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Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2009: 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: 

With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed 
in Tri-agency Decision Making: 

GAO-09-564: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-564, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition-—managed by the Department of 
Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 
Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA)—-that has experienced escalating costs, schedule 
delays, and technical difficulties. As the often-delayed launch of its 
demonstration satellite draws closer, these problems continue. 

GAO was asked to (1) identify the status and risks of key program 
components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive Committee’s ability to 
fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify an 
alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites. To do so, 
GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and 
interviewed agency officials. 

What GAO Found: 

While selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress over 
the past year, the program is once again over budget and behind 
schedule. In terms of progress, three of the five instruments slated 
for a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project—
NPP) have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-
based satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at 
both of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites’ 
command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance 
testing. However, the program’s approved cost and schedule baseline are 
not achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to 
drive the program’s cost and schedule. Costs could grow by $1 billion 
over the current $13.95 billion estimate, and the schedules for NPP and 
the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, 
and 5 months, respectively. These delays increase the risk of a gap in 
satellite continuity. An independent review team established to assess 
key program risks recently reported that the constellation of 
satellites is extremely fragile, and that there could be a 3 to 5 year 
gap in satellite coverage if NPP, NPOESS, or other DOD satellites fail 
on launch. 

The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for overseeing the program 
has made improvements over the last several years, but still has not 
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities. Responding to past concerns 
expressed by GAO and the Department of Commerce’s Inspector General, 
the Committee now meets on a regular basis, and has sought and reacted 
to advice from external advisors to mitigate specific risks. However, 
the Committee lacks the membership and leadership needed to effectively 
and efficiently oversee and direct the program. Specifically, the DOD 
Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Executive 
Committee meetings—and sometimes contradicts the Committee’s decisions, 
the Committee does not track its action items to closure, and many of 
the Committee’s decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Program 
officials and external independent reviewers explained that it is 
extremely difficult for the Committee to navigate three agencies’ 
competing requirements and priorities. Until these shortfalls are 
addressed, the Committee will remain ineffective. 

The NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives 
to using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS 
satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current 
contractor. Both studies assessed a variety of alternatives, including 
re-competing the entire prime contract, obtaining an independent system 
integrator while having the existing prime contractor continue to 
develop space and ground components, and having the government take 
over responsibility for the system’s integration. The first study 
identified strengths and weaknesses and the second study identified 
high-level costs and benefits. Neither study identified an alternative 
that is viable. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior 
to the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime 
contractor. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the Executive Committee. In commenting on a draft of 
this report, NASA and Commerce officials concurred with the 
recommendations; DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with 
the other recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] or key 
components. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Progress Made, but Continued Instrument Problems Are Driving Costs 
Upward, Forcing Launch Delays, and Endangering Satellite Continuity: 

Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities: 

Program Has Assessed Alternatives, but Has Not Yet Identified a Viable 
Alternative for Acquiring the Last Two NPOESS Satellites: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Summary of the Fall 2008 Independent Review Team's 
Findings and Recommendations: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004: 

Table 2: Major Changes to the NPOESS Program by the Nunn-McCurdy 
Certification Decision: 

Table 3: Changes to NPOESS Instruments, as of June 2006: 

Table 4: Configuration of Instruments Planned for NPP and NPOESS 
Satellites, as of May 2008: 

Table 5: Status and Risk Level of Key Space and Ground Components, as 
of April 2009: 

Table 6: Changes in Key Program Milestones over Time: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

Figure 4: NPOESS Program Roles and Responsibilities: 

Figure 5: Nunn-McCurdy Certified Satellite Constellation: 

Figure 6: Potential Gaps in the Continuity of Current and Planned Polar 
Satellites: 

Abbreviations: 

CrIS: Cross-track Infrared Sounder: 

DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EDR: Environmental Data Record: 

MetOp: Meteorological Operational (satellite): 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NPOESS: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System: 

NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project: 

POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 

VIIRS: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 17, 2009: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS) program is expected to be a state-of-the-art, 
environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing 
polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting 
satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather 
forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor 
changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. The 
NPOESS program is considered critical to the United States' ability to 
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting 
(including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate 
monitoring through the year 2026. 

Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition: the 
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States 
Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). These agencies established a tri-agency office to manage the 
NPOESS program. The program is overseen by an Executive Committee made 
up of senior executives from each of the agencies. Since its inception, 
NPOESS costs have doubled, launch schedules have been repeatedly 
delayed, and significant functionality was cut from the program. Even 
after a major restructuring, the program is still encountering 
technical issues, schedule delays, and the likelihood of further cost 
increases. More importantly, delays in launching the satellites have 
put the program's mission at risk. 

This report responds to your request that we (1) identify the status 
and risks of key program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive 
Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate 
efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS 
satellites. To identify the status and risks to the program, we 
reviewed program documentation including status briefings, monthly 
program management documents, and contractor-provided earned value 
data. We compared the contractor's earned value management data to cost 
and schedule estimates and evaluated reasons for variances in the 
contractor's performance. To assess the NPOESS Executive Committee's 
ability to fulfill its responsibilities, we reviewed Executive 
Committee documentation, including meeting minutes. We compared the 
Committee's actions to its documented responsibilities, as well as to 
best practices in investment management and oversight.[Footnote 1] To 
evaluate the efforts to develop an alternative system integrator for 
NPOESS, we compared the requirement for a study of alternatives to the 
results of two successive studies. We also interviewed relevant agency 
officials from NOAA, NASA, and DOD. In addition, this report builds on 
work we have done on environmental satellites over the last several 
years.[Footnote 2] 

We conducted our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office 
headquarters and at NOAA, NASA, and DOD facilities in the Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at contractors' 
facilities in the Los Angeles, California, area because of the 
importance of these sites to development of the sensors for the program 
and to the satellites' integration. We conducted this performance audit 
from October 2008 to June 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Additional details on our objectives, scope, and methodology are 
provided in appendix I. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. These satellites obtain 
environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather 
images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also 
the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are 
a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance--
including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather 
products and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe 
weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and 
mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to 
monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought 
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a 
variety of studies such as climate monitoring. 

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position 
relative to the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the 
earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage of 
conditions that affect the weather and climate. Each satellite makes 
about 14 orbits a day. As the earth rotates beneath it, each satellite 
views the entire earth's surface twice a day. Currently, there is one 
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that are 
positioned so that they can observe the earth in early morning, 
midmorning, and early afternoon polar orbits. In addition, the 
government is also relying on a European satellite, called the 
Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite, in the midmorning orbit. 
[Footnote 3] Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, 
the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 hours old. 
Figure 1 illustrates the current operational polar satellite 
configuration. Besides the four operational satellites, six older 
satellites are in orbit that still collect some data and are available 
to provide limited backup to the operational satellites should they 
degrade or fail. The last POES satellite was launched in February 2009 
and declared operational in early June 2009. The Air Force plans to 
continue to launch its three remaining DMSP satellites every few years, 
with the final launch planned for 2014. 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites: 

Polar Satellite Data and Products: 

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into 
a variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of 
radiation wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely 
determining information about the earth's atmosphere, land surface, 
oceans, and the space environment. When first received, satellite data 
are considered raw data. To make them usable, the processing centers 
format the data so that they are time-sequenced and include earth 
location and calibration information. After formatting, these data are 
called raw data records. The centers further process these raw data 
records into channel-specific data sets, called sensor data records and 
temperature data records. These data records are then used to derive 
weather and climate products called environmental data records (EDR). 
EDRs include a wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud 
coverage, temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface 
products showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products 
depicting sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and 
characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data 
records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are 
also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from 
numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is 
a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data 
processing, and figure 3 depicts examples of two different weather 
products. 

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

1) Raw data; 

2) Raw data records; 

3) Sensor data records and temperature data records; 

4) Environmental data records; 

5) Derived products and output from numerical weather prediction 
models. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA information. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, and the figure on the right is an analysis of ozone concentration 
produced from POES satellite data. 

Source: NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information 
Service. 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS Overview: 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of 
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 4] The 
converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States' 
ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather 
forecasting and global climate monitoring. To manage this program, DOD, 
NOAA, and NASA formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain 
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the 
converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force has the 
lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for 
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into 
the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding NPOESS, 
while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In addition, 
an Executive Committee--made up of the administrators of NOAA and NASA 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics--is responsible for providing policy guidance, ensuring 
agency support and funding, and exercising oversight authority. 
[Footnote 5] Figure 4 depicts the organizations that make up the NPOESS 
program and lists their responsibilities. 

Figure 4: NPOESS Program Roles and Responsibilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

NPOESS Integrated Program Office: 

Agency: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; 
Responsibility: Overall program management and satellite operations; 
Funding: Shared funding with U.S. Air Force for NPOESS. 

Agency: United States Air Force; 
Responsibility: Acquisition; 
Funding: Shared funding with NOAA for NPOESS. 

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Responsibility: Technologies; 
Funding: Specific technology projects and studies. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of figure] 

Acquisition Strategy: 

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to 
cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its 
inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite 
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite 
data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main 
categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and 
sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the 
system for transforming raw data into EDRs and is to be located at the 
four processing centers; (3) the command, control, and communications 
segment, which includes the equipment and services needed to support 
satellite operations; and (4) the launch segment, which includes the 
launch vehicle services. 

When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract 
was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7 
billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six 
satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 
13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on 
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and 
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support 
nonenvironmental search and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and 
environmental data collection activities. The program office considered 
four of the sensors to be critical because they provide data for key 
weather products; these sensors are in bold in table 1, which describes 
each of the expected NPOESS instruments. 

Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical 
sensors are indicated in brackets): 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder [critical sensor]; 
Description: Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the 
atmosphere and is to be used with infrared sounding data from the cross-
track infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric temperature, 
humidity, and pressure profiles. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Description: Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols 
(liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such 
as sea spray, smog, and smoke). 

Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder [critical sensor]; 
Description: Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain 
rate, ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the 
clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at 
different atmospheric levels. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) [critical sensor]; 
Description: Collects measurements of the earth’s radiation to 
determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and 
pressure in the atmosphere. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Description: Collects environmental data from platforms around the 
world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Description: Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave 
radiation released by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to 
enhance long-term climate studies. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite; 
Description: Collects data needed to measure the amount and 
distribution of ozone in the earth’s atmosphere. Consists of two 
components (limb and nadir) which can be provided separately. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Description: Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and 
ocean surface roughness, which are used to determine sea surface 
height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to 
provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction 
models. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system; 
Description: Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based 
users in distress. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Description: Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects 
of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and 
radio links. 

Instrument: Survivability sensor; 
Description: Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other 
instruments in case of an attack. 

Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
Description: Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance 
data. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) [critical 
sensor]; 
Description: Collects images and radiometric data used to provide 
information on the earth’s clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces.
Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory 
Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years before the 
first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk associated with 
launching new sensor technologies and to ensure continuity of climate 
data with NASA's Earth Observing System satellites. NPP was to host 
three of the four critical NPOESS sensors, as well as one other sensor 
and to provide the program office and the processing centers an early 
opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data 
processing systems.[Footnote 6] 

When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for 
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the NPOESS 
satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites 
should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these 
satellites.[Footnote 7] Early program milestones included (1) launching 
NPP by May 2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to 
back up the final POES satellite launch then planned for March 2008, 
and (3) having the second NPOESS satellite available to back up the 
final DMSP satellite launch then planned for October 2009. If the 
NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the final predecessor 
satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 
and June 2011, respectively. 

Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems Led to a 
Decision to Restructure the NPOESS Program: 

Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced continued 
cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical problems. 
[Footnote 8] By November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the 
program had grown from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition, the 
program was experiencing major technical problems with the VIIRS sensor 
and expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost 
2 years. These issues ultimately required difficult decisions to be 
made about the program's direction and capabilities. 

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major 
defense acquisition program growth exceeds certain cost thresholds. 
[Footnote 9] Key provisions of the law require the Secretary of Defense 
to notify Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to 
overrun its current baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the 
program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its current baseline 
by 25 percent or more.[Footnote 10] In November 2005, NPOESS exceeded 
the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program. 
Certifying a program entails providing a determination that (1) the 
program is essential to national security, (2) there are no 
alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost 
are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the program is 
adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams--
made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each of the four 
elements of the certification process. 

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) 
certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 
billion through 2026--an increase of $4 billion more than the prior 
life cycle cost estimate.[Footnote 11] This restructuring decision 
delayed the launch of NPP and the first 2 satellites by roughly 3 to 5 
years--a deviation from NOAA's requirement to have NPOESS satellites 
available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything 
go wrong during those launches. The restructured program also reduced 
the number of satellites to be produced by relying on European 
satellites for the midmorning orbit and planning to use NPOESS 
satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits. In addition, in 
order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification 
decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and 
reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. 

In addition, a new executive position--called the Program Executive 
Officer--was established to oversee the NPOESS program office and to 
report directly to the Executive Committee. The Program Executive 
Officer obtains weekly and monthly reports on the program's cost, 
schedule, performance, and risks from the System Program Director, and 
in turn, provides monthly and quarterly updates to the Executive 
Committee. Table 2 summarizes the major program changes made by the 
Nunn-McCurdy certification decision, and figure 5 denotes the 
configuration of the planned polar-operational satellite program in the 
future. 

Table 2: Major Changes to the NPOESS Program by the Nunn-McCurdy 
Certification Decision: 

Key area: Life cycle range; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 1995—2020; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 1995—2026. 

Key area: Estimated life cycle cost; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: $8.4 billion; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): $12.5 
billion. 

Key area: Launch schedule; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 
NPP by October 2006; 
First NPOESS (C1) by November 2009; 
Second NPOESS (C2) by June 2011; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 
NPP by January 2010; 
C1 by January 2013; 
C2 by January 2016. 

Key area: Management structure; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: System Program Director 
reports to a tri-agency steering committee and the tri-agency Executive 
Committee. Independent program reviews noted insufficient system 
engineering and cost analysis staff; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): System 
Program Director is responsible for day-to-day program management and 
reports to the Program Executive Officer. Program Executive Officer 
oversees program and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee. 

Key area: Number of satellites; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 6 (in addition to NPP); 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 4 (in 
addition to NPP). 

Key area: Number of orbits; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 3 (early morning, midmorning, 
and afternoon);; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 2 (early 
morning and afternoon; will rely on European satellites for midmorning 
orbit data). 

Key area: Number and complement of instruments; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 13 instruments (10 sensors 
and 3 subsystems); 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 9 
instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems); 4 of the sensors are to 
provide fewer capabilities. 

Key area: Number of EDRs; 
Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision: 55; 
Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision (as of June 2006): 39 (6 are to 
be degraded products). 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

Figure 5: Nunn-McCurdy Certified Satellite Constellation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

This illustration depicts the notional local equatorial crossing times 
for the following satellites: 

NPOESS: 0530 hours; 
MetOp: 0930 hours; 
NPOESS: 1330 hours. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data; MapArt (globe). 

[End of figure] 

While the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision decreased the number of 
NPOESS sensors and reduced the functionality of others, it allowed for 
the reintegration of the canceled sensors if other parties choose to 
fund them. Table 3 describes the changes to NPOESS instruments. 

Table 3: Changes to NPOESS Instruments, as of June 2006: 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor unchanged; to 
be included on NPP and on afternoon satellites. 

Instrument: Aerosol polarimetry sensor; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was 
canceled[A]. 

Instrument: Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was canceled; 
program office to procure a less complex microwave imager/sounder for 
inclusion beginning on the second NPOESS satellite. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor unchanged; to 
be included on NPP and on afternoon satellites. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: No change; subsystem 
is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: Earth radiation budget sensor; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was canceled; 
is to be replaced by a legacy sensor on C1 only[A]. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: One part of the 
sensor (limb) was canceled; remaining part is to be included on NPP and 
on all four NPOESS satellites[A]. 

Instrument: Radar altimeter; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was canceled. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor unchanged; 
subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Instrument: Space environmental sensor suite; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was canceled; 
is to be replaced by a less capable, less expensive legacy sensor[A]. 

Instrument: Survivability sensor; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Subsystem was 
canceled[A]. 

Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor was 
canceled[A]. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite; 
Status of instrument after Nunn-McCurdy decision: Sensor unchanged; 
sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[A] While direct program funding for these sensors was eliminated, 
these sensors could be reintegrated should other parties choose to fund 
them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision notes that the spacecraft is to include 
space for these sensors and funds to integrate them. 

[End of table] 

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the 
resulting weather and environmental products, called EDRs. In selecting 
sensors for the restructured program during the Nunn-McCurdy process, 
decision makers placed the highest priority on continuing current 
operational weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining 
selected environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, 
the revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for 
providing global climate measures than was originally planned. 
Specifically, the number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which 
6 are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud base 
height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and sea 
surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle 
size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the 
top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in 
the space environment. The six EDRs that are of a reduced quality 
include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting 
energy in the space environment. 

Selected Climate Sensors Have Been Added Back to the Program: 

After the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy decision, the NPOESS Executive Committee 
decided to add selected sensors back to individual satellites in order 
to address concerns from the climate community about the loss of key 
climate data. In January 2008, the Committee approved plans to include 
a replacement for the Earth radiation budget sensor (called the Clouds' 
and the earth's radiant energy system sensor) on the NPP satellite. In 
addition, in May 2008, the Committee approved plans to include a Total 
solar irradiance sensor on the C1 satellite. Table 4 shows which 
instruments are currently planned for NPP and the four satellites of 
the NPOESS program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4. Program officials 
acknowledged that these configurations could change if other parties 
decide to develop the sensors that were canceled. 

Table 4: Configuration of Instruments Planned for NPP and NPOESS 
Satellites, as of May 2008: 

Instrument: Advanced technology microwave sounder; 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [B]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [B]. 

Instrument: Microwave imager/sounder (replacing the canceled Conical-
scanned microwave imager/sounder); 
NPP: [C]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [C]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [A]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [A]. 

Instrument: Cross-track infrared sounder; 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [B]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [B]. 

Instrument: Data collection system; 
NPP: [C]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [A]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [A]; 

Instrument: Clouds’ and the earth’s radiant energy system sensor 
(replacing selected capabilities of the Earth radiation budget sensor); 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [C]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [C]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [C]. 

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (nadir); 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [C]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [C].  

Instrument: Ozone mapper/profiler suite (limb); 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [B]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [C]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [B]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [C]. 

Instrument: Search and rescue satellite aided tracking system; 
NPP: [C]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [A]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [A]. 

Instrument: Space environment monitor (replacing selected capabilities 
of the space environmental sensor suite); 
NPP: [C]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [C]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [C]. 

Instrument: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
NPP: [C]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [B]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [C]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [B]. 

Instrument: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite; 
NPP: [A]; 
NPOESS C1 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C2 (AM): [A]; 
NPOESS C3 (PM): [A]; 
NPOESS C4 (AM): [A]. 

[A] = Sensor is currently planned for this satellite: 

[B] = Canceled but could be restored to this satellite: 

[C] = Not applicable--sensor was never planned for this satellite: 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

NPOESS Experienced Schedule Delays and Cost Growth after It Was 
Restructured: 

After the program was restructured, NPOESS continued to experience 
schedule delays and cost growth. In June 2008, we reported that poor 
workmanship and testing delays caused an additional 8-month slip to the 
expected delivery date of the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite 
(VIIRS) sensor.[Footnote 12] This late delivery caused a corresponding 
delay in the expected launch date of the NPP demonstration satellite, 
moving it to June 2010. In addition, we reported that the program life 
cycle costs, estimated at $12.5 billion, were expected to rise by 
approximately $1 billion because of problems experienced in the 
development of the VIIRS and Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) 
sensors, the need to revise outdated operations and support cost 
estimates, and the need to modify information security requirements on 
ground systems. Program officials subsequently modified their life 
cycle cost estimate to $13.95 billion, which included about $1.15 
billion for revised pre-and post-launch operations and support costs 
and about $300 million to address development issues. The revised cost 
estimate did not include funds to modify information security 
requirements. 

Prior Reports Recommended Steps to Mitigate Program Risks: 

In recent years, we have made a series of recommendations to mitigate 
risks on the NPOESS program. In April 2007, we reported that the 
program lacked a process and plan for identifying and filling key 
staffing shortages and that DOD's plans to reassign the Program 
Executive Officer would unnecessarily increase risks to an already 
risky program.[Footnote 13] We also reported that while the program 
office had made progress in restructuring NPOESS after the June 2006 
Nunn-McCurdy certification decision, important tasks leading up to 
finalizing contract changes remained to be completed. Specifically, the 
program had made progress in drafting key acquisition documents, 
including the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master 
plan, and the memorandum of agreement between the agencies. However, 
executive approval of those documents was about 6 months late at that 
time--due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies' 
approval processes. To address these issues, we recommended that NPOESS 
program officials develop and implement a written process for 
identifying and addressing human capital needs and establish a plan to 
immediately fill needed positions; that DOD delay the reassignment of 
the Program Executive Officer until all sensors were delivered to NPP; 
and that the appropriate agency executives finalize key acquisition 
documents by the end of April 2007. 

Following up on these recommendations, in May 2008, we reported that 
program officials had documented the program's staffing process and 
made progress in filling selected budgeting and system engineering 
vacancies.[Footnote 14] DOD, however, reassigned the Program Executive 
Officer in July 2007 and replaced this person with a new Program 
Executive Officer. We also reported that executive approval of key 
acquisition documents was more than a year late at that time and 
reiterated our prior recommendation that the agencies immediately 
complete these activities. The last of these acquisition documents was 
approved in December 2008. 

Progress Made, but Continued Instrument Problems Are Driving Costs 
Upward, Forcing Launch Delays, and Endangering Satellite Continuity: 

Over the past year, selected components of the NPOESS program-- 
including the ground segment and selected sensors--have made progress. 
However, the program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not 
achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive 
the program's cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about $1 
billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the 
schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to 
be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays endanger 
the continuity of weather and climate satellite data because there will 
not be a satellite available as backup should a satellite fail on 
launch or in orbit. Program officials reported that they are assessing 
alternatives for mitigating risks, and that they plan to propose a new 
cost and schedule baseline by June 2009. 

Program Made Progress on Selected Components: 

With over $4 billion expended on the program through the end of fiscal 
year 2008, the program is well under way. Over the past year, selected 
components of the NPOESS program have made progress. Specifically, 
three of the five instruments slated for NPP have been delivered and 
integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data 
processing system has been installed and tested at both of the 
locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites' command, 
control, and communications system has passed acceptance testing. 
Details on the status of key components are provided in table 5. 

Table 5: Status and Risk Level of Key Space and Ground Components, as 
of April 2009: 

Component: Advanced technology microwave sounder; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: 
For NPP: The instrument was integrated on the spacecraft in December 
2006 and is awaiting delivery of the other sensors in order to complete 
integration testing.
For C1: The instrument is currently being built by the prime 
contractor. Although the effort is low risk, the effort is taking more 
time than originally expected. 

Component: Clouds’ and the earth’s radiant energy system; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: 
For NPP: The instrument was integrated on the spacecraft in November 
2008.
For C1: The instrument is on track and expected to go through systems 
requirements review in April 2009. 

Component: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS); 
Program-identified risk level: High; 
Status: For NPP: The instrument has experienced several issues during 
testing and final review, including a faulty calibration target and 
overstressed semiconductors. Repairing these issues delayed the 
instrument’s delivery to the NPP integration contractor. That date is 
now set for July 2009. 

Component: Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS); 
Program-identified risk level: Medium; 
Status: For C1: A new calibration target will be needed for the second 
flight unit. A simplified design has been chosen that is based on 
existing technology. In addition, because the program needs to delay 
activities on the second flight unit in 2009, delivery of the unit 
could be delayed by a full year. 

Component: Microwave imager/sounder; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: For C2: The NPOESS Executive Committee recently directed the 
program to review the sensor’s requirements in order to mitigate 
growing program costs. Because the sensor is not yet in development, 
the executive committee noted that this is an appropriate time to 
consider developing a less complex sensor. The program director stated 
that he expects the sensor to undergo a requirements review by the end 
of May 2009. 

Component: Ozone mapper/profiler suite; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium; 
Status: For NPP: The instrument was recently integrated on the 
spacecraft. However, the program office raised concerns that screws had 
been overtorqued and is reviewing the assembly of the instrument. 

Component: Ozone mapper/profiler suite; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: For C1: In order to fund problems on VIIRS, work was halted on 
the second flight unit—which will lead to a delayed delivery of 
approximately 1 year. 

Component: Total solar irradiance sensor; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: For C1: Due to a lack of available funds prior to April 2009, 
the program office is reassessing the schedule for the first flight 
unit of this instrument. The preliminary design review is currently 
scheduled for April 2009. 

Component: Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS)
Program-identified risk level: High; 
Status: 
For NPP: The sensor has completed electromagnetic compatibility and 
vibration testing, and it began thermal vacuum testing in early May 
2009. However, continued slow test execution and problems during 
environmental testing have led to further delays in delivering it to 
the NPP integration contractor. While the contractor’s current plan 
shows delivery in September 2009, the government estimates a delivery 
by December 2009.
For C1: More than 80 percent of the parts for the second VIIRS sensor 
have already been acquired. 

Component: Spacecraft; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: For NPP: The spacecraft has been completed and three of five 
instruments have been integrated on it. 

Component: Spacecraft; 
Program-identified risk level: Medium; 
Status: For C1: The spacecraft recently completed a critical design 
audit; however, it is also on the “critical path” for C1, which means 
that any delays in the spacecraft could delay the launch date. 

Component: Command, Control, and Communications; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: The command, control, and communications segment is being 
developed in a series of builds.
For NPP: Build 1.4 has been completed.
For C1: Build 2.1 is under development. 

Component: Integrated Data Processing System; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: For NPP: Hardware has been deployed to two central data 
processing centers (NOAA’s National Satellite Operations Facility in 
Suitland, Maryland and the Air Force Weather Agency) and testing has 
begun. Development continues on the next system software build. 

Component: Ground stations for receiving satellite data; 
Program-identified risk level: Low; 
Status: NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to obtain 
approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data. To date, 
the program office has reached agreement with 7 of 15 ground station 
sites. According to agency officials, only 3 ground stations will be 
operational by the launch of the first NPOESS satellite and the full 
complement of ground stations will be operational by the launch of the 
second NPOESS satellite. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

[End of table] 

Technical Challenges Cause Cost Increases, Delay Schedule, and Risk 
Data Continuity; Key Decisions on Program's Next Steps Are Pending: 

While the program has made progress, problems with two critical sensors 
continue to drive the program's cost and schedule. Specifically, 
ongoing challenges with VIIRS development, design, and workmanship have 
led to additional cost overruns and delayed the instrument's delivery 
to NPP. In addition, problems discovered during environmental testing 
on CrIS led the contractor to further delay its delivery to NPP and 
added further unanticipated costs to the program. To address these 
issues, the program office halted or delayed activities on other 
components (including the development of a sensor planned for the C1 
satellite) and redirected those funds to fixing VIIRS and CrIS. As a 
result, those other activities now face cost increases and schedule 
delays. 

Program officials acknowledge that NPOESS will cost more than the 
$13.95 billion previously estimated, but they have not yet adopted a 
new cost estimate. Program officials estimated that program costs will 
grow by about $370 million due to recent technical issues experienced 
on the sensors and the costs associated with halting and then 
restarting work on other components of the program. In addition, the 
costs associated with adding new information security requirements to 
the program could reach $200 million.[Footnote 15] This estimate also 
does not include approximately $410 million for operations and support 
costs for the last two years of the program's life cycle (2025 and 
2026). Thus, we anticipate that the overall cost of the program could 
grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion estimate-- 
especially given the fact that difficult integration and testing of the 
sensors on the NPP and C1 spacecrafts has not yet occurred.[Footnote 
16] Program officials reported that they plan to revise the program's 
cost estimate over the next few weeks and to submit it for executive- 
level approval in June 2009. 

As for the program's schedule, program officials estimate that the 
delivery of VIIRS to the NPP contractor will be delayed, resulting in a 
further delay in the launch of the NPP satellite to January 2011, a 
year later than the date estimated during the program restructuring-- 
and seven months later than the June 2010 date that was established 
last year. In addition, program officials estimated that the first and 
second NPOESS satellites would be delayed by 14 and 5 months, 
respectively, because selected development activities were halted or 
slowed to address VIIRS and CrIS problems. The program's current plans 
are to launch C1 in March 2014 and C2 in May 2016. Program officials 
notified the Executive Committee and DOD's acquisition authority of the 
schedule delays, and under DOD acquisition rules, are required to 
submit a new schedule baseline by June 2009. See table 6 for changes in 
key program milestones over time. 

Table 6: Changes in Key Program Milestones over Time: 

Milestones: Final POES launch[A]; 
As of the August 2002 contract award: March 2008; 
As of the June 2006 certification decision: February 2009; 
Current program estimates (as of April 2009): February 2009 (actual); 
Change from 2006 certification decision: Not applicable. 

Milestones: NPP launch; 
As of the August 2002 contract award: May 2006; 
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2010[B]; 
Current program estimates (as of April 2009): January 2011; 
Change from 2006 certification decision: 1-year delay. 

Milestones: First NPOESS satellite planned for launch; 
As of the August 2002 contract award: April 2009; 
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2013; 
Current program estimates (as of April 2009): March 2014; 
Change from 2006 certification decision: 14-month delay. 

Milestones: Final DMSP launch[A]; 
As of the August 2002 contract award: October 2009; 
As of the June 2006 certification decision: April 2012; 
Current program estimates (as of April 2009): May 2014[C]; 
Change from 2006 certification decision: 25-month delay. 

Milestones: Second NPOESS satellite planned for launch; 
As of the August 2002 contract award: June 2011; 
As of the June 2006 certification decision: January 2016; 
Current program estimates (as of April 2009): May 2016; 
Change from 2006 certification decision: 5-month delay[D]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, NOAA, and NPOESS program office data. 

[A] POES and DMSP are not part of the NPOESS program. Their launch 
dates are provided to indicate the increased risk of satellite data 
gaps between when these systems launch and when the NPOESS satellites 
launch. 

[B] In February 2008, the launch date for NPP was delayed to June 2010. 

[C] DMSP program staff noted that the DMSP launches were delayed due to 
the health of existing satellites and to mitigate the impact of NPOESS 
delays. The final DMSP could be delayed to as late as 2018, if 
required. 

[D] This 5-month delay extends from the first day of January 2016 to 
the last day of May 2016. 

[End of table] 

These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to ensure the 
continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. The final POES satellite, 
called NOAA-19, is in an afternoon orbit and is expected to have a 5- 
year lifespan. Both NPP and C1 are planned to support the afternoon 
orbit. Should the NOAA-19 satellite fail before NPP is launched, 
calibrated, and operational, there would be a gap in satellite data in 
that orbit. Further, the delays in C1 mean that NPP will not be the 
research and risk reduction satellite it was originally intended to be. 
Instead, it will have to function as an operational satellite until C1 
is in orbit and operational--and if C1 fails on launch or in early 
operations, NPP will be needed to function until C3 is available, 
currently planned for 2018. The delay in the C2 satellite launch 
affects the early morning orbit. There are three more DMSP satellites 
to be launched in the early and midmorning orbits. DOD is revisiting 
the launch schedules for these satellites to try to extend them as long 
as possible. An independent review team, established to assess key 
program risks, recently reported that the constellation of satellites 
is extremely fragile and that a single launch failure of DMSP or of the 
NPP satellite could result in a gap in satellite coverage from 3 to 5 
years. Figure 6 shows the current and planned satellites and highlights 
gaps where the constellation is at risk. 

Figure 6: Potential Gaps in the Continuity of Current and Planned Polar 
Satellites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Orbit: Early morning; 
Satellite: DMSP F-17; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: prior to 2009 through late 2010; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: late 2010 through late 2012. 

Orbit: Early morning; 
Satellite: DMSP F-19; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2012 through late 2017; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: late 2012 through late 2017; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Early morning; 
Satellite: NPOESS C-2; 
Calibration and validation: mid-2016 through late 2017; 
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2017 through mid-2023; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: late 2017 through mid-2020; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Early morning; 
Satellite: NPOESS C-4; 
Calibration and validation: early to mid-2020; 
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2020 through 2026; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Mid-morning; 
Satellite: DMSP F-18; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2009 through mid-2013; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: mid-2013 through mid-2014. 

Orbit: Mid-morning; 
Satellite: DMSP F-20; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2014 through mid-2019; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Mid-morning; 
Satellite: MetOp-A; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: prior to 2009 through late 2011; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Mid-morning; 
Satellite: MetOp-B; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: early 2011 through early 2016; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Mid-morning; 
Satellite: MetOp-C; 
Calibration and validation: Not indicated; 
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2015 through late 2020; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Afternoon; 
Satellite: NOAA-19; 
Planned spacecraft operations: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; early 2009 through late 2012; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Afternoon; 
Satellite: NPP; 
Calibration and validation: early 2011 through late 2012; 
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2012 through late 2015; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: late 20123 through late 2014; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Afternoon; 
Satellite: NPOESS C-1; 
Calibration and validation: early through late 2014; 
Planned spacecraft operations: late 2014 through early 2021; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: early 2016 through mid-2018; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Orbit: Afternoon; 
Satellite: NPOESS C-3; 
Calibration and validation: early through mid-2018; 
Planned spacecraft operations: mid-2018 through 2024; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite fails on launch or in 
orbit: Not indicated; 
Potential gap in data continuity if satellite does not live beyond its 
expected life: Not indicated. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD, NOAA, and NPOESS program office data. 

[End of figure] 

Although the program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not 
achievable and the polar satellite constellation is at risk, the 
Executive Committee has not yet made a decision on how to proceed with 
the program. Specifically, the Committee has not approved a new program 
schedule and a realistic cost estimate or determined whether it will 
mitigate or accept the risk of a potential gap in satellite continuity. 
Program officials plan to propose new cost and schedule baselines in 
June 2009. However, the Executive Committee does not have an estimate 
for when it will make critical decisions on cost, schedule, and risk 
mitigation. Program officials reported that they are addressing 
immediate funding constraints by deferring selected activities to later 
fiscal years in order to pay for VIIRS and CrIS problems, delaying the 
launches of NPP, C1, and C2, and assessing alternatives for mitigating 
the risk that VIIRS will continue to experience problems--including the 
possibility of purchasing a legacy imaging sensor to replace VIIRS on 
C1. Without an executive-level decision to do so, the program is 
proceeding on a course that is deferring cost growth, delaying 
launches, and risking its underlying mission of providing operational 
weather continuity to the civil and military communities. 

Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities: 

While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the 
last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not 
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the 
membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently 
oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Specifically, the DOD Executive 
Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend committee 
meetings--and sometimes contradicts the Committee's decisions, the 
Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the 
Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Independent 
reviewers, as well as program officials, explained that the tri-agency 
structure of the program makes it very difficult to effectively manage 
the program. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is 
unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program--and important issues 
involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will 
likely remain unresolved. 

Executive Committee Has Responded to Past Recommendations: 

In November 2005, we reported that the Executive Committee did not meet 
on a regular basis and that most of its meetings did not result in 
major decisions, but instead triggered further analysis and review. 
[Footnote 17] In addition, in May 2006, the Department of Commerce's 
Inspector General reported that the Committee did not effectively 
challenge the program's optimistic assessments and recommended that it 
provide more vigilant oversight. Since then, the Committee has met 
regularly on a quarterly basis and held interim teleconferences as 
needed. 

The Committee has also sought and reacted to advice from external 
advisors by, among other actions, authorizing a government program 
manager to reside onsite at the VIIRS contractor's facility to improve 
oversight of the sensor's development on a day-to-day basis. More 
recently, the Executive Committee sponsored a broad-based independent 
review of the NPOESS program and is beginning to respond to its 
recommendations. The independent review team's findings and 
recommendations are provided in appendix II. 

Key Acquisition Executive Does Not Attend Executive Committee Meetings: 

As established by the 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement signed by 
all three agencies, the members of the NPOESS Executive Committee are 
(1) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; (2) the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
and (3) the NASA Administrator.[Footnote 18] Because DOD has the lead 
responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, was also designated 
as the milestone decision authority--the individual with the authority 
to approve a major acquisition program's progression in the acquisition 
process, as well as any changes to the cost, schedule, and 
functionality of the acquisition.[Footnote 19] The intent of the tri- 
agency memorandums was that acquisition decisions would be agreed to by 
the Executive Committee before a final acquisition decision is made by 
the milestone decision authority.[Footnote 20] 

However, DOD's acquisition authority has never attended an Executive 
Committee meeting. This individual delegated the responsibility for 
attending the meetings--but not the authority to make acquisition 
decisions--to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Therefore, none of 
the individuals who attend the Executive Committee meetings for the 
three agencies have the authority to approve the acquisition program 
baseline or major changes to the baseline. As a result, agreements 
between committee members have been overturned by the acquisition 
authority, leading to significant delays. For example, the details of 
the program's acquisition program baseline were agreed to by members of 
the Executive Committee, but were overruled by the office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. This 
required several months of extensive renegotiation. In addition, after 
the Executive Committee members agreed to a revised tri-agency 
memorandum of agreement and it was signed by the Secretary of Commerce 
and the Administrator of NASA, the Under Secretary of Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics refused to approve the document, and it took 
over a year to finalize it. Crucially, this year-long disagreement 
focused on whether the Under Secretary should consult with or 
coordinate with members of the Executive Committee on matters related 
to NPOESS. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans 
and Atmosphere wrote to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, expressing concern that DOD did not 
recognize the management role of the tri-agency NPOESS Executive 
Committee or its responsibility, authority, and accountability to make 
decisions that represent the respective agency positions. 

At the conclusion of our review, DOD agency officials stated that the 
absence of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics at Executive Committee meetings is not the root cause of 
the Executive Committee's problems, but acknowledged that this 
individual's presence at the meetings could be helpful in streamlining 
the flow of information and the decision-making process. 

Committee Does Not Aggressively Manage Risks: 

Best practices note that oversight of large investments is a critical 
part of the investment life cycle and call for oversight boards to take 
corrective actions at the first sign of cost, schedule, and performance 
problems. They also call for oversight boards to ensure that corrective 
actions and related efforts are executed by the project management team 
and tracked until the desired outcomes occur.[Footnote 21] To provide 
this oversight, the Executive Committee holds quarterly meetings during 
which the program's progress is reviewed using metrics that provide an 
early warning of cost, schedule, and technical risks. 

Although the Executive Committee meets quarterly to review program 
progress and risks, and the results of those meetings are recorded in 
meeting minutes, the Committee does not routinely document action items 
or track those items to closure. Specifically, in the four meetings 
held between March 2007 and January 2008, the Committee explicitly 
documented 12 action items, but did not explicitly document action 
items in the three meetings from May to December 2008. Instead, 5 
actions were implied in the text of the meeting minutes and at least 1 
action item to proceed with a modified schedule for VIIRS was not 
recorded at all. Further, the Executive Committee did not routinely 
track the closure of its action items. Some action items were not 
discussed in later meetings and in cases where an item was discussed, 
it was not always clear what action was taken, whether it was 
effective, and whether the item was closed. Specifically, of the 18 
action items we identified between March 2007 and December 2008, 7 were 
clearly closed and 11 were not.[Footnote 22] For example, in May 2008, 
the Executive Committee asked DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group and 
the program office to reconcile their cost estimates, but it is not 
clear from the meetings that took place after this one whether this 
action was taken and what the result was. Also in May 2008, the 
Committee directed the prime contractor and others to investigate the 
root causes of technical issues; again, it is not clear whether this 
was completed or what the results were. 

According to the Program Executive Officer, the closing of an action 
item is not always explicitly tracked because it typically involves 
gathering information that is presented during later Committee 
meetings. Nonetheless, by not rigorously documenting action items-- 
including identifying the party responsible for the action, the desired 
outcome, and the time frame for completion--and then tracking the 
action items to closure, the Executive Committee is not able to ensure 
that its actions have achieved their intended results and to determine 
whether additional changes or modifications are still needed. This 
impedes the Committee's ability to effectively oversee the program, 
direct risk mitigation activities, and obtain feedback on the results 
of its actions. 

Committee Decisions Do Not Achieve Desired Outcomes: 

Best practices in investment management call for oversight of large 
investments throughout their life cycles.[Footnote 23] Government 
guidance calls for oversight boards to take corrective actions at the 
first sign of cost, schedule, and performance slippages in order to 
mitigate risks and achieve successful outcomes. The NPOESS Executive 
Committee generally took immediate action to mitigate the risks that 
were brought before them; however, a majority of these actions were not 
effective--that is, they did not fully resolve the underlying issues or 
result in a successful outcome. Specifically, of 22 significant risks 
forwarded to the Executive Committee between January and December 2008, 
the Committee took some action to mitigate 17 of the risks and decided 
to monitor the other 5 risks. Committee actions included approving 
modifications to the VIIRS schedule and directing the program to modify 
key acquisition documents to resolve disagreements, to establish an 
onsite government manager at a subcontractor's facility, and to develop 
a plan for the way forward for the program once it was determined that 
the program could not execute its baseline on time within its budget. 

However, the Committee's actions either did not result in successful 
outcomes or were inefficient in achieving successful outcomes. Of the 
22 risks presented to the Executive Committee, 18 involved cost, 
schedule, and technical issues on the VIIRS and CrIS sensors, and 4 
involved barriers to gaining approval of key acquisition documents. The 
Committee's actions on the sensor development risks accomplished 
interim successes by improving the government's oversight of a 
subcontractor's activities and guiding next steps in addressing 
technical issues--but even with committee actions, the sensors' 
performance has continued to falter and affect the rest of the program. 
Independent reviewers reported that the tri-agency structure of the 
program complicated the resolution of sensor risks because any decision 
could be revisited by another agency. In addition, while the 
government's onsite program manager is responsible for managing 
deliverables of a critical sensor, this individual reported that the 
plurality of customers with different expectations and priorities made 
it difficult to move the sensor development effort forward. 

As for the 4 risks involving barriers to gaining approval of key 
acquisition documents, by the end of 2008, all of the acquisition 
documents had been completed. However, the path to achieving this 
successful outcome was inefficient. For example, it took over 2 years 
and countless iterations by multiple levels of management in three 
different agencies to complete the tri-agency memorandum of agreement. 
The leader of an independent review team charged with reviewing key 
program risks recently reported that the Executive Committee is "at 
best… inefficient." Program officials explained that interagency 
disagreements and differing priorities make it difficult to effectively 
resolve issues. In addition, two independent advisors noted that the 
tri-agency aspect of the program makes it difficult to make decisions 
that balance the needs of all three agencies. 

The Committee's inability to make effective and efficient decisions is 
further complicated when difficult risks are not escalated in a timely 
manner. While most risks are raised to the Committee within months of 
the time they surface at the program level, selected interagency issues 
lingered before being brought before the Executive Committee. 
Specifically, an interagency disagreement regarding the appropriate 
level of security requirements was discussed and studied for 2 years 
before the Committee was notified--and the Committee still has not been 
asked to make a decision on this issue. 

At the conclusion of our review, DOD officials reported that part of 
the problem in escalating risks is that, in violation of interagency 
agreements and inconsistent with DOD acquisition policy, two senior 
NOAA officials review and limit what the Program Executive Officer 
provides to the Executive Committee.[Footnote 24] NOAA officials and 
the Program Executive Officer strongly disagreed with this statement. 
NASA officials commented that NOAA's enhanced oversight provides a 
healthy set of checks and balances to the program. 

Program Has Assessed Alternatives, but Has Not Yet Identified a Viable 
Alternative for Acquiring the Last Two NPOESS Satellites: 

When NPOESS was restructured in June 2006, the program included two 
satellites (C1 and C2) and an option to have the prime contractor 
produce the next two satellites (C3 and C4). In approving the 
restructured program, DOD's decision authority noted that he reserved 
the right to use a different satellite integrator for the final two 
satellites, and that a decision on whether to exercise the option was 
to be made in June 2010. To prepare for this decision, DOD required a 
tri-agency assessment of alternative management strategies. This 
assessment was to examine the feasibility of an alternative satellite 
integrator, to estimate the cost and schedule implications of moving to 
an alternative integrator, and within one year, to provide a viable 
alternative to the NPOESS Executive Committee. 

To address DOD's requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer 
sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however, 
neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing 
satellite integrator. The first study, conducted in 2007, identified 
three alternatives to the existing satellite integrator, including (1) 
re-competing the entire prime contract, (2) obtaining an independent 
system integrator while having the existing prime contractor continue 
to develop space and ground components, and (3) having the government 
take over responsibility for the system integration. The study 
identified the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives 
and recommended that the program remain with the existing prime 
contractor for C3 and C4 because doing otherwise would increase cost 
and schedule risks. It did not quantify these costs or risks. The 
second alternative management study, conducted in 2008, identified the 
same alternatives to the current system integrator and assessed their 
relative cost, schedule, and performance risks to the program. The 
study determined that the alternatives to the system integrator were 
not viable options because of their potential costs, and because the 
prime contractor's performance had been meeting requirements. This 
study also recommended staying with the prime contractor for C3 and C4. 
Both of these studies also assessed other aspects of program 
management--including the government's executive and program management 
and the contractors' management--and made recommendations to improve 
them. 

The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a final assessment of 
alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to exercise the 
option to have the current system integrator produce the next two 
NPOESS satellites. Program officials explained that the program's 
evolving costs, schedules, and risks could mean that an alternative 
that was not viable in the past would become viable. For example, if 
the prime contractor's performance no longer meets basic requirements, 
an alternative that was previously too costly to be considered viable 
might become so. 

Conclusions: 

Continued problems in the development of critical NPOESS sensors have 
contributed to growing costs and schedule delays. Costs are now 
expected to grow by as much as $1 billion over the prior life cycle 
cost estimate of $13.95 billion, and problems in delivering key sensors 
have led to delays in launching NPP and the first two NPOESS 
satellites--by a year or more for NPP and the first NPOESS satellite. 
These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to ensure the 
continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. Specifically, if any 
planned satellites fail on launch or in orbit, there would be a gap in 
satellite data until the next NPOESS satellite is launched and 
operational--a gap that could last for 3 to 5 years. 

The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for making cost and schedule 
decisions and addressing the many and continuing risks facing the 
program has not yet made important decisions on program costs, 
schedules, and risks--or identified when it will do so. In addition, 
the Committee has not been effective or efficient in carrying out its 
oversight responsibilities. Specifically, the individual with the 
authority to make acquisition decisions does not attend committee 
meetings; corrective actions are not identified in terms of desired 
outcomes, resources, and time frames for completion; these actions are 
not tracked to closure; and selected risks are not escalated in a 
timely manner. Until the Committee's shortfalls are addressed, 
important decisions may not be effective and issues involving cost 
increases, schedule delays, and satellite continuity may remain 
unresolved. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision- 
making on the NPOESS program, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics to attend and participate in NPOESS Executive 
Committee meetings. 

We also recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the 
Administrator of NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the 
following five actions: 

* establish a realistic time frame for revising the program's cost and 
schedule baselines; 

* develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; 

* track the Committee's action items from inception to closure; 

* improve the Committee's ability to achieve successful outcomes by 
identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the Committee's 
actions, as well as time frames and responsible parties, when new 
action items are established; and: 

* improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing time frames for 
escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not linger 
unresolved at the program executive level. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Secretary of Commerce (see appendix III), the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (see appendix IV), and the Associate Deputy 
Administrator of NASA (see appendix V). In their comments, NASA and 
NOAA agreed with our findings and recommendations and identified plans 
to implement them. For example, NASA noted that it would work closely 
with DOD and NOAA to ensure that a realistic time frame was established 
for cost and schedule baselines and to develop plans to mitigate 
program risks. NOAA noted that it planned to mitigate risk, in part by 
accelerating the development of environmental products--and planned to 
use more data from NPP than it had originally planned. Regarding our 
recommendations to track Executive Committee actions and ensure 
successful outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with 
each action as well as time frames and responsible parties, both NASA 
and NOAA noted that they would work with the Program Executive Officer 
to ensure that these actions happen in a timely and effective manner. 
Finally, regarding our recommendation to improve the Executive 
Committee's efficiency by establishing time frames for escalating risks 
to the Committee, both NASA and NOAA noted that they would work with 
the Program Executive Officer to ensure that this was done. NOAA also 
provided technical comments on the report, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

In its written comments, DOD concurred with one and partially concurred 
with our other recommendations. Regarding our recommendation to have 
the appropriate official attend Executive Committee meetings, the 
agency partially concurred and noted that the Under Secretary of 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the necessity of 
attending future Executive Committee meetings. DOD also reiterated that 
the Under Secretary of the Air Force was delegated the authority to 
attend the meetings. While we acknowledge that the Under Secretary 
delegated responsibility for attending these meetings, it is an 
inefficient way to make decisions and achieve outcomes. In the past, 
agreements between Executive Committee members have been overturned by 
the Under Secretary, leading to significant delays in key decisions. 

In addition, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the 
Executive Committee establish a realistic time frame for revising the 
program's cost and schedule baselines, and develop plans to mitigate 
the risk of data gaps. For both recommendations, DOD noted that the 
program office should develop the plans, which would then be reviewed 
by the Executive Committee. We agree that the program is responsible 
for revising the cost and schedule baselines and developing risk 
mitigation plans, and that the Executive Committee is responsible for 
approving these plans. However, our recommendations focused on 
implementing these activities. Until the Committee establishes a time 
frame for making decisions on the program's cost and schedule baseline 
and endorses risk mitigation plans, there is a continued risk that the 
program will encounter further delays or gaps in satellite data 
continuity. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Executive Committee 
track action items and noted that it will recommend that the Program 
Executive Officer establish a Web-based tracking system so that all 
agencies can review the action items and their status. 

Regarding our recommendation to identify the desired outcomes, 
responsible parties, and time frames associated with the Committee's 
corrective actions, DOD partially concurred and noted that the tri- 
agency memorandum of agreement empowers the System Program Director and 
Program Executive Officer to achieve successful outcomes. While we 
agree that the memorandum establishes these executives' 
responsibilities, it is the responsibility of the Executive Committee 
to define expectations associated with their directed actions-- 
including desired outcomes, who is accountable, and time frames for 
completion. In past Executive Committee meetings, these expectations 
have not been defined. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish time 
frames for escalating risks to the Executive Committee, and noted that 
the Program Executive Officer should be able to do so. However, DOD 
expressed concern that interference by the other agencies had weakened 
the Program Executive Officer's ability to perform as intended. We 
acknowledge that there is a disagreement among the three agencies on 
the appropriate level of oversight of the program; however, we believe 
that one of the roles of the Executive Committee members should be to 
ensure that risks are escalated in a timely manner. Until time frames 
are established, risks may continue to linger unresolved at the program 
level. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be 
available on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in Appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

List of Congressional Requesters: 

The Honorable Brian Baird: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bob Inglis: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Brad Miller: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr. 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) identify the status and risks of key 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive 
Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate 
efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS 
satellites. 

To evaluate the status and risks of key program components, we reviewed 
briefings and monthly program management reports. We analyzed earned 
value management data to assess the contractors' performance against 
cost and schedule estimates and evaluated reasons for variances in the 
contractors' performance. We obtained adequate assurance that these 
agency-provided data had been tested and were sufficient for our 
assessment purposes. We reviewed cost reports and program risk 
management documents and interviewed program officials to determine 
program and program segment risks that could negatively affect the 
program's ability to maintain the current schedule and cost estimates. 
We also interviewed agency officials from the Department of Defense 
(DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the NPOESS 
program office to determine the status and risks of the key program 
segments. We interviewed senior-level officials representing the prime 
contractor and the subcontractor responsible for developing a critical 
sensor. We also observed senior-level management review meetings to 
obtain information on the status of the NPOESS program. 

To assess the NPOESS Executive Committee's ability to fulfill its 
responsibilities, we reviewed the presidential directive that 
established NPOESS and the 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement 
signed by all three agencies to determine the responsibilities and 
membership of the Executive Committee. We analyzed Executive Committee 
meeting minutes to determine the attendees of the meetings, the action 
items that were identified, and whether those action items were tracked 
to closure. We reviewed monthly briefings from the Program Executive 
Officer's Program Management Council to identify the key risks and 
issues facing the program. We then compared these risks and issues to 
the matters brought to the Executive Committee's attention in monthly 
letters and meeting minutes to determine whether those risks were 
escalated. In addition, we analyzed the Executive Committee's response 
to the identified risks and issues to determine whether and how the 
Committee responded. Finally, we interviewed senior officials in the 
NPOESS program office and program executive office. 

To evaluate efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for 
later NPOESS satellites, we reviewed the Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum that identified the need for a study of alternatives. We 
reviewed briefings from two alternative management studies and analyzed 
the alternatives presented in those briefings. We reviewed program 
plans and status for addressing the recommendations of those studies. 
We interviewed the chair of the 2008 alternative management study and 
senior officials from the NPOESS program office regarding steps taken 
to close the studies' recommendations. We also interviewed the Program 
Executive Officer to understand the next steps to be taken by the 
program. 

We primarily performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office 
and at DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at the Los Angeles, 
California, facilities of the prime contractor, the subcontractor 
responsible for a critical sensor, and the Defense Contract Management 
Agency groups overseeing those contractors. We conducted this 
performance audit from October 2008 to June 2009 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Summary of the Fall 2008 Independent Review Team's 
Findings and Recommendations: 

To address programwide risks and challenges, the National Polar- 
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Executive 
Committee sponsored an independent review of the program in Fall 2008. 
In March 2009, the independent review team reported on its findings to 
the Executive Committee.[Footnote 25] Its findings were that: 

* the program has a low probability of success in its current 
configuration; 

* the program, as configured after the Nunn-McCurdy certification, 
places continuity of data at high risk because of the inability to 
recover from a launch or spacecraft failure; 

* cost has become the most important parameter, over mission success; 

* the Executive Committee is at best inefficient; 

* the program office suffers from a lack of space acquisition 
infrastructure typically found at space acquisition centers; 

* the program is making questionable decisions because of the pressure 
put on it by near-term budget needs; 

* the highest probability of success is with the current contractor 
team for both NPOESS and the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite; 

* the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite is an operational 
asset; 

* the priorities of the Air Force and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration are not aligned; and: 

* the current budget is inadequate. 

To address these findings, the independent review team recommended that 
the Committee: 

* address the continuity issues by defining the "right" program to meet 
the country's weather and climate needs; 

* determine how to co-locate the program office at an acquisition 
center; 

* determine an appropriate budget for the program; 

* accelerate the schedule of the third and fourth NPOESS satellites; 

* use NPP data operationally; 

* assess whether to launch NPP on schedule or on an anticipated need 
date for the data; 

* change the culture to put mission need first; 

* stop looking at options for VIIRS and NPOESS; and: 

* either fund the program at an 80 percent confidence level or reduce 
the content of the program so that it can be funded at an 80 percent 
confidence instead of a 50 percent confidence level.[Footnote 26] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department Of Commerce: 
The Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

June 1, 2009: 

Mr. David A. Powner Director: 
Information Technology: 
Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Polar-orbiting 
Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at 
Risk Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making (GAO-09-564). On 
behalf of the Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments to the 
draft report. 

Sincerely: 

Signed by: 
Gary Locke: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 
Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Polar-orbiting Environmental 
Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, 
Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision-Making" (GAO-09-564, June 
2009): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce (DOC) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) appreciate the opportunity to review 
this report on the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite System (NPOESS) program. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) makes six recommendations that it anticipates will improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the tri-agency Executive Committee 
(EXCOM). The first recommendation is directed to the Secretary of 
Defense, while the remaining five recommendations are directed to DOC 
as well as to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Overall, the report was 
fair and balanced in assessing the status and risks of key program 
components. DOC is committed to successfully executing the NPOESS 
program. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

The draft GAO report states, "We are also recommending that the 
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five 
actions:" 

Recommendation 2: "Establish a realistic timeframe for revising the 
program's cost and schedule baselines." 

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPOESS 
Integrated Program Office is developing an updated program office 
estimate for a revised acquisition program baseline as required by DoD 
acquisition regulation. However, a revised program cost and schedule 
estimate will be established later this year following a robust 
independent cost analysis of recommended programmatic and acquisition 
alternatives that better reflect a budget with appropriate contingency 
funding to reduce risk. The revised program cost and schedule estimates 
will be ready for initial EXCOM review in late summer 2009. The updated 
acquisition program baseline review process should subsequently be 
completed in fall 2009. 

Recommendation 3: "Develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in 
satellite continuity." 

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPOESS 
Preparatory Project (NPP) sensors are capable of producing data that 
meet or exceed the data provided by NOAA-19, our current operational 
satellite. Accordingly, to mitigate the potential gap in polar 
environmental satellite data coverage in the afternoon orbit between 
NOAA-19 and NPOESS C1, NOAA plans to make operational use of the data 
from the NPP spacecraft and increase the number of products NOAA had 
planned to generate from the NPP system as a risk reduction mission to 
minimize impacts to NOAA's National Weather Service and other users. 

Specifically, NOAA will accelerate development of 54 polar legacy 
products. Previously, 19 legacy products were expected from NPP, with 
an increase to 54 products in the NPOESS C1 era. NOAA will enhance its 
NPP data processing ground system with sufficient infrastructure to 
support the additional 35 products and 24/7 operations and support. 

In the mid-morning orbit, NOAA will continue through the next decade to 
process and deliver environmental products to its customers from the 
U.S. and European instruments on board the European Organisation for 
the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) MetOp series 
of satellites. 

NOAA will assess the use of additional international and interagency 
assets as well as potential development of spare satellites and 
instruments. The cost and schedule details associated with these 
contingency options are currently under review. Any alternative 
decision will ultimately be made consistent with results of the 
Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument testing 
that is currently underway. 

Recommendation 4: "Track the Committee's action items from inception to 
closure." 

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task 
the NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) to ensure that Executive 
Committee (EXCOM) action items are clearly and completely defined; 
assigned to responsible parties for completion within a specific 
timeframe; and tracked to completion, including reporting the results 
to the EXCOM. NOAA will monitor EXCOM action items through the NOAA 
Program Management Council and take corrective actions needed to ensure 
action item coordination and closure. 

Recommendation 5: "Improve the Committee's ability to achieve 
successful outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with 
each of the Committee actions, as well as timeframes and responsible 
parties, when new action items are established." 

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task 
the PEO to ensure EXCOM action items and desired outcomes are clearly 
and completely defined; assigned to responsible parties for completion 
within a specific timeframe; and tracked to completion, including 
reporting the results to the EXCOM. NOAA will monitor EXCOM action 
items through the NOAA Program Management Council and take corrective 
actions needed to ensure successful outcomes. 

Recommendation 6: "Improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing 
timeframes for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that 
they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level." 

NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The PEO will 
ensure that resolution plans and schedules are established and tracked 
at the PEO's monthly management council. NOAA will work with NASA and 
DoD to ensure that the PEO establishes clear criteria and timeframes 
for elevating risks to the EXCOM for action. NOAA will monitor PEO 
action items and issue resolution through the NOAA Program Management 
Council and the tri-agency NPOESS Oversight Council (NOC) to take 
corrective actions needed to ensure timeliness in addressing escalating 
risks. 

Note: The NOC, established in the spring of 2009, is the tri-agency 
council that reviews the NPOESS program on a more recurrent basis than 
the senior-level EXCOM. The NOC, which reports to the EXCOM, is co-
chaired by NOAA's Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and 
Atmosphere, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Deputy 
Administrator of NASA. These members are responsible for representing 
their agencies and providing a reasonable representation of their EXCOM 
position to ensure that issues and actions are responded to in a timely 
manner. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Networks And Information Integration: 
6000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-6000: 

May 28, 2009: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology and Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-09-564, "Polar-Orbiting 
Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity at 
Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making" dated May 1, 
2009 (GAO Code 310890). The DoD acknowledges receipt of the Draft 
report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Dr. Ronald C. Jost
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and Spectrum): 

Enclosure(s): As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated May 1, 2009: 
GAO-09-564 (GAO Code 310890): 

"Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing And 
Data Continuity At Risk, Improvements Needed In Tri-Agency Decision 
Making" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to attend and participate in National Polar-orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Executive Committee 
meetings. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The recently confirmed Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) as the 
Milestone Decision Authority for NPOESS, will evaluate the necessity to 
attend and participate in all future Executive Committee (EXCOM) 
meetings. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of 
Commerce, Department of Defense, and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration clearly defines the responsibilities of the EXCOM, 
Integrated Program Office (IPO), Program Executive Officer (PEO), and 
System Program Director (SPD). The Under Secretary of the Air Force 
attends EXCOM meetings on behalf of USD AT&L as delegated on 03 June 
2002. The SecAF is the DoD lead for acquisition execution review, 
funding and manpower, as well as the lead service for operational 
weather products for the DoD. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to establish a realistic 
timeframe for revising the program's cost and schedule baselines. (p. 
32/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. Per the Memorandum of Agreement (18 Dec 
2008), "The Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
and the NASA Administrator will form the NPOESS EXCOM. Each EXCOM 
member will be accountable to the EXCOM for his/her agency's support of 
the NPOESS program." The DoD EXCOM member will continue to monitor and 
review the NPOESS program cost and schedule updates to the baseline 
from the PEO quarterly. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to develop plans to mitigate the 
risk of gaps in satellite continuity. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The EXCOM should direct the program 
office to establish plans to mitigate the risk gaps in satellite 
continuity as indicated in this report. The EXCOM can review the 
program's risk mitigation plan and modify as necessary. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to track the Committee's action 
items from inception to closure. (p. 33/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur. To accomplish this, the DOD recommends the PEO 
establish a web-based tracking system such that all agencies can review 
action items from inception to closure. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to improve the Committee's 
ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired 
outcome associated with each of the Committee actions, as well as 
timeframes and responsible parties, when new action items are 
established. (p. 33/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The DOD believes the MOA establishes 
responsibilities that empower responsible individuals (e.g. PEO, SPD) 
to achieve successful outcomes. The MOA states, "The SPD will direct 
and manage the NPOESS IPO with immediate oversight of the PEO. The SPD 
is ultimately responsible to the EXCOM for the conduct of the NPOESS 
program and will be granted the decision authority deemed necessary to 
execute the program. The SPD will also coordinate decisions on NPOESS 
matters that affect DOC, NASA, and DoD with the PEO to ensure 
resolution and coordination of all major decisions." Furthermore, the 
EXCOM will "exercise oversight authority over the program through the 
PEO ". The DOD EXCOM member will support Committee actions and will be 
responsive to the PEO's recommendations. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to improve the committee's 
efficiency by establishing timeframes for escalating risks to the 
Committee for action so that they do not linger unresolved at the 
program executive level. (p. 33/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The DOD agrees that issues that are 
unresolved at the program execution level should be brought to the 
EXCOM and efficiently acted upon. As a DOD led acquisition, the PEO 
structure is in place to manage program risks. As such, the PEO has the 
responsibility to follow the traditional DOD streamlined acquisition 
supervision channels between the PEO and MDA. The object of this 
streamlined channel is to improve ability of MDA-PEO chain to pass 
clear unfiltered information up/subsequent acquisition guidance down. 
Impact of additional entities in PEO-MDA chain, contrary to approved 
MOA Amendment, has apparently weakened PEO oversight (as highlighted in 
the Alternative Management Structure Study of 2008). 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Office of the Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

May 29, 2009: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report 
entitled, "Polarorbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs 
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making," (GAO-09-564). 

In the draft report, GAO makes a total of six recommendations intended 
to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision-
making on the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite System (NPOESS) program. Below is NASA's response to the five 
recommendations which were addressed directly to the Agency: 

Recommendations 2 and 3: (1) Establish a realistic timeframe for 
revising the program's cost and schedule baselines; and (2) develop 
plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity. 

Response: Concur. We have been working closely with the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to develop a viable course of action to address both of 
these concerns. The NPOESS program continues to struggle with the 
impacts of persistent delays caused by the late deliveries of key 
instruments. As you know, this has significantly impacted the launch 
readiness date for our NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) Mission, 
causing near-term concerns about data continuity with the on-orbit Aqua 
Satellite. NASA has been actively supporting the tri-agency assessment 
efforts that are studying the possible options for a path forward for 
NPOESS and will continue to do so. 

Recommendation 4: Track the Committee's action items from inception to 
closure. 

Response: Concur. We agree with your recommendation that the Executive 
Committee (EXCOM) maintain a status of action items established during 
the quarterly EXCOM meetings and track these items from inception to 
closure. We will work with the Program Executive Officer for 
Environmental Satellites (PEO) to ensure that the necessary controls 
and processes are established. 

Recommendation 5: Improve the Committee's ability to achieve successful 
outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the 
Committee actions, as well as timeframes and responsible parties, when 
new action items are established. 

Response: Concur. We agree with your recommendation to establish 
desired outcomes, timeframes, and responsible parties for the actions 
taken during the EXCOM meetings. Again, we will work with the PEO to 
ensure that the actions are fully documented and recorded in the 
minutes to the EXCOM meetings. 

Recommendation 6: Improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing 
timeframes for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that 
they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level. 

Response: Concur. We agree with your concerns and recommendation 
regarding unresolved program risks and the escalation of risks to the 
EXCOM. Although many risks can be adequately managed at the PEO or 
Systems Program Director (SPD) level, there are some risks that would 
benefit from escalation to the EXCOM level for tri-agency adjudication. 
We will work with the PEO to ensure that these risks are escalated to 
the EXCOM level when necessary. 

NASA will continue to work with NOAA and the DoD toward the success of 
the NPP and NPOESS programs. If you have any questions or require 
additional information, please contact Andrew Carson at (202) 358-1702. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to review this draft report, and we 
are looking forward to your final report to Congress. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by 

Charles H. Scales: 
Associate Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen M. Phillips, Assistant 
Director; Kate Agatone; Carol Cha; Neil Doherty; Kaelin P. Kuhn; 
Kathleen S. Lovett; and Lee McCracken made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for 
Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2004). 

[2] GAO, Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition 
Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate 
Data Continuity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-899T] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008); Environmental Satellites: Polar-
orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on 
Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518] (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 
2008); Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges; 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1099T] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 11, 2007); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks 
Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-910T] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007); Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical 
Challenges and Risks Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 
2007); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost 
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need 
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2005); Polar- orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program 
Cost and Schedule Changes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2004); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could 
Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-987T] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2003); and Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and 
Future Data Management Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-684T] (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 
2002). 

[3] The European MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting 
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are 
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 
satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational. 

[4] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

[5] The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics delegated the responsibility for attending the meetings--but 
not the authority to make acquisition decisions--to the Under Secretary 
of the Air Force. 

[6] The four sensors are the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite, 
the Cross-track infrared sounder, the Advanced technology microwave 
sounder, and the Ozone mapper/profiler suite. NPP will now also host 
the Clouds' and earth's radiant energy system sensor. 

[7] In general, satellite experts anticipate that roughly 1 out of 
every 10 satellites will fail either during launch or during early 
operations after launch. 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-987T], and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-684T]. 

[9] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 

[10] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 has recently been amended by Pub. L. No. 109-163, 
§ 802 (Jan. 6, 2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 213 (a) (Oct. 17, 
2006). The law now also includes cost growth thresholds from the 
program's original baseline. 

[11] DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified 
program would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes 
satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and 
support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion 
for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life 
cycle cost to $12.5 billion. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-899T]. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498]. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518]. 

[15] These estimates are subject to further refinement because the 
Executive Committee has not agreed on a cost estimating methodology and 
the agencies have not yet agreed to new information security 
requirements. 

[16] This cost estimate includes launch vehicle costs of approximately 
$329 million, which are funded outside the program's baseline. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T]. 

[18] The 1995 agreement specified that the NASA member would be the 
Deputy Administrator. Responsibility was subsequently taken over by the 
Administrator of NASA. 

[19] According to DOD, the milestone decision authority is the 
designated individual who has overall responsibility for an investment. 
This person has the authority to approve a major acquisition program's 
progression in the acquisition process and is responsible for reporting 
cost, schedule, and performance results. 

[20] The 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement differ slightly in this 
regard. The first agreement stated that DOD's milestone decision 
authority will make acquisition decisions with concurrence of the other 
Executive Committee members while the second agreement states that the 
DOD authority must consider committee decisions. The second agreement 
takes precedence in the case of a conflict. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G]. 

[22] The program subsequently reported that 12 of the 18 action items 
have been closed and that 6 are in progress. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G]. 

[24] DOD directive 5000.55 section E2.1.43 states that a Program 
Executive Officer only reports to and receives guidance and direction 
from the DOD component acquisition executive. Also, the 2008 tri-agency 
memorandum of agreement reiterates that the Program Executive Officer 
reports directly to and takes direction from the Executive Committee. 

[25] The independent review team has provided briefings on its findings 
and recommendations, but as of the first week of June 2009, had not yet 
released its final report. 

[26] A 50 percent level of confidence indicates that a program has a 50 
percent chance that the program will be delivered at the identified 
cost. 

[End of section] 

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