willing or able 
to prosecute them. Further, the United States has made some progress 
on the task to disrupt pirate revenue. In April 2010, President Obama 
signed an executive order[Footnote 24] that blocks assets of certain 
persons, including two suspected pirates, who have engaged in acts 
that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia.[Footnote 
25] However, according to officials at Treasury, the department 
charged with implementation, the executive order applies only to 
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and U.S. efforts to track and 
block pirates' finances in Somalia are hampered by the lack of 
government and formal banking institutions there and resulting gaps in 
intelligence. 

The U.S. government has made some progress on the task to support 
"shiprider" programs and other agreements. The United States has 
supported some bilateral and regional counterpiracy arrangements, most 
notably the International Maritime Organization's effort to conclude a 
regional arrangement, generally referred to as the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct.[Footnote 26] This arrangement contains provisions related to 
information sharing regarding pirate activity among the signatories, 
reviews of national legislation related to piracy, and provision of 
assistance between signatories.[Footnote 27] However, U.S. agencies 
have made little progress on the second part of this task to develop 
shiprider programs, in which regional law enforcement officials 
accompany naval patrols to collect evidence to support successful 
prosecutions. Justice officials explained that the potential benefits 
do not warrant the resource investment the programs would require. 
Specifically, the presence of shipriders would not significantly 
enhance the ability of regional countries to prosecute suspected 
pirates. 

State and Defense officials report that no steps have been made to 
disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore in part because the 
President has not authorized this action, the United States has other 
interests in the region that compete for resources, and long-standing 
concerns about security hinder the presence of U.S. military and 
government officials in Somalia. While the United States has not 
supported the creation of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center, as 
called for in the Action Plan, we did not provide a progress 
assessment for this task since government and industry officials have 
stated that existing organizations and coordination centers[Footnote 
28] currently fulfill the incident reporting and monitoring functions, 
and that establishing a new center would duplicate those efforts. 

U.S. Agency Efforts to Facilitate Prosecution of Suspected Pirates: 

While the United States has made some progress on implementing the 
tasks established in the Action Plan to hold pirates accountable, the 
United States and its international partners have only prosecuted a 
small number of pirates overall for a variety of reasons. As of July 
2010, Kenya and the Seychelles were the only regional partners that 
accepted transfers of suspected pirates from U.S. forces for purposes 
of prosecution. According to officials from State, the reluctance of 
affected states to prosecute and limited judicial capacity in the 
region are barriers to the ability of the U.S. government to make 
substantial progress on the task of concluding prosecution 
arrangements. Officials also noted that the facts and circumstances of 
each encounter differ, with not all cases eliciting evidence that 
could be brought to court. As already described, these factors 
contributed to the release of almost 57 percent of the suspected 
Somali pirates that international forces encountered from August 2008 
to June 2010. The United States has made some progress on the task to 
support and encourage the exercise of jurisdiction under the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation as a framework to prosecute suspected pirates. For 
example, the United States has used the convention while prosecuting 
one pirate in the United States.[Footnote 29] The U.S. government has 
also supported and encouraged the use of other applicable conventions 
and laws by exercising jurisdiction over 11 suspected pirates who 
attempted an attack on U.S. warships.[Footnote 30] However, Defense, 
State, and Justice officials reported that the United States and its 
international partners have faced significant challenges in 
encouraging countries to prosecute pirates, due to a lack of political 
will or judicial capacity, such as an inadequate number of attorneys 
to prosecute the cases. Lastly, on the task to enhance the 
capabilities of regional states to accept suspected pirates for 
prosecution, the U.S. government has provided assistance to several 
regional states, and the United States has contributed to 
international efforts to build regional judicial capacity. For 
example, according to State officials, the United States has worked 
with the government of Tanzania to allow pirates to be prosecuted 
there even when cases lack a domestic connection. However, regional 
states continue to have a limited capacity to prosecute suspected 
pirates and incarcerate convicted pirates. 

Pirates Have Increased the Number of Attacks, Expanded Their Area of 
Operations, and Become More Organized: 

While many stakeholders anecdotally credit international, industry, 
and U.S. government efforts with preventing and disrupting piracy off 
the Horn of Africa, from 2007 through the first half of 2010 piracy 
has evolved in many ways--pirates increased their attacks, claimed 
more hostages and revenue from shipping industry's ransom payments, 
expanded their area of operations, and became more organized. As 
figure 6 illustrates, the total number of reported pirate attacks 
increased from 30 in 2007 to 218 in 2009. These reported attacks 
include four attempts on U.S.-flagged vessels in 2009, one of which 
was successful--the attack on the MV Maersk Alabama. 

Figure 6: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa, 2007-2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Year: 2007; 
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 19; 
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 11; 
Total: 30. 

Year: 2008; 
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 67; 
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 44; 
Total: 111. 

Year: 2009; 
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 170; 
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 48; 
Total: 218. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data. 

Note: Successful attacks include those that resulted in vessel 
boardings or hijackings. The types of vessels attacked included: bulk 
carriers, container ships, fishing vessels, passenger ships, research 
vessels, roll-on roll-off ships, supply ships, tankers, tugs, and 
yachts. 

[End of figure] 

However, the rate of successful attacks, or the proportion of total 
reported attacks that resulted in vessel boardings or hijackings, 
decreased from around 40 percent in 2008 to 22 percent in 2009. U.S. 
and international officials interpret this as a sign that the efforts 
of the shipping industry, governments, and the international naval 
patrols to prevent or disrupt attacks are having a positive effect on 
the situation. In addition, in the first 6 months of 2010, reports of 
total attacks declined to about 100 attacks, as compared with 149 
attacks during the first half of 2009. However, other data show that 
piracy remains a persistent problem. For example, as figure 7 shows, 
the number of hostages of various nationalities captured by Somali 
pirates from 2007 to 2009 more than quintupled. The total number of 
hostages includes 21 hostages from the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama 
in 2009. Furthermore, in the first half of 2010, pirates took 529 
hostages compared to 510 in the first half of 2009. 

Figure 7: Total Hostages Captured by Somali Pirates, 2007-2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Year: 2007; 
Total hostages: 163. 

Year: 2008; 
Total hostages: 815. 

Year: 2009; 
Total hostages: 867. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, pirates have expanded their area of operations with an 
increasing number of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area 
much larger to patrol than the Gulf of Aden. By the end of 2008, when 
the NSC issued its Action Plan, approximately 83 percent of the 111 
reported pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa that year took place in 
the Gulf of Aden, an area just over 100,000 square miles, with the 
remainder off the coast of Somalia. However, just a year later in 
2009, only 53 percent of the 218 total attacks occurred in the Gulf of 
Aden as Somali pirates expanded their area of operations to the 
broader Indian Ocean. Pirates now threaten an area of nearly 2 million 
square nautical miles in the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and Northern 
Arabian Sea. Figure 8 shows the number and location of pirate attacks 
off the Horn of Africa reported to the International Maritime Bureau 
in 2007, 2008, 2009, and the first half of 2010. 

Figure 8: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustrated map] 

Interactivity instructions: Roll your mouse over the year in the
legend box to see the data by year. Each represents a successful or
attempted attack. The color of the indicates the year of the incident.
This map is interactive and uses color to distinguish years in the 
electronic version of this report. For the print version, the map is 
supplemented by a set of black and white maps that break out the data 
by year, see figure 11 in appendix IV. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map 
Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

While the Action Plan cites attacks as far as 450 miles from Somalia's 
coast, in April 2010 the International Maritime Bureau reported that 
pirates had increased their capability to attack and hijack vessels to 
more than 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia using mother ships, from 
which they launch smaller boats to conduct the attacks.[Footnote 31] 
International officials stated that piracy in the Indian Ocean is more 
challenging due to the great expanse of water, and requires a 
different approach than that used in the Gulf of Aden. One U.S. Navy 
analysis estimated that 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters would be 
required to provide the same level of coverage in the Indian Ocean 
that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden--an approach that is 
clearly infeasible. 

Although U.S. and international officials have expressed concern that 
international support networks may be providing pirate groups with 
financing, supplies, and intelligence in return for shares of ransom 
payments, as of March 2010 the intelligence community assessed that 
Somali pirates are not receiving funding or coordination from non-U.S. 
foreign sources outside Somalia, aside from ransom payments. Defense 
supports FBI and Treasury efforts to monitor whether there is U.S.- 
based support for piracy. Figure 9 shows that from 2007 to 2009 the 
estimated amount of total ransom payments paid to pirates by the 
shipping industry increased from about $3 million to $74 million, with 
the average amount of ransoms paid per vessel increasing from $300,000 
to more than $2 million.[Footnote 32] 

Figure 9: Total and Average Ransom Payments to Somali Pirates, 2007- 
2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

Calendar year: 2007; 
Total paid: $3.2 million; 
Average paid: $0.3 million. 

Calendar year: 2008; 
Total paid: $27.7 million; 
Average paid: $1.5 million. 

Calendar year: 2009; 
Total paid: $74.1 million; 
Average paid: $2.1 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Naval Intelligence data. 

[End of figure] 

A December 2008 United Nations report revealed characteristics of 
structural organization in piracy operations, including evidence of 
pirate leaders and financiers who supply the equipment and provisions 
for other pirates to carry out the attacks, and that ransom payments 
are distributed according to organizational roles. In addition, State, 
Defense, and FBI officials observed that piracy off the Horn of Africa 
has become more organized, and Defense officials said that gathering 
more information about pirate organizations that could be used to 
identify pirate leaders would be beneficial. FBI officials noted that 
pirate organizations lack the sophistication associated with other 
types of organized crime, such as the American mafia. These officials 
stated that the FBI continues to investigate potential ties Somali 
pirates may have to individuals outside of Somalia. Moreover, U.S. 
officials have expressed repeated concerns that funds generated by 
piracy have the potential to attract extremists or terrorists located 
in the region to become involved in piracy. Treasury, Justice, State, 
and Defense are monitoring piracy on an ongoing basis to determine if 
there is a link between pirates and extremist organizations, but as of 
July 2010 had found no credible link. 

The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or 
Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or 
Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly: 

The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy in the interest of 
the global economy, among other things, but the effectiveness of U.S. 
resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency 
group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation was 
not specifically charged with tracking the cost of U.S. activities or 
systematically evaluating the relative benefits or effectiveness of 
the Action Plan's tasks and neither the interagency steering group nor 
the federal agencies involved have performed these tasks. Our prior 
work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts 
need to evaluate activities to identify areas for improvement. 
Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has 
not been revised. 

The U.S. government is not systematically tracking the costs or the 
benefits and effectiveness of its counterpiracy activities to 
determine whether its investment has achieved the desired results or 
should be revised. According to officials at State and Defense, the 
interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group, which is jointly led by 
these two agencies and charged with monitoring implementation of the 
Action Plan, has not been systematically monitoring the cost or 
evaluating the benefits or effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy 
efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, Defense stated that 
the interagency group was not performing these functions because it 
was not specifically charged to do so in the Action Plan. Instead, 
State officials told us the group primarily provides a forum for U.S. 
agencies to coordinate efforts before multilateral Contact Group 
meetings or discuss ongoing initiatives such as the development of the 
April 2010 executive order on Somalia. Officials from Justice, 
Treasury, Coast Guard, and State reported that the NSC's Maritime 
Security Interagency Policy Committee, a high-level interagency group 
that is focused on maritime issues, generally tracks U.S. progress 
toward implementing the Action Plan and discusses status updates on 
piracy provided from the various agencies represented on the task 
force. However, the officials were not aware of systematic efforts to 
track the costs, or evaluate the benefits or effectiveness of U.S. 
counterpiracy activities. Table 1 describes selected costs we 
identified that may be incurred by U.S. agencies for counterpiracy 
efforts. 

Table 1: Selected Types of Costs Incurred by the U.S. Government to 
Counter Piracy: 

General costs: 

Costs: Personnel; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security, 
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime 
Administration, Treasury. 

Costs: Information technology; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security, 
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime 
Administration, Treasury. 

Costs: Training; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security, 
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime 
Administration, Treasury. 

Efforts to prevent piracy: 

Costs: Contact Group meeting logistics and coordination; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Maritime 
Administration, State. 

Costs: Military coordination (e.g., Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 
meetings); 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense. 

Costs: Outreach to industry; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Maritime 
Administration, State, Treasury. 

Costs: Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Maritime 
Administration. 

Costs: Review of ship security plans; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard. 

Efforts to disrupt acts of piracy: 

Costs: Operational costs of maritime assets; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense. 

Costs: Industry liaison; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense. 

Costs: Flying hours for maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense. 

Costs: Law enforcement support; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service. 

Costs: Holding pirates on board naval vessels; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense. 

Costs: Personnel costs for intelligence gathering and analysis 
(including implementation of the piracy aspects of Executive Order 
13536); 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Justice, State, 
Treasury, Naval Criminal Investigative Service. 

Costs: Interagency coordination (Global Maritime Operational Threat 
Response process); 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Homeland Security. 

Efforts to prosecute pirates: 

Costs: Bilateral efforts to secure prosecution venues; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: State. 

Costs: Transportation of suspected pirates for prosecution; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Justice. 

Costs: Evidence collection and case development; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Justice, 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service. 

Costs: Prosecution of suspected pirates; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice. 

Costs: Judicial capacity-building (direct and indirect); 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice, State, Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service. 

Costs: Incarceration of pirates prosecuted by the United States; 
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by U.S. agencies. 

[End of table] 

While most of the agencies involved had not systematically tracked the 
cost of their counterpiracy efforts, Defense developed a partial 
estimate. Defense officials estimated that U.S. Central Command's 
counterpiracy operations for fiscal year 2009 totaled approximately 
$64 million for costs associated with 773 U.S. Navy ship steaming 
days, flight hours to support ships operating in the area, port costs, 
and those related to detaining and delivering suspected pirates to 
proper authorities.[Footnote 33] However, officials said this estimate 
does not include estimates for costs incurred for counterpiracy 
operations by other combatant commands such as U.S. Africa Command. In 
addition, Defense officials noted the deployment of naval forces in 
support of the counterpiracy operations takes the ships, crew, 
aircraft, intelligence assets, and other forces away from other global 
missions such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. 

In addition to not tracking the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts, 
U.S. agencies also are not evaluating the benefits of U.S. 
counterpiracy efforts to U.S. interests. While the Action Plan 
discusses the United States' national security interest in maintaining 
freedom of navigation of the seas in order to facilitate vibrant 
maritime commerce, the extent to which counterpiracy benefits U.S. 
interests and maritime commerce has not been evaluated. The Maritime 
Administration reports that piracy may pose costs to the maritime 
industry for protecting vessels from being attacked or hijacked. For 
example, industry may incur costs for rerouting ships to avoid pirate- 
infested waters, higher insurance premiums, or enhancing vessel 
security by hiring private security guards or installing nonlethal 
deterrent equipment. Ultimately, according to the Maritime 
Administration, any costs incurred would be passed along to the 
taxpayer and the consumer. However, agencies are not systematically 
evaluating the extent to which the U.S. investment in counterpiracy 
operations is benefiting maritime commerce or weighing these benefits 
against the costs incurred to conduct counterpiracy operations. In 
addition, data show that the number of U.S. ships operating in the 
region is low. The Coast Guard reports that, at any given time, there 
are about six to eight U.S.-flagged vessels operating in the region 
and the chance of a commercial vessel being attacked by pirates in the 
Gulf of Aden is estimated to be less than 1 percent. Furthermore, 
according to the Maritime Administration, vessels carrying commerce to 
the United States are less susceptible to piracy given their high 
speed. Moreover, in 2009, the Congressional Research Service reported 
that despite the increased threats and estimates of rising costs 
associated with piracy off the Horn of Africa, the effect on the 
insurance industry appeared negligible and U.S. insurance rates had 
not changed.[Footnote 34] 

The Action Plan also establishes objectives related to repressing 
piracy and reducing incidents of piracy, but it does not define 
measures of effectiveness that can be used to evaluate progress toward 
reaching those objectives, or assess the relative benefits or 
effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks to prevent, disrupt, and 
prosecute acts of piracy. Further, the Action Plan does not specify 
what information the NSC or other designated interagency groups should 
use to monitor or evaluate to determine progress, or assess benefits 
or effectiveness. Agency officials have cited several challenges 
associated with measuring the effectiveness of U.S. efforts, including 
the complexity of the piracy problem, difficulty in establishing a 
desired end-state for counterpiracy efforts, and difficulty in 
distinguishing the effect of U.S. efforts from those of its 
international and industry partners. Nevertheless, U.S., 
international, and industry officials we spoke with attributed the 
decrease in the pirates' rate of successful attacks in 2009 and shift 
to the Indian Ocean to U.S. and international prevention and 
interdiction efforts. We previously have reported that performance 
information is essential to the ability of decision makers to make 
informed decisions, and that specifying performance metrics can be one 
tool in evaluating the effectiveness of government efforts in a 
changing environment.[Footnote 35] Identifying measures of 
effectiveness and systematically evaluating the effectiveness of 
agency efforts could assist the U.S. government in determining the 
costs and benefits of their activities to ensure that resources 
devoted to counterpiracy efforts are being targeted most effectively, 
and whether adjustments to plans are required. 

Without information on the magnitude of U.S. resources devoted to 
counterpiracy operations, or the benefits or effectiveness of its 
actions, the U.S. government is limited in its ability to weigh its 
investment of resources to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa 
against its other interests in the region. The lack of systematic 
evaluation of costs, benefits, and effectiveness also makes it 
difficult for agencies to target and prioritize their activities to 
achieve the greatest benefits. We have previously reported that 
agencies should identify the human, information technology, physical, 
and financial resources needed to initiate or sustain a joint effort 
among multiple agencies, as one means of enhancing interagency 
collaboration.[Footnote 36] In addition, a discussion of resources, 
investments, and risk management is an important characteristic of 
national strategies that can enhance their usefulness to resource and 
policy decision makers and resource managers.[Footnote 37] 

Moreover, despite the expansion of pirate attacks over a vastly larger 
geographic area, increased ransom demands and payments, and better 
organized pirate activities since the Action Plan was written, 
according to U.S. government officials, there are no plans to reassess 
the Action Plan in order to determine whether it should be revised. 
Currently, the Action Plan does not specifically address how to 
counter pirates in the broader Indian Ocean or what methods to use to 
meets its objective of apprehending leaders of pirate organizations 
and their financiers. U.S. agencies have reported taking some steps to 
respond to the changing methods and location of pirate attacks. For 
example, the Navy issues weekly updates on piracy incidents to inform 
mariners and naval forces, which in 2010 have cautioned that pirates 
are operating at considerable distances off the coast of Somalia. 
Defense officials also have worked with coalition partners to develop 
a coordination guide for operations in the Somali Basin and have 
described measures they have taken to interdict and destroy pirate 
mother ships. However, according to Coast Guard, Treasury, and Justice 
officials, as of April 2010, the Maritime Security Interagency Policy 
Committee affirmed the overall course of U.S. counterpiracy efforts 
and did not identify a need to modify the current approach to 
countering piracy. Furthermore, the Action Plan contains tasks such as 
those to create a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center and support 
shiprider programs that are no longer being pursued by U.S. agencies 
because they have determined that these tasks are not needed or would 
not be beneficial. We have established in prior work that federal 
efforts are implemented in dynamic environments in which needs must be 
constantly reassessed, and that agencies can enhance and sustain 
collaborative efforts by, among other things, developing mechanisms to 
report on results.[Footnote 38] By continually evaluating its approach 
to countering piracy off the Horn of Africa and reporting on results 
of its counterpiracy efforts to key stakeholders, the United States 
may be in a better position to hold agencies accountable for results 
and achieve its ultimate goal of repressing piracy. 

U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take 
Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy 
Efforts: 

U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and 
industry partners to counter piracy, but they could implement other 
key collaborative practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration 
among U.S. interagency partners. According to U.S., international, and 
industry stakeholders, U.S. agencies have collaborated effectively 
with international and industry partners through mechanisms and 
organizations to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa. The United 
States also has collaborated well with international military partners 
and industry groups. Within the U.S. government, while agencies have 
implemented some collaborative practices, other practices could be 
implemented to further enhance collaboration. The U.S. government has 
not made substantial progress on those Action Plan tasks that involve 
multiple agencies and those in which the NSC has not clearly 
identified roles and responsibilities or coordinated with U.S. 
agencies to develop joint guidance. 

U.S. Agencies Have Collaborated Effectively with International and 
Industry Partners: 

U.S. agencies, primarily State and Defense, have collaborated with 
international partners through two new organizations established to 
counter piracy off the Horn of Africa: the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) and the Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction meetings. As previously discussed, the Action Plan 
directed U.S. agencies to establish and maintain a Contact Group, 
which serves as an international forum for countries contributing to 
the counterpiracy effort to share information. State orchestrates U.S. 
participation in the Contact Group, coordinating with officials from 
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Treasury. As 
part of the Contact Group, the United States has participated in six 
plenary meetings with international partners in counter piracy efforts 
since January 2009. These meetings have facilitated international 
military coordination, provided guidance to international efforts, and 
established a trust fund to support counterpiracy efforts. As part of 
the Contact Group's efforts, the Coast Guard and the Maritime 
Administration cochair a working group focusing on coordinating with 
the shipping industry, which has reviewed and updated best management 
practices for industry self-protection, encouraged continued 
communication between industry and government organizations such as 
the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa, and is developing 
guidance for seafarer training regarding pirate attacks. In addition, 
officials told us that State has participated in the working group on 
strategic communication and assisted in developing draft strategic 
communication documents considered by the group. 

The United States also has worked to establish collaborative 
organizations, share information, and develop joint guidance for 
international military partners working to counter piracy. As the 
leader of the Combined Maritime Forces, in 2008 the U.S. Navy, along 
with other international partners, established the Shared Awareness 
and Deconfliction meetings that are intended to provide a mechanism 
for militaries active in the region to share information on their 
movements and make efficient use of the limited naval assets 
patrolling pirate-infested waters. We observed one of these meetings 
that occur every 4 to 6 weeks with representatives from the European 
Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the shipping industry, 
as well as with nontraditional partners from countries such as Russia 
and China. According to U.S. and international officials, these 
meetings have improved coordination and led to the creation of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor within the Maritime 
Security Patrol Area as well as coordination guides for military 
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The coordination 
guides provide joint guidance to participating international forces 
intended to ensure the most effective use of the military assets in 
the region by outlining shared practices and procedures. 

The United States has also worked to support information sharing 
efforts on investigative and prosecutorial techniques. In July, 2010, 
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service hosted a workshop on 
counterpiracy investigations that was attended by over 50 
representatives from the United States, international military, law 
enforcement, and industry organizations. According to Defense 
officials, this workshop facilitated development of a draft 
investigators manual designed to help standardize counterpiracy 
operations. 

U.S. agencies, primarily the Coast Guard and the Maritime 
Administration, have worked with industry partners to facilitate 
collaborative forums, share information, and develop joint guidance 
for implementing counterpiracy efforts. Industry partners play an 
important role in preventing and deterring pirate attacks since they 
are responsible for implementing self -protection measures on 
commercial vessels. According to officials, in late 2008 the Coast 
Guard and the Maritime Administration encouraged industry groups to 
develop best practices for industry to counter piracy and hosted 
several meetings with U.S. and international industry groups. 
According to U.S. and shipping industry officials, these meetings 
resulted in the industry-published best management practices 
guide.[Footnote 39] This document has provided critical guidance to 
ship owners and operators on how to protect themselves from pirate 
attacks. In addition, for those ship owners who choose or are required 
to carry armed security teams, the Coast Guard and State have worked 
to identify viable methods for doing so in accordance with applicable 
U.S., international, and port-state laws.[Footnote 40] The Coast Guard 
has communicated methods for taking arms on ships and the responses 
from international partners to the shipping industry through two port 
security advisories. As the U.S. agency responsible for implementing 
national and international maritime security regulations on U.S.-
flagged vessels, the Coast Guard also has hosted four collaborative 
forums with industry partners to address piracy issues since April 
2009. These meetings have provided a forum to discuss changes required 
to ship security plans to address the piracy threat, the evolving 
piracy situation, and U.S. efforts to assist in protecting U.S.-
flagged vessels. For example, the Coast Guard facilitated a meeting 
with industry representatives and officials from State and Treasury in 
April 2010 to discuss the executive order on Somalia, which has 
implications for the shipping industry's ability to pay ransoms to 
secure the release of captive crews. Further, the Maritime 
Administration developed training courses to inform vessel crews about 
how to help prevent piracy and steps to take if taken hostage. 

In addition, the Maritime Administration and the Military Sealift 
Command have created a new collaborative mechanism for working with 
industry in the form of Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams. When requested 
by the owner of a U.S.-flagged vessel, a team consisting of the 
Maritime Administration and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
personnel will assess a ship's security and offer advice on ways to 
improve. When the teams visit a vessel, Maritime Administration 
officials meet with company officials to discuss their security 
efforts and document these efforts so they can be shared with other 
ship operators. Lastly, U.S. Central Command has used the Maritime 
Liaison Office based in Bahrain as an additional mechanism to exchange 
information between naval forces and industry. This office serves as a 
conduit for information focused on safety of shipping and conducts 
outreach with the shipping industry, such as through newsletters to 
encourage the use of self-protection measures. 

U.S. Agencies Have Implemented Some Collaborative Practices but Could 
Enhance Efforts by Incorporating Others: 

U.S. government agencies have implemented some collaborative practices 
in working with interagency partners to counter piracy but could 
enhance efforts where less progress has been made by incorporating 
other key practices. Several key practices than can enhance 
interagency collaboration include developing an overarching strategy, 
establishing collaborative mechanisms to share information with 
partners, assigning roles and responsibilities, and developing joint 
guidance to implement interagency efforts. Consistent with key 
practices, the NSC established its Action Plan, which serves an 
overarching strategy to guide U.S. interagency efforts and provides a 
framework for interagency collaboration.[Footnote 41] The Action Plan 
creates an interagency task force that is intended to coordinate, 
implement, and monitor the actions contained in the plan. 

In addition, the U.S. departments and multiple component agencies 
involved in counterpiracy efforts have also implemented another key 
practice--using collaborative organizations to share information. 
Collaborative organizations that provide adequate coordination 
mechanisms to facilitate interagency collaboration and achieve an 
integrated approach are particularly important when differences exist 
between agencies that can impede collaboration and progress toward 
shared goals by potentially wasting scarce resources and limiting 
effectiveness.[Footnote 42] Within the NSC, which includes committees 
with agency secretaries, deputy secretaries, and assistant 
secretaries, are existing forums for discussing and coordinating 
interagency efforts that officials have reported discuss counterpiracy 
efforts. Additionally, as called for in the Action Plan, State and 
Defense established the Counter-Piracy Steering Group, which includes 
representatives from the U.S. departments and component agencies 
involved in counterpiracy efforts. 

Furthermore, in certain circumstances, such as a pirate attack on a 
U.S.-flagged vessel, the U.S. government uses the existing Maritime 
Operational Threat Response process to facilitate a discussion among 
U.S. agencies and decide on courses of action, which is outlined in an 
October 2006 plan that is part of the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security.[Footnote 43] For example, when the MV Maersk Alabama was 
attacked in April 2009, facilitators utilized established protocols to 
activate the process and bring together the appropriate government 
officials . Figure 10 shows U.S. authorities responding to the MV 
Maersk Alabama incident in 2009. According to U.S. and Maersk 
officials involved, over the course of several meetings--some of which 
included Maersk representatives--U.S. officials decided on actions to 
take in response to the attack, resulting in the release of a U.S. 
merchant marine captain that had been taken hostage by pirates. 
[Footnote 44] U.S. and Maersk officials considered the outcome of the 
Alabama incident to be a success. Officials from Defense, State, Coast 
Guard, the Maritime Administration, and Justice have reported that 
this process has been an effective tool in responding to this and 
other piracy incidents. In addition, the Coast Guard established a new 
collaboration mechanism--a weekly interagency conference call--to 
coordinate operational efforts among the agency partners working to 
counter piracy, which we observed during this review. 

Figure 10: U.S. Personnel Respond to the MV Maersk Alabama Incident in 
2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

U.S. officials used the Maritime Operational Threat Response process 
to coordinate the response to the kidnapping of a U.S. merchant marine 
captain, who was held hostage by pirates for 5 days in the Indian 
Ocean aboard the lifeboat pictured above. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Although the NSC and U.S. agencies have taken these collaborative 
steps, the NSC could incorporate two other key practices--assigning 
roles and responsibilities and developing joint implementation 
strategies--to further enhance interagency collaboration in 
counterpiracy efforts. As of July 2010, the NSC had only assigned 
roles and responsibilities for implementing 1 of the 14 Action Plan 
tasks. The Action Plan recognizes that, consistent with other U.S. 
mission requirements, the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard provide 
persistent interdiction through their presence and can conduct 
maritime counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Action Plan states 
that those forces shall coordinate counterpiracy activities with other 
forces operating in the region to the extent practicable and sets out 
a number of specific actions to be taken in various piracy situations. 
Although the Action Plan states that the Departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury, 
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall 
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance 
with the Action Plan, the NSC did not clearly identify roles and 
responsibilities for specific agencies that will ensure the 
implementation of the other 13 tasks in the Action Plan. Establishing 
roles and responsibilities can help agencies clarify which agencies 
will lead or participate in activities, help organize their joint and 
individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.[Footnote 45] 

Agencies could enhance collaboration by developing joint guidance to 
implement and coordinate actions on several Action Plan tasks. Joint 
guidance helps ensure that agencies involved in collaborative efforts 
work together efficiently and effectively by establishing policies, 
procedures, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate 
across agency boundaries.[Footnote 46] Effective joint guidance also 
addresses how agency activities and resources will be aligned to 
achieve goals. 

Implementing Key Practices Could Enhance Efforts Involving Multiple 
Agencies Where Less Progress Has Been Made: 

In the absence of clearly identified roles and responsibilities and 
joint implementation strategies, agencies involved in countering 
piracy have made comparatively more progress in implementing those 
Action Plan tasks that fall firmly within one agency's area of 
expertise, such as those to establish a Contact Group, update ship 
security plans, and provide an interdiction-capable presence, than 
they have on those tasks for which multiple agencies may be involved. 
For example, State, which has the authority and capability to work 
with international partners in establishing the Contact Group, has 
made substantial progress toward implementing that task. Furthermore, 
the Action Plan calls for commercial vessels to review and update 
their ship security plans in order to prevent and deter pirate 
attacks. Officials explained that because the Coast Guard has 
responsibility for enforcing U.S.-regulated commercial-vessel 
compliance with maritime security requirements, the agency took the 
lead on implementing this task and has made substantial progress. 
Similarly, Defense has primary responsibility for providing a 
persistent interdiction-capable presence in the region and has made 
substantial progress as lead on that task. 

In contrast, there are several tasks in the Action Plan for which 
multiple agencies have relevant authorities, capabilities, or 
interests, and on which less progress has been made. The NSC did not 
identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks and 
officials have acknowledged that the agencies have not developed joint 
guidance to ensure their efforts work together efficiently and 
effectively. For example, the NSC included efforts related to 
developing a strategic communications strategy, disrupting pirate 
revenue, and holding pirates accountable as essential to implementing 
the Action Plan. 

* Strategic communication: The Action Plan calls for the United States 
to lead and support a global public information and diplomatic 
campaign to highlight, among other things, the international 
cooperation undertaken to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa, as 
well as piracy's destructive effects on trade, human and maritime 
security, and the rule of law. In addition, according to the Action 
Plan, any strategic communication strategy must also convey concerns 
about the risks associated with paying ransoms demands. Multiple 
agencies are involved in communicating with various audiences about 
piracy. State communicates with international partners about 
international cooperation; Defense communicates with military partners 
about international military cooperation and with African audiences to 
discourage piracy; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
communicates with U.S. and international law enforcement partners 
about law enforcement, investigative, and analytical cooperation; and 
the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration communicate with the 
shipping industry about self-protection measures and ransom concerns. 
However, there is no governmentwide strategic communication plan in 
place to guide agency efforts, optimize effects, and enhance the 
achievement of goals. According to State officials, State has drafted 
a governmentwide counterpiracy strategic communication plan for 
interagency review but as of July 2010, the department was still 
awaiting comments from interagency partners and did not have an 
estimated date for when the plan would be finalized, though Treasury 
officials had provided comments. Meanwhile agencies have taken varying 
approaches to strategic communication. Defense has developed a 
classified plan for its activities, and according to Coast Guard 
officials, the Coast Guard suspended its effort to develop a plan upon 
learning that State was drafting a governmentwide plan. As a result, 
U.S. agencies have not implemented all the strategic communication 
efforts called for by the Action Plan, and it is not clear that the 
agencies' efforts are coordinated or as effective as possible in 
communicating the intended messages about piracy. 

* Disrupting pirate revenue: According to the Action Plan, the goal 
for disrupting pirate revenue is to trace ransom payments and 
apprehend leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. Multiple 
agencies are involved in collecting information on pirate finances. 
Justice collects information on financial assets entering the United 
States related to piracy. According to officials, Treasury examines 
financial activities and reviews intelligence, law enforcement, and 
publicly available information, to map illicit financial networks and 
to determine appropriate action, including potential designation of an 
individual or entity pursuant to the April 2010 executive order on 
Somalia. State officials described their work with international 
partners to gather information on illicit financial networks, while 
Defense officials told us they collect intelligence on pirate 
financial activities by questioning captured pirate suspects. However, 
the NSC did not clearly identify any agency with specific 
responsibility for disrupting pirate revenue. As a result, officials 
at Justice, State, and Defense agree that information their agencies 
gather on pirate finances is not being systematically analyzed, and it 
is unclear if any agency is using it to identify and apprehend pirate 
leaders or financiers. In addition, though Justice, State, and Defense 
officials reported that Somali piracy exhibits characteristics of 
international organized crime, currently pirate attacks prosecuted by 
the United States are not investigated by the FBI's Organized Crime 
Section but instead by the Violent Crimes Section. In the absence of 
clearly identified roles and responsibilities, and with competing 
priorities, officials indicated agencies have not taken initiative to 
develop joint guidance to ensure these disparate efforts work together 
efficiently and effectively. Similarly, officials acknowledged there 
is no supporting plan or joint guidance to direct U.S. interagency 
efforts to collect and analyze criminal intelligence on pirates. 
However, State is in the process of creating a Counter-piracy Finance 
Working Group intended to facilitate closer interagency coordination 
of efforts to combat the financial flows and support networks of 
piracy off Somalia. According to Justice officials, as of July 2010, 
the United States has not apprehended or prosecuted the leaders of any 
pirate organizations or their enablers as called for in the Action 
Plan. 

* Facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates: The Action Plan 
contains several tasks related to facilitating the prosecution of 
suspected pirates by parties with an interest in prosecution, but it 
does not identify clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies 
needed to ensure implementation of these tasks. In some cases, U.S. 
officials said roles are apparent where an agency's mission aligns 
with the Action Plan's tasks, such as State's diplomatic work with 
regional partners to conclude prosecution arrangements. However, a 
lack of defined roles and joint guidance to implement U.S. efforts to 
facilitate prosecutions poses challenges for prosecuting suspected 
pirates when each agency's role is less clear. For example, absent 
defined roles and responsibilities and interagency guidance, U.S. 
officials explained that they had to dedicate time during a high-level 
interagency meeting of the Maritime Security Interagency Policy 
Committee to arrange details, including cost sharing, for the 
transportation of suspects after the spring 2010 pirate attacks on the 
USS Ashland and USS Nicholas. State officials told us that prior to 
these attacks the U.S. government had limited experience being 
involved with the prosecution of Somali pirates and had not 
established the necessary interagency procedures for transferring 
suspects and sharing costs among the agencies involved. 

By enhancing interagency collaboration, the NSC can reduce the risk of 
leaving gaps in its counterpiracy efforts or the risk that agency 
efforts may overlap, which could waste resources that could be applied 
to combat other threats to national security, such as terrorism. 
Clarifying roles and responsibilities and developing joint 
implementing guidance could also help agency officials--who must 
balance their time and resources among many competing priorities--more 
fully and effectively carry out their roles in helping to repress 
piracy and avoid duplication of effort. 

Conclusions: 

Given that the President identified piracy as a threat to U.S. 
national security interests and that it is a complex problem that 
affects a variety of stakeholders, the U.S. government has taken a 
collaborative approach in its counterpiracy plans. The U.S. government 
has taken many steps to implement the Countering Piracy off the Horn 
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), but still faces 
a number of challenges to meeting the Action Plan's objective of 
repressing piracy, including inherent limits on its ability to 
influence industry and international partners and persuade other 
states to consider prosecuting suspected pirates. In addition, the 
United States must address the problem of piracy in an environment in 
which counterpiracy efforts compete with other high-priority U.S. 
interests in the region, and the NSC acknowledges that longer-term 
efforts to stabilize Somalia are needed to fully address the root 
causes of piracy. In the face of such challenges, the NSC's Action 
Plan provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to follow 
in implementing efforts to counter piracy. However, the U.S. 
government is not tracking the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of 
its counterpiracy activities and thus lacks information needed to 
weigh resource investments. In addition, without a systematic 
evaluation of interagency efforts to compare the relative 
effectiveness of various Action Plan tasks, key stakeholders lack a 
clear picture of what effect, if any, its efforts have had. 
Establishing performance measures or other mechanisms to judge 
progress and evaluating performance information could provide U.S. 
government stakeholders with more specific information to update the 
Action Plan and better direct the course of U.S. government plans and 
activities to repress piracy. Without updating U.S. government plans 
and efforts to reflect performance information and the dynamic nature 
of piracy, the U.S. government is limited in its ability to ensure 
that efforts and resources are being targeted toward the areas of 
greatest national interest. 

Federal agencies have made great strides to collaborate with each 
other and with international and shipping-industry partners, but could 
benefit from greater specificity in the Action Plan about their roles 
and responsibilities and development of joint implementing guidance, 
especially with regard to those Action Plan tasks that require a 
variety of stakeholders to implement. Without specific roles and 
responsibilities for essential aspects of its Action Plan--including 
developing a U.S. government strategic communication plan, disrupting 
pirate revenue, or facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates--U.S. 
agencies have either developed their own approaches to these tasks or 
developed no approach at all. In addition, developing joint 
implementing guidance could help agencies work together more 
effectively and potentially improve progress toward U.S. goals. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve U.S. government efforts to implement the Countering Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), 
enhance interagency collaboration, provide information to decision 
makers on results, and better target resources, we recommend that the 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in 
collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury: 

* reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving 
conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and 
plans; 

* identify measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. 
counterpiracy efforts; 

* direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to (1) identify the costs 
of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and 
personnel costs; and (2) assess the benefits, and effectiveness of 
U.S. counterpiracy activities; and: 

* clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint 
guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate 
across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as 
strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating 
prosecution. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of 
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the 
Treasury; and the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC did not 
provide comments on the report or our recommendations. Defense 
provided written comments to clarify facts in the report which are 
reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury provided technical 
comments which we incorporated as appropriate. 

In written comments, Defense stated that the department does not agree 
that using percent of seized suspected pirates who were delivered for 
prosecution is an appropriate measure of program success. Defense also 
commented that the metric does not take into account that it is up to 
individual countries within the coalition to determine the validity of 
evidence and decide whether to prosecute. In the draft report, we 
stated that the Action Plan establishes objectives related to 
repressing piracy and reducing incidents of piracy, but does not 
define measures of effectiveness that can be used to evaluate progress 
toward reaching those objectives. In the absence of defined measures 
of effectiveness, we made qualitative assessments of U.S. government 
progress in implementing the Action Plan tasks by reviewing program 
documents, analyzing data, and interviewing agency officials. We 
determined that the U.S. government had made some progress on the 
Action Plan task to seize and destroy pirate vessels and related 
equipment and deliver captured suspected pirates for prosecution. In 
response to Defense's comments, we have modified the report to 
explicitly recommend that the NSC identify measures of effectiveness 
to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We also revised the 
summary text contained in figure 5 for this line of action to better 
incorporate some of the prosecution challenges discussed in appendix 
II and more fully address the rationale for our assessment. 

Defense also provided comments to better depict the contributions of 
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service to counterpiracy operations 
which we incorporated throughout the report. And finally, Defense 
stated that U.S. Special Operations Command does not conduct 
counterpiracy operations and stated in its technical comments that it 
is a force provider to other combatant commands who are responsible 
for conducting counterpiracy operations. As a result, we modified the 
draft to eliminate reference to the U.S. Special Operations Command as 
incurring costs for counterpiracy operations. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7 
days from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland 
Security, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and interested 
congressional committees. We also will make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact either John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Signed by: 

Stephen L. Caldwell: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To address our objectives, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation, 
and interviewed officials from the U.S. government agencies that the 
National Security Council (NSC) specifically tasked to contribute to, 
coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with NSC's 2008 
Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan 
(Action Plan). We met with and gathered information from officials 
representing the various agencies tasked with implementing the Action 
Plan and who participate on the committees within the NSC.[Footnote 
47] We also conducted work with international and industry partners 
involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 48] 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has made progress in 
countering piracy off the Horn of Africa and the challenges it faces, 
we reviewed the Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of 
Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 2005 National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, relevant U.S. laws, United Nations 
Security Council resolutions on piracy off the Horn of Africa, as well 
as our prior work related to Somalia, maritime security, interagency 
collaboration, and combating illicit financing. To assess the 
implementation status of the actions called for in the Action Plan, we 
reviewed program documents, analyzed data, and interviewed agency 
officials. Our assessments are based on data from multiple sources, 
are qualitative in nature, and are derived from consensus judgments. 
We assessed "substantial progress" for those tasks where all 
components specified by the Action Plan were implemented; "some 
progress" for tasks where components were partially implemented or 
agencies had taken steps toward implementation; and "little or no 
progress" where agencies had made minimal or no effort toward 
implementing the components of the task. We provided a "not 
applicable" assessment for one task in the Action Plan that agency 
officials and our analysis revealed to have been overtaken by events 
and no longer relevant for U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We provided a 
summary of our progress assessments to the agencies and incorporated 
their comments as appropriate. We also reviewed our prior work related 
to results-oriented government[Footnote 49] and evaluated the extent 
to which the interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group charged with 
coordinating, implementing, and monitoring the actions in the NSC plan 
followed select key practices for achieving results including 
monitoring and evaluating efforts, using performance information to 
improve efforts and revise plans as needed, and reporting on results. 
In addition, we met with international and industry partners involved 
in developing best practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, 
working with the international Contact Group, and participating in 
naval patrols off the Horn of Africa to gain their perspective on the 
challenges and progress in countering piracy, the effectiveness of 
counterpiracy actions, implementation of best management practices for 
protecting ships, and how conditions off the Horn of Africa are 
evolving. To gain insight on trends in pirate activity since the 
United States and coalition partners began counterpiracy operations, 
we obtained and analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off the Horn 
of Africa for the years 2007 through June 2010 from the International 
Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau. The International 
Maritime Bureau operates a Piracy Reporting Center that collects data 
on pirate attacks worldwide. According to its officials, there are 
some limitations with International Maritime Bureau data because they 
rely on ship officials to provide the information, which can vary, and 
some information is not provided due to sovereignty issues regarding 
investigations. However, we reviewed internal controls and measures 
used by the bureau to protect the reliability and accuracy of their 
data on pirate attacks and attempted attacks and discussed the 
reliability of the bureau's data with international, industry, and 
government subject-matter experts involved in counterpiracy operations 
and determined that the bureau's data were the best data available on 
pirate attacks and attempted attacks. Therefore, we determined the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of describing the 
context of piracy as a threat to seafarers and the geographical scope 
of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. To identify the results of 
interdiction efforts led and supported by the United States we 
obtained and reviewed data from the Combined Maritime Forces for the 
years 2008 to June 2010. There are some limitations with Combined 
Maritime Forces' data because these data are compiled from military 
and nonmilitary sources and reporting. Although efforts are made to 
correlate and confirm the accuracy of these data, Combined Maritime 
Forces cannot fully guarantee their accuracy. We discussed data-
collection methods, processes for data entry, and the steps taken to 
ensure reasonable accuracy of the data with both the International 
Maritime Bureau and the Combined Maritime Forces. We determined the 
data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To 
identify the amount of ransoms being paid to Somali pirates we 
reviewed monthly ransom data from the Office of Naval Intelligence for 
2007 through 2009. Due to the classified nature of the sources and 
methods used to develop this data, we did not independently verify the 
reliability of this information. 

To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are 
collaborating with each other and with international and industry 
partners, we synthesized key practices for enhancing and sustaining 
collaboration on complex national security issues from our prior work. 
[Footnote 50] We then evaluated the extent to which department and 
agency actions incorporate select key practices including (1) 
developing overarching strategies and mutually reinforcing plans, (2) 
assigning roles and responsibilities, and (3) creating collaborative 
organizations that share and integrate information. To obtain 
information on the nature and extent of collaboration on counterpiracy 
efforts among agencies, international and industry partners, we 
reviewed the NSC's Action Plan, and department and agency program 
documents; and interviewed agency, international, and industry 
officials. To gain insight into new and existing coordination 
mechanisms applicable to piracy, we observed the weekly interagency 
conference calls on counterpiracy efforts, attended a Shared Awareness 
and Deconfliction meeting in Manama, Bahrain, and reviewed program 
documents. 

U.S. Government Agencies: 

For both of our objectives, we interviewed and, where appropriate, 
obtained documentation from officials with the following U.S. 
government agencies: 

Department of Defense: 

* Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy): the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (Counter-Narcotics and Global 
Threats), the Oceans Policy Advisor in the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (Countering Weapons 
of Mass Destruction), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs (African Affairs): 

* Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy 
Directorate) for Oceans Policy/Counterpiracy, J3 (Operations 
Directorate), and J2 (Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate), Piracy 
Lead: 

* Office of General Counsel: 

* Under United States Africa Command: the Strategy, Plans and Programs 
Directorate; the Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate; 
the Operations and Logistics Directorate, Information Operations 
Division; the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems 
and Chief Info Officer Directorate; and the Outreach Directorate, 
Strategic Communications Division: 

* Under United States Central Command: the Maritime Liaison Office 
(Bahrain); and the Naval Forces Central Command's Maritime Operational 
Center (Bahrain), Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General's Corps U.S. 
Naval Forces Central Command (Bahrain), and Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (Bahrain): 

* United States Special Operations Command: 

* Under the Department of the Navy: the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence: 

Department of Homeland Security: 

* United States Coast Guard's offices of Assessment, Integration, and 
Risk Management; Counterterrorism and Defense Operations; 
International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor; Public Affairs; 
Vessel Activities; Prevention Policy; Maritime and International Law; 
Policy Integration; Law Enforcement; Operations Law; and the Patrol 
Forces Southwest Asia (Bahrain): 

Department of Justice: 

* National Security Division: 

* Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development 
Assistance Training and Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section: 

* Federal Bureau of Investigation's Criminal Investigative Division, 
Violent Crimes Section and Organized Crime Section: 

* United States Attorneys' Office: 

Department of State: 

* Office of the Secretary of State: 

* Bureau of African Affairs' Office of East African Affairs and Office 
of Regional Security Affairs: 

* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Plans, Policy and 
Analysis and Office of International Security Operations: 

* Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence; 
Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Attorney- 
Adviser (specializing in law of the seas); and Attorney-Adviser 
(specializing in United Nations issues): 

* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' 
Office of Anti-Crime Programs, Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing 
Unit: 

* Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Office of Country 
Reports and Asylum Affairs and Office of Africa and Eurasia: 

* Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs' Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs: 

* Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs' Office of 
Transportation Policy and Office of Terrorism Finance and Economics 
Sanctions Policy: 

* Foreign Policy Advisor from the Department of State to the U.S. 
Naval Forces Central Command (Manama, Bahrain), and the Permanent 
Representative to the International Maritime Organization from the 
Department of State/U.S. Embassy-London U.S. 

Department of Transportation: 

* The Maritime Administration's Office's of the Chief Counsel, Office 
of International Activities, Associate Administrator for National 
Security, Associate Administrator for Environment and Compliance and 
its Office of Security, and the Office of Financial Approvals and 
Marine Insurance's Division of Marine Insurance: 

Department of the Treasury: 

* Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence's offices of 
Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, Foreign Assets Control, and 
Intelligence and Analysis: 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

* National Maritime Intelligence Center: 

International, Industry, and Nongovernmental Organizations: 

We also interviewed and, where appropriate, obtained documentation 
from the following: 

International Partners: 

* International Maritime Organization (London, U.K.): 

* European Union Naval Forces (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Security 
Centre-Horn Of Africa Industry Liaison, Chief of Staff, J4 Movements 
and Transport, and Industry Liaison: 

* Combined Maritime Forces (Manama, Bahrain), Coalition Forces' Chief 
Air Coordination Element and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 
Meeting: 

* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Air 
Operations, N2 Intelligence Division, N3 Operations Division, and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Shipping Centre: 

* United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, 
and Department for Transport: 

Industry Partners: 

* APL Maritime; Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO); 
Chamber of Shipping of America; International Association of Dry Cargo 
Shipowners (INTERCARGO); International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO); International Chamber of Shipping; 
International Group of P&I Clubs; International Maritime Bureau; 
International Transportation Workers Federation (ITF); Lloyd's Market 
Association; Maersk Line Limited; National Academy of Sciences, 
Transportation Research Board, Marine Board; Society of International 
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited (SIGTTO); and the World 
Shipping Council. 

Maritime Experts: 

* Former Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (Combined Task 
Force 151), former United States Navy Judge Advocate General, Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs (Chatham House). 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September 
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Agency Progress in Implementing the 
National Security Council's Action Plan: 

In December 2008, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) published 
its Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action 
Plan (Action Plan), which laid out 14 tasks to implement three lines 
of action to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of Somali piracy. We 
assessed the extent to which U.S. government agencies involved in 
countering piracy[Footnote 51] have made progress implementing the 
Action Plan. In addition to the information provided earlier in this 
report, this appendix contains further details on the steps that those 
agencies have taken--or have yet to take--to implement various tasks 
called for under each of the plan's three lines of action: (1) prevent 
pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to 
piracy; (2) disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law 
and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and 
(3) facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, 
and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to 
ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for 
their actions. 

We based our assessment on reviews of agency plans, status reports, 
and interviews with U.S. government, international, and industry 
officials involved in counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 52] The scope 
and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in 
appendix I. 

Progress in Implementing Actions to Prevent Pirate Attacks by Reducing 
the Vulnerability of the Maritime Domain to Piracy: 

Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Establish and Maintain a Contact 
Group: 

In concert with the United Nations and international partners, the 
U.S. government has made substantial progress in helping to establish 
and maintain a Contact Group of countries willing and able to help 
combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Action Plan calls for the 
immediate establishment of a Contact Group to combat piracy off the 
Horn of Africa, which would meet as necessary to develop and 
coordinate international policy initiatives, share information, 
provide resources for building regional capacity to counter piracy, 
and advocate for other mechanisms to repress piracy. In January 2009, 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) 
was formed in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1851, and, as of June 2010, it had 49 member nations as well as 
international organization partners. The Contact Group established a 
multidonor trust fund to help offset the cost of prosecuting suspected 
pirates, and in April 2010, members approved $2.1 million for programs 
in the Seychelles and Somalia. 

The Department of State (State) orchestrates U.S. participation in the 
Contact Group, coordinating with officials from the Departments of 
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury. 
In addition, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration cochair 
the working group on industry self-protection, which facilitated 
development and adoption of best management practices for self- 
protection, in coordination with industry and the International 
Maritime Organization. Military, industry, and international officials 
credit these self-protection measures, in part, for the reduction in 
successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 to 2009. 
According to agency officials, the Department of Defense (Defense) and 
State have participated in various other working groups, including 
military coordination and judicial efforts. 

Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Strengthen and Encourage the Use 
of the Maritime Security Patrol Area: 

The U.S. government has made substantial progress on strengthening the 
use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area in collaboration with its 
international partners, though there are limits to the reach of 
government influence on commercial vessels. The Action Plan calls for 
the United States to strengthen the use of the Maritime Security 
Patrol Area--the area patrolled by coalition Combined Maritime Forces 
and other navies--by encouraging other countries to assign naval 
forces and assets to the area, coordinating and sharing information 
with the other navies, and urging members of the shipping industry to 
use the Maritime Security Patrol Area.[Footnote 53] State has 
encouraged multinational military coordination through bilateral 
channels and the Contact Group. The U.S. Navy has contributed to both 
to the Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
patrols. In addition, the United States contributes to Shared 
Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, established to share information 
with and coordinate the counterpiracy patrols of coalition forces and 
independent countries. International officials also told us that 
Combined Maritime Forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
European Union forces are coordinating surveillance and patrol of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, the recommended route 
within the Maritime Security Patrol Area for commercial vessels 
transiting the Gulf of Aden. 

Defense, Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the Maritime 
Liaison Office have used a variety of methods to encourage commercial 
vessels to use the Maritime Security Patrol Area and coordinate with 
naval patrols, such as publishing advisories, maintaining 
informational Web sites, and sponsoring information-sharing meetings. 
The Coast Guard requires that U.S.-flagged vessels register their 
transit plans through the Horn of Africa region with the Maritime 
Security Centre-Horn of Africa and notify the United Kingdom Maritime 
Trade Operations office in Dubai, which both monitor the transit of 
vessels in the region. However, U.S.-flagged vessels comprise a small 
proportion of the ships that transit the high-risk waters off the Horn 
of Africa, and, and the Coast Guard regulations mandating self-
protection measures only apply to U.S.-flagged vessels. While the U.S. 
government encourages commercial vessels from other flag states to 
take advantage of the monitoring provided by navies patrolling the 
Maritime Security Patrol Area, Defense, Maritime Administration, 
shipping industry, and international officials estimate that 
approximately 20 to 25 percent of the shipping traffic in the region 
does not register its transit with patrolling forces. These officials 
also told us that, as pirates have expanded their area of operations 
into the Indian Ocean, coalition forces faced increased challenges in 
disrupting attacks given the unfeasibility of establishing secured 
transit corridors in this area similar to that used in the Gulf of 
Aden. 

Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Update Ships' Security 
Assessments and Plans: 

The Coast Guard has achieved substantial progress in ensuring that 
ship security plans for U.S.-flagged vessels have been updated with 
piracy annexes, and the United States is encouraging other countries 
to implement similar measures. The Action Plan calls for the United 
States to urge other nations to update their ship security plans and 
to encourage vessels in the Gulf of Aden to take specific protective 
measures. In May 2009, the Coast Guard promulgated the second revision 
of Maritime Security Directive 104-6, which requires that all U.S.- 
flagged vessels transiting high-risk areas have an approved security 
plan to prevent and defend against pirate attacks.[Footnote 54] 
Furthermore, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration have 
taken steps to implement this task by issuing guidance to support 
industry efforts to prevent attacks.[Footnote 55] For example, the 
Coast Guard's Port Security Advisories provide information on using 
armed security teams to protect vessels transiting high-risk waters. 
[Footnote 56] As of July 2010, the Coast Guard had approved the 
additional security measures submitted by each of the 211 U.S.-flagged 
vessels identified as traveling through high-risk waters, 108 of which 
travel through the Horn of Africa region. The Coast Guard ensures 
those U.S.-flagged vessels transiting high-risk waters have an updated 
plan by monitoring the movement of U.S.-flagged vessels, checking for 
approved plans, and investigating compliance when vessels are at 
certain ports. However, U.S.-flagged vessels comprise only a small 
proportion of the ships that transit the area, and according to 
officials the influence of the U.S. government on international ships 
is limited. 

To encourage international implementation of self-protection measures 
by commercial vessels, the United States has signed and promoted the 
nonbinding New York Declaration. According to the declaration, the 
signatory countries will ensure, when carrying out their obligations 
under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 
that vessels on their registry have adopted and documented appropriate 
self-protection measures in their ship security plans.[Footnote 57] 
These plans specify how each vessel will employ the applicable self- 
protection measures. While officials acknowledge that best management 
practices do not provide guaranteed protection against a hijacking, 
officials at the International Maritime Organization and the Maritime 
Security Centre-Horn of Africa, established by the European Union 
Naval Force, estimate that the majority of ships hijacked in the Gulf 
of Aden were not following one of the easiest and least costly of self-
protection measures, registering their voyage through high-risk waters 
with the centre. Although U.S., international, and industry officials 
told us that no data are available on the extent to which ships 
transiting high-risk waters are following best practices, U.S., 
international military, and industry officials estimate that 
approximately 70 to 80 percent of ships are using best management 
practices to deter piracy. However, the United States and its 
international partners still face challenges urging compliance with 
these practices among the remaining 20 to 30 percent of vessels. 

Some Progress Has Been Made in Strategic Communication to Counter 
Piracy: 

In collaboration with the Contact Group, U.S. departments and agencies 
involved in strategic communication efforts have made some progress in 
implementing actions called for in the Action Plan. The Action Plan 
calls for the U.S. government to lead and support a global public 
information and diplomatic campaign to highlight the international 
cooperation, coordination, and integration undertaken to repress 
piracy off the Horn of Africa while emphasizing the destructive 
effects of piracy and the rule of law. Agency officials have stated 
that the lack of a U.S. presence in Somalia presents challenges to 
efforts to communicate directly with the Somali population to 
discourage piracy and makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness 
of strategic communication efforts. 

High-level U.S. government officials have warned of the threat of 
piracy in public statements, and the Coast Guard and the Maritime 
Administration have actively shared information with members of the 
shipping industry to encourage self-protection from attack. For 
example, in April 2009 the Secretary of State outlined four steps 
State was taking in the aftermath of the hijacking of the MV Maersk 
Alabama, primarily diplomatic engagement with international partners 
and Somali government officials, and work with the shipping and 
insurance industries. Further, the Coast Guard held a series of 
roundtable discussions with the shipping industry to address concerns 
about ransom payments following the issuance of an April 2010 
executive order that prohibits persons under U.S. jurisdiction from 
making payments to persons designated under the Order, and State and 
the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials also told us they 
established guidance for and communicated with the shipping industry 
after the executive order was issued. 

In addition, according to officials, Defense and State lead 
interagency meetings held, in part, to gain U.S. consensus on piracy-
related strategic communication issues prior to meetings with 
international partners. State officials also reported contributing to 
interagency strategic communication efforts of the Contact Group and 
have created a publicly available maritime security Web page, which 
includes information on piracy. 

The Department of Defense has developed a strategic communication 
plan, but it is a classified document for internal use. State 
officials told us they have drafted a plan to coordinate interagency 
strategic communication on counterpiracy efforts, including outreach 
to domestic and foreign audiences to inform them about U.S. and 
international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, but 
at the time of this report, the draft was still undergoing review by 
interagency partners and had not been finalized. 

Progress in Disrupting Acts of Piracy Consistent with International 
Law and the Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal and Flag States: 

Progress Assessment Is Not Applicable for Efforts to Support and 
Contribute to a Regionally Based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center: 

The United States has not worked to create a Counter-Piracy 
Coordination Center as called for in the Action Plan, but a progress 
assessment toward this task was considered not applicable given 
changing circumstances and the status of other ongoing counterpiracy 
efforts since the time of the plan's publication. The Action Plan 
calls for the creation of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center to 
establish a single, centralized service to receive reports of piracy 
and suspicious vessels, alert maritime interests, gather and analyze 
information regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa, provide a secure 
common operating picture for stakeholder governments and the shipping 
industry, and as appropriate, coordinate the dispatch of available 
response assets. However, according to Defense officials, creating 
such a center would duplicate existing capabilities provided by 
international partners. Subsequent to the publication of the Action 
Plan, Defense officials determined that existing efforts were in place 
to meet the goals outlined for a coordination center. Three 
organizations are currently involved in carrying out the tasks 
outlined for a single coordination center, each of which covers the 
functions of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center. The Maritime 
Security Centre-Horn of Africa is a coordination center for transiting 
ships to voluntarily record their ships' movements and to receive 
updated threat information. It also coordinates available response 
assets to provide support and protection to mariners. The United 
Kingdom's Maritime Trade Operations office in Dubai serves as the 
first point of contact for reporting an attack. The Maritime Liaison 
Office in Bahrain serves as the link between the commercial maritime 
community and U.S. and coalition military forces. Other mechanisms 
exist to coordinate stakeholder governments, such as the Contact Group 
and its associated working groups, and to coordinate military patrols, 
such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings. 

Some Progress Has Been Made in Seizing and Destroying Pirate Vessels 
and Equipment, and Delivering Suspects for Prosecution: 

The United States has made progress toward seizing and destroying 
pirate vessels and equipment but has had limited progress delivering 
suspected pirates for prosecution. The Action Plan calls for the 
seizing and destroying of vessels outfitted for piracy and related 
equipment, and states the U.S. government may conduct and urge others 
to conduct counterpiracy operations in international waters around 
Somalia. According to data from the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, 
coalition and other international partners destroyed or confiscated 
nearly 100 pirate vessels and confiscated more than 380 weapons, 
including small arms and rocket propelled grenades between August 2008 
and June 2010. Coalition forces also report that international 
partners confiscated approximately 140 items of pirate paraphernalia, 
including automatic weapons, grappling hooks, ladders, and global 
positioning system devices in that same time period. 

According to military officials, interdicting forces determine a 
vessel to be potentially used for piracy upon sight, given the 
presence of certain gear and weaponry and the absence of typical 
fishing gear. Military officials also told us that, once piracy 
equipment is seized and destroyed, U.S. forces follow international 
protocols and release the vessel and those onboard with sufficient 
fuel and provisions to reach shore.[Footnote 58] According to 
international military officials, European Union and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization forces also are monitoring pirate bases on shore 
from warships, and then seizing and destroying pirate skiffs and 
equipment as they leave bases. However, military and international 
officials told us that the seizing of pirate paraphernalia provides 
only a temporary obstacle to pirate operations. 

U.S. efforts to deliver suspected pirates to states for prosecution 
are hampered by a lack of states that are willing and able to 
prosecute. The Action Plan states the U.S. government will deliver 
suspected pirates to states that are willing and able to prosecute in 
those cases where pirate vessels are seized or destroyed. As of June 
2010, international forces had encountered more than 1,100 suspected 
Somali pirates since August 2008 but had delivered only approximately 
40 percent to states for prosecution. According to a report issued by 
the Department of Defense in May 2010, U.S. military forces have 
transferred 24 suspected pirates for prosecution to Kenya, the only 
country with which the United States had an arrangement to accept 
pirate transfers at the time. According to State and Department of 
Justice (Justice) officials, Kenya is only willing to accept cases 
with strong evidence, such as cases in which suspects are caught in 
the act of committing piracy. According to Combined Maritime Forces 
officials, when suspected pirates are interdicted at sea and are not 
engaged in an act of piracy, but are in possession of pirate 
equipment, interdicting forces typically will detain the suspected 
pirates, confiscate their equipment, and then release the suspects. 
Additionally, officials stated that because of evidence standards and 
the limited options for prosecution, interdicting forces are left with 
little choice but to catch and release the suspected pirates. 

As of June 2010, approximately 57 percent of the suspects that 
international forces encountered were caught and released. 
Furthermore, military officials told us there have been cases of 
suspects being encountered multiple times at sea, so the practice of 
catching and releasing suspects could allow multiple attempts at 
piracy. Although Defense officials we spoke with had varied opinions 
on whether repeat offenders were a credible issue, since biometric 
data--such as fingerprints--are not systematically gathered to track 
such cases, U.S. and international forces cannot determine whether 
they are finding repeat offenders. 

Although, as noted in the Action Plan, piracy is a universal crime 
that any state could potentially prosecute, most states, including the 
United States, in practice will consider prosecuting suspected pirates 
in appropriate cases when it is in their national interest to do so. 
However, according to State officials, some countries lack sufficient 
domestic law to support prosecution of suspected pirates. Others may 
have the domestic legal frameworks, but lack the resources or 
political will to take action. State officials also told us that 
logistical difficulties exist in prosecuting piracy cases such as 
evidence collection and preservation at sea, bringing in merchant 
mariners or naval personnel to provide testimony and difficulty 
proving intent in cases where suspects were not caught in the act. 
Finally, some countries that might otherwise provide a venue for 
prosecution may also have concerns that acquitted suspects or 
convicted pirates who are released after serving a prison sentence may 
seek asylum. Officials from State told us the U.S. government has 
prosecuted cases against every suspected pirate captured who attempted 
an attack on a U.S. vessel. Currently, a total of 12 suspects from 
attacks on the MV Maersk Alabama (April 2009), USS Nicholas (March 
2010) and USS Ashland (April 2010) are being tried in the United 
States. The U.S. government will approach other affected states for 
prosecution in cases interdicted by U.S. forces where there is no 
interest for the U.S. government to prosecute. According to officials 
at State, preference for prosecution is given to the flag state of a 
vessel. State officials also said they are encouraging regional 
countries to prosecute. 

Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Provide Persistent Interdiction- 
Capable Presence: 

Since the Action Plan was issued, the U.S. military and Coast Guard 
have made substantial progress in providing an interdiction-capable 
presence by providing resources to a counterpiracy task force under 
the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, and the U.S. Navy has 
contributed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization counterpiracy 
operations. According to the Action Plan, the U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard forces operating in the region provide persistent interdiction 
through presence, can conduct maritime counterpiracy operations, and 
shall coordinate counterpiracy activities with other forces to 
prevent, respond to, and disrupt pirate attacks. Since the Combined 
Maritime Forces' counterpiracy task force was established in January 
2009, the U.S. Navy has provided patrol ships, aircraft, surveillance 
assets, medical response units, as well as leadership for the 
international naval coalition conducting counter piracy operations in 
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. According to Defense officials, 
from June 2009 to June 2010, the U.S. Navy had an average of four to 
five ships present daily in the Horn of Africa, with two or three of 
those ships having embarked air assets. Defense officials told us as 
many as eight U.S. Navy ships could be present on any given day, with 
Navy ships supporting Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization counterpiracy operations, and other maritime 
coalition and U.S. national efforts. For example, U.S. Marine Corps 
aviation units have provided support to counterpiracy operations 
during transits of the area and the Coast Guard has assigned 
deployable specialized forces and a cutter to the combatant commander 
to support counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service also supports maritime counterpiracy operations 
by providing special agents afloat to assist boarding teams and lead 
immediate investigations into piracy incidents on the high seas. 

U.S., international, and industry officials credit the reduction in 
the rate of successful pirate attacks from approximately 40 percent in 
2008 to 22 percent in 2009, in part, to international patrols in the 
Gulf of Aden. The U.S. military also initiated and contributes to 
tactical military coordination and information sharing with 
international partners through Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 
meetings that optimize patrol coverage of the transit corridor in the 
Gulf of Aden and aid with coordination of coalition and independently 
deployed counterpiracy forces. However, coalition officials 
acknowledge U.S. and international forces face challenges in 
interdicting pirate incidents as pirates have adapted their tactics 
and expanded their area of activity to the much larger and harder-to-
patrol Indian Ocean. Pirates have attacked several vessels more than 
1,000 nautical miles from Somalia and now threaten an area of nearly 2 
million square nautical miles. Analytic estimates from Defense 
officials show that full coverage of the area affected by piracy would 
require more than 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters--a level of 
support Defense officials say is beyond the means of the world's 
navies to provide. With current resources, Combined Maritime Forces 
officials estimate 25 to 30 international ships conduct counterpiracy 
patrols in the Horn of Africa at any given time. In addition, military 
officials noted it is hard to predict how long countries will sustain 
counterpiracy investments, since countries participate in Combined 
Maritime Forces patrols at will. The Action Plan also states that 
effective and prompt consequence-delivery mechanisms are critical to 
the success of interdiction efforts. However, challenges related to 
judicial capacity and securing prosecution venues may complicate 
interdiction efforts. 

Some Progress Has Been Made in Supporting Shiprider Programs and Other 
Bilateral and Regional Counterpiracy Agreements and Arrangements: 

The U.S. government has discussed shiprider programs with several 
countries but no counterpiracy shiprider programs have been finalized 
for this region. The Action Plan calls for supporting and 
participating in the development of shiprider programs and other 
bilateral and regional counterpiracy agreements and arrangements. 
Shiprider arrangements would allow foreign law enforcement officials 
to operate from U.S. naval vessels and facilitate the prosecution of 
suspected pirates. For example, shipriders from the country that would 
prosecute suspected pirates would be able to arrest the suspects and 
collect evidence directly, thereby facilitating the prosecution of the 
suspected pirates. 

According to officials at State, they determined, in discussion with 
Kenyan officials, that a shiprider program would not facilitate 
prosecution of suspected pirates in Kenya because Kenyan law requires 
suspects to be presented before a magistrate within 24 hours of being 
taken into custody by a Kenyan official, including a shiprider. This 
requirement would be challenging to meet when suspected pirates are 
interdicted far out in the Indian Ocean. A shiprider provision was 
therefore not included in the prosecution arrangement facilitating 
transfer of suspects between the United States and Kenya for 
prosecution. According to officials at State, the Seychelles has a 
similar law and therefore a shiprider provision was not included in 
its arrangement with the United States. While State and Justice 
officials told us there are ongoing discussions regarding arrangements 
with other countries, such as Mauritius and the Philippines, the U.S. 
government faces challenges in finding willing partners for such 
programs. Officials acknowledged that shiprider programs may not be as 
beneficial for counterpiracy efforts as the authors of the Action Plan 
intended. 

The U.S. government also has been involved in the International 
Maritime Organization's effort to conclude a regional arrangement, 
called the Djibouti Code of Conduct. This arrangement includes 
sections that address topics similar to those addressed in the Action 
Plan. For example, the code contains provisions related to information 
sharing regarding pirate activity, reviews of national legislation 
related to piracy, and the provision of assistance between the 
signatories. The code also includes a section addressing the 
possibility of using shipriders. Coast Guard and State officials were 
involved in the development of the code and have also expressed 
support for implementing elements of the code. 

Little or No Progress Has Been Made to Disrupt and Dismantle Pirate 
Bases Ashore: 

The U.S. government has not taken any action toward disrupting and 
dismantling pirate bases ashore, for a number of reasons including 
that the President has not authorized this action, the United States 
has other interests in the region that compete for resources, and long-
standing concerns about security hinder the presence of U.S. military 
and government officials in Somalia. The Action Plan states that 
piracy at sea can be abated only if pirate bases ashore are disrupted 
or dismantled. Additionally, the plan states that the appropriate 
authority to disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore has been 
obtained from the United Nations Security Council and Somali 
authorities, and states that the United States will work with 
concerned governments and international organizations to disrupt and 
dismantle pirate bases to the fullest extent permitted by national 
law. However, as of April 2010, such action had not been authorized by 
the President. In addition, Somalia has lacked a functioning central 
government since 1991. Further, the United States closed its embassy 
in Mogadishu in 1991, and there is currently no official U.S. military 
or civilian presence in that country. While the international 
community, including the United States, continues to provide 
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia, challenges have 
limited efforts to establishing peace, security, stability, and an 
effective and functioning government. According to officials at State 
and Defense, U.S. agencies allow travel to Somalia; however, general 
practice has severely limited the U.S. presence in Somalia since 1994. 
Furthermore, State officials told us that there has been no recent 
travel to Somalia other than a short trip by a senior official made in 
February 2008. Defense and State officials said that the United States 
has a number of other higher priority interests in Somalia and in the 
region, which compete for military and civilian resources and that may 
ultimately affect counterpiracy decisions. 

Some Progress Has Been Made toward Disrupting Pirate Revenue: 

While Treasury, State, and Justice have each taken steps to achieve 
some progress toward disrupting pirate revenue, challenges inhibit 
further implementation of this task. The Action Plan states that the 
U.S. government will coordinate with all stakeholders to deprive 
pirates and their supporters of any illicit revenue and the fruits of 
their crime, advocating the development of national capabilities to 
gather, assess and share financial intelligence on pirate financial 
operations, with the goal of tracing payments to and apprehending the 
leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. Treasury served as 
the lead agency for implementing an executive order signed by the 
President in April 2010 that blocks all property or interests in 
property within U.S. jurisdiction of any persons that are listed in 
the order and allows for designation of other persons that threaten 
the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including those who 
support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. However, 
Treasury officials told us the order applies only to assets that pass 
through U.S. financial institutions or come into the possession or 
control of persons in the United States or U.S. citizens or permanent 
residents, which limits the potential effect of the executive order on 
piracy revenue. As a result, it is not clear the extent to which 
designating pirates in the executive order will achieve the goal of 
disrupting pirate revenue. 

While officials told us the U.S. government has reserved the right to 
take enforcement action against private companies for paying ransoms 
to individuals designated in the executive order, only two pirates 
have been designated thus far. Representatives of the shipping 
industry have stated that ship owners have no viable option for 
rescuing crews being held hostage other than to pay ransoms, and they 
fear that a failure to pay ransoms could escalate pirates' violence 
against crew members. State and Treasury officials told us they have 
communicated to shipping industry representatives that Treasury and 
Justice have discretion to decide whether or not to take enforcement 
action for any violation of the order, and that a decision to take 
enforcement actions will depend on the facts of each case. 

Treasury officials told us their efforts to disrupt pirate revenue 
also have been limited by the lack of sufficient information on pirate 
networks in Somalia and on the flows of pirate finances, including 
ransom payments. According to officials at State, the U.S. 
intelligence community has the strongest understanding of pirate 
financing, but no U.S. agencies have dedicated resources toward the 
issue. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and State officials told 
us that information related to pirate organizations may be collected 
in the course of pursuing other U.S. interests in the area, but piracy 
is not among their top priorities and is unlikely to be assigned 
resources. As a result, according to FBI officials, the FBI Organized 
Crime Section is not working to build a case against pirate leaders 
and enablers. State officials described the need to better use 
intelligence to target efforts by the U.S. government and other 
stakeholders, but also acknowledged that the poor security situation 
in Somalia poses challenges for gathering the intelligence needed to 
disrupt pirate financing. Ultimately, officials from multiple agencies 
told us U.S. agencies face resource constraints in disrupting pirate 
financing given higher-priority concerns such as counterterrorism. 

In addition, the absence of a formal financial sector in Somalia is a 
major challenge to filling intelligence gaps. Treasury officials 
stated that the lack of a formal financial sector in Somalia and the 
pirates' reliance on informal financial systems presents a challenge 
because many of the tools they normally would use to track financial 
activity are implemented through formalized financial systems. 

State has taken several actions to raise the issue of pirate financing 
among international partners and to address misconceptions within the 
shipping industry about the U.S. position on ransoms. The U.S. 
government has helped elevate the issue of pirate financing within the 
Contact Group, including releasing a paper to participants. State and 
Justice also have worked with partner governments and international 
organizations, such as Interpol and the United Nations, to develop 
collaborative events linking experts on pirate financing, and 
sponsored a workshop in Kenya with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime that covered money laundering and organized crime. 

Progress to Ensure That Those Who Commit Acts of Piracy Are Held 
Accountable for Their Actions by Facilitating the Prosecution of 
Suspected Pirates by Flag, Victim, and Coastal States, and, in 
Appropriate Cases, the United States: 

Some Progress Has Been Made toward Concluding Arrangements to 
Formalize Custody and Prosecution: 

The U.S. government has made some progress in concluding prosecution 
arrangements for Somali piracy cases, by securing prosecution 
arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and is working toward 
similar arrangements with other countries. The Action Plan calls for 
the U.S. government to conclude agreements and arrangements to 
formalize custody and prosecution arrangements both in and outside the 
region. In January 2009, the U.S. government formalized an arrangement 
with Kenya to facilitate transfers of piracy cases from U.S. forces. 
The United States has transferred 24 suspected pirates to Kenya for 
prosecution, and Defense officials told us one conviction has been 
secured thus far. In July 2010, the U.S. government also concluded an 
arrangement with the Seychelles for transfers of piracy cases from 
U.S. forces. In addition, State officials said that discussions are 
ongoing with countries that have a regional or commercial interest in 
countering piracy, such as Mauritius, the Philippines, and Tanzania, 
and it is taking steps to conclude further arrangements. As of May 
2010, according to agency officials, State had encouraged 17 countries 
to consider prosecution of suspected pirates. However, State officials 
told us that the lack of prosecution venues is a primary challenge to 
prosecuting pirates, which may undermine interdiction efforts. 
According to State and Justice officials, challenges to establishing 
prosecution arrangements include limited regional capacity and 
interest of states outside the region to prosecute suspected pirates. 

In addition the relatively low rate of prosecutions contributes to the 
perception that pirates operate with relative impunity. As of June 
2010, international forces had encountered more than 1,100 suspected 
Somali pirates since August 2008 but had delivered only approximately 
40 percent to states for prosecution. Although Kenya announced its 
intent to withdraw from its arrangement with the United States in 
April 2010, that decision was later reversed, and more than 100 piracy 
cases were being processed through the Kenyan criminal justice system 
as of June 2010. 

Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts: 

The United States has made some progress in using the United Nations 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation[Footnote 59] to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute 
suspected pirates, but this effort involves several challenges. The 
Action Plan calls for the United States to use--and encourage other 
countries to use--appropriate jurisdiction of flag, port, and coastal 
states, as well as states of the nationality of victims and 
perpetrators of piracy, through the prosecution of any persons having 
committed an act of piracy, and states that the United States will 
urge other states party to the convention to use it as a vehicle for 
the prosecution of acts violating the convention. For example, the 
United States has exercised jurisdiction under the convention to 
prosecute one pirate in the United States. U.S. officials told us that 
State, Justice, Defense, and the Coast Guard have been involved in 
efforts, through the Contact Group and the International Maritime 
Organization, to encourage use of the Convention to prosecute 
suspects. However, U.S. agency officials cited hurdles to prosecuting 
pirates, such as limits to affected countries' willingness and 
capacity to prosecute pirates, and difficulties associated with 
collecting evidence in the maritime environment. 

Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Use of Other 
Applicable International Conventions and Customary International Law: 

The United States has taken some steps to support and encourage the 
use of other applicable international conventions and customary 
international law as they relate to prosecuting piracy. The Action 
Plan calls for the U.S. government to support and encourage the use of 
relevant and appropriate jurisdiction through the framework of 
applicable international conventions, in addition to the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, such as the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention, the 2000 
Transnational Organized Crime Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist 
Financing Convention, and customary international law. For example, 
the U.S. government has exercised jurisdiction over 11 suspected 
pirates who attempted attacks on the USS Nicholas in March 2010 and 
the USS Ashland in April 2010. 

The Action Plan also anticipates ongoing discussion with other states 
on the possibility of an international court to prosecute suspected 
pirates, if necessary. However, the U.S. government does not support 
creation of a dedicated piracy court because of the amount of time, 
resources, and infrastructure that would be required. State officials 
said that the U.S. government is interested in solutions for 
challenges to prosecution, including the possibility of a hybrid court 
combining a piracy chamber within a national system. However, they 
said despite interest expressed by members of the Contact Group and 
other nations, no countries have offered their prosecutors or 
territories for use in establishing a dedicated international court. 

Some Progress Has Been Made toward Enhancing Regional States' 
Capabilities to Accept Suspected Pirates for Prosecution, Extradition, 
and Incarceration: 

The Departments of Justice and State have achieved some progress in 
providing assistance to several regional countries, and the United 
States is contributing to international efforts to develop regional 
judicial capacity. The Action Plan calls for the United States to work 
with interested parties to identify the nature and scope of 
international assistance needed to enhance the capacities of regional 
states in connection with the arrest, detention, prosecution, and fair 
trial of persons accused of involvement in piracy, and to pursue 
bilateral programs to provide judicial capacity-building efforts. 
State has created an assessment tool to identify gaps in regional 
states' maritime capabilities including judicial issues. The U.S. 
government provides support to regional partners for building judicial 
capacity. For example, the resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy 
in Nairobi has provided assistance to Kenya, Tanzania, and the 
Seychelles. This advisor, a position within Justice's Office of 
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training but 
supported by State, told us he provided assistance in developing 
piracy cases, and helped develop guidance for U.S. forces on evidence 
collection and transferring piracy cases to Kenya. Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service special agents have testified in Kenyan courts, 
and provided counter-piracy training and operational support to 
officials in the Seychelles. In addition, the U.S. government, in 
conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, has 
sponsored conferences focused on piracy for law enforcement and judges 
from countries in the Horn of Africa region. 

Further, the United States has contributed $250,000 to the United 
Nations counterpiracy effort for regional capacity-building. In April 
2010, the Contact Group board that administers a trust fund for 
prosecution issues, which includes the United States, approved $2.1 
million for five projects primarily to support the prosecution of 
suspected pirates in Somalia and the Seychelles. However, Justice and 
State officials told us that regional states continue to have a 
limited capacity to prosecute suspected pirates and incarcerate 
convicted pirates. Although State officials said that they were 
attempting to include a funding request for future operations, in the 
current budget cycle, counterpiracy operations at State have no 
dedicated budget. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III International and Shipping-Industry Partners Involved in 
Counterpiracy Efforts: 

Table 2: International Partners Involved in Counterpiracy Efforts: 

Country: Australia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Austria; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Bahamas; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]. 

Country: Bahrain; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Belgium; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Canada; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: China; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Comoros; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Cyprus; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Czech Republic; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Denmark; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Djibouti; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Egypt; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Ethiopia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Finland; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: France; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Germany; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Greece; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: India; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Indonesia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Iran; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Ireland; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Italy; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Japan; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Jordan; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Kenya; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Republic of Korea; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Liberia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]. 

Country: Lithuania; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Luxembourg; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Madagascar; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Malaysia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Maldives; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Malta; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Marshall Islands; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]. 

Country: Mauritius; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Mexico; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Morocco; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Netherlands; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Norway; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Oman; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Panama; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]. 

Country: Portugal; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: Russia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]; 
Independent deployers. 

Country: Seychelles; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]; 
Independent deployers; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Singapore; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Somalia TFG; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Spain; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Sudan; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Sweden; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: Tanzania; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]. 

Country: Thailand; 
Combined Task Force 151. 

Country: Turkey; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Combined Task Force 151; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield. 

Country: Ukraine; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Combined Task Force 151; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta. 

Country: United States; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
New York Declaration signatories[A]; 
Combined Task Force 151; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Country: Yemen; 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; 
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B]; 
Independent deployers; 
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Other countries occasionally contribute to Standing North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Maritime Group 2, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization group implementing Operation Ocean Shield. 

[B] The Djibouti Code of Conduct is open for signature by the 21 
countries in the region. As of March 2010, 13 countries had signed the 
Code of Conduct. 

[End of table] 

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: 

In January 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(Contact Group) was formed in response to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1851 to facilitate discussion and coordination of 
actions among countries and organizations working to suppress piracy 
off the coast of Somalia. The participating countries established four 
working groups in which all Contact Group parties may participate. 
Working Group 1 addresses activities related to military and 
operational coordination and information sharing and the establishment 
of the regional coordination center, and is chaired by the United 
Kingdom with the support of the International Maritime Organization. 
Denmark chairs Working Group 2, which addresses judicial aspects of 
piracy with the support of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
The United States chairs Working Group 3 to strengthen shipping self- 
awareness and other capabilities, with the support of the 
International Maritime Organization. Egypt chairs Working Group 4 
which focuses on improving diplomatic and public-information efforts 
on all aspects of piracy. As of June 2010, 49 countries, 7 
international organizations, and 3 industry observers participate in 
the Contact Group. 

New York Declaration: 

First open for signature in May 2009, the New York Declaration is a 
commitment by countries to promulgate the internationally recognized 
best management practices for self-protection to vessels on their 
registry and ensure that vessels on their registry have adopted and 
documented appropriate self-protection measures. As of July 2010, 10 
countries had signed the declaration. 

Djibouti Code of Conduct: 

The Djibouti Code of Conduct recognizes the problem of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in the Horn of Africa region. Signatories 
declare their intention to cooperate to the fullest extent possible, 
consistent with their available resources and related priorities, 
their respective national laws and regulations, and international law 
in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Among 
other things, under the Djibouti Code of Conduct, participants should 
set up national focal points to facilitate coordinated, timely, and 
effective flow of information about piracy and armed robbery against 
ships. Additionally, according to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, each 
participant intends to review its national legislation to ensure its 
has laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against 
ships and adequate provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
conduct of investigations, and prosecution of alleged offenders. The 
code is open for signature by the 21 countries in the region and, as 
of March 2010, 13 of the 21 countries had signed. 

Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151: 

Under the leadership of the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command and U.S. 5th Fleet, the Combined Maritime Forces is a 25-
nation coalition that is focused on countering terrorism, preventing 
piracy, reducing illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and 
promoting safety of the maritime environment. Established in 2002, the 
Combined Maritime Forces patrol more than 2.5 million square miles of 
international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated 
operations. Additionally, the Combined Maritime Forces conducts 
maritime security operations in the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of 
Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean. This expanse includes three 
critical points in high-risk waters at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez 
Canal, and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen. 

In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established Combined 
Task Force 151 with the sole mission of conducting counterpiracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in 
the Indian Ocean. This is a multinational naval task force made up of 
countries willing and able to participate in counterpiracy operations. 
So far, 11 countries have contributed forces to Combined Task Force 
151 and several others that have agreed to send ships or aircraft or 
both to participate in counterpiracy operations. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield: 

Operation Ocean Shield is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 
contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of 
Africa. This operation builds on the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization's previous counterpiracy operations which began in late 
2008 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began providing 
escorts to United Nations World Food Programme vessels transiting the 
high-risk waters off the Horn of Africa. The North Atlantic Council 
approved Operation Ocean Shield in August 2009. This operation focuses 
on at-sea counterpiracy operations, support to the maritime community 
to take actions to reduce incidents of piracy, as well as regional- 
state counterpiracy capacity building. This operation is designed to 
complement the efforts of existing international organizations and 
forces operating in the area. This operation is being implemented by 
the Standing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maritime Group 2 
made up of vessels from eight different member countries that 
routinely contribute to the group and other countries that 
occasionally contribute. 

European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta: 

The European Union is conducting Operation Atalanta to help deter, 
prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of 
Somalia. This operation began in late 2008 following the adoption of 
Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846 by the United Nations Security 
Council. The operation's objectives are to protect vessels of the 
World Food Programme, humanitarian aid, and African Union Military 
Mission in Somalia shipping; help deter, prevent, and repress acts of 
piracy and armed robbery; protect vulnerable shipping; and monitor 
fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. This operation is being 
implemented by 14 countries with operational support provided by a 
team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters. Operation Atalanta has 
been extended by the European Council until December 2012. 

Independent Deployers: 

Independent deployers are countries that are not part of the coalition 
forces. These countries deploy naval forces to the region under 
national auspices to escort their ships through high-risk waters and 
to monitor counterpiracy operations, and may coordinate with coalition 
patrols. 

Countries Prosecuting Suspected Pirates: 

Although the Action Plan considers piracy to be a universal crime that 
any country can prosecute, in practice, most countries, including the 
United States, will consider prosecuting suspected pirates in 
appropriate cases when it is in their national interest to do so. A 
single piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous 
countries, including the country in which the vessel is flagged, the 
various countries of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, 
regional coastal countries, the country of the vessel or cargo owner, 
and transshipment and destination countries. 

Shipping-Industry Partners: 

Various organizations representing interests of the shipping industry 
have been involved in efforts to prevent or respond to piracy off the 
Horn of Africa. For example, the 12 shipping industry organizations 
actively involved in the development of the "Best Management Practices 
to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia" 
represent the interests of ship owners, seafarers, marine insurance 
companies, and others, and included: the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil 
Companies International Marine Forum, Baltic and International 
Maritime Council, Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal 
Operators, International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, 
International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, Cruise Lines 
International Association, International Union of Marine Insurers, 
Joint War Committee & Joint Hull Committee, International Maritime 
Bureau, and International Transport Workers Federation. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

Pirates have expanded their area of operations with an increasing 
number of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area much larger 
than the Gulf of Aden. Defense officials report that pirates now 
threaten an area of nearly 2 million square nautical miles in the 
Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. Figure 11 shows the number and location 
of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa reported to the International 
Maritime Bureau in 2007, 2008, 2009, and the first half of 2010. 

Figure 11: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of 
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 maps] 

Map indicate the location in the Indian Ocean of attacks during the 
years 2007-2010. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map 
Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent 
Capabilities: 
2500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500: 

September 9, 2010: 

Mr. John Pendleton: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-10-856, "Maritime 
Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance 
Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the 
Horn of Africa," dated September 2010. 

We noted in our technical comments several areas whereby the 
significant contributions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
(NCIS) to our counter-piracy efforts could be depicted more 
accurately. The Department does not agree that using percent of seized 
suspected pirates who were delivered for prosecution is an appropriate 
measure of program success. The metric does not take into account that 
fact that it is up to individual countries within the coalition to 
determine the validity of the evidence to determine whether to 
prosecute. Additionally, it should be noted that U.S. Special 
Operations Command does not conduct counter-piracy operations. 

Your consideration of these comments is appreciated. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

William F. Wechsler: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; 
Patricia Lentini, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Curda; Susan Ditto; 
Nicole Harms; Barbara Hills; Brandon L. Hunt; Farhanaz Kermalli; 
Eileen Larence; Tom Melito; Tobin McMurdie; John Mingus; Susan Offutt; 
Terry Richardson; Mike Rohrback; Leslie Sarapu; Amie Steele; Gabriele 
Tonsil; Suzanne Wren; and Loren Yager made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

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[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirate attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and off the 
coast of Oman have been attributed to Somali pirates. 

[2] For example, Resolution 1816 authorized governments to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, but only with authorization from the 
Somali Transitional Federal Government. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/ 
RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 

[3] S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 

[4] The White House NSC is the principal forum used by the President 
of the United States for considering national security and foreign 
policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet 
officials and is part of the Executive Office of the President of the 
United States. The function of the Council is to advise and assist the 
president on national security and foreign policies. The Council also 
serves as the president's principal arm for coordinating these 
policies among various government agencies. On May 26, 2009, President 
Obama merged the White House staff supporting the Homeland Security 
Council (HSC) and the National Security Council into one National 
Security Staff (NSS). The HSC and NSC each continue to exist by 
statute as bodies supporting the president. 

[5] In the context of this report, the term "states" refers to nations 
or countries involved in counterpiracy efforts. 

[6] GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address 
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy 
Commodity Tankers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). 

[7] GAO, Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International 
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts,[hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-351] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.19, 
2008). 

[8] GAO, Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans 
Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672] (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2008). 

[9] GAO, Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury's Office of Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve 
Its Mission, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-794] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2009). 

[10] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, 
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2009). 

[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[13] The Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 
84 U.N.T.S. 11, which has been ratified by the United States, 
attempted to codify the rules of international law relating to the 
high seas and contains provisions determined to be generally 
declaratory of established principles of international law by the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The United States has 
not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. Both conventions define piracy as any of 
the following acts: (1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any 
act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) 
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property onboard such ship or aircraft; (b) against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; (2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft; (3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2. 

[14] The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered. 
In general, flag states have the authority to enforce their own as 
well as international regulations, such as those relating to security 
standards, with respect to such vessels. Most ships are not registered 
under the same flag as the nationality of the owner. As of 2008 only 
422 of the 1154 U.S.-owned commercial ships were registered in the 
United States with the remaining 732, or 63 percent, registered in 
other countries. Panama and Liberia have the two largest registries 
and together register 23.5 percent of commercial vessels worldwide. 
Panama has 6,323 ships registered, 85 percent of which are foreign-
owned; Liberia has 2,204 ships registered, 96 percent of which are 
foreign-owned. Coastal states are countries with a sea coast. Some 
regional coastal states include Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen. 

[15] According to the World Shipping Council, more than 7 percent of 
the world's total ocean trade transited the Suez Canal in 2007. The 
alternative to using the Suez Canal is to travel an additional 4,900 
nautical miles around the African continent. 

[16] S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). The 
authorities provided by that resolution were renewed in 2009 with the 
adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1897, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009). 

[17] According to the declaration, the signatory countries will 
ensure, when carrying out their obligations under the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code that vessels on their 
registry have adopted and documented appropriate self-protection 
measures in their ship security plans. The ISPS is a part of the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
T.I.A.S. No. 9700. See appendix III for complete listing of countries 
that have signed the New York Declaration. 

[18] In April 2009, Somali pirates seized the MV Maersk Alabama 
approximately 250 nautical miles southeast of the Somali town of Eyl. 
The pirates held the captain hostage for five days. U.S. naval forces 
rescued the captain, killing three suspected pirates and taking one 
into custody. In March 2010 pirates attacked the USS Nicholas while it 
was operating west of the Seychelles in international waters. The USS 
Nicholas captured five suspected pirates after exchanging fire, 
sinking a skiff, and confiscating a suspected mother ship. In April 
2010 pirates fired upon the USS Ashland about 330 nautical miles off 
the coast of Djibouti. The USS Ashland captured six suspected pirates 
after exchanging fire and sinking their skiff. The United States also 
has brought charges related to the November 2008 attack on the Danish-
owned MV CEC Future that was carrying cargo belonging to a U.S. 
company against one of the suspected pirates involved in the attack on 
the USS Ashland. 

[19] A dhow is a type of vessel used for coastal trading off the Horn 
of Africa. 

[20] Although Kenya announced its intent to withdraw from its 
arrangement with the United States in April 2010, that decision was 
later reversed. The United States formalized its arrangement with the 
Seychelles in July 2010. 

[21] As of June 2010, 49 countries, 7 international organizations, and 
3 industry observers were participating in the Contact Group on Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia. For a list of participating countries, see 
appendix III. 

[22] The Coast Guard and Maritime Administration facilitated an 
industry-led effort to develop measures to protect ships from pirate 
attack, first published as "Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia" in 2009 and most 
recently updated in June 2010. According to Coast Guard and shipping 
industry officials, registering a vessel's transit through the region 
with the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa provides an 
indication of whether the vessel owner or operator is likely to be 
following other best management practices. Additional information on 
U.S. agency efforts to help prevent acts of piracy can be found in 
appendix II. 

[23] The Coast Guard reports that, at any given time, there are about 
six to eight U.S.-flagged vessels operating in the region. More 
information about Coast Guard's regulations and guidance regarding 
piracy is provided in appendix II. 

[24] Executive Order 13536, Blocking Property of Certain Persons 
Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia (Apr. 12, 2010), blocks all 
property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction of persons 
listed in the Annex to the Order, including two individuals determined 
to be principal organizers and financiers of pirate activities. The 
order provides authority for the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate other persons 
determined to have engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, 
or stability of Somalia, including those who support or engage in acts 
of piracy. 

[25] Representatives of the shipping industry have raised concerns 
that the executive order could be used to block ransom payments to 
secure the release of captive crews, and the U.S. government has 
engaged with the shipping industry to address their concerns and 
questions regarding the executive order. See appendix II for 
additional information on Executive Order 13536. 

[26] International Maritime Organization, Code of Conduct Concerning 
the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, IMO Doc. C 102/14, Annex at 
5 (Apr. 3, 2009). This is generally referred to as the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct. 

[27] See appendix III for more information about the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct. 

[28] The shipping industry is encouraged to share vessel transit 
information through the Horn of Africa with naval organizations. 
Specifically, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations is the 
first point of contact for ships in the region and provides the daily 
interface between vessel captains and naval forces. The Maritime 
Security Centre-Horn of Africa is the planning and coordination 
authority for European Union forces in the Gulf of Aden and Somali 
Basin. The Maritime Liaison Office exchanges information between the 
Combined Maritime Forces and industry within the region. 

[29] The United States used the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation while 
prosecuting Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse. As of June 25, 2010, Muse pled 
guilty to charges associated with an April 2009 pirate attack on the 
U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama, a commercial container vessel, and 
sentencing is scheduled for October 2010. 

[30] Since the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation does not apply to attacks on 
warships, the United States is using other authorities to exercise 
jurisdiction and prosecute 11 suspected pirates for attacks on the USS 
Nicholas and USS Ashland. 

[31] For example, in March 2010, pirates hijacked a bulk carrier about 
1,350 nautical miles east of Somalia, taking 21 crew members hostage. 
In May 2010, pirates hijacked a fishing vessel about 1,350 nautical 
miles east of Somalia, taking 28 crew members hostage. 

[32] According to officials from Lloyds Market Association, the 
vessels owner typically negotiates and pays the ransom to the pirates 
and then declares a "general average." General average is the 
principle of equity in which all parties in a sea adventure (ship, 
cargo, and freight) proportionately share losses resulting from a 
voluntary and successful sacrifice of part of the ship or cargo to 
save the whole adventure from an impending peril, or extraordinary 
expenses necessarily incurred for the joint benefit of ship and cargo. 
A general average adjuster determines which entities had a share in 
the voyage and their proportional interest. The insurance companies 
that cover the ship, crew and cargo reimburse the owner for their 
share of the cost. If the parties had kidnap and ransom coverage, the 
cost of delivery and ransom may be covered by the kidnap and ransom 
insurer. 

[33] This figure does not reflect a number of other costs including, 
but not limited to life-cycle costs for the applicable ships and 
aircraft, as well as lost opportunity costs for other maritime 
security missions. We did not independently verify the data that 
support Defense's $64 million estimate. 

[34] Congressional Research Service, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on 
Insurance, R40081, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6 2009). 

[35] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[36] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[37] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004). 

[38] GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can 
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 26, 1999) and GAO-06-15. 

[39] The document provides guidance including actions to take before 
transiting the region, such as installing razor wire and planning for 
additional watch duty, and actions to take in the event of a pirate 
attack, such as reporting to authorities and using evasive maneuvers. 
"Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
and in the Arabian Sea Area," version 3, June 2010, [hyperlink, 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Piracy_Best_Management_Practices_3.pd
f] (downloaded July 13, 2010). 

[40] According to Maritime Administration officials and shipping 
industry representatives, challenges remain that have made it 
difficult to for U.S.-vessels to transit the area with security teams 
carrying weapons onboard, including restrictions in national or port-
state laws in the region. 

[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[43] The Maritime Operational Threat Response is an interagency 
process used during maritime security incidents. The response is 
coordinated by a newly established Global Maritime Operational Threat 
Response Coordination Cell, an Department of Homeland Security office 
located at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters, and follows documented 
protocols that, among other things, provide guidance on conducting 
coordination activities. 

[44] According to a facilitator of the process, under normal 
circumstances, Coast Guard officials liaise with industry 
representatives during an incident and the Maritime Operational Threat 
Response meetings are restricted to U.S. government officials. Due to 
the unique circumstances of the Alabama incident, Maersk 
representatives were allowed to participate in some of the meetings. 

[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[47] During the course of our review, we made several requests to meet 
with staff from the NSC to discuss the Action Plan and its 
implementation but they did not respond to our requests. 

[48] See below for a complete listing of agencies and partners we 
obtained information from during our review. 

[49] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[50] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, 
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2009). 

[51] These include the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence as well as component agencies 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Coast Guard, and 
National Maritime Intelligence Center. 

[52] We provided an assessment of "substantial progress" for cases 
where all components under a task specified by the NSC were 
implemented; "some progress" for cases where components were at least 
partially implemented or agencies demonstrated effort had been made 
toward implementation; and "little or no progress" where there was 
minimal or no result or effort made toward implementing any components 
of that specific task. 

[53] See appendix III for international partners contributing to 
counterpiracy operations. 

[54] The Coast Guard issued a third revision of Maritime Security 
Directive 104-6 in May 2010. 

[55] As of June 2010, the Coast Guard had issued eight Port Security 
Advisories related to piracy, and the Maritime Administration had 
issued four maritime security advisories on this topic. 

[56] Port Security Advisories 4-09 and 8-09 provide information to 
those ship owners who choose or may be required to use armed security 
teams to protect vessels transiting high-risk waters off the Horn of 
Africa. While the Coast Guard requires that U.S.-flagged vessels 
transiting the Horn of Africa have a security team onboard, the 
decision about whether the security team will be armed is left to the 
ship owner. Many members of the shipping industry have raised concerns 
about having weapons onboard commercial vessels. While there is no 
consensus about whether or not to arm security teams, the United 
States has worked with partners to facilitate the arming of vessels 
when owners have chosen this approach as part of their security plan, 
but challenges remain. 

[57] The ISPS is a part of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700. 

[58] IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf 
of Aden, IMO Doc. C 102/14, Annex at 5 (Apr. 3, 2009). 

[59] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (Mar. 10, 1988). 

[End of section] 

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