Title: To Fight Fraud, Inspectors General Need Help Identifying Companies' Ownership Description: Fraud in federal programs is a significant and persistent problem. Some fraud is perpetrated by private companies that obscure their ownership information when competing for government contracts or applying for other federal benefits. In a new report, we looked at efforts to help uncover this fraud. We'll learn more from GAO's Rebecca Shea. Related work: GAO-25-107143, Fraud in Federal Programs: FinCEN Should Take Steps to Improve the Ability of Inspectors General to Determine Beneficial Owners of Companies Released: April 2025 {Music} [Rebecca Shea:] Lack of ownership transparency creates opportunities to defraud the federal government. [Holly Hobbs:] Hi and welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report. Your source for fact-based, nonpartisan news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I'm your host, Holly Hobbs. Fraud in federal programs is a significant and persistent problem. Some fraud is perpetrated by private companies that obscure their ownership information when competing for government contracts or applying for other federal benefits. In a new report, we looked at efforts to uncover this fraud, and today we'll learn more from GAO's Rebecca Shea. Thanks for joining us. [Rebecca Shea:] Thanks for having me, Holly. [Holly Hobbs:] Rebecca, maybe we can start with--why would a company want to obscure its identity? Why would they want to hide that? [Rebecca Shea:] Well, the government generally wants to know who it's contracting with or providing grants or benefits to--partly to make sure that that business is eligible for those contracts, grants or benefits; but also because the government can face national security or safety or other risks if a bad actor is on the receiving side of those awards. And when you're dealing with a business, it can sometimes be difficult to know who the real owner is. And if that person who ultimately benefits financially or otherwise from the company--that's known as the 'beneficial owner'--if they're not eligible, they may try to hide their ownership or their involvement in the business to fraudulently access the benefits. And bad actors may use multiple shell and shelf companies to further obscure their involvement or make it really hard to find and trace illicit funds or stolen funds. [Holly Hobbs:] Do we have any idea how often this happens? [Rebecca Shea:] Yeah, we don't really know how frequently this happens. But there are a wide variety of ways that risks from opaque ownership come up in the federal context. For example, in the contracting space, we highlight a case where a DOD contractor created a company, and then he used his family members' names on the incorporation to hide his, involvement in the company. And then, in his official role with the DOD contractor, he subcontracted to his own company to the tune of $10 million and got away with that for a couple of years. There are also set aside schemes where these opaque ownership issues come up fairly frequently, where a company owner will recruit, for example, a disabled veteran to serve as a figurehead--you know, somebody in name only for the company--in order to access set-aside grants for small, disabled, veteran owned businesses. And we highlight a case in the report where somebody did this and received over $32 million in awards under those false pretenses. On the grants front, we give some examples in there as well. In particular, one that involves the Small Business Innovation Research grant, where this individual established three businesses applied to three different agencies to receive the awards, pretending that they were completely separate businesses with separate facilities. But it was all essentially the same business. He got three awards across three different agencies for essentially the same work, by using that scheme. And what I just described, there was fairly typical. But opaque ownership risk also come up with national security issues as well. For example, sanctions evasion. People may hide their ownership in a company to evade sanctions. And we give an example of a World Bank contract that was awarded to somebody who was on the sanctions list for drug trafficking. We did a report a number of years ago also where we looked at opaque ownership risks in federal leasing space. Where you don't know the true owner of the federal lease space, it poses risks to federal agencies from espionage, sabotage and unauthorized access. So, a lot of different risks in a lot of different contexts. [Holly Hobbs:] There's a new law, a 2024 law, that is meant to help. What does it require businesses to do? [Rebecca Shea:] The Corporate Transparency Act, the CTA, it was actually passed in 2020. But it's to be in place by 2024. And it was passed to address some of the concerns I just described. Initially, U.S. companies were required to report their beneficial ownership information to a company registry that was developed and managed by Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN. Now, recently, Treasury put in place a new rule that narrowed the scope of reporting to foreign-owned companies. So now the foreign-owned companies will be reporting their beneficial ownership information to this registry. And FinCEN is in the process of rolling that registry information out to law enforcement agencies, to financial institutions, and other approved users. [Holly Hobbs:] So this is a fairly new effort, but do we know anything about whether it's helped yet? [Rebecca Shea:] We don't know yet because it's still under development. But we did do a very comprehensive survey and interviews with investigators at a wide variety of the inspectors generals' offices to ask them how it might help them with their investigations. Right now, the investigators, they use currently available information from federal, state, and commercial databases to try and identify beneficial owners from the investigations that they're doing. But there are some limitations with the variety of these resources. For example, one key resource is the state registries, right? Businesses are incorporated at the state level, and every state has different requirements on the information that businesses incorporating are required to provide. They have different formats that they maintain that information. They have different information that's publicly available to different people. And so, the investigators may have to go looking across 50 different databases to try and find information and connect things across those different state databases. One of the key things, too, is that most of those state registries don't require information on the owners when forming a new business or registering an existing one, and that's one thing. But then there's also not a lot of requirements on the contact information that has to be provided either. So it can make it very challenging to identify beneficial owners for law enforcement. So the investigators that we spoke to, you know, they were, I'll say a little bit excited about the registry. You know, they thought that it could be useful because with all of that information in one standardized location, it can help them with things like data matching within the registry and then also matching across to other data sources. {Music} [Holly Hobbs:] So, knowing who really owns a company can help prevent fraud in federal contracting, grants, and benefit programs, as well as protect national security. And a new centralized database is a key tool for tracking this information. Rebecca, where is FinCEN and the Inspectors General--where are they hoping this will go? What are they hoping it'll be used for in the future? [Rebecca Shea:] So one of the primary goals of the registry was to support financial institutions compliance with Bank Secrecy Act requirements and help law enforcement's ability to investigate money laundering, illicit finance issues. But it can also support the federal government's ability to know who it's dealing with. You know, who are we doing business with, who are awarding contracts, grants and benefits to? And what we've seen with the cases involving foreign and domestic beneficial owners is that, you know, these bad actors, they're going to continue to use this as a mechanism to abuse and defraud public programs. But the registry, it can give inspectors general an additional data source to help them run this down. [Holly Hobbs:] You've said these efforts are still early on. But is there anything we think could be done to improve it? [Rebecca Shea:] Well, especially with the recent changes that Treasury made to the scope of who's required to report, so the scope of what will be in the registry--it's more important than ever that they are communicating with the inspectors general to make sure that they know what's in the registry, what isn't in the registry, and the limitations of that data for their investigations. [Holly Hobbs:] And last question, what's the bottom line of this report? [Rebecca Shea:] So the lack of business ownership transparency, it creates opportunities to defraud the federal government. And uncovering and investigating this can be difficult given the limited information that is available across the 50 state and territories registries and also what's available in commercial and existing databases. The registry, as it is currently planned by Treasury, it's going to have some information that can support the Office of Inspector General Investigations. But FinCEN does need to coordinate with the inspectors general so that it can understand what they need to best leverage the registry for their fraud investigations. [Holly Hobbs:] That was Rebecca Shay talking about our new report on beneficial ownership and fraud. Thanks for your time. [Rebecca Shea:] Thanks. [Holly Hobbs:] And thank you for listening to the Watchdog Report. To hear more podcasts, subscribe to us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen. And make sure to leave a rating and review to let others know about the work we're doing. For more from the congressional watchdog, the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Visit us at GAO.gov.