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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National 
Security and International Relations, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

January 2007: 

Chemical And Biological Defense: 

Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical 
Unit Preparedness and Stated National Priorities: 

GAO-07-143: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-143, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department 
of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the 
effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or 
overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military 
to define the nature and potential requests for military capabilities 
needed to respond to 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the 
Homeland Security Council. The Army’s chemical units are key players in 
this mission. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army’s chemical and 
biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with 
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and 
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units 
also tasked with a homeland defense mission—especially National Guard 
and Reserve units—are adequately prepared for this mission. During this 
review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators 
for 78 Army chemical units. 

What GAO Found: 

Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense 
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform 
their missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 
current operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at 
home and abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and 
biological defenses since 2001 and plans to increase funding for this 
program during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, there is a misalignment 
between the high priority DOD states that it places on chemical and 
biological defense and the current low level of chemical unit 
readiness. Most of the Army’s chemical and biological units, 
particularly in the National Guard and Reserve, are reporting the 
lowest readiness ratings—meaning that they are not considered 
sufficiently qualified for deployment. This situation reflects critical 
personnel shortages, particularly in their key occupational 
specialty—chemical operations—and shortages of mission-critical 
equipment, such as decontamination equipment. Lacking key personnel and 
equipment, some units have not been able to train for their wartime 
chemical and biological defense missions. Army chemical unit readiness 
problems have historically been attributed to personnel and equipment 
shortages, and recently these have been greatly exacerbated by 
personnel and equipment transfers to other types of units in support of 
current operations. Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in 
place to resolve long-standing shortages in personnel and equipment. 
Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and 
decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical 
operations specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense 
forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack at home or 
abroad. 

Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the 
Homeland Security Council involve chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, the ability of Army 
chemical and biological units, especially National Guard and Reserve 
units, to concurrently perform both their original warfighting chemical 
and biological defense mission and their homeland defense mission is 
doubtful. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list 
contains a limited number of chemical and biological units that must be 
ready to perform homeland defense missions, the forces on this list, 
according to United States Northern Command planning documents, are 
intended only to be an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting 
the transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment 
list to deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this 
is an adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission 
because no criteria have been established to determine how many and 
which chemical units are needed. In the event of multiple near-
simultaneous WMD attacks in the United States, additional chemical 
units would be required—but most chemical and biological units are 
already at a low state of readiness and DOD has not updated doctrine 
for addressing the new homeland defense missions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends actions to address long-standing chemical unit personnel 
and equipment shortages; and better enable Army chemical units to 
perform wartime and homeland defense missions. DOD generally agreed 
with two recommendations and disagreed with those to address unit 
personnel and equipment shortages. GAO continues to believe its 
recommendations have merit. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-143]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and 
Trained to Perform Their Missions: 

Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and 
Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component: 

Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System: 

Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System: 

Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System: 

Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance 
System: 

Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System: 

Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type: 

Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military 
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006: 

Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component, 
2000 through 2006: 

Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System: 

Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System: 

Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to 
Army Units, as of July 2006: 

Abbreviations: 

BIDS: Biological Integrated Detection System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield 
Explosive: 

CERFP: CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages: 

COTS: commercial off-the-shelf: 

CST: Civil Support Teams: 

HMMWV: high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle: 

NBC: nuclear, biological, chemical: 

WMD: weapons of mass destruction: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 19, 2007: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that the United States is 
likely to be faced with adversaries abroad who possess a wide range of 
asymmetric capabilities, including chemical and biological weapons, 
which challenge our military forces' ability to fight and win conflicts 
overseas. Additionally, the United States continues to believe that 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the 
greatest security challenges facing our country.[Footnote 1] The 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review report states that DOD must be prepared to 
respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at home or overseas. 
All of the military services--the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 
Corps--plan and execute chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
defense programs, ranging from basic research to procurement and 
sustainment. 

The Army, however, is the only service[Footnote 2] that includes 
dedicated chemical and biological units[Footnote 3] as a standard part 
of its force structure. The Army's chemical units provide the following 
capabilities: chemical and biological detection, decontamination, 
reconnaissance, and smoke screening.[Footnote 4] Additionally, certain 
Reserve component chemical units have been given the mission of 
providing hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty 
decontamination in the event of a WMD attack on the homeland. These 
designated units are rotated annually on the Joint Task Force-Civil 
Support's[Footnote 5] force deployment list. These units' personnel and 
equipment remain with the unit; they are not reassigned to deploying 
units in support of ongoing operations overseas. 

The National Guard is creating a new regionally based force that would 
support the WMD-Civil Support Teams (CST) in the event of a WMD attack 
on the homeland. WMD-CSTs are federally funded, state-controlled 
National Guard units whose mission is to assist civil authorities in 
the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD, including 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 
(CBRNE) weapons and agents. Specifically, the WMD-CSTs are to identify 
CBRNE agents and substances, assess current or projected consequences, 
and advise civil authorities on response measures. They do not perform 
any decontamination functions. Unlike traditional National Guard units, 
each team is composed of 22 members who are on full-time duty.[Footnote 
6] The new National Guard regional forces, called CBRNE Enhanced 
Response Force Packages (CERFP), are composed of Army and Air National 
Guard units who will support local, state, and federal agencies in 
managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing capabilities to 
conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical services, and 
casualty search and rescue.[Footnote 7] Existing Army National Guard 
chemical companies will perform the personnel decontamination function. 

All of the services' chemical and biological defense training, except 
for medical courses, is located at the U.S. Army Chemical School at 
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The U.S. Army Chemical School Doctrine 
Division is responsible for joint, multiservice, and Army doctrine 
development for operations related to nuclear/biological/chemical 
contamination avoidance, protection, decontamination, and smoke 
screening. 

The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, as well as other 
DOD publications, have emphasized the need to address the increasing 
threat posed by WMD, including chemical and biological weapons. Toward 
this end, DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and biological 
defenses since 2001, and it is increasing funding for its Chemical and 
Biological Defense Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent) 
for the next 5 years beginning in fiscal year 2006. The department 
plans to use these funds primarily for improving its research, 
development, and testing infrastructure as well as expanding efforts to 
improve defenses against emerging chemical and biological threats. 
However, experiences during preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom 
exposed continuing weaknesses in the preparedness of U.S. forces to 
defend against a chemical or biological attack that were identified 
during the Persian Gulf War. We and DOD's Inspector General have 
published multiple reports addressing continued problems in aspects of 
DOD's chemical and biological defense preparedness. While potential 
opponents have been assessed to be technologically capable of 
sustaining certain levels of chemical and biological warfare, there is 
still disagreement on the specific extent to which this capability has 
actually been developed. 

At your request, we evaluated the preparedness of Army chemical units. 
Specifically, we determined the extent to which (1) units tasked with 
providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and 
commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units 
also tasked with the homeland defense mission--especially Army National 
Guard and Army Reserve chemical units--are adequately prepared for this 
mission. 

To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical 
and biological defense support to combat units and commands are 
adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from 
the office of the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the 
National Guard Bureau, and officials from a nonprobability sample of 
Army chemical companies. We selected companies from each Army component 
and from each type of chemical company. Results from nonprobability 
samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population because 
some elements of the population have no chance of being selected. We 
obtained readiness data from the Army Readiness Management System and 
reviewed readiness reports for all 78 chemical companies from fiscal 
years 2000 through 2006. To assess whether Army chemical companies are 
adequately staffed to perform their missions, we obtained personnel 
data from the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and 
compared personnel authorized with personnel on-hand for all of the 
chemical companies and Army-wide. We determined that the readiness and 
personnel data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To assess the extent to which active, National Guard, and Reserve Army 
chemical companies have the equipment needed to perform their missions, 
we obtained chemical equipment requirements from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR 
Database, and compared those requirements to what the data indicated 
that the chemical units had on-hand. We also obtained and analyzed data 
on other types of mission-essential items and compared authorizations 
to what the data indicated were on hand in chemical units and Army- 
wide. The data from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database were of 
undetermined reliability because we received them close to our 
reporting deadline and, therefore, were not able to conduct a full 
reliability assessment. However, we corroborated the system data we 
used with officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the National Guard Bureau, and 
selected Army chemical units. 

To assess the extent to which units also tasked with the homeland 
defense mission--especially Army National Guard and Reserve chemical 
units--are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data 
obtained in the first objective, contacted officials from the U.S. 
Northern Command, and obtained planning documents that describe the use 
of Army chemical units to perform chemical and biological homeland 
defense missions. We also discussed this mission with some National 
Guard and Reserve chemical units who had been given this mission. We 
reviewed and analyzed current and planned chemical and biological 
defense doctrine and discussed the applicability of this doctrine to 
the newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials from the 
U.S. Army Chemical School and U.S. Army Reserve Command. We conducted 
our review from July 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Our assessments of 
data reliability, other than that for the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database, 
showed that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for this 
report. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is 
contained in appendix I. 

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated 
September 29, 2006.[Footnote 8] That report provides additional details 
on the readiness of the Army's chemical units. 

Results in Brief: 

Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense 
support are not adequately staffed, equipped, or trained to perform 
their missions. Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 
current operational plans highlight the need to mitigate WMD attacks at 
home and abroad and DOD has doubled its investment in chemical and 
biological defenses since 2001, there is a misalignment between the 
high priority DOD places on chemical and biological defense and the 
current low level of preparedness characterizing Army chemical 
companies, particularly in the National Guard and Reserve. Problems 
occurring primarily as the result of personnel shortages related to 
current operations are now causing most of the Army chemical units 
expected to perform these missions to report low readiness ratings--in 
other words, they are not considered sufficiently qualified for 
deployment. The low readiness ratings reflect critical personnel 
shortages, particularly in the key occupational specialty--chemical 
operations. Army chemical unit readiness is also being compromised by 
shortages of mission-critical equipment, such as decontamination 
equipment. For example, Army chemical units, particularly in the 
National Guard and Reserve, currently lack a substantial portion of 
their authorized light decontamination equipment. Because they lack key 
personnel and equipment, some units have not been able to train for 
their wartime chemical and biological defense missions. Army National 
Guard and Reserve chemical unit readiness problems have historically 
been attributed to personnel and equipment shortages, and recently 
these have been greatly exacerbated by personnel and equipment 
transfers to other types of units in support of current operations. 
Moreover, the Army does not have a specific plan in place to resolve 
long-standing shortages in chemical defense personnel and equipment. 
Until the Army develops a specific plan to address personnel and 
decontamination equipment shortfalls and the transfer of chemical 
operations specialists to deploying units, adequate chemical defense 
forces may not be available in the event of a WMD attack at home or 
abroad. 

Even though 12 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the 
Homeland Security Council involve CBRNE response, the ability of Army 
chemical units, especially National Guard and Reserve units, to be 
concurrently prepared to perform either their original warfighting 
chemical and biological defense mission or their homeland defense 
mission is doubtful. According to Army Reserve Command officials, no 
criteria have thus far been established for determining how many and 
which units are needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 
attacks on the United States. While the Joint Task Force-Civil Support 
deployment data list contains a limited number of chemical units that 
must be ready to perform homeland defense missions, this list, 
according to U.S. Northern Command planning documents, is intended to 
provide only an initial response force. The Army is prohibiting the 
transfer of personnel and equipment from units on this deployment list 
to deploying units overseas. However, it is unclear whether this is an 
adequate number of units to support the homeland defense mission, 
because no criteria have been established to determine how many and 
which chemical units are needed. Since most chemical units are already 
at a low state of readiness, their ability to respond in the event of a 
mass casualty WMD attack on the United States is doubtful. Given DOD's 
emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and abroad, we believe that 
leaving chemical units in such a low state of readiness and dual 
tasking them will result in an increasing operational risk to both the 
homeland defense and warfighting missions. Further, although some Army 
National Guard and Reserve chemical units are currently being trained 
and equipped to meet both new homeland defense and ongoing wartime 
chemical and biological defense missions, the Army has not updated 
doctrine for addressing these new missions, and Army Chemical School 
officials told us that this doctrine would not be completed until at 
least June 2007. However, it is unclear whether officials will meet 
this date, given the low priority updating the doctrine has received in 
the past. 

We are recommending several actions to align DOD's stated emphasis on 
responding to and mitigating effects from WMD incidents at home and 
abroad with the actual readiness of the Army's chemical units. However, 
in written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed 
with two recommendations but disagreed with our recommendations to 
address long-standing chemical unit personnel and equipment shortages. 
Specifically, DOD disagreed with our recommendation to develop a 
specific plan to address chemical unit personnel shortfalls. In 
general, the department stated that we did not fully consider the 
Army's current accession and recruitment plan as a solution to chemical 
unit personnel shortfalls and questioned our method for measuring unit 
readiness for homeland defense missions. As discussed in this report, 
we did consider the recruitment plan and found it has had a limited 
effect on personnel shortfalls, and we used the only available DOD 
metric because there is no other metric available to measure readiness 
of chemical units. The department also disagreed with our 
recommendation to develop a plan to address decontamination equipment 
shortages until new joint systems are fielded because the department 
believes these issues are addressed in its Fiscal Years 2008-2013 
Program Objective Memorandum. In our view, that approach does not 
address many of the issues we highlight in our recommendation, such as 
training and logistics support. We continue to believe our 
recommendations have merit. DOD's comments and our evaluation of them 
are discussed in the agency comments section of this report. 

Background: 

The Army Chemical Corps is comprised of brigades, battalions, 
companies, and detachments that perform a variety of chemical and 
biological defense missions. However, the chemical company is the 
primary operative unit that performs the majority of these missions. Of 
the Army's 78 chemical companies, about three-fourths (74 percent) are 
located in the Army National Guard or Army Reserve. Two of these 
companies are actually multicomponent--composed of both active and 
Reserve platoons--but are counted as Reserve companies because their 
headquarters platoons are part of the Army Reserve. Figure 1 
illustrates the division of the Army's chemical companies between the 
active, Reserve, and National Guard components. 

Figure 1: Composition of Army Chemical Companies, by Component: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's chemical companies provide the following capabilities:  

1. Biological detection-Biological detection units provide monitoring, 
sampling, detection, and identification of biological agents through 
the use of a detector suite in a Lightweight Multipurpose Shelter 
mounted on a dedicated, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle 
(HMMWV). The detector suite is called the Biological Integrated 
Detection System (BIDS), and hence these units are commonly referred to 
as BIDS units (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Biological Integrated Detection System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

2. Decontamination-Decontamination units perform decontamination 
operations in direct support of either fighting forces or operations at 
fixed sites, such as strategic ports of embarkation and debarkation. 
The decontamination mission is performed using primarily either heavy 
or light decontamination equipment. The M12 Heavy Decontamination 
System consists of a pump, tank, and water heater mounted on a 5-ton 
truck, and it performs both equipment and terrain decontamination (see 
fig. 3). 

Figure 3: M12 Heavy Decontamination System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

The M17 Light Decontamination System is a portable, lightweight, 
compact, engine-driven pump and water heating system used to perform 
mostly personnel and equipment decontamination (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: M17 Light Decontamination System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

3. Reconnaissance-Chemical reconnaissance companies perform 
reconnaissance--that is, they conduct surveillance, monitoring, and 
sampling in hostile territory--often using the lightly armored, wheeled 
FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (see 
fig. 5) or a similar system mounted on other vehicles such as a HMMWV. 

Figure 5: FOX M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance 
System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

4. Smoke screening-Smoke companies use smoke-generating equipment (see 
fig. 6) to provide large-area obscurant screening intended to enhance 
the commander's ability to conceal and thus deploy and maneuver forces. 

Figure 6: M56 Coyote Smoke Generating System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Most of the Army's chemical companies are multifunctional-- that is, 
the company may perform a combination of capabilities, such as 
reconnaissance and decontamination; smoke and decontamination; and 
smoke, decontamination, and reconnaissance. Most of the Army's chemical 
companies are smoke/decontamination companies, as shown in figure 7.  

Figure 7: Army Chemical Companies by Type: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to their wartime chemical and biological defense missions, 
certain Army National Guard and Army Reserve chemical units have also 
been given homeland defense missions. The Defense Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandated the enhancement of domestic 
preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving 
nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.[Footnote 9] In 
response to this mandate, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested an 
assessment for integrating the National Guard and the Army Reserve into 
ongoing WMD domestic preparedness programs. This assessment, led by the 
Under Secretary of the Army, was completed in January 1998. The 
assessment recommended the training of Reserve component chemical 
companies for domestic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 
reconnaissance and decontamination and specified additional equipment 
lists to enable the needed capabilities. It also required the creation 
of Military Support Detachments, now known as WMD-CSTs. The Deputy 
Secretary of Defense approved this plan in January 1998 and directed 
its implementation. 

According to an Army official, the fiscal year 1999 Army budget 
included funds for addressing the increased support requirements 
associated with terrorist use of WMD in the United States. 
Specifically, the support requirement included the establishment of 10 
WMD-CSTs (later increased to 55 authorized) to perform identification 
of CBRNE agents and substances, assess current or projected 
consequences, and advise civil authorities on response measures; the 
establishment of WMD patient decontamination teams within existing 
standard National Guard and Reserve chemical companies; and the 
training and equipping of standard National Guard and Reserve units to 
conduct WMD reconnaissance. A March 1999 U.S. Army Forces Command 
message required the training and equipping of standard National Guard 
and Reserve chemical units to perform NBC reconnaissance and mass 
casualty decontamination. Additionally, in October 2001, the Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans directed that U.S. Army 
Forces Command, with support from Army Training and Doctrine Command 
and the Director of Military Support, refine the domestic 
reconnaissance and casualty decontamination mission for standard Army 
chemical units and develop operational requirements documents and 
training support packages. However, by 2005, the Army was still in the 
process of designing and implementing its response to these tasks, and 
the needed doctrine and training support packages had not been 
completed. This and other problems raised questions regarding the 
readiness of the Army's chemical units to perform their assigned 
missions and led to a 2005 congressional request that we perform this 
review. 

In response to an initiative from the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, the National Guard is in the process of creating additional 
regional forces to support WMD-CSTs in the event of a WMD attack. 
According to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the mission of the 
17 currently authorized CERFPs is to support local, state, and federal 
agencies managing the consequences of a CBRNE event by providing 
capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical 
services, and casualty search and rescue. Army National Guard chemical 
companies will perform the decontamination function of the CERFPs. 

Both Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies perform their 
homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities under the 
direction of the U.S. Northern Command. One of the U.S. Northern 
Command's missions is, when requested by civil authorities and directed 
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to provide support to 
civil authorities for response and recovery from incidents such as 
CBRNE events.  

Most Army Chemical Companies Are Inadequately Staffed, Equipped, and 
Trained to Perform Their Missions: 

The vast majority of the Army's chemical companies, particularly in the 
National Guard and Reserve, are currently reporting readiness levels so 
low that their ability to perform their mission is in doubt. Our 
analysis of Army active duty, National Guard, and Reserve chemical unit 
readiness and personnel data determined that most of these units' 
readiness is currently being affected by severe personnel shortages, 
especially in key chemical occupational specialties. They are also 
experiencing key equipment shortages, and both these factors are 
adversely affecting chemical unit training. Under these conditions it 
is questionable whether most of these units would be able to respond 
effectively to significant wartime or terrorist CBRNE events, and the 
Army appears to lack a specific plan for remedying this condition. 

Army Chemical Company Readiness Is Low: 

As of March 2006, most of the Army's chemical companies, particularly 
in the National Guard and Reserve, were reporting the two lowest states 
of readiness measured by the Army's Unit Status Reporting 
System.[Footnote 10] In fact, the overall readiness of the Army's 
chemical companies began to decline precipitously from already low 
levels in early 2004. According to Army officials, this decline in 
readiness was primarily attributable to the transfer of resources from 
chemical units to other types of units deploying to support Operations 
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army chemical companies reporting 
the lowest level of readiness doubled from March 2000 to March 2006. 
Specific details on the readiness ratings and readiness trends of the 
Army's chemical companies are included in the classified version of 
this report.[Footnote 11] 

Personnel Shortages Are Driving Chemical Companies' Low Readiness 
Rates: 

Severe personnel shortages created primarily by the transfer of 
chemical unit personnel to other types of units deploying in support of 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are the primary reason 
why Army chemical companies, particularly in the National Guard and 
Reserve, are reporting low readiness levels. Long-standing shortages in 
key occupational specialties are now becoming worse and further 
exacerbating chemical company personnel shortages. 

Chemical companies are not staffed to authorized levels: 

The impact of these shortages on chemical companies is demonstrated by 
comparing the staffing levels authorized with the staffing levels 
actually filled. Army units are designed to perform certain defined 
missions and are authorized a specific number of personnel in order to 
be able to conduct their missions. Active Army chemical units are 
relatively well-staffed in relation to their authorized levels. 
However, about 74 percent of the Army's chemical companies are located 
in the National Guard and Reserve, and these companies are presently 
staffed far below their authorized levels. 

Current operational plans for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 
Freedom have little or no requirement for chemical companies. As a 
result, soldiers from chemical companies are being reassigned to 
address personnel shortages in deploying units. For example, in one 
state we contacted, three Army National Guard chemical companies are 
currently staffed at 22-45 percent of their authorized levels due to 
the transfer of 141 soldiers to other deploying Army National Guard 
units, such as military police units, from that state. These units were 
already suffering low fill rates before the transfer of soldiers to 
deploying units. The three companies together were authorized 401 
soldiers, but only 275 soldiers had been assigned--a fill rate of 69 
percent. Currently, the only soldiers in these three chemical companies 
who are not deployed are those ineligible for deployment because they 
either (1) have not received the training required for deployment or 
(2) do not meet deployment standards due to medical reasons. 

Active Army chemical companies have significantly better personnel fill 
rates than Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies. Overall, 
active Army chemical companies do not need to be supplemented with 
soldiers transferred from other units in order to deploy. However, our 
data show that Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies will 
require extensive personnel increases in order to deploy. According to 
Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the overall fill rates for 
these companies will not improve until Army personnel requirements for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom are significantly reduced. As long as the Army 
National Guard and Reserve are tasked to provide a significant portion 
of the units deployed to Iraq, chemical companies as well as other low 
demand units will be used as a source of soldiers to fill deploying 
units. In addition, these officials stated that concrete plans to bring 
their chemical company fill rates back to pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom 
levels are not currently in place, or being developed, due to the 
Army's focus on supporting current operations. 

Army chemical companies have shortages in their key specialties: 

Chemical company personnel fill problems are being exacerbated by Army- 
wide shortages in occupational specialties that are key to chemical 
units. The Army classifies the jobs its soldiers perform as military 
occupational specialties. Army units are comprised of many occupational 
specialties, such as mechanics, supply personnel, and truck drivers. 
The primary specialty in chemical companies is the chemical operations 
specialist. We determined, based on interviews with Army chemical 
officials, that three occupational specialty groups are critical to 
chemical companies in the performance of their missions: chemical 
operations specialists, chemical officers, and mechanics (that is, 
chemical equipment repairer, wheeled vehicle mechanic, tracked vehicle 
mechanic, and fuel and electrical repairer). These specialties are also 
found in other types of Army units. For example, most combat units have 
an assigned chemical officer or noncommissioned officer to advise their 
commander on chemical and biological defense matters. 

Chemical companies are staffed significantly below their authorized 
levels for chemical operations specialists, chemical officers, and 
mechanics, and these shortages exist Army-wide. However, as shown in 
figure 8, these shortages are greater for the chemical companies than 
for the Army as a whole. 

Figure 8: Fill Rates for Selected Army Chemical Company Military 
Occupational Specialties, as of February 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System 
and the Total Army Personnel Database. 

[End of figure] 

Army officials told us that the primary reason for the greater shortage 
in chemical companies is that very few chemical companies are deployed; 
therefore, as the need for deployable personnel has arisen, many of 
these soldiers have been transferred to deploying units. 

Chemical operations specialist shortages have worsened: 

The Army has historically had difficulty recruiting and retaining the 
primary chemical company occupational specialty, the chemical 
operations specialist, but shortages of this occupational specialty are 
currently worsening despite Army efforts to reverse this trend. Army 
officials told us that staff for the chemical occupational specialty 
has always been difficult to recruit and retain because of the high 
aptitude scores required. In addition, they said that chemical unit 
training with real and simulated agents is limited, chemical unit 
personnel are often assigned nonchemical additional duties, and 
chemical unit equipment often is also used for more mundane tasks. For 
example, decontamination equipment such as the M17 and M12 can also be 
used for washing vehicles and operating showers for troops in the 
field. Officials also told us that there are limited promotion 
opportunities in the chemical operations career field, making it 
difficult to retain personnel in this specialty. 

The military services have offered enlistment or reenlistment bonuses 
to critical specialties in order to attract and retain personnel in 
these specialties. Although bonuses offered to chemical operations 
specialists led to some improvement in fill rates in the past, this has 
perpetually been one of the Army's underfilled military occupational 
specialties.[Footnote 12] Fill rates for chemical operations 
specialists were on the increase between 2000 and 2003. According to 
Army officials, this increase was due to (1) enlistment and 
reenlistment bonuses for personnel who selected the chemical operations 
specialty as their primary military occupational specialty and (2) the 
efforts of Army recruiters. However, as shown in figure 9, the fill 
rates for this specialty began a steady decline in 2004, especially in 
the Army National Guard and Reserve. 

Figure 9: Chemical Operations Specialist Fill Rates, by Army Component, 
2000 through 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of the Total Army Authorizations Document System 
and the Total Army Personnel Database. 

[End of figure] 

According to Army National Guard and Reserve officials, the subsequent 
decline in chemical operations specialist fill rates is directly 
attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, as operations continued 
in Iraq, certain critical, nonchemical specialties were required due to 
the declining security situation. As a result, chemical operations 
specialists were often retrained, reclassified, and assigned to other 
units, such as military police units. Second, the fill rate for 
chemical operations specialists declined because, according to Army 
officials, this specialty is considered by recruits to be less 
attractive than other military occupational specialties. Recruits have 
historically been drawn to combat military occupational specialties, 
such as infantrymen, and to specialties, such as military police and 
mechanics, which more directly correspond to civilian jobs. 
Furthermore, many recruits want the opportunity to serve in Iraq, and 
they have a much better chance of doing so if they enlist as 
infantrymen or military police. 

In addition, the shortage of chemical operations specialists has 
worsened in part because once transferred, retrained, or reclassified, 
these specialists often opt not to return to chemical units or 
specialties. For example, as discussed earlier, three Army National 
Guard chemical companies in one state lost a significant number of 
personnel to deploying units from that state. Of the 275 soldiers 
assigned to these three companies, 141 soldiers (51 percent) of those 
assigned were transferred to other deploying units. Of the 141 
transferred, 129 went to military police companies, and most of these 
soldiers were retrained and reclassified as military police. The 
remaining 12 soldiers were transferred to a support battalion that 
deployed to Kuwait. National Guard officials from this state are not 
expecting many of these soldiers to return to their former chemical 
companies when their military police companies return because, 
according to these officials, these soldiers will have developed new 
camaraderies within their current units and as a result will not 
transfer back to their former chemical companies. Consequently, unless 
DOD requires soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to 
units requiring those specialties, National Guard officials will need 
to recruit additional soldiers into chemical operations specialties in 
order to address personnel shortfalls. 

In one case, an entire Army National Guard chemical company from a 
different state was retrained and reclassified as military police and 
deployed to Germany as a military police company in order to assume the 
mission of an active duty military police company deploying to support 
the global war on terrorism. According to National Guard officials from 
that state, when this unit returns, it will remain a military police 
company. Other chemical companies from this state have lost personnel 
due to their transfer to other deploying units, including military 
police units. Army National Guard officials from this state also told 
us that increased recruitment of chemical operations specialists would 
be needed to refill these units with the required number of personnel.  

Some Chemical Companies Lack Equipment Needed to Perform Their 
Missions: 

After personnel shortages, the second major reason for Army chemical 
companies' reporting low readiness rates is the shortage of key 
equipment, thus hampering their ability to perform their missions. Army 
chemical doctrine states that chemical units will perform both heavy 
and light decontamination functions. But the heavy and light 
decontamination equipment in use today by Army chemical companies is 
old and difficult or costly to maintain, previous attempts to replace 
it have failed, and the fielding of new replacement equipment is not 
scheduled to begin until at least fiscal year 2009. 

The M12 Heavy Decontamination System and the M17 Light Decontamination 
System are the two primary types of decontamination equipment currently 
found in Army chemical units. The M12 is 35 years old and is scheduled 
to be replaced by a joint system beginning in fiscal year 2012. Army 
chemical company personnel told us that while recently refurbished and 
adequate to perform most functions, the M12 is inadequate to support 
all of the Army's heavy decontamination requirements. This has recently 
resulted in emergency purchases of alternate heavy decontamination 
equipment from commercial sources to meet standard operational 
requirements. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, heavy 
chemical companies equipped with the M12 were tasked with performing 
fixed-site (such as seaport and airfield) decontamination, including 
spraying decontaminant on buildings or large pieces of equipment, if 
needed. However, according to a Corps chemical officer, the M12 cannot 
effectively reach higher than a one-story building or the upper 
surfaces of large aircraft. As a result, U.S. Central Command submitted 
an Operational Needs Statement requesting a different mobile 
decontamination system to provide the heavy decontamination support 
needed for terrain, large area, and fixed-site decontamination 
operations. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the 
same new systems for U.S. Army forces in Korea in order to enhance the 
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense preparedness in this theater. 
These requests were approved, and DOD subsequently purchased new 
commercial heavy decontamination equipment--116 Falcon Fixed Site 
Decontamination Systems costing $14.2 million--to meet these 
requirements (see fig. 10). 

Figure 10: Falcon Fixed Site Decontamination System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Light decontamination companies are assigned the M17 Light 
Decontamination System to perform tactical personnel and equipment 
decontamination. This system is also typically fielded to Army combat 
units to enable them to decontaminate their own personnel and equipment 
(see fig. 4). 

The M17 is also an old system (20 years old) that has reached the end 
of its service life. This system has been seriously affected by long-
standing maintenance problems, and it has been difficult for the Army 
to obtain the needed repair parts. The Army consequently implemented a 
modernization program to replace the M17's engine and upgrade the 
system's hose/wand assembly. However, this effort was terminated 
because its costs were greater than those to purchase a new commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) replacement system, called the Karcher 
Multipurpose Decontamination System (see fig. 11). 

Figure 11: Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 25: With the termination of the M17 overhaul program, the 
decontamination system program manager determined that any future 
lightweight decontamination system requirements would be filled by the 
Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination System until the replacement 
system is fielded, currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. As 
with the M12, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, one Army Corps 
submitted an Operational Needs Statement requesting a new, improved 
light decontamination system, due to the mission capability problems of 
the M17. Subsequently, another Army corps, an Army organization in 
Korea, and the Marine Corps all submitted Operational Needs Statements 
requesting the procurement of an alternative to the M17. Consequently, 
DOD purchased 410 Karcher Multipurpose Decontamination Systems, costing 
approximately $8.2 million, to provide the required light 
decontamination capability. 

Furthermore, the Army--particularly the National Guard and Reserve--
does not have sufficient M17s to meet the numbers currently authorized. 
As shown in figure 12, the fill rate of M17s for the Army as a whole is 
less than 52 percent; the fill rates for the National Guard and Reserve 
are about 13 percent and 56 percent, respectively. For the chemical 
companies we reviewed, the fill rate for M17s is about 65 percent, 
since it is a mission-critical piece of equipment, but that is still 
well below required levels. Five Army National Guard chemical companies 
we visited had never received their authorized M17s or Karcher 
Multipurpose Decontamination System substitute equipment, even though 
these units had been activated in 2002 and this piece of equipment is a 
mission-critical item. 

Figure 12: M17 Light Decontamination Systems Authorized and Assigned to 
Army Units, as of July 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Army EQUIPFOR database. 

Note: These data are of undetermined reliability. 

[End of figure] 

DOD has long recognized the need to replace its aging decontamination 
systems. However, the Modular Decontamination System, an attempted 
replacement program for both the M12 and M17 begun in 1993, was 
unsuccessful and was officially terminated in 2003. According to an 
Army Chemical School memorandum, this system did not keep up with the 
emerging requirements of the Army's transformation, and the planned 
replacement system continued to be plagued with reliability 
deficiencies. According to officials from the Joint Program Executive 
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, the M17 and M12 will not be 
replaced by new, joint systems until at least fiscal years 2009 and 
2012, respectively. In the meantime, the Army will resort to equipping 
units with commercial systems, in limited quantities, as an interim 
solution. However, the suitability of these commercial off-the-shelf 
systems for serving as interim replacements for the M12 and M17 has not 
been fully determined. For example, as commercial-off-the-shelf 
systems, they have not been ruggedized or tested for suitability in a 
tactical field environment. Since they have not been type-classified as 
standard military equipment, they are not recognized as standard issue 
items or included on chemical unit equipment lists. Furthermore, 
questions remain regarding logistical support issues, such as spare 
parts, maintenance, and training support. It is presently unclear how 
many commercial decontamination systems will be required in the 
interim, how these will be integrated with the new systems planned for 
delivery after fiscal year 2009, or how effectively the Army will be 
able to address its near-term decontamination mission requirements. At 
the time of our review, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 
and Biological Defense had identified several options for addressing 
the replacement of M12s and M17s with interim commercial equipment, but 
no decision had yet been reached. After we completed our work on this 
assignment, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 
Biological Defense told us that they are now evaluating steps that 
would ensure that the commercial decontamination equipment and existing 
M12s and M17s will be integrated with the new, joint systems currently 
under development. A recommendation in this report on this subject 
remains, however, since these actions have not yet been completed. 

Chemical companies are low on other pieces of key equipment: 

A further contributing factor to the chemical companies' readiness 
problem is the Army-wide shortage of other key equipment. The Army 
chemical companies we visited, especially in the National Guard and 
Reserve, reported shortages of other key pieces of equipment that 
hamper their ability to perform their mission. Military units cannot 
deploy without other mission-critical equipment, including chemical 
monitors, weapon night-vision sights, and radio sets. Since these items 
are in short supply across the Army, nondeploying units have 
transferred them to deploying units to support current operations. We 
previously reported on the extent of this problem in the National Guard 
and concluded that growing equipment shortages resulting from the need 
to fully equip deploying units (1) make it unclear whether units will 
be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for 
missions overseas or at home and (2) hamper the ability of nondeployed 
forces to train for future missions.[Footnote 13] 

Chemical Company Mission Training Is Suffering: 

Personnel and equipment shortages, as well as other priority 
requirements, have had an adverse impact on some chemical companies' 
ability to train collectively for their wartime chemical defense 
mission. Chemical companies are required to train for the tasks on 
their Mission Essential Task Lists[Footnote 14] as well as complete 
other priority training as designated by their headquarters. For 
example, due to the high pace of current operations, all Army soldiers 
are required to train on "warrior skills," the individual skills in 
which all soldiers need to be proficient if deployed. 

Transferring soldiers from nondeploying units to deploying units to 
support current operations has had a negative impact on chemical 
companies' ability to train for their chemical mission-essential tasks. 
For example, two Army National Guard chemical companies that we visited 
have been unable to conduct unit-level training because of the 
requirement to transfer soldiers to other deploying National Guard 
units from that state. Further, another National Guard chemical company 
we visited told us they were unable to train for their mission- 
essential tasks due to the transfer of 44 soldiers to a deploying unit. 

We visited four active-duty chemical companies at one Army installation 
that had not been able to train together as a unit for their chemical 
and biological defense mission because they were being used as trainers 
for other Army units that were deploying from that installation for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. This training consisted of tasks such as 
convoy operations, individual readiness training, and live-fire 
training. One unit also operated the equipment movement site, where 
deploying units' equipment was located prior to being shipped to the 
port of debarkation. Performing these missions was a full-time 
responsibility, and as a result, these companies told us they had not 
trained for their mission-essential tasks since June 2005. However, as 
of April 2006, three of the four units had recently resumed unit-level 
training for their chemical and biological missions. The fourth unit 
still had not been able to train due to personnel shortages. This unit 
had only about 50 percent of its authorized personnel, and as a result 
the unit was unable to train for its mission-essential tasks. This 
unit's headquarters battalion transferred the company's soldiers to 
other active-duty chemical companies so that those units, which were 
also short of personnel due to the transfer of personnel to deploying 
units, were able to conduct their unit-level mission training. 

Equipment shortages have similarly adversely affected chemical 
companies' ability to train for their mission-essential tasks. For 
example, three Army National Guard chemical companies we contacted from 
one state have a chemical decontamination mission, but only two of them 
had received any decontamination equipment; in this case, they received 
only 4 of the 54 decontamination systems authorized. As a result, these 
three companies, activated in September 2003, have never had the 
opportunity to conduct unit-level decontamination training. 
Additionally, five Army National Guard chemical companies we visited 
from another state have similar equipment shortages that impede their 
ability to train for their mission. All these chemical companies have a 
chemical decontamination mission, but none have been issued M17 light 
decontamination systems. To improvise, one company conducted annual 
training using M12 heavy decontamination systems and commercial 
sprayers. But since these substitute decontamination systems are 
markedly different from the authorized light decontamination system in 
performance and application, company personnel told us that the 
training experience was not nearly as effective as it would have been 
if conducted with the authorized decontamination systems. 

Army Chemical Units' Ability to Perform Both Homeland Defense and 
Warfighting Chemical and Biological Defense Missions Is Doubtful: 

Army National Guard and Reserve chemical units' ability to perform not 
only their original warfighting chemical and biological defense mission 
but also their homeland defense mission is doubtful. DOD is currently 
tasked with planning how the U.S. military will support the response to 
the Homeland Security Council's National Planning Scenarios, 12 of 
which involve a CBRNE response. Selected National Guard and Reserve 
chemical units are being trained and equipped for homeland defense 
missions, and a limited number of active duty and Reserve units have 
been placed on the Joint Task Force-Civil Support's deployment list to 
be prepared to respond to a range of CBRNE incidents, including 
multiple, near-simultaneous mass casualty attacks on the United States. 
The Army is prohibiting the transfer of personnel and equipment from 
units on this deployment list to units that are deploying overseas. 
However, it is unclear whether this is an adequate number of units to 
support the homeland defense mission because no criteria have been 
established to determine how many and which chemical units are needed. 
Further, the poor readiness of these units, as described above, and 
inadequate doctrine to guide these units in the procedures needed for 
operating in the homeland defense environment, may compromise their 
ability to perform these missions. 

Lack of Criteria and Poor Overall Readiness Will Likely Compromise Unit 
Preparedness for Homeland Defense Missions: 

DOD's strategy for homeland defense and civil support calls for its 
warfighting forces to be trained and equipped for domestic CBRNE 
consequence management to support its interagency partners in 
responding to a range of CBRNE incidents, including multiple, 
simultaneous mass casualty attacks within the United States, in 
addition to their warfighting chemical and biological defense 
missions.[Footnote 15] The standing consequence management execute 
order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically 
directs the U.S. Northern Command to be prepared to execute multiple, 
near-simultaneous CBRNE consequence management operations for up to 
three incidents within the U.S. Northern Command area of 
responsibility. Moreover, in the spring of 2006, the Secretary of 
Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential 
requests for DOD capabilities needed to support its response to 15 
National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security 
Council.[Footnote 16] Twelve of these scenarios involve a CBRNE 
response, and 6 involve a specifically chemical or biological response. 
Army National Guard and Reserve chemical companies have been given the 
hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination 
portions of the homeland defense mission. However, according to Army 
Reserve Command officials, no criteria have thus far been established 
for determining how many and which units are needed to perform this 
mission. Without such criteria, it is uncertain whether adequate 
chemical units will be available to respond to near-simultaneous mass 
casualty attacks on the United States. 

In fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Army Reserve Command began training and 
equipping selected standard chemical units for domestic reconnaissance 
and mass casualty decontamination missions. As of April 2006, 12 
platoons in 4 companies had been trained and equipped for hazardous 
materials reconnaissance. Additionally, 178 additional Army Reserve 
chemical soldiers have been trained for hazardous materials 
reconnaissance, for a total of 430 trained and certified hazardous 
materials technicians. Further, 75 platoons in 25 companies have been 
trained and equipped for mass casualty decontamination, and about 3,500 
Army Reserve chemical and medical soldiers have been trained to perform 
mass casualty decontamination operations. The National Guard has 
designated certain standard chemical companies to provide the personnel 
decontamination function for the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 
(CERFP). These companies are also expected to continue to maintain the 
skills necessary to perform their wartime mission. Consequently, the 
Army must ensure that the chemical units tasked with performing 
homeland defense missions are ready to perform them, along with their 
warfighting missions. However, the Unit Status Report is designed only 
to address unit readiness for major combat operations. DOD currently 
does not have readiness measures designed to assess unit readiness to 
conduct domestic missions. We previously reported, though, that 
traditional readiness measures are likely adequate for some types of 
units to determine their preparedness to successfully conduct their 
domestic missions.[Footnote 17] As of July 2006, five National Guard 
decontamination companies, about 375 personnel, had been trained and 
equipped to provide personnel decontamination as part of their homeland 
defense mission. The National Guard Bureau plans to train and equip an 
additional five decontamination companies during the remainder of 
fiscal year 2006. 

The Joint Task Force-Civil Support deployment data list contains 
certain chemical units that must be ready to perform CBRNE consequence 
management operations in support of civil authorities. Specifically, 
one Reserve chemical company, two active duty platoons, and two Reserve 
platoons are currently on this deployment list. As such, the Army is 
not allowing the reassignment of personnel or equipment from these 
units to units deploying in support of current operations. To provide 
additional surge capacity, Army Reserve Command officials have 
unofficially designated two additional companies as exempt from the 
reassignment of personnel and equipment to support ongoing operations. 
The force structure identified is strictly an initial response 
capability; additional forces will be required and will have to be 
requested using established request-for-forces processes. However, 
other Reserve chemical companies with a homeland defense mission that 
are not currently on the deployment list have lost personnel due to 
transfers to deploying units. Unless DOD prohibits the transfers of 
personnel from all chemical units with homeland defense missions into 
units supporting other operations, there may not be sufficient Reserve 
chemical units available to provide surge capacity if needed. 

Since many chemical units are already stressed due to their support of 
ongoing operations and are reporting low readiness levels, it is 
unclear whether they would be ready to support consequence management 
operations in the event of a catastrophic WMD attack in the United 
States. We have previously reported that although DOD has met the 
Northern Command requirements for forces to be made available should a 
CBRNE event occur, DOD acknowledges that it has become increasingly 
difficult to meet all expected requirements because of the high pace of 
operations, which may include the forces that would be requested or 
directed to support civil authorities for CBRNE events.[Footnote 18] 
Additionally, we reported that Northern Command officials are 
particularly concerned about a domestic CBRNE attack and have asked for 
forces to be dedicated to this mission. We also reported that DOD still 
plans to continue with its present practice of trying to balance the 
competing demands of the various combatant commanders and the use of 
dual-purpose units to accomplish CBRNE missions both at home and 
abroad. Further, the Quadrennial Defense Review states that military 
forces are also to be prepared for conducting a "long war" in the 
future. Given DOD's emphasis on planning for WMD events at home and 
abroad, we continue to believe there is operational risk to both the 
homeland defense and the warfighting missions in not only leaving 
chemical units in such a low state of readiness but also dual tasking 
them. 

Current Chemical and Biological Defense Doctrine Does Not Adequately 
Reflect Homeland Defense Missions: 

The Army published doctrine in December 2001[Footnote 19] on nuclear, 
biological, and chemical consequence management that mentions the 
reconnaissance and mass casualty decontamination capabilities of the 
National Guard and Army Reserve. According to an Army Reserve Command 
senior official, however, this doctrine was published in the early 
stages of developing the Army Reserve's CBRNE domestic response 
capabilities, and consequently this doctrine is now out of date. In the 
past 3 years, the Army Reserve has made progress in this area, having 
completely revised and improved the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
for these missions. For example, in 2001, it took approximately 1-½ 
hours for a single mass casualty decontamination line to be set up and 
become operational. By the summer of 2005, Army Reserve soldiers were 
able to perform the same operation with the latest procedures and 
equipment in an average of 20 minutes. 

However, the Army Chemical School has not updated the doctrine needed 
for addressing these homeland defense missions. A 2001 memorandum from 
the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans specifically 
states that Army chemical units have a mission to provide nuclear, 
biological, and chemical reconnaissance and mass casualty 
decontamination in support of domestic emergencies involving WMD. The 
memorandum goes on to list several other defense directives and 
publications that identify this mission. Further, it specifically 
directs Army Forces Command, along with Training and Doctrine Command 
and the Director of Military Support, to refine the homeland defense 
mission and develop operational requirements documents and training 
support packages. However, according to an official from the Army 
Chemical School's homeland security office and documents provided by 
the school, DOD has not been told what military capabilities are 
required to support civil authorities in the event of a terrorist 
attack involving WMD, making it more difficult to write doctrine. In 
addition, the Army did not provide funding for the school to update its 
doctrine or provide training for the Reserve component homeland defense 
missions until fiscal year 2006. Since the Army did not consider these 
missions to be warfighting missions, it gave them a low priority for 
funding, even though DOD considers defending against a chemical and 
biological attack to be a national priority. Once the funding was 
received, the Army Chemical School began exploring options to revise 
current doctrine to include comprehensive tactics, techniques, and 
procedures on the hazardous materials reconnaissance and mass casualty 
decontamination homeland defense missions. The school finalized its 
plan to update its doctrine in March 2006. 

Army Chemical School officials told us that it typically takes 24-36 
months to update doctrine to incorporate a new mission, but they are 
accelerating this process and plan to complete revised doctrine, to 
include the homeland defense missions, by June 2007. The chemical 
companies we visited with homeland defense missions told us that they 
need updated doctrine to provide guidance on how to operate effectively 
in the unique homeland defense environment because of differences 
between homeland defense and tactical wartime missions. Further, the 
new equipment that has been fielded to these units is nonstandard 
equipment and, therefore, the chemical companies lack guidance on how 
to properly integrate it with their standard wartime military 
equipment. As a result, without doctrine to guide their efforts, Army 
National Guard and Reserve chemical companies cannot ensure that they 
are meeting DOD needs, prioritizing their training requirements 
appropriately, and properly integrating new equipment with existing 
items. 

Conclusions: 

The readiness of Army chemical units--particularly in the National 
Guard and Reserve--is so low that it is doubtful whether most of these 
units can now perform their missions. The absence of a plan to address 
the personnel and equipment shortfalls that are primarily responsible 
for these readiness problems makes it unclear whether and when these 
problems will be corrected. Consequently, we believe there is a 
misalignment between DOD's stated national priorities, especially the 
Secretary of Defense's requirement for military forces to be able to 
respond to the Homeland Security Council's 12 National Planning 
Scenarios requiring a CBRNE response, and the current readiness of Army 
chemical units. Moreover, it is unclear whether Army chemical units 
affected by low readiness, but tasked with both wartime and homeland 
defense chemical and biological missions, can perform both effectively, 
especially given the lack of criteria to determine how many and which 
units are needed to support civil authorities in the event of multiple, 
near-simultaneous attacks on the United States. Even though DOD 
considers responding to and mitigating the effects of WMD attacks on 
the United States to be a national priority, the Army did not consider 
funding the completion of doctrine for the Reserve component homeland 
defense mission to be a priority. Consequently, the U.S. Army Chemical 
School has not yet updated the doctrine needed for performing homeland 
defense missions, leaving chemical units assigned these missions with 
only limited guidance on how to accomplish them. Unless DOD takes the 
steps needed to address long-standing gaps in chemical unit readiness 
and doctrine, we question whether these units will be able to perform 
either their warfighting or homeland defense missions effectively. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To align DOD's stated emphasis on responding to and mitigating the 
effects from WMD incidents at home and abroad with the readiness of 
Army chemical units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Army to take the following actions: 

* Develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit 
personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations, 
particularly for chemical operations specialists. 

* This plan should specifically address and discuss options such as: 

- the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer of personnel from 
chemical units with homeland defense missions into units supporting 
other operations; 

- requiring soldiers in chemical occupational specialties to return to 
assignments requiring that specialty after deployments, as long as 
shortages continue in that specialty; 

- other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these personnel; and: 

- the risks associated with not taking such steps. 

* Determine how many and which active, National Guard, and Army Reserve 
chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense missions, 
including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE attacks on 
the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units, 
the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions. 

* Develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination 
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning in 
fiscal year 2009. This plan should determine: 

- the total number of systems needed during the interim period, by type 
of system (M12, M17, Karcher, or Falcon) to maintain the needed 
decontamination capability; 

- how the interim systems will be integrated with retained M12 and M17 
systems; 

- how training and logistical support for the interim systems will be 
addressed; and: 

- whether the interim systems should be type-classified and 
standardized as official military equipment with a national stock 
number, and added to units' official equipment lists. 

* Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological 
defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our 
recommendation to direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a 
specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit personnel 
shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations, 
particularly for chemical operations specialists, and cited several 
reasons as a basis for their position. First, DOD stated that we are 
discounting the Army's accession and recruitment plan, which strives 
for 100 percent fill of all units. We acknowledge that the Army does 
have an agencywide accession and recruitment plan, and the goal is 100 
percent fill of all units. However, as we discuss in this report, that 
plan by itself has not been fully successful and has had little 
positive long-term impact on chemical unit personnel shortages. 
Specifically, while the recruitment and retention bonuses--which are a 
part of the Army's plan--were helping to alleviate chemical operations 
specialist shortages to some extent, the transfer of chemical unit 
personnel to other deploying units for Operation Iraqi Freedom negated 
those gains. Second, DOD disagreed with our use of the Unit Status 
Report to gauge the readiness of the chemical forces to support a 
homeland defense mission. In their comments, the department points out 
that the Unit Status Report is designed to evaluate an organization's 
ability to support wartime missions, not a homeland defense mission, 
and that the Army is developing improved readiness metrics in support 
of evolving DOD and Joint Staff reporting requirements, which will 
include the readiness for contingency operations such as homeland 
defense missions. We agree that the Unit Status Report is designed to 
address readiness for major combat operations. However, DOD also 
acknowledges there is no other metric currently available to measure 
readiness for homeland defense missions. DOD also stated that some unit 
personnel who are not available for a major combat operations 
deployment are available for a homeland defense mission. Our analysis 
shows that chemical unit personnel shortages are severe and primarily a 
result of personnel transfers to deploying units; therefore, DOD's 
statement that unit personnel could be available for a homeland defense 
mission is in our opinion, invalid. Because of the severe personnel 
shortages in most chemical units, we continue to believe our 
recommendation has merit and is an important step that should be taken 
by the Army. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of 
the Army to determine how many and which active, National Guard, and 
Army Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense 
missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 
attacks on the United States, and set forth a plan to ensure that for 
these units, the homeland defense mission is given priority over other 
missions. DOD agreed that the capability requirements for homeland 
defense, including the number and type of chemical units, must be 
identified in the context of an interagency, DOD, and Army assessment 
process. DOD further states that the Chief of Staff of the Army has 
identified improvement of homeland defense as a focus area with the 
intent of identifying Army contributions to homeland defense as well as 
gaps and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved to 
support the joint force. However, DOD then stated that, with some 
exceptions, the Army generally does not develop force structure to 
identify specific units for specific missions beyond those supporting 
the Joint Task Force-Civil Support because such designation limits the 
pool of units that can be deployed for overseas requirements, greatly 
increasing the burden on the deployable units. While we believe the 
above DOD actions are good first steps, we do not believe DOD's 
comments address the overall intent of our recommendation, which was to 
ensure DOD identified all forces needed to respond to homeland defense 
missions and develop a plan to ensure that these forces are available 
and ready for those missions. Specifically, as we highlight in this 
report, the units designated to support the Joint Task Force-Civil 
Support are only intended to be an initial response capability, and 
additional forces would be required to support multiple, near- 
simultaneous attacks on the homeland. The low readiness levels of units 
not associated with the Joint Task Force, combined with the potential 
deployment of personnel from other units in support of overseas 
operations, could inhibit DOD's ability to provide the planned surge 
capacity needed for supporting DOD's execute order on multiple, near- 
simultaneous homeland defense missions. DOD's response does not 
indicate how, or to what extent, this homeland defense requirement will 
be prioritized compared with other missions, and our recommendation to 
do this is both valid and important to accomplish. Without a clear set 
of priorities for chemical unit response capabilities, DOD increases 
the risk that it may not be able to provide the forces required to 
respond to its own stated homeland defense requirements. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the 
Army to develop and approve a plan for addressing DOD's decontamination 
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded. DOD stated 
that while the equipment information contained in the report is 
generally correct as of the time the information was collected, our 
recommendation does not accurately depict the current situation. Since 
a draft of this report was provided to DOD for comment, the Joint 
Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense developed 
a plan that addresses replacement and future fielding of 
decontamination equipment and this plan was funded in the Fiscal Years 
2008-2013 Program Objective Memorandum. Although we have not analyzed 
this plan in-depth, it appears to be a good first step in meeting the 
Army's decontamination needs as long as the procurement and fielding of 
replacement systems stays on track. However, in its comments, DOD did 
not discuss whether its plan will address the specifics of our 
recommendation, including how training and logistics support for the 
interim systems will be addressed and whether the interim systems 
should be type-classified and standardized as official military 
equipment with a national stock number and added to units' official 
equipment lists. We maintain that these steps are necessary so that 
appropriate training and logistical support will be available and 
accountability over these interim systems can be maintained. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation to set a definitive deadline for 
completing chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect new 
homeland defense missions. Although DOD agreed that updated chemical 
and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland defense missions is 
a high priority, they did not set a deadline because they believe any 
deadline must account for the impact on other high-priority doctrine 
development projects, particularly those supporting ongoing combat 
operations. We continue to believe that without a deadline, development 
of this doctrine will be uncertain, leaving chemical units without much-
needed doctrine to address the unique requirements associated with 
their homeland defense missions. 

DOD's comments are included in appendix II. DOD also provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretaries of Defense and the Army. If you have any questions about 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which units tasked with providing chemical 
and biological defense support to combat units and commands are 
adequately staffed, equipped, and trained, we met with officials from 
the office of the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Plans, U.S. Army Forces Command, National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army 
Reserve Command to define the population of Army chemical units. Using 
the information provided, we determined that in fiscal year 2006, the 
Army had 78 chemical companies tasked with providing chemical and 
biological defense support to combat units and commands. We did not 
include command and control units (brigades and battalions) and units 
smaller than companies, such as detachments, in our population since 
the actual chemical and biological defense mission is largely performed 
at the company level. 

To determine the overall readiness levels of Army chemical companies in 
our population and reasons why units were reporting low readiness 
rates, we obtained and analyzed data from the Army Readiness Management 
System for fiscal years 2000 through 2006. We determined that these 
data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by comparing the 
system data with the readiness data reports submitted by the companies 
we visited (see below). We also reviewed reliability assessments 
conducted by other GAO teams. To further assess the preparedness of 
Army chemical companies to perform their missions, we visited five 
active duty Army chemical companies located at Fort Hood, Texas; five 
Army National Guard chemical companies in Alabama and Texas; and five 
Army Reserve chemical companies in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas. We 
selected units to visit from each Army component--active, National 
Guard, and Reserve--and from each type of chemical unit--biological 
detection, decontamination, reconnaissance, and smoke screening. We 
discussed personnel fill rates, the adequacy of decontamination 
equipment, fill rates for mission-essential equipment items, and 
training issues with officials from each of these companies. We also 
discussed chemical company mission preparedness with officials from the 
Kentucky Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve's 81st and 90th 
Regional Readiness Commands. 

To assess whether Army chemical companies are adequately staffed to 
perform their missions, we obtained and analyzed data provided by 
officials from the U.S Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. This 
office provided us with personnel data for the entire Army, which 
includes our universe of 78 chemical companies. It included authorized 
and assigned soldiers segregated by grade and military occupational 
specialty as of February 2006. To assess the reliability of the 
personnel data, we reviewed data reliability assessments prepared on 
the same data system by another GAO team and performed electronic 
testing of the data. We also corroborated system data with officials at 
selected sites and interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data. 
We determined that the personnel data we used were sufficiently 
reliable for our reporting purposes. 

To determine the extent to which the Army chemical companies have the 
equipment needed to perform their mission, we obtained and analyzed 
data as of July 2006 from the U.S. Army EQUIPFOR Database. We 
determined the equipment fill rates by comparing the equipment 
authorized to the equipment on-hand of selected chemical and other 
mission-essential equipment for the 78 chemical companies and compared 
this with overall Army equipment fill rates. Because we received the 
Army EQUIPFOR Database data close to our reporting deadline, we were 
not able to conduct a full reliability assessment. Consequently, these 
data are of undetermined reliability. However, as noted above, we used 
the Army EQUIPFOR Database as only one source of information for 
findings about equipment readiness. In addition, we corroborated system 
data with officials at the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Programs, U.S. Army Reserve Command, National Guard Bureau, and 
selected Army chemical units. We also discussed decontamination 
equipment issues with officials at the chemical units we visited and 
with officials from the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Programs; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and the Joint Program Executive 
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense. 

To determine the extent to which units with the additional homeland 
defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve chemical units-
-are adequately prepared for this mission, we used the data collected 
in the first objective, contacted officials from U.S. Northern Command, 
and obtained planning documents that describe the use of Army chemical 
units to perform chemical and biological decontamination and 
reconnaissance functions for homeland defense. We discussed these 
missions with officials from the Army Reserve Command and National 
Guard Bureau. We also reviewed and analyzed current chemical and 
biological defense doctrine and discussed the applicability of this 
doctrine to the newly emerging homeland defense missions with officials 
from the Army Chemical School and Army Reserve Command. We also 
discussed the chemical and biological homeland defense doctrine that is 
being developed with Army Chemical School officials and discussed 
homeland defense doctrine needs with officials from the chemical 
companies we visited that had been assigned homeland defense missions. 

We performed our work from July 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs: 
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense: 
3050 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3050: 

Sep 13 2006: 

Ms. Davi D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Chemical And Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed 
To Close The Gap Between Chemical Unit Preparedness And Stated National 
Priorities," dated August 1, 2006 (GAO Code 350714/GAO-06-867C). 

The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Army to: 

1. develop a specific plan to address the long-standing chemical unit 
personnel shortages that have been exacerbated by ongoing operations, 

2. determine how many and which Active, National Guard (NG), and Army 
Reserve chemical units will be needed to perform homeland defense 
missions, including responding to multiple, near-simultaneous attacks 
on the homeland, and set forth a plan to ensure that for these units, 
and the homeland defense mission is given priority over other missions, 

3. develop and approve a plan for addressing DoD's decontamination 
equipment shortages until new joint systems are fielded beginning in 
fiscal year 2009, and: 

4. set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and biological 
defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions. 

The Department non-concurs with recommendations 1 and 3, partially 
concurs with recommendation 2, and concurs with recommendation 4. 
Detailed comments on the report are enclosed. 

Signed by: 

Jean D. Reed: 
Special Assistant: 
Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated August 1, 2006 GAO Code 350714/GAO-06-867C: 

"Chemical And Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to 
Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National 
Priorities" 

Department Of Defense (DOD) Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a specific plan to address 
the long-standing chemical unit personnel shortages that have been 
exacerbated by ongoing operations, particularly for chemical operations 
specialists. This plan should specifically address and discuss options 
such as: (1) the need for temporarily prohibiting the transfer of 
personnel from chemical units with homeland defense missions into units 
supporting other operations; (2) requiring soldiers in chemical 
occupational specialties to return to assignments requiring that 
specialty after deployments, as long as shortages continue in that 
specialty; (3) other steps designed to mitigate the loss of these 
personnel; and (4) the risks associated with not taking such steps. 

DOD Response: DoD non-concurs. The report states that the Army does not 
have a plan to fix personnel readiness; this statement discounts the 
Army's accession and recruitment plan which strives for 100% fill of 
all units. Promotion, reclassification and incentive programs are 
constantly adjusted to react to the changing needs of the Army. The 
language of the report also treats the active and reserve components as 
the same, when in fact they are very different when it comes to 
personnel lifecycle management. 

The Army is engaged in active combat operations in overseas 
environments where demand for CBRNE capabilities is low and demand for 
other, more basic ground combat capabilities is much higher. While 
operating within fixed fiscal and end strength toplines, the Army is 
internally transforming to meet current and anticipated challenges. 
This has resulted in the tradeoffs noted in the GAO report. 

Overall the report only uses one metric (Unit Status Reports) to gauge 
the readiness of the Chemical Forces to support a Homeland Defense 
(HLD) mission. The Unit Status Report is a metric that evaluates an 
organization's ability to support a wartime mission. Many areas 
reflected in a USR report do not crosswalk from Major Combat Operation 
(MCO) to a HLD mission. For example, some equipment needed for an MCO 
would not be needed for a HLD mission; likewise some unit personnel who 
would not be available for a MCO deployment are available for 
employment during a Homeland Defense Mission. The Army is developing 
improved readiness metrics in support of evolving DoD and Joint Staff 
reporting requirements. The metrics will include readiness for 
contingency operations such as HLD missions. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to determine how many and which 
Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve chemical units will be needed 
to perform homeland defense missions, including responding to multiple, 
near-simultaneous Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-
Yield Explosive (CBRNE) attacks on the homeland, and set forth a plan 
to ensure that for these units, the homeland defense mission is given 
priority over other missions. 

DOD Response: DoD partially concurs. The DoD agrees that the capability 
requirements for homeland defense, including the number and type of 
chemical units, must be identified in the context of an Interagency, 
DoD, and Army assessment process. The Army is participating in ongoing 
DoD assessments of support to civil authorities including CBRNE 
response. An example is the ongoing Multi-Service Force Deployment 
assessments and a Consequence Management Capabilities-Based Assessment. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army has identified "Improvement of Homeland 
Defense" as one of twenty focus Areas (Focus Area #18). The intent is 
currently to identify Anny contributions to Homeland Defense (HLD), as 
well as gaps and shortfalls where Army capabilities could be improved 
to support the Joint force in HLD. 

With some exceptions, the Army does not develop force structure to 
identify specific units for specific missions. As part of the Total 
Army Analysis (TAA) process, the Army uses a model with scenario 
vignettes to determine requirements for the number and type of various 
units (including Chemical units). The Army does not assign forces by 
name beyond those supporting Joint Task Force-Civil Support because 
such designation limits the pool of units that can be deployed for 
overseas requirements, greatly increasing the burden on the deployable 
units. The Army maintains flexibility to rotate units to support the 
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and approve a plan for 
addressing DOD's decontamination equipment shortages until new joint 
systems are fielded beginning in FY 2009. This plan should determine: 
(1) the total number of systems needed during the interim period, by 
type of system (M12, M17, Karcher, or Falcon), to maintain the needed 
decontamination capability; (2) how the interim systems will be 
integrated with retained M12 and M17 systems; (3) how training and 
logistical support for the interim systems will be addressed; and (4) 
whether the interim systems should be type-classified and standardized 
as official military equipment with a national stock number, and added 
to units' official equipment lists. 

DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs. While the equipment information 
contained in this report is generally correct as of the time the 
information was collected, the recommendation does not accurately 
depict the current situation. The Chemical and Biological Defense 
Program, in coordination with the Services, including the Army, has 
developed a plan from validated requirements that addresses replacement 
and future fielding of Department of Defense's decontamination 
equipment, including joint systems scheduled to begin fielding prior to 
FY 2009 (FY09). This plan is contained in the FY 2008-2013 Program 
Objectives Memorandum (FY 08-13 POM). This comprehensive plan includes 
next-generation replacement systems meeting joint small scale and large 
scale decontamination requirements to replace the M17 Light 
Decontamination System and the M12 Heavy Decontamination System, 
respectively. These two systems are the primary types of 
decontamination equipment currently used to solve the small and large 
scale requirements, respectively, in Army chemical units. As an interim 
measure until these new systems are fielded, the small scale 
requirement will be covered by the existing M17 systems, augmented by 
410 already fielded Multi-Purpose Decontamination Systems and 115 
Lightweight Multipurpose Decontamination Systems that will start 
fielding in October 2006. The Joint Service Transportable 
Decontamination System (JSTDS-SS) will start fielding in 2nd Quarter 
FY08. 

To cover the large scale requirement until the Joint Service 
Transportable Decontamination System-Large Scale (JSTDS-LS) system 
starts fielding in FYI 2, the recently completely refurbished and fully 
mission capable M12 systems will continue service. Of the entire M12 
fleet, 505 have been completely over-hauled and converted to diesel 
fuel. An additional 13 more will be completed before the end of FY06 
and an additional 32 will be converted in FY07. Furthermore, 103 
recently fielded FALCON systems augment this large scale capability. 

The FY08-13 plan also funds future decontamination systems to round out 
Service decontamination capabilities. These new capabilities include a 
man-portable (back-packed) decontamination system, human remains 
decontamination, and sensitive equipment (e.g., avionics and night 
vision devices) and platform interior (aircraft, ship, and vehicle) 
decontamination. There is also funding in the FY08-13 POM for continued 
fielding of skin decontamination kits. 

Recommendation 4: Set a definitive deadline for completing chemical and 
biological defense doctrine to reflect new homeland defense missions. 

DOD Response: The DoD concurs with Recommendation 4. The publication of 
updated chemical and biological defense doctrine to reflect homeland 
defense missions is a high priority. However, any deadline must account 
for the impact on other high priority doctrine development projects, 
particularly those supporting ongoing combat operations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, William W. Cawood, Assistant 
Director; Hamid Ali; Jane Ervin; Robert Malpass; Enemencio Sanchez; 
Kimberly Seay; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this 
report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] For the purposes of this report, the term weapons of mass 
destruction means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the 
capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant 
number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (1) 
toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors, (2) a disease 
organism, or (3) radiation or radioactivity. 50 U.S.C. § 2302 (1). 

[2] One exception is that the Marine Corps has a Chemical Biological 
Incident Response Force that, when directed, is to deploy and/or 
respond to a credible threat of a chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in order to assist 
local, state, or federal agencies and unified combatant commanders in 
the conduct of consequence management operations. This force 
accomplishes its mission by providing capabilities for agent detection 
and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel 
decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of 
contaminated personnel. However, chemical and biological defense in the 
Marine Corps is generally considered an additional duty performed by 
regular marines rather than by specialized chemical or biological 
units. We recently reported that this force had some operational 
challenges. See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Marine Corps 
Response Force Has Developed Many Capabilities, but Critical 
Operational Challenges Remain, GAO-05-2C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 3, 
2004). 

[3] Hereinafter referred to as "chemical units." 

[4] Smoke screening is the act of providing large-area obscurant 
screening intended to enhance a commander's ability to conceal and 
therefore deploy and maneuver forces. 

[5] The Joint Task Force-Civil Support, part of U.S. Northern Command, 
will provide dedicated domestic CBRNE command and control in support of 
the responsible lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence 
management operations. 

[6] We recently issued a report on these teams' mission and management: 
GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 
Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, GAO-06-498 
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

[7] The National Guard has already placed 12 certified force packages 
on the ground. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006 increased the Army National Guard end strength and, in the 
conference report, the conferees recommended that this end strength 
include 5 additional certified force packages. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109- 
360, at 687 (2005). 

[8] GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed 
to Close the Gap between Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National 
Priorities, GAO-06-867C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

[9] Public Law 104-201, § 1411 (1996). 

[10] The Unit Status Report is the Army's primary mechanism for 
measuring and reporting a unit's readiness, i.e., the unit's ability to 
perform its wartime mission. The Unit Status Report provides a snapshot 
of the status of the unit's overall readiness (C rating). Unit Status 
reports are submitted monthly by active Army units, and quarterly by 
Army National Guard and Reserve units. The Army measures four areas of 
readiness: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness, and 
training. There are five levels for rating readiness. The highest 
level, C1, indicates that the unit is prepared to undertake its full 
wartime mission. At C2 the unit is able to undertake most of its 
wartime mission and at C3 the unit is able to undertake many, but not 
all, portions of its wartime mission. C4 is the lowest level and, at 
this level, the unit is not prepared and requires additional resources 
or training to conduct its wartime mission. In addition, the C5 level 
indicates that the unit is undergoing an Army-directed resource action 
and is not prepared, at the time of the report, to perform its wartime 
mission. 

[11] GAO-06-867C. 

[12] See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address 
Enlisted Personnel and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

[13] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 
2005). 

[14] The Mission Essential Task List is a statement of the tasks a unit 
is required to accomplish in order to perform its wartime missions. For 
example, tasks on a biological detection company's task list include 
conducting mobilization and deployment operations, biological 
surveillance operations, and force protection/antiterrorism operations. 

[15] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005). 

[16] Department of Defense, Strategic Planning Guidance Fiscal Years 
2008-2013 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006). 

[17] GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve 
Northern Command's Mission, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-622C 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

[18] GAO-04-622C. 

[19] U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.21: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of 
Consequence Management (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo: Dec. 2001). 

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