From the U.S. Government Accountability Office, www.gao.gov Transcript for: DOD's Management of Biosafety and Biosecurity Program Description: Three years ago the Department of Defense mistakenly made hundreds of shipments of anthrax-causing bacterium. This episode of the Watchdog Report looks at how DOD has responded to this incident. Related GAO Work: GAO-18-422: Biological Select Agents and Toxins: Actions Needed to Improve Management of DOD's Biosafety and Biosecurity Program Released: September 2018 [Background Music] [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] The assessment of these high risk bio agents is vital for our own safety and the ability to conduct military operations in the future. [ Matt Oldham: ] Welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report, your source for news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I'm Matt Oldham. Three years ago a Department of Defense laboratory mistakenly made hundreds of shipments of live anthrax-causing bacterium to nearly 200 labs and contractors across the globe. There was a follow on Army investigation looking into this series of errors. And while they made recommendations on how to improve safety and security, they didn't have enough information to determine what went wrong. I'm with Joe Kirschbaum, a director on our Defense Capabilities and Management team and he led a GAO report that reviewed DOD's responses to the erroneous shipments and the Army's investigation. Thanks for joining me, Joe. [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] Thanks very much. [ Matt Oldham: ] So what's at stake as we talk about these shipments? [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] What's at stake here is that these labs deal with very dangerous biological materials. In this case, the Bacillus Anthracis that could potentially cause anthrax which, as you recall from the post 9/11 anthrax attacks in Washington and other places could be potentially disastrous. And these laboratories deal with these bacteria on purpose to try to provide defenses against them. They understand how to work with them. They're very competent. They have all the right equipment, the rightly trained people. What's at stake when they shipped potentially active or still active bacteria is not understanding the extent to which that what's required to deactivate it. And that was literally what happened. There was a lack of understanding about just what it took, either through radiological means, through chemical means, to deactivate the bacterium. So when it's sent potentially live, not that it's going to cause anthrax right away, but there's a potential if it got loose that it might cause that. So, obviously that was of concern to everyone. [ Matt Oldham: ] How did the Department of Defense respond once they realized their mistake? [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] Obviously there was an immediate response which was the laboratory that was responsible at the Dugway Proving Grounds ceased operation. They literally took it down, took its certifications away and they're starting from scratch to build it up again. And then to figure out how far the shipments had gone. Obviously those were the immediate responses. They also took a longer term response looking at what it is that led to those incidents; whether it was scientific issues, technical issues, operational issues, leadership issues. The whole gamut. And they looked at what they need to do to correct those problems. Both at the short term and the long term. [ Matt Oldham: ] So do you believe this response or these responses will help prevent this from happening again? [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] I do think it really cuts down the risk of this happening again for several reasons. One because it addresses those immediate problems. You know you identify what the immediate proximate causes were and you address those. But also because they take that longer term view which was really important for how we looked at it as well. There are organizational challenges that were in place. There were potential procedural issues. And looking at those from that long term perspective is important because you not only fix those things there, you fix them throughout the chemical and biological defense enterprise in the Department of Defense. Essentially you end up with a better, more effective organization at doing risk management and preventing these kind of things. [ Background Music ] [ Matt Oldham: ] It sounds like as the Army investigated what went wrong in this case, they came up with some recommendations that could have broader applications. So Joe, what recommendations did your team have? [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] We recommended that they follow up on the recommendations that they're supposed to take action on. So putting in place that mechanism that allows them to not only ensure that they've done what they need to do in terms of the immediate recommendations but also understand that the effects they've achieved from taking those actions, whether or not they've actually done what they set out to do. And not only that, but making sure that they have not done anything that was unintended as a consequence of making those actions. We also made recommendations that go to kind of some of the broader things that the congress wanted DOD to do which is follow through on their actions to set up some of the biosafety programs in the future, to solidify some of the risk management structures they have in place, and then also to answer some congressional concerns about assessing the broader biosafety program. Who does it? How is it done? Is it possible to achieve efficiencies by looking at other ways to do it whether it's intergovernmental, whether it's public private partnerships. [ Matt Oldham: ] Last question, what do you believe is the bottom line of your report? [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] The bottom line is that the assessment of these high risk bioagents is vital for our own safety and the ability to conduct military operations in the future. So it's really important that the Department of Defense continue to take this seriously. The good news is they have and they are. And as a broader area of interest that ensuring that the department does so with that broader perspective in mind. And that's what's critical about this. [ Matt Oldham: ] Joe Kirschbaum is a Defense Capabilities and Management Director and he was talking about a GAO report on the DOD response to incidents- of hundreds of anthrax causing bacterium mistakenly shipped across the globe. Thank you for your time, Joe. [ Joe Kirschbaum: ] Thank you very much. [ Background Music ] [ Matt Oldham: ] And thank you for listening to the Watchdog Report. To hear more podcasts, subscribe to us on Apple Podcasts. [ Background Music ] [ Matt Oldham: ] For more from the congressional watchdog, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, visit us at gao.gov.