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Screening Highlights Need to Plan Effective Security Assessments' 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

December 2014: 

Aviation Security: 

Rapid Growth in Expedited Passenger Screening Highlights Need to Plan 
Effective Security Assessments: 

GAO-15-150: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-15-150, a report to Congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

TSA screens or oversees the screening of more than 650 million 
passengers annually at more than 450 U.S. airports. In 2011, TSA began 
providing expedited screening to selected passengers as part of its 
overall emphasis on risk-based security. Specifically, by determining 
passenger risk prior to travel, TSA intended to focus screening 
resources on higher-risk passengers while expediting screening for 
lower-risk passengers. 

GAO was asked to determine how TSA implemented and expanded expedited 
screening via TSA PreCheck™ This report examines, among other things, 
(1) how TSA has developed, implemented, and used expedited screening, 
(2) how TSA assesses passenger risk, and (3) the extent to which TSA 
has determined the Managed Inclusion system's effectiveness. GAO 
analyzed TSA procedures and data from October 2011 through January 
2014 on expedited screening and interviewed officials at TSA, airport 
authorities, air carriers, and industry associations about expedited 
screening. 

What GAO Found: 

Since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented its 
expedited screening program—-known as TSA PreCheck™--in 2011, the 
number of passengers receiving expedited screening grew slowly, and 
then increased about 300 percent in October 2013 when TSA expanded its 
use of methods to increase passenger participation, such as conducting 
automated risk assessments of all passengers. In conducting these 
assessments, TSA assigns passenger scores based upon information 
available to TSA to identify low risk passengers eligible for 
expedited screening for a specific flight prior to the passengers' 
arrival at the airport. 

To assess whether a passenger is eligible for expedited screening, TSA 
considers (1) inclusion on an approved TSA PreCheck™ list of known 
travelers; (2) results from the automated risk assessments of all 
passengers; and (3) threat assessments of passengers conducted at 
airport checkpoints known as Managed Inclusion. Managed Inclusion uses 
several layers of security, including procedures that randomly select 
passengers for expedited screening, behavior detection officers who 
observe passengers to identify high-risk behaviors, and either 
passenger screening canine teams or explosives trace detection devices 
to help ensure that passengers selected for expedited screening have 
not handled explosive material. Prior to Managed Inclusion's 
implementation, TSA relied primarily on approved lists of known 
travelers to determine passenger eligibility for expedited screening. 

TSA has tested the effectiveness of individual Managed Inclusion 
security layers and determined that each layer provides effective 
security. GAO has previously conducted work on several of the layers 
used in the Managed Inclusion process, raising concerns regarding its 
effectiveness and recommending actions to TSA to strengthen them. For 
example, in January 2013, GAO recommended that TSA take actions to 
comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. TSA 
subsequently addressed this recommendation by conducting the 
assessment. In October 2014, TSA planned to begin testing Managed 
Inclusion as an overall system, but could not provide specifics or a 
plan or documentation showing how the testing is to be conducted, the 
locations where it is to occur, how these locations are to be 
selected, or the timeframes for conducting testing at each location. 
Moreover, GAO has previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in 
designing studies to test the security effectiveness of its other 
programs in accordance with established methodological practices such 
as ensuring an adequate sample size or randomly selecting items in a 
study to ensure the results can be generalizable—key features of 
established evaluation design practices. Ensuring its planned testing 
of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation 
design practices will help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the 
testing will yield reliable results. 

This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in 
September 2014. Information that the Department of Homeland Security 
deemed sensitive has been removed. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its 
planned testing of the Managed Inclusion system adheres to established 
evaluation design practices, among other things. DHS concurred with 
GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-150]. For more 
information, contact Jennifer A. Grover at (202) 512-7141 or 
GroverJ@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments and Other Programs Have Significantly 
Increased Availability and Use of Expedited Screening: 

TSA Used Various Methods to Collaborate with Stakeholders about 
Expedited Screening; TSA has begun Taking Action to Improve 
Communication with Passengers: 

TSA Uses Three Methods to Assess Risk for Participation in Expedited 
Screening, But Has Not Tested the Overall Effectiveness of the Managed 
Inclusion Process: 

TSA Could Improve Program Assessment by Aligning Goals with Measures 
and Has Estimated Savings from Expedited Screening for Fiscal Year 
2015: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Listing of 118 Airports at Which Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) Offers Expedited Screening with Dedicated 
Screening Lanes as of April 2014: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center 
TSA PreCheck™ Data, October 2011 through April 2014: 

Table 2: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Estimated 
Savings From Risk-Based Security Initiatives by Category, Fiscal Year 
2015: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) PreCheck™ Lists: 

Figure 2: Examples of Boarding Passes with the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) PreCheck™ Designation: 

Figure 3: Airports that Offer Dedicated TSA PreCheck™ Expedited 
Screening Lanes, as of April 2014: 

Figure 4: Expansion of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Expedited Screening, October 2011 through January 2014: 

Figure 5: Percent of Passengers Screened by Type of Screening from May 
11, 2014 through May 18, 2014: 

Figure 6: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight 
Screening Process: 

Figure 7: How the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Operates Managed Inclusion with Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) 
Devices: 

Abbreviations: 

BDO: behavior detection officer: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

ETD: explosives trace detection: 

FSD: federal security director: 

NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 

SPOT: Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSO: transportation security officer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 12, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the 
Department of Homeland Security, screens or oversees the screening of 
more than 650 million air passengers annually at more than 450 
airports nationwide, and attempts to balance its aviation security 
mission with the freedom of movement for people and commerce. In 2011, 
TSA began developing new security procedures intended to strengthen 
security and improve the passenger experience by shortening lines and 
wait times. These new procedures apply risk-based, intelligence-driven 
screening concepts and enhance the use of technology to determine 
passenger risk prior to travel. These procedures are intended to allow 
TSA to devote more time and resources at the airport to screening the 
passengers TSA determines to be higher or unknown risk while providing 
expedited screening to those passengers TSA determines pose a lower 
risk to the aviation system.[Footnote 1] According to TSA, expedited 
screening involves a relatively more efficient and convenient 
screening process for individuals from whom TSA has obtained 
sufficient information to determine them to be lower risk, compared 
with the standard screening process for a traveler for whom TSA does 
not have such information. For example, passengers eligible for 
expedited screening may no longer have to remove their shoes; may 
leave their permitted liquids, gels, and laptops in carry-on baggage; 
and are not required to divest light outerwear, jackets, or belts when 
passing through screening checkpoints unless the walk-through metal 
detector alarms, in which case these items must be removed. 

In October 2011, TSA implemented the TSA PreCheck™ program and has 
used it to gather information about passengers to assess passenger 
risk prior to travel. Those passengers determined to be lower risk 
prior to arriving at the airport are eligible for expedited screening. 
In November 2012, TSA implemented its Managed Inclusion process to 
assess passenger risk in real time at the airport using randomization 
procedures and behavior detection officers (BDOs), as well as either 
passenger screening canine teams--referred to as canine teams for 
purposes of this report--or explosives trace detection (ETD) devices. 
[Footnote 2] Using Managed Inclusion, TSA is able to provide expedited 
screening to passengers who have not been identified for this 
screening under the TSA PreCheck™ program prior to arriving at the 
airport. TSA's Office of the Chief Risk Officer is responsible for 
overseeing and integrating TSA's risk-based security initiatives, and 
the TSA Offices of Security Capabilities, Intelligence and Analysis, 
and Security Operations are responsible for implementing and deploying 
these initiatives.[Footnote 3] 

You asked us to determine how TSA implemented and expanded expedited 
screening via the TSA PreCheck™ program and Managed Inclusion process, 
including how TSA collaborated with stakeholders to implement and 
expand expedited screening, assesses passenger risk to determine 
whether some passengers are lower risk than others and therefore 
eligible for expedited screening, and measures the effectiveness of 
and cost savings resulting from expedited screening. This report 
addresses the following questions: 

1. How has the development of TSA PreCheck™, Managed Inclusion, and 
other TSA programs affected the availability and use of expedited 
screening at airports? 

2. How did TSA collaborate with stakeholders when developing and 
expanding expedited screening programs? 

3. How does TSA assess the risk of passengers to determine their 
eligibility to receive expedited screening, and to what extent has TSA 
determined the effectiveness of its Managed Inclusion process? 

4. To what extent does TSA assess progress towards achieving expedited 
screening program goals and estimate cost savings as a result of 
expedited screening programs? 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you. The Department of Homeland Security deemed some of 
the information in our prior report as sensitive security information, 
which must be protected from public disclosure.[Footnote 4] Therefore, 
this report omits this sensitive information, which includes 
information about the TSA PreCheck™Risk Assessment program and Managed 
Inclusion process. Although the information provided in this report is 
more limited in scope, it addresses the same questions as the 
sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology used for both reports 
is the same. 

To determine how the development of TSA PreCheck™, Managed Inclusion, 
and other TSA programs affected the availability and use of expedited 
screening, we analyzed TSA documentation including expedited screening 
and Managed Inclusion procedures developed in October 2011 and revised 
through September 2013, expedited screening and Managed Inclusion 
implementation plans and time frames developed in October 2011 and 
revised through March 2014, memorandums of agreement, and decision 
memorandums, among other documents. We also reviewed TSA's December 
2013 screening procedures for standard screening lanes to understand 
the differences between expedited screening and standard screening. To 
determine how the use of expedited screening has changed over time for 
both the number of passengers eligible for and using expedited 
screening, we analyzed TSA data available from TSA's Secure Flight 
system and Performance Management Information System to determine how 
many boarding passes with the TSA PreCheck™ designation were issued 
and compared the number of boarding passes issued with the number of 
boarding passes that were scanned in a dedicated TSA PreCheck™ 
expedited screening lane from October 2011 through January 2014 (the 
most recent data available).[Footnote 5] We assessed the reliability 
of the data collected by reviewing Secure Flight and Performance 
Management Information System documents and interviewing TSA officials 
and determined that data for the number of passengers eligible for and 
using expedited screening were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. To further clarify our understanding of how expedited 
screening and Managed Inclusion operate, we visited six airports to 
observe expedited screening and Managed Inclusion and interviewed TSA 
federal security directors (FSD) about how expedited screening and 
Managed Inclusion were implemented at these airports.[Footnote 6] We 
selected these airports based on (1) the number of annual 
enplanements, (2) the availability of TSA PreCheck™ and Managed 
Inclusion, (3) the ease of passenger access to TSA PreCheck™ expedited 
screening lanes, and (4) the number and variety of air carriers with a 
presence at the airport, among other reasons.[Footnote 7] Because we 
selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the information 
obtained cannot be generalized to all airports. However, the site 
visits provided illustrative examples of how TSA PreCheck™ and Managed 
Inclusion operate. We also interviewed TSA officials from the Offices 
of the Chief Risk Officer, Security Capabilities, Intelligence and 
Analysis, and Security Operations to confirm our understanding of TSA 
expedited screening and Managed Inclusion. 

To determine how TSA collaborated with stakeholders including air 
carriers, airports, and industry associations to implement and expand 
expedited screening, we analyzed TSA data and documents including 
passenger comments provided to the TSA Contact Center from October 
2011 through April 2014, a list of industry events and conference 
appearances made by TSA officials from July 2011 through June 2013 
(the most recent data available related to TSA's collaboration 
activities on expedited screening), and TSA briefing slides used to 
present information about expedited screening to airport officials, 
among other documents. We assessed the reliability of the Contact 
Center data by reviewing documents and interviewing TSA officials and 
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. In addition, we interviewed officials representing 
five air carriers, five airport authorities, and six industry 
associations. Of the five air carriers we interviewed, four 
represented air carriers that worked with TSA during 2011 and 2012 to 
implement and expand expedited screening and provided air carriers' 
perspectives about TSA collaboration efforts. We also interviewed one 
air carrier that began participating in TSA PreCheck™ in late 2013 to 
determine whether TSA's collaboration efforts changed over time. The 
five airport authorities we interviewed were co-located with the 
airports we visited, as noted above, and provided the airport 
authorities' perspectives regarding TSA collaboration efforts. The six 
industry associations we interviewed represented different types of 
passengers, including leisure, business, and international passengers 
as well as air carrier and airport executives, and provided the 
perspectives of these associations and their constituents regarding 
how TSA collaborated with them when implementing and expanding 
expedited screening.[Footnote 8] Because we selected a nonprobability 
sample of stakeholders to interview, the information obtained cannot 
be generalized to all stakeholders. However, the interviews provided 
illustrative examples of the perspectives of these stakeholders about 
how TSA collaborated with them when implementing and expanding 
expedited screening, and how TSA PreCheck™ was implemented and 
expanded at specific airports. We also interviewed TSA officials about 
the stakeholders' views of TSA's collaboration efforts and discussed 
any discrepancies between the stakeholders' and TSA's views. 

To determine how TSA assesses the risk of passengers to determine 
their eligibility or opportunity to receive expedited screening at the 
airport, we reviewed TSA documents including decision memorandums and 
reports from September 2011 to March 2014 that document TSA's 
development of and rationale behind the risk assessment methodologies 
it used to determine passenger risk both prior to travel and at the 
airport. We also reviewed expedited screening and Managed Inclusion 
policies and procedures developed in October 2011 and revised through 
March 2014 to determine how TSA assesses passenger risk before 
passengers arrive at the airport and once passengers arrive at the 
airport, among other documents. We also interviewed TSA officials 
responsible for determining how TSA assesses passenger risk to confirm 
our understanding of the rationale behind TSA's risk assessments. To 
determine the extent to which TSA has determined the effectiveness of 
its Managed Inclusion process, we interviewed TSA officials to confirm 
our understanding of TSA's progress in this area. In addition, we 
reviewed our prior work on the Screening of Passengers by Observation 
Techniques (SPOT) program and Advanced Imaging Technology to inform 
our understanding of TSA's past experience with evaluating and testing 
security related programs in accordance with established practices. 
[Footnote 9] 

To assess the extent to which TSA assesses progress towards achieving 
expedited screening program goals, we analyzed documentation including 
the Office of Security Operations Daily Leadership Report Reference 
Guide, examples of Daily Leadership Reports, and the TSA May 2014 Air 
Passenger Certification report to determine the goals and performance 
measures TSA developed to gauge expedited screening performance and 
progress. We compared these goals and performance measures against 
various criteria including performance measurement best practices to 
determine whether TSA's performance goals and measures comport with 
these criteria, and if they did not, determined where gaps 
exist.[Footnote 10] In addition, we interviewed TSA officials to 
obtain information on their efforts to collect and use data to measure 
performance and track progress towards meeting performance goals for 
expedited screening and Managed Inclusion and to confirm our 
understanding of the goals, measures, and the data used to determine 
progress toward the goals. During these interviews, we also discussed 
any discrepancies between performance measurement best practices and 
TSA's performance measurement efforts to obtain TSA's views on the 
reasons any discrepancies existed. Regarding cost savings, we analyzed 
TSA estimates of the financial savings TSA plans to achieve as a 
result of expedited screening and interviewed TSA officials to confirm 
our understanding of the financial savings estimates and the data 
included in these estimates. We compared TSA estimated financial 
savings with the Office of Management and Budget guidance for 
developing budget submissions to determine whether TSA's financial 
savings estimates comport with these criteria, and if not, determined 
where gaps exist.[Footnote 11] 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to December 2014, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

According to TSA, the majority of air carrier passengers present a low 
risk to aviation security, but until recently, with the exception of 
passengers matched to watchlists, TSA has used the same security 
screening procedures for passengers without regard for the risk 
passengers posed. TSA, through the Secure Flight system, utilizes 
watchlists derived from the Terrorist Screening Database--the U.S. 
government's consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists--
and other sources to identify potentially high-risk passengers. 
[Footnote 12] For example, the No Fly List contains information on 
individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft, and the 
Selectee List contains information on individuals who must undergo 
additional security screening before being permitted to board an 
aircraft. As part of TSA PreCheck™, TSA conducts terrorism related 
checks using lists derived from the database as a part of the security 
threat assessment process.[Footnote 13] 

In 2011, TSA began to explore the benefits of using risk-based, 
intelligence-driven security screening procedures that would allow TSA 
to learn more about passengers prior to travel because, according to 
TSA, it can better assess passenger risk when it knows more about 
passengers. In addition, TSA worked to develop procedures to ensure 
screening resources are focused on passengers determined to be high 
risk and passengers about whom TSA has less information while 
expediting the screening of passengers TSA has assessed as being lower 
risk based on information it has on such passengers. Using this risk-
based approach, TSA began to identify and define lower risk passenger 
populations or "known travelers"--that is, those who have volunteered 
personal information to TSA so that TSA can confirm these known 
travelers are lower risk. 

Expedited Screening: 

When TSA began offering expedited airport screening in the summer of 
2011, TSA initially provided such screenings in standard lanes to 
passengers aged 12 and younger, and subsequently extended expedited 
screening to certain flight crew members and then to passengers aged 
75 and older.[Footnote 14] In October 2011, TSA began to expand the 
concept of expedited airport screening to more of the flying public by 
piloting the TSA PreCheck™ program. This pilot program allowed certain 
frequent fliers of two air carriers to experience expedited screening 
at four airports.[Footnote 15] These frequent fliers became eligible 
for screening in dedicated expedited screening lanes, which became 
known as TSA PreCheck™ lanes, because they had opted into the TSA 
PreCheck™ program through the air carrier with which they had attained 
frequent flier status.[Footnote 16] TSA also allowed certain members 
of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Trusted Traveler 
programs to experience expedited screening as part of the TSA PreCheck™
 pilot. [Footnote 17] TSA provided expedited screening in dedicated 
screening lanes to these frequent fliers and CBP's Trusted Travelers 
during the TSA PreCheck™ pilot program because TSA had information 
about these passengers, and TSA used this information to determine 
that passengers in these groups were lower risk. When traveling on one 
of the air carriers and departing from one of the airports 
participating in the pilot, these passengers were eligible to be 
screened in dedicated TSA PreCheck™ screening lanes where the 
passengers were not required to remove their shoes; divest light 
outerwear, jackets, and belts; or remove liquids, gels, and laptops 
from carry-on baggage. 

After the pilot concluded, in February 2012, and transitioned into a 
formal program, TSA began to add additional air carriers and passenger 
groups to the TSA PreCheck™ program. For an air carrier to participate 
in TSA PreCheck™, the air carrier must have the technological 
capability to send the necessary passenger information to Secure 
Flight for vetting against federal government watchlists, and print 
the low-risk designation in the encrypted boarding pass bar code and 
the TSA PreCheck™ designation on the boarding pass. As each air 
carrier joined TSA PreCheck™, the carrier's frequent fliers became 
eligible to opt in for expedited screening only when traveling on that 
air carrier. 

Since October 2011, TSA further expanded the known traveler 
populations eligible for expedited screening. After TSA piloted TSA 
PreCheck™ with certain passengers who are frequent fliers and members 
of CBP's Trusted Traveler programs, TSA established separate TSA 
PreCheck™ lists for additional low-risk passenger populations, 
including members of the U.S. armed forces, Congressional Medal of 
Honor Society Members, members of the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council, and Members of Congress, among others.[Footnote 18] In 
addition to TSA PreCheck™ lists sponsored by other agencies or 
entities, TSA created its own TSA PreCheck™ list composed of 
individuals who apply to be preapproved as low-risk travelers through 
the TSA PreCheck™ Application Program, an initiative launched in 
December 2013. To apply, individuals must visit an enrollment center 
where they provide biographic information (i.e., name, date of birth, 
and address), valid identity and citizenship documentation, and 
fingerprints to undergo a TSA Security Threat Assessment.[Footnote 19] 
TSA leveraged existing federal capabilities to both enroll and conduct 
threat assessments for program applicants using enrollment centers 
previously established for the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential Program, and existing transportation vetting systems to 
conduct applicant threat assessments.[Footnote 20] Applicants must be 
U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals or lawful permanent residents, and 
cannot have been convicted of certain crimes.[Footnote 21] As of April 
2014, there were about 5.6 million individuals who, through TSA 
PreCheck™ lists, were eligible for expedited screening. Figure 1 shows 
the populations for each TSA PreCheck™ list. 

Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) PreCheck™ Lists: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated list] 

TSA PreCheck™ program lists: 5.6 million travelers as of April 2014: 

The TSA PreCheck™ program lists offer passengers included on the lists 
the opportunity to experience expedited screening. 

Screening operation: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted 
Travelers[A]: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 2,492,962; October 2011; 
List owner: CBP; 
Description: A list of individuals enrolled in one of CBP's Trusted 
Traveler programs (Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI) who have undergone a 
background check and an interview by CBP and who wish to participate 
in TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: Department of Defense (DOD) military personnel: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 2,202,596; December 2013; 
List owner: DOD; 
Description: A list of eligible DOD service members, including active 
duty, National Guard, reserves, and U.S. Coast Guard, who wish to 
participate in TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard civilian employees: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 700,000; April 2014; 
List owner: DOD; 
Description: A list of eligible DOD and U.S. Coast Guard civilian 
employees who wish to participate in TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: TSA PreCheck™ Application Program: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 180,573; December 2013; 
List owner: TSA; 
Description: A list of individuals who apply to the TSA PreCheck™ 
Application Program to be preapproved as low-risk travelers. TSA 
conducts a background check to determine if an applicant should be 
included on this list. 

Screening operation: National intelligence agencies: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 70,254; May 2012; 
List owner: Office of Director of National Intelligence: 
Description: A list of individuals employed by national intelligence 
agencies with active Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized 
Information clearances who wish to participate in TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: Federal judges and federal tax court judges: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 1,308; June 2012; 
List owner: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts: 
Description: A list of federal judges who wish to participate in TSA 
PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: Members of Congress: 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 447; January 2013; 
List owner: TSA Office of Legislative Affairs; 
Description: A list of Members of Congress who wish to participate in 
TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: Medal of Honor recipients; 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 79; February 2013; 
List owner: Congressional Medal of Honor Society; 
Description: A list of Medal of Honor recipients who wish to 
participate in TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP); 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 66; February 2013; 
List owner: IACP; 
Description: A list of members of the major U.S. law enforcement 
associations and other members of the IACP who wish to participate in 
TSA PreCheck™. 

Screening operation: Homeland security advisors; 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 49; August 2013; 
List owner: National Governors Association; 
Description: A list of Homeland security advisors (HSA) who wish to 
participate in TSA PreCheck™. HSAs advise governors of states and 
territories on homeland security issues. 

Screening operation: Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC); 
Number of travelers in program and date incorporated into Secure 
Flight operations: 14; August 2013; 
List owner: HSAC; 
Description: A list of current HSAC members who wish to participate in 
TSA PreCheck™. HSAC members provide insight and guidance to the 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary on matters related to 
homeland security. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-15-150. 

[End of figure] 

[A] In addition to U.S. citizens, the CBP list also includes U.S. 
lawful permanent residents and certain other non-U.S. citizen members. 

In addition to passengers who are included on one of the TSA PreCheck™
lists, in October 2013, TSA began implementing the TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessment program, which evaluates passenger risk using data 
available to TSA to determine a certain likelihood that passengers 
will be designated as eligible to receive expedited screening through 
TSA PreCheck™. 

The TSA PreCheck™ Process at the Airport: 

According to TSA officials, in February 2013, TSA established a policy 
to notify passengers of their eligibility for expedited screening 
using the air carrier reservation systems in order to improve 
passenger movement through airports for TSA PreCheck™ eligible 
passengers. For every passenger, TSA uses the Secure Flight system to 
automatically match passenger information collected by the air 
carriers against the various watchlists (e.g., the No Fly and Selectee 
Lists) up to 72 hours before passengers' scheduled air travel. After 
checking for matches to the watchlists, Secure Flight directs the air 
carrier to mark a passenger's boarding pass for enhanced screening or 
expedited screening, or to identify a passenger as being prohibited 
from boarding an aircraft, or to identify a passenger for standard 
screening.TSA uses a similar process to identify passengers who are 
eligible for expedited screening at the airport by using the same 
information provided by the air carriers to the Secure Flight system 
to match against lists of individuals who have been designated as low 
risk. TSA informs passengers of this eligibility by directing the air 
carriers to mark the boarding pass with the TSA PreCheck™ designation. 
Figure 2 shows examples of boarding passes with the TSA PreCheck™ 
designation. 

Figure 2: Examples of Boarding Passes with the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) PreCheck™ Designation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 illustrations] 

Paper boarding pass; 
Mobile boarding pass. 

Source: TSA. GAO-15-150. 

[End of figure] 

At airports, the mechanism TSA uses to screen passengers who have the 
TSA PreCheck™ designation on their boarding pass depends on the 
configuration of the airport. At some airports, TSA has dedicated TSA 
PreCheck™ expedited screening lanes where passengers with the TSA 
PreCheck™ designation on their boarding passes are not required to 
divest shoes, light outerwear, laptops, liquids, and gels. Because TSA 
PreCheck™ expedited screening is voluntary, a passenger designated as 
eligible for TSA PreCheck™ expedited screening may choose not to use a 
TSA PreCheck™ dedicated screening lane. Also, some airports do not 
have dedicated TSA PreCheck™ expedited screening lanes either because 
of space restrictions that preclude the airport from installing a 
dedicated screening lane in a security checkpoint or because the 
number of passengers with the TSA PreCheck™ boarding pass designations 
is low and therefore does not warrant a separate dedicated lane. 
According to TSA officials, at these airports, passengers with a TSA 
PreCheck™ boarding pass can still experience expedited screening of 
"their persons" (i.e., passengers are not required to divest shoes, 
light jackets, and belts) and use a walk through metal detector in the 
standard screening lane; however, they must divest their liquids, 
gels, and laptops from baggage because the screening process used in 
the standard screening lanes should result in the transportation 
security officer (TSO) identifying these items and searching the 
baggage--slowing throughput in the standard screening lane--if these 
items are not removed. 

For airports at which there are dedicated screening lanes, security 
checkpoints may not consistently have a volume of TSA PreCheck™ 
passengers that warrants operating such lanes because the TSO working 
in the lanes would be underutilized. Also, an underutilized expedited 
screening lane can result in longer wait times in standard screening 
lanes because airports that offer expedited screening in dedicated 
screening lanes generally do so at the expense of standard screening 
lane availability, according to airport and TSA officials. To ensure 
the utility of expedited screening lanes for non-TSA PreCheck™ 
passengers, TSA implemented the Managed Inclusion process in November 
2012. The Managed Inclusion process involves using real-time threat 
assessment methods, including randomization procedures and behavior 
detection officers (BDO), as well as either canine teams or explosives 
trace detection (ETD) devices to screen non-TSA PreCheck™ passengers 
in lanes that are otherwise dedicated to TSA PreCheck™ passengers. 
[Footnote 22] TSA operates Managed Inclusion at the discretion of the 
airport's FSD and is available at airports that have dedicated TSA 
PreCheck™ expedited screening lanes, and either canine teams, ETD 
devices, or both. The Managed Inclusion process will be more fully 
described later in this report. 

As of April 2014, TSA officials stated they provided expedited 
screening at essentially all of the approximately 450 airports at 
which TSA performs, or oversees the performance of, security 
screening, including 118 airports where TSA offers expedited screening 
in dedicated TSA PreCheck™ screening lanes. The 118 airports where 
expedited screening is offered in dedicated TSA PreCheck™ screening 
lanes represent about 95 percent of total air carrier enplanements 
based on Federal Aviation Administration calendar year 2012 data. 
Figure 3 shows the locations of the airports with dedicated TSA PreCheck
™ screening lanes. Also, appendix I provides a list of the airports 
included on the map. 

Figure 3: Airports that Offer Dedicated TSA PreCheck™ Expedited 
Screening Lanes, as of April 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Depicts locations of airports. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information; Mapinfo (map). GAO-15-150. 

[End of figure] 

TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments and Other Programs Have Significantly 
Increased Availability and Use of Expedited Screening: 

TSA's implementation of the TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments, expansion 
of Managed Inclusion, and increasing the number of TSA PreCheck™ 
airports accounted for a significant increase in the overall number of 
passengers designated as eligible for expedited screening, as well as 
the number of passengers who generally underwent such screening. 
Specifically, according to TSA data and as shown in figure 4, the 
number of TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes issued each month grew slowly 
from October 2011, when TSA PreCheck™ was launched, through September 
2013, increasing from about 673,000 to about 3 million. In October 
2013, when TSA began the TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessment process, TSA 
issued almost 9 million TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes. Furthermore 
since October 2011, air carrier participation has expanded from two 
air carriers to nine air carriers as of April 2014. Figure 4 also 
shows the number of passengers receiving TSA PreCheck™ expedited 
screening, the dates when air carriers began participating in the TSA 
PreCheck™ program, and the dates when various programs intended to 
expand the use of expedited screening were implemented. 

Figure 4: Expansion of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Expedited Screening, October 2011 through January 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Number of passengers: 

Date: October, 2011; [TSA PreCheck™ launch date] American Airlines; 
Delta Air Lines; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 673,237; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 73,362. 

Date: November, 2011; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 791,872; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 73,935. 

Date: December, 2011; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 780,057; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 77,997. 

Date: January, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 819,856; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 111,459. 

Date: February, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 917,251; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 158,407. 

Date: March, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.1 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 214,015. 

Date: April, 2012; Alaska Airlines; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.2 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 284,805. 

Date: May, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.3 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 378,393. 

Date: June, 2012; U.S.Airways, United Airlines; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.5 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 380,262. 

Date: July, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.5 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 385,887. 

Date: August, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.7 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 523,524. 

Date: September, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.8 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 564,048. 

Date: October, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.1 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 702,834. 

Date: November, 2012; Managed Inclusion implemented; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.9 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 735,674. 

Date: December, 2012; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 1.8 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 692,567. 

Date: January, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.0 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 867,645. 

Date: February, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.0 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 893,240. 

Date: March, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.2 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.1 million. 

Date: April, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.6 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.2 million. 

Date: May, 2013; Virgin America; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.7 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.3 million. 

Date: June, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.9 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.4 million. 

Date: July, 2013; Hawaiian Airlines; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.7 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.5 million. 

Date: August, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 2.9 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 1.9 million. 

Date: September, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 3.0 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 2.0 million. 

Date: October, 2013; TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessment implementation; 
TSA PreCheck™ airport expansion; Managed Inclusion expansion[A]; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 8.9 million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 7.6 million. 

Date: November, 2013; JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 12.5 
million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 9.5 million. 

Date: December, 2013; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 15.5 
million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 12.3 million. 

Date: Jan, 2014; 
TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes authorized by Secure Flight: 14.1 
million; 
Passengers receiving expedited screening: 12.3 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. GAO-15-150. 

Notes: According to TSA officials, these data do not include known 
crew members or passengers who experience expedited screening in 
standard screening lanes. Also, the number of boarding passes issued 
is a predictive number, and therefore indicates the possibility that a 
passenger may experience expedited screening and may be overstated 
because some passengers cancel their reservations or make changes to 
their travel after the boarding pass is issued. 

[A] Managed Inclusion with canine teams was implemented in November 
2012. In October 2013, TSA expanded Managed Inclusion to additional 
locations that use explosives trace detection devices instead of 
canine teams. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4 also shows the difference between the number of TSA PreCheck™ 
boarding passes issued and the number of passengers who receive 
expedited screening at the airport. According to TSA officials, this 
difference occurs because TSA PreCheck™ is a voluntary program and not 
all passengers who are eligible necessarily use expedited screening. 
For example, a passenger may be traveling with a group in which not 
all passengers in the group are eligible for expedited screening so 
the passenger may choose to forgo expedited screening. Prior to 
October 2013, TSA designated passengers as eligible for expedited 
screening because they were members of one of the populations TSA had 
designated as low risk. These populations included individuals who 
opted to participate in the TSA PreCheck™ lists shown in figure 1, as 
well as almost 1.5 million frequent fliers who opted in to participate 
in the TSA PreCheck™ program, and passengers aged 12 and under and 75 
and older. In October 2013, TSA began to provide expedited screening 
to a much larger population of travelers using the TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessment program and Managed Inclusion. After TSA implemented the 
TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessment program any passenger flying on a 
participating air carrier could be designated as low risk and provided 
a TSA PreCheck™ boarding pass designation. 

At the same time the number of TSA PreCheck™ boarding pass 
designations increased, the expedited screening throughput in TSA 
PreCheck™ lanes also increased. For example, according to TSA data and 
as shown in figure 4, the number of passengers receiving expedited 
screening in September 2013 was about 2 million. In October 2013, 
about 8 million passengers received expedited screening, about a 300 
percent increase. According to TSA officials, the increased throughput 
in TSA PreCheck™ lanes was due to the implementation of the TSA 
PreCheck™ Risk Assessments and the expansion from 40 to 100 airports 
at that time with dedicated expedited screening lanes. In addition, 
TSA increased the number of passengers with the opportunity to 
experience expedited screening in October and November 2013 by 
expanding Managed Inclusion, in which TSA uses real-time threat 
assessment methods to screen standard passengers in lanes that are 
otherwise dedicated to TSA PreCheck™ passengers. Whereas TSA first 
implemented Managed Inclusion in November 2012 using canine teams to 
screen passengers for explosives as part of a real-time threat 
assessment, TSA determined it could operate Managed Inclusion at more 
airports by screening for explosives using ETD devices. TSA piloted 
Managed Inclusion with ETD devices in Boston and Seattle in July 2013, 
and implemented the program nationwide in October and November 2013 
when it increased the number of airports operating Managed Inclusion 
with ETD devices. Figure 5 shows a snapshot from May 11, 2014, through 
May 18, 2014, of the percentage of weekly passengers receiving non-
expedited screening and expedited screening, and further shows whether 
known crew members experienced expedited screening, and whether 
expedited screening occurred in TSA PreCheck™ lanes (for passengers 
designated as known travelers or through the TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessment program, or passengers chosen for expedited screening using 
Managed Inclusion), or in standard lanes. 

Figure 5: Percent of Passengers Screened by Type of Screening from May 
11, 2014 through May 18, 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and sub-chart] 

Nonexpedited screening: 59%; 
Expedited screening: 41%: 
* Known crew members: 5%; 
* Expedited screening in standard lanes including passengers 
identified as known travelers who are listed on a TSA PreCheck™ list 
or through the TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments[a]: 38%; 
* Expedited screening in TSA PreCheck™ lanes including passengers 
identified as known travelers who are listed on a TSA PreCheck™ list, 
through TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments, or through Managed 
Inclusion[A]: 57%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
data. GAO-15-150. 

[A] Known travelers are individuals who have volunteered personal 
information to TSA so that TSA can confirm these known travelers are 
lower risk. 

[End of figure] 

As noted in figure 5, out of the 41 percent of passengers nationwide 
receiving expedited screening during the week ending May 18, 2014, 
nearly 40 percent of them were issued TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes, 
but were provided expedited screening in a standard screening lane, 
meaning that they were provided expedited screening of their persons 
and did not have to remove their shoes, belts, and light outerwear, 
but they had to divest their liquids, gels, and laptops. TSA provides 
expedited screening to TSA PreCheck™-eligible passengers in standard 
lanes when airports do not have dedicated TSA PreCheck™ screening 
lanes because of airport space constraints and limited TSA PreCheck™ 
throughput. 

TSA Used Various Methods to Collaborate with Stakeholders about 
Expedited Screening; TSA has begun Taking Action to Improve 
Communication with Passengers: 

TSA collaborated with stakeholders about how TSA PreCheck™ works in 
various ways, including presenting information about TSA PreCheck™ at 
industry conferences and events, holding monthly meetings with air 
carriers and airport authorities, and conducting stakeholder briefings 
with air carriers and airport authorities when implementing TSA 
PreCheck™ at airports. In addition, TSA officials stated that they 
have provided Power Point presentations, reference materials, and 
promotional materials such as advertisements to air carrier and 
industry stakeholders. TSA officials said that they have also worked 
with a number of airports to set up tables and information booths 
where passengers can obtain information about TSA PreCheck™ and 
expedited screening. Further, officials stated TSA has updated their 
website and provided TSA PreCheck™ information via the My TSA App to 
inform passengers about how to enroll in the TSA PreCheck™ Application 
Program, which air carriers are participating in TSA PreCheck™, and 
which airports have dedicated TSA PreCheck™ screening lanes. TSOs 
informally communicate information about TSA PreCheck™ at airports by 
explaining to passengers waiting in the screening queue how they could 
enroll in the TSA PreCheck™ Application Program to be eligible for 
expedited screening. 

Stakeholders told us that TSA coordinated with them at the local level 
to implement dedicated TSA PreCheck™ lanes. For example, one airport 
authority we spoke with stated that TSA held regular meetings with 
airport management and with the air carriers and included them in the 
implementation process for opening expedited screening lanes. In 
addition, representatives from two of the six industry associations 
that represent passenger groups and that we interviewed noted that 
TSA's coordination with them was effective and that TSA gave the 
associations the opportunity to provide input to TSA on how the 
program was first implemented. According to these industry 
associations, TSA met with them to encourage the associations to 
advertise expedited screening and TSA PreCheck™ to members. Further, 
three of five air carriers said that they worked closely with TSA 
officials at the local airport level and provided input to TSA on 
issues like where to place TSA PreCheck™ lanes within the airport. 

Eight of the 16 stakeholders that we interviewed stated that TSA could 
do a better job of communicating to passengers details about expedited 
screening in dedicated TSA PreCheck™ lanes. For example, 
representatives from air carriers and industry associations stated 
that TSA could better inform passengers about (1) the TSA PreCheck™ 
expedited screening eligibility requirements, including the fact that 
expedited screening is not always guaranteed even when a passenger is 
on one of the TSA PreCheck™ lists; (2) how to know if they are 
eligible for expedited screening on a flight on a given day; and (3) 
the divestiture requirements and procedures in TSA PreCheck™ screening 
lanes, among other things. In addition, officials from one airport 
authority noted that they observe passengers who are confused and 
improperly using expedited screening and stated that passengers who 
travel infrequently could be better educated about TSA PreCheck™. 
Furthermore, at two of the six airports we visited we observed 
customers divesting liquids, laptops, shoes, and outerwear in TSA 
PreCheck™ screening lanes, which we noted caused the throughput to 
decrease and wait times to increase for other passengers in the TSA 
PreCheck™ expedited screening lanes. TSA officials stated that it 
takes time to train passengers about the expedited screening process 
and that some confusion on the screening procedures is to be expected 
as passengers are retrained on this process after becoming accustomed 
to the security measures instituted since the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks. 

TSA tracks customers' experiences using the TSA Contact Center, where 
passengers can call or e-mail TSA officials about passenger screening 
experiences or ask TSA staff for information about security screening. 
Contact Center staff record details of each call and label the calls 
regarding TSA PreCheck™ as compliments, complaints, or information 
requests about the program. TSA has collected the number of calls 
received regarding TSA PreCheck™ since October of 2011, reviews these 
data weekly, and produces a weekly report on the call data. Our 
analysis of Contact Center data shows that each month since October 
2011, passengers have submitted between 303 and 4,211 information 
requests about TSA PreCheck™ screening lanes. As shown in table 1, as 
of April 2014 TSA had received over 97,000 calls regarding TSA PreCheck™
 since October of 2011. 

Table 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center 
TSA PreCheck™ Data, October 2011 through April 2014: 

Type of call: Compliments; 
Number: 4,204; 
Examples of reason for contact: 
* "Quick and easy"; 
* "The agents were very friendly"; 
* "Thanks for this program." 

Type of call: Complaints; 
Number: 24,816; 
Examples of reason for contact: 
* "I have not been selected the past five or six times"; 
* "I am never selected for TSA PreCheck™, why?" 
* "Why are the TSA PreCheck™ lanes so long now?" 

Type of call: Information request; 
Number: 68,285; 
Examples of reason for contact: 
* "How did I get TSA PreCheck™ when I didn't sign up?" 
* "How do I become eligible for TSA PreCheck™?" 
* "Can children go through TSA PreCheck™?" 

Type of call: Total calls regarding TSA PreCheck™; 
Number: 97,305. 

Source: TSA Customer Contact Center Data. GAO-15-150. 

[End of table] 

As of July 2014, TSA officials stated they are beginning to analyze 
trends and patterns from the Contact Center data in order to determine 
the effectiveness of their advertising and messaging to passengers, 
and to identify potential ways to make improvements. The Office of the 
Chief Risk Officer has developed a trend analysis to record the number 
of TSA PreCheck™-related calls the Contact Center received per month 
since October of 2012. The trend analysis also tracks the types of 
calls received over time to identify changes in the number of 
compliments, complaints, or information requests and highlights trends 
relative to events such as the start up of TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessments in October 2013 and TSA's roll-out of the TSA PreCheck™ 
Application Program in December 2013. While these efforts could 
address concerns raised by stakeholders, they are still in the early 
stages, so it is too soon to determine whether TSA's planned actions 
will effectively address these concerns. 

TSA Uses Three Methods to Assess Risk for Participation in Expedited 
Screening, But Has Not Tested the Overall Effectiveness of the Managed 
Inclusion Process: 

TSA determines a passenger's eligibility for or opportunity to 
experience expedited screening at the airport using one of three risk 
assessment methods. These include (1) inclusion on a TSA PreCheck™ 
list of known travelers, (2) identification of passengers as low risk 
by TSA's Risk Assessment algorithm, or (3) a real-time threat 
assessment at the airport using the Managed Inclusion process. 

Passenger Eligibility Based on Inclusion on a TSA PreCheck™ List of 
Known Travelers: 

TSA has determined that the individuals included on the TSA PreCheck™ 
lists of known travelers are low risk by virtue of their membership in 
a specific group or based on group vetting requirements. For example, 
TSA determined that members of the Congressional Medal of Honor 
Society, a group whose members have been awarded the highest U.S. 
award for valor in action against enemy forces, present a low risk to 
transportation security and are good candidates to receive expedited 
screening. In other cases, TSA determined that members of groups whose 
individual members have undergone a security threat assessment by the 
federal government, such as individuals working for agencies in the 
intelligence community and who hold active Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmentalized Information clearances, are low risk and can be 
provided expedited screening.[Footnote 23] Similarly, TSA designated 
all active and reserve service members of the United States armed 
forces, whose combined members total over 2 million people, as a low 
risk group of trusted travelers. TSA determined that active duty 
military members were low risk and good candidates to receive 
expedited screening because the Department of Defense administers 
common background checks of its members. 

Except for those who joined through the TSA PreCheck™ Application 
program, the TSA PreCheck™ lists include populations for which TSA 
coordinated with a lead agency or outside entity willing to compile 
and maintain the lists.[Footnote 24] TSA has entered into separate 
agreements with the various agencies and entities to administer these 
lists. Generally, according to these agreements, Secure Flight has 
responsibility for receiving and processing the lists, but the 
originating agencies or entities are to maintain them by ensuring that 
individuals continue to meet the criteria for inclusion and to update 
the lists as needed. [Footnote 25] 

TSA also continues to provide expedited screening on a per-flight 
basis to the almost 1.5 million frequent fliers who opted to 
participate in the TSA PreCheck™ program pilot. According to TSA, this 
group of eligible frequent fliers met the standards set for the pilot 
based on their frequent flyer status as of October 1, 2011. TSA 
determined that these frequent fliers were an appropriate population 
to include in the program for several reasons, including the fact that 
frequent fliers are vetted against various watchlists each time they 
travel to ensure that they are not listed as known or suspected 
terrorists and screened at the checkpoint. 

Passenger Eligibility Based on TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments: 

The TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessment program evaluates passenger risk 
based on certain information available for a specific flight and 
determines the likelihood that passengers will be designated as 
eligible to receive expedited screening through TSA PreCheck™. 
Beginning in 2011, TSA piloted the process of using the Secure Flight 
system to obtain Secure Flight Passenger Data from air carriers and 
other data to assess whether the passenger is low risk on a per-flight 
basis and thus eligible to receive a TSA PreCheck™ designation on his 
or her boarding pass to give the flier access to expedited screening. 
In September 2013 after completing this pilot, TSA decided to explore 
expanding this risk assessment approach to every traveler. In order to 
develop the set of low-risk rules to determine the passengers' 
relative risk, TSA formed an Integrated Project Team consisting of 
officials from the Offices of Security Operations, Intelligence and 
Analysis, Security Capabilities, and Risk-Based Security. The team 
used data from multiple sources, including passenger data from the 
Secure Flight system from calendar year 2012, to derive a baseline 
level of relative risk for the entire passenger population. Our review 
of TSA's documentation showed that TSA considered the three elements 
of risk assessment--Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence--in its 
development of the risk assessment. These three elements constitute 
the framework for assessing risk as called for in the Department of 
Homeland Security's National Infrastructure Protection Plan.[Footnote 
26] TSA worked with a contractor to evaluate the data elements and the 
proposed risk model rules used for the baseline level of relative 
risk. In its assessment of the algorithm used for the analysis, the 
contractor agreed with TSA's analysis of the relationship between the 
data elements and relative risk assigned to the data elements. 
[Footnote 27] 

Although TSA determined that certain combinations of data elements in 
its risk-based algorithm are less likely to include unknown potential 
terrorists, it also noted that designating passengers as low risk 
based solely on the algorithm carries some risk. To mitigate these 
risks, TSA uses a random exclusion factor that places passengers, even 
those who are otherwise eligible for expedited screening, into 
standard screening a certain percentage of the time. TSA adjusts the 
level of random exclusion based on the relative risk of the 
combinations of various data elements used in the algorithm, such that 
data combinations carrying more risk are randomly excluded from 
expedited screening more often than other data combinations. For 
example, TSA's assessment indicated that combinations of certain data 
elements are considered relatively more risky than other data groups 
and passengers who fit this profile for a given flight should seldom 
be eligible for expedited screening, while combinations of other data 
on a given flight pose relatively less risk and could therefore be 
made eligible for expedited screening most of the of the time. TSA 
developed a risk algorithm that scores each passenger on each flight, 
and passengers with a high enough score receive a TSA PreCheck™ 
boarding pass designation making them eligible for expedited screening 
for that trip. 

For both the TSA PreCheck™ known traveler lists and the TSA PreCheck™ 
Risk Assessments, TSA uses the Secure Flight system to determine 
passengers' risk levels and to assign low-risk passengers the TSA 
PreCheck™ designation to their boarding passes. Air carriers collect 
each passenger's name and date of birth when the passenger books 
travel. When a passenger has a known traveler number, he or she may 
enter the number into the air carrier reservation system when booking 
travel. The air carrier sends this passenger information, along with 
the travel itinerary, to the Secure Flight system 72 hours before the 
passenger's scheduled air travel. The Secure Flight system checks 
passenger data against watchlists and TSA PreCheck™ lists, and runs 
the data through the low-risk rules in the TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessment algorithm, including applying the random exclusion rate to 
some passengers. Secure Flight then directs the air carrier to mark a 
passenger's boarding pass for enhanced screening or expedited 
screening, or to identify a passenger as prohibited from boarding an 
aircraft or for standard screening.[Footnote 28] Figure 6 illustrates 
the process by which TSA uses Secure Flight to determine the boarding 
pass result. 

Figure 6: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure Flight 
Screening Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration] 

Passenger: Submits reservation data, including full name, date of 
birth, and gender. 

Air carrier: Submits Secure Flight passenger data to TSA[A]. 

Secure Flight screening: 

Secure Flight automated list matching with high-risk lists and TSA 
PreCheck™ lists; 

Rules engine applies intelligence and risk-driven rules to further
assess passengers; 

Low risk: 
* Match TSA PreCheck™ list; 
* Identified by TSA PreCheck™ risk assessments; 
Risk level sent to air carrier to issue boarding pass: TSA PreCheck™. 

Unknown risk: 
Passengers do not match high- or low-risk lists, and are not designated 
as low risk via the Secure Flight Risk Assessment algorithm for their 
flight. 

High risk: 
Passengers match a watchlist (such as the No Fly List or selectee 
lists); 
Risk level sent to air carrier to issue boarding pass: Enhanced, Do 
Not Board. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-15-150. 

Note: Passengers of unknown risk do not have screening-related 
markings on their boarding pass. 

[A] Secure Flight passenger data include personally identifiable 
information, such as full name, gender, date of birth, passport 
information (if available), and certain nonpersonally identifiable 
information, such as itinerary information and the unique number 
associated with a travel record (e.g., record locator number). See 49 
C.F.R. §1560.3 (defining "secure flight passenger data"). 

[End of figure] 

Passenger Eligibility Based on Real Time Threat Assessments Using 
Managed Inclusion Process: 

Managed Inclusion is designed to provide expedited screening to 
passengers not deemed low risk prior to arriving at the airport. TSA 
uses Managed Inclusion as a tool to direct passengers who are not on a 
TSA PreCheck™ list or designated as eligible for expedited screening 
via the TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessments into the expedited screening 
lanes to increase passenger throughput in these lanes when the volume 
of TSA PreCheck™-eligible passengers is low. In addition, Managed 
Inclusion was developed to improve the efficiency of dedicated TSA 
PreCheck™ screening lanes as well as to help TSA reach its internal 
goal of providing expedited screening to at least 25 percent of 
passengers by the end of calendar year 2013. TSA randomly selects 
passengers to enter the Managed Inclusion queue using a randomizer 
device that directs a certain percentage of passengers not previously 
designated that day as eligible for expedited screening to the TSA 
PreCheck™ expedited screening lane. To screen passengers who have been 
randomly directed into the expedited screening lane, TSA uses real 
time threat assessments including combinations of BDOs, canine teams 
and ETD devices to ensure that passengers do not exhibit high-risk 
behaviors or otherwise present a risk at the airport.[Footnote 29] 

According to TSA, it designed the Managed Inclusion process using a 
layered approach to provide security when providing expedited 
screening to passengers via Managed Inclusion. Specifically, the 
Office of Security Capabilities' proof of concept design noted that 
the Managed Inclusion process was designed to provide a more rigorous 
real-time threat assessment layer of security when compared to 
standard screening or TSA PreCheck™ screening. According to the design 
concept, this real-time threat assessment, utilizing both BDOs and 
canine teams, allows TSA to provide expedited screening to passengers 
who have not been designated as low risk without decreasing overall 
security effectiveness. These layers include (1) the Secure Flight 
vetting TSA performs to identify high-risk passengers required to 
undergo enhanced screening at the checkpoint and to ensure these 
passengers are not directed to TSA PreCheck™ expedited screening 
lanes, (2) a randomization process that TSA uses to include passengers 
into TSA PreCheck™ screening lanes who otherwise were not eligible for 
expedited screening, (3) BDOs who observe passengers and look for 
certain high-risk behaviors, (4) canine teams and ETD devices that 
help ensure that passengers have not handled explosive materials prior 
to travel, and (5) an unpredictable screening process involving walk-
through metal detectors in expedited screening lanes that randomly 
select a percentage of passengers for additional screening. 

Managed Inclusion Process: 

When passengers approach a security checkpoint that is operating 
Managed Inclusion, they approach a TSO who is holding a randomizer 
device, typically an iPad that directs the passenger to the expedited 
or standard screening lane. TSA officials stated that the 
randomization layer of security is intended to ensure that passengers 
cannot count on being screened in the expedited screening lane even if 
they use a security checkpoint that is operating Managed Inclusion. 
FSDs can adjust the percentage of passengers randomly sent into the 
Managed Inclusion lane depending on specific risk factors. Figure 7 
illustrates how these layers of security operate when FSDs use Managed 
Inclusion lanes. 

Figure 7: How the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Operates Managed Inclusion with Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) 
Devices: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Behavior detection officer: 

TSA PreCheck™ passengers: 
TSA PreCheck™ queue; 
Travel document checker; 
Walk-through metal detector; 
TSA PreCheck™ screening. 

All other passengers: 

Managed Inclusion queue: 
Explosives trace detection; 
Travel document checker; 
Walk-through metal detector; 
TSA PreCheck™ screening. 

or: 

Standard queue: 
Travel document checker; 
Advanced imaging technology scanner; 
Standard screening. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-15-150. 

[End of figure] 

According to TSA, it designed the Managed Inclusion process to use 
BDOs stationed in the expedited screening lane as one of its layers of 
security when Managed Inclusion is operational to observe passengers' 
behavior as they move through the security checkpoint queue. When BDOs 
observe certain behaviors that indicate a passenger may be higher 
risk, the BDOs are to refer the passenger to a standard screening lane 
so that the passenger can be screened using standard or enhanced 
screening procedures. We have conducted past work on TSA's behavior 
detection analysis program, including the Screening of Passengers by 
Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, which BDOs use to identify 
potential high-risk passengers.[Footnote 30] In our November 2013 
report, we reported that although TSA has taken several positive steps 
to validate the scientific basis and strengthen program management of 
behavior detection analysis and the SPOT program, TSA has not 
demonstrated that BDOs can reliably and effectively identify high-risk 
passengers who may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system. In our 
2013 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
direct the TSA Administrator to limit future funding support for the 
agency's behavior detection activities until TSA can provide 
scientifically validated evidence that demonstrates that behavioral 
indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to 
aviation security. The Department of Homeland Security did not concur 
with this recommendation; however, in August 2014, TSA noted that it 
is taking actions to optimize the effectiveness of its behavior 
detection program and plans to begin testing this effort in October 
2014. 

According to a TSA decision memorandum and its accompanying analysis, 
TSA uses canine teams and ETD devices at airports as an additional 
layer of security when Managed Inclusion is operational to determine 
whether passengers may have interacted with explosives prior to 
arriving at the airport. In airports with canine teams, passengers 
must walk past a canine and its handler in an environment where the 
canine is trained to detect explosive odors and to alert the handler 
when a passenger has any trace of explosives on his or her person. For 
example, passengers in the Managed Inclusion lane may be directed to 
walk from the travel document checker through the passageway and past 
the canine teams to reach the X-ray belt and the walk-through metal 
detector. According to TSA documents, the canines, when combined with 
the other layers of security in the Managed Inclusion process provide 
effective security.[Footnote 31] According to TSA, it made this 
determination by considering the probability of canines detecting 
explosives on passengers, and then designed the Managed Inclusion 
process to ensure that passengers would encounter a canine a certain 
percentage of the time.[Footnote 32] 

Our prior work examined data TSA had on its canine program, what these 
data show, and to what extent TSA analyzed these data to identify 
program trends. Further we analyzed the extent to which TSA deployed 
canine teams using a risk-based approach and determined their 
effectiveness prior to deployment. As a result of this work, we 
recommended in January 2013, among other things, that TSA take actions 
to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. The 
Department of Homeland Security concurred with this recommendation and 
has taken steps to address it.[Footnote 33] Specifically, according to 
TSA canine test results, TSA has conducted work to assess canine teams 
and to ensure they meet the security effectiveness thresholds TSA 
established for working in the Managed Inclusion lane; and the canines 
met these thresholds as a requirement to screen passengers in managed 
inclusion lanes. 

In those airports where canines are unavailable, TSA uses ETD devices 
as a layer of security when operating Managed Inclusion. TSOs 
stationed at the ETD device are to select passengers to have their 
hands swabbed as they move through the expedited screening lane. TSOs 
are to wait for a passenger to proceed through the Managed Inclusion 
queue and approach the device, where the TSO is to swab the 
passenger's hands with an ETD pad and place the pad in the ETD device 
to determine whether any explosive residue is detected on the pad. 
[Footnote 34] Once the passenger who was swabbed is cleared, the 
passenger then proceeds through the lane to the X-ray belt and walk-
through metal detector for screening. TSA procedures require FSDs to 
meet certain performance requirements when ETD devices are operating, 
and TSA data from January 1, 2014, through April 1, 2014, show that 
these requirements were not always met. Beginning in May 2014, TSA's 
Office of Security Operations began tracking compliance with the ETD 
swab requirements and developed and implemented a process to ensure 
that the requirements are met. 

According to TSA, it uses unpredictable screening procedures as an 
additional layer of security after passengers who are using expedited 
screening pass through the walk-through metal detector. This random 
selection of passengers for enhanced screening after they have passed 
all security layers TSA uses for Managed Inclusion provides one more 
chance for TSA to detect explosives on a passenger. 

TSA Should Ensure that Its Effectiveness Testing of the Managed 
Inclusion Process is Conducted in Accordance with Established 
Methodological Practices: 

TSA officials stated that they tested the security effectiveness of 
the individual components of the Managed Inclusion process before 
implementing Managed Inclusion, and determined that each layer alone 
provides an effective level of security. For example, TSA tested the 
threat detection ability of its canines using a variety of variables 
such as concealment location and the length of time the item was 
concealed prior to the encounter with the canine team. We did not 
evaluate the security effectiveness testing TSA conducted on the 
individual layers of the Managed Inclusion process. However, we have 
previously conducted work on several of the layers used in the Managed 
Inclusion process, including BDOs, ETD, and canine teams and raised 
concerns regarding their effectiveness and recommended actions to 
address those concerns.[Footnote 35] As discussed earlier in this 
report, TSA has made progress in addressing those recommendations. TSA 
determined through the initial testing of the Managed Inclusion layers 
that Managed Inclusion provides a higher level of security than TSA 
baseline security levels. In addition, according to TSA standard 
operating procedures, Managed Inclusion passengers are more likely 
than other passengers to be screened for explosives. TSA officials 
stated that they have not yet tested the security effectiveness of the 
overall Managed Inclusion process as it functions as a whole, as TSA 
has been planning for such testing over the course of the last year. 
TSA documentation shows that the Office of Security Capabilities 
recommended in January 2013 that TSA test the security effectiveness 
of Managed Inclusion as a system. According to officials, TSA 
anticipates that testing will begin in October 2014 and estimates that 
testing could take 12 to 18 months to complete. However, TSA could not 
provide us with specifics or a plan or documentation showing how the 
testing is to be conducted, the locations where it is to occur, how 
those locations are to be selected, or the timeframes for conducting 
testing at each location. Testing the security effectiveness of the 
Managed Inclusion process is consistent with federal policy, as laid 
out in Executive Order 13450--Improving Government Program 
Performance.[Footnote 36] 

We have previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing 
studies and protocols to test the effectiveness of security systems 
and programs in accordance with established methodological practices. 
For example, in our March 2014 assessment of TSA's acquisition of 
Advanced Imagining Technology, we found that TSA conducted operational 
and laboratory tests, but did not evaluate the performance of the 
entire system, which is necessary to ensure that mission needs are 
met.[Footnote 37] A key element of evaluation design is to define 
purpose and scope, to establish what questions the evaluation will and 
will not address. 

Further, in November 2013 we identified methodological weaknesses in 
the overall design and data collection of TSA's April 2011 validation 
comparison study to determine the effectiveness of the SPOT program. 
[Footnote 38] For example we found that TSA did not randomly select 
airports to participate in the study, so the results were not 
generalizeable across airports. In addition, we found that TSA 
collected the validation study data unevenly and experienced 
challenges in collecting an adequate sample size for the randomly 
selected passengers, facts that might have further affected the 
representativeness of the findings. According to established 
evaluation design practices, data collection should be sufficiently 
free of bias or other significant errors that could lead to inaccurate 
conclusions.[Footnote 39] 

Ensuring its planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion 
process adheres to established evaluation design practices will help 
TSA provide reasonable assurance that the effectiveness testing will 
yield reliable results.[Footnote 40] The specific design limitations 
we identified in TSA's previous studies of Advanced Imaging Technology 
and SPOT may or may not be relevant design issues for an assessment of 
the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process, as evaluation 
design necessarily differs based on the scope and nature of the 
question being addressed. In general, evaluations are most likely to 
be successful when key steps are addressed during design, including 
defining research questions appropriate to the scope of the 
evaluation, and selecting appropriate measures and study approaches 
that will permit valid conclusions. 

TSA Could Improve Program Assessment by Aligning Goals with Measures 
and Has Estimated Savings from Expedited Screening for Fiscal Year 
2015: 

TSA has two goals and one measure intended to assess the performance 
of its expedited screening programs, but our analysis shows that the 
goals and measure are not aligned. Also, TSA has estimated savings 
from expedited screening and has reduced its fiscal year 2015 budget 
request by the amount of the estimated savings. 

TSA's Expedited Screening Performance Measure Does Not Accurately Link 
to Goals on Passenger Eligibility: 

TSA has two goals intended to assess the performance of its expedited 
screening programs and uses one measure to track progress toward these 
goals. However, our analysis shows that the measure used does not 
align with the goals. Specifically, TSA's program goals are to ensure: 
(1) that 25 percent of air passengers were eligible for expedited 
screening by the end of calendar year 2013; and (2) that 50 percent of 
passengers are eligible for expedited screening by the end of calendar 
year 2014. According to TSA documents, TSA uses one measure--the total 
number of air passengers screened daily using expedited screening as a 
percentage of the total number of passengers screened daily--to assess 
progress towards these goals.[Footnote 41] TSA collects data for this 
measure by reporting, not the number of passengers designated as 
eligible for expedited screening, but the number of passengers who 
actually receive such screening. As noted earlier in this report, 
because expedited screening is voluntary, not all passengers who are 
eligible necessarily use expedited screening. For example, a passenger 
may be traveling with a group in which not all passengers in the group 
are eligible for expedited screening, so the passenger may choose to 
forgo expedited screening. Also, TSA may not use boarding pass 
scanners at the airport or at a specific checkpoint, which would 
preclude TSA from offering expedited screening at the airport to 
passengers with TSA PreCheck™ boarding passes who were not otherwise 
eligible for expedited screening due to the age of the 
passenger.[Footnote 42] As a result, the information that TSA is 
reporting to show that it is meeting its goal may be understated and 
inaccurate. 

TSA's Chief Risk Officer agreed that the goals and the measure are not 
linked, but said that tracking actual screening data rather than 
eligibility data presents a more accurate picture of the expedited 
screening program performance. Specifically, the Chief Risk Officer 
noted that TSA's definition of "eligible" is broader than passengers 
who receive the TSA PreCheck™ designation on the boarding pass and 
that eligible passengers also include those individuals who have opted 
into the TSA PreCheck™ program as members of one of the TSA PreCheck™ 
lists, and passengers who fly on one of the participating TSA PreCheck™
 air carriers who could become eligible through the TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessment process. He stated that broadly measuring the number of 
passengers eligible rather than those who receive a TSA PreCheck™ 
boarding pass result (making them eligible for expedited screening) 
would overstate progress toward the eligibility goal. According to 
TSA, the Administrator set an internal TSA target in September 2012 
that 25 percent of daily travelers screened by TSA were to receive 
some form of expedited screening by the end of the calendar year 2013 
and 50 percent by the end of the calendar year 2014 and did so to 
encourage the development and expansion of TSA's risk-based security 
initiatives and expedited screening of passengers. TSA also noted that 
it began achieving the 25 percent of passengers receiving expedited 
screening goal in November 2013 and attributed reaching this goal to 
an increase in the number of participating air carriers from seven in 
July 2013 to nine in November 2013, an increase in the number of 
airports where TSA PreCheck™ dedicated screening lanes are available 
to over 100 airports in October 2013, the implementation of TSA 
PreCheck™ Risk Assessments on a flight-by-flight basis in October 
2013, and the increased use of Managed Inclusion in October 2013. 

While we agree that tracking actual screening data may provide 
insights about expedited screening program performance, ensuring that 
the goals and measure are aligned is important to provide more 
accurate performance measurement data to guide program performance. 
Best practices regarding the key attributes of successful performance 
measurement state that performance measures should link and align with 
agency-wide goals and the mission should be clearly communicated 
throughout the organization.[Footnote 43] Furthermore, in response to 
a requirement of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act, 2014, TSA submitted a report to the Committees on Appropriations 
of the Senate and House of Representatives certifying that one in four 
(or 25 percent of) passengers are eligible for expedited screening 
without lowering security standards and outlined a strategy to 
increase the number of passengers eligible for expedited screening to 
50 percent by the end of calendar year 2014.[Footnote 44] Aligning 
TSA's measures and goals could help ensure that TSA, as well as 
lawmakers, has a clear and accurate picture of the program's 
performance and can make improvements as needed. 

TSA's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates Savings Resulting from 
Expedited Screening Programs: 

TSA's fiscal year 2015 budget request includes savings noted as a 
budget decrease resulting from efficiencies anticipated from risk-
based security initiatives including expedited screening. In its 
fiscal year 2015 budget request, TSA estimated savings of $100 million 
as a result of risk-based security initiatives and primarily based 
these savings on an expected reduction in screening staff at airports. 
[Footnote 45] Specifically, TSA estimated that it could reduce staff 
costs by about $92 million (or 1,441 full-time-equivalent staff) with 
an additional savings of almost $8 million realized from an associated 
reduction in indirect costs such as training, information technology 
support, and recruitment, among other expenses. According to TSA 
officials, implementing expedited screening allows for staff 
reductions because TSA is able to operate fewer screening lanes while 
maintaining throughput rates and short wait times. Also, TSA officials 
noted that these staff reductions are to be realized through staff 
attrition. Table 2 shows TSA's estimated cost savings as a result of 
risk-based security initiatives. 

Table 2: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Estimated 
Savings From Risk-Based Security Initiatives by Category, Fiscal Year 
2015: 

Category: Salary; 
Amount saved: $92,231,000. 

Category: Transportation security officer salary; 
Amount saved: $85,896,000. 

Category: Support salary; 
Amount saved: $6,335,000. 

Category: Training; 
Amount saved: $4,605,000. 

Category: Consumables; 
Amount saved: $762,000. 

Category: Other[A]; 
Amount saved: $2,402,000. 

Category: Total; 
Amount saved: $100,000,000. 

Source: TSA. GAO-15-150: 

[A] This includes information technology, recruitment, payroll 
processing, and other support costs. 

[End of table] 

Identifying potential cost savings and including these savings amounts 
in proposed budgets is consistent with Office of Management and Budget 
federal budgeting guidance. Specifically, for the fiscal year 2014 
budget cycle, the Office of Management and Budget instructed agencies 
to identify programs where legislative, budget, or administrative 
changes could improve program effectiveness and efficiency and result 
in cost savings so that the deficit reductions included in the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 could be realized.[Footnote 46] Further, the 
Office of Management and Budget's fiscal year 2015 budget guidance 
instructed agencies to continue to identify areas where cost savings 
might be realized, consistent with the fiscal year 2014 budget 
guidance. In addition, identifying potential savings from program 
efficiencies in spending estimates is consistent with Office of 
Management and Budget guidance for developing budget submissions and 
included in the instructions provided to federal agencies for 
preparing annual budgets.[Footnote 47] We compared TSA's savings 
estimates with the Office of Management and Budget guidance for 
preparing agency budgets and found that TSA's estimates were 
consistent with this guidance. Specifically, the guidance states that 
agencies' budgets must reflect all requirements anticipated by the 
agency at the time of the budget submission, including budget 
decreases for activities proposed for reduction. 

Conclusions: 

TSA's new methods to assess passenger risk, such as TSA PreCheck™ Risk 
Assessments and Managed Inclusion, have significantly increased the 
use of expedited screening. As a result, it will be important for TSA 
to evaluate the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion 
process as a whole, to ensure that it is functioning as intended and 
that passengers are being screened at a level commensurate with their 
risk. According to TSA, this testing is scheduled to begin in October 
2014 and could take 12 to 18 months to complete. Ensuring that its 
planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres 
to established evaluation design practices will help TSA provide 
reasonable assurance that the effectiveness testing yields reliable 
results. Regarding overall program performance, although TSA collects 
information to assess the performance of its expedited screening 
programs, its assessment could be improved because the performance 
goals and the measures used to evaluate those goals are currently not 
aligned. Aligning TSA's measures and goals could help ensure that TSA, 
as well as lawmakers, has a clear and accurate picture of the 
program's performance and can make improvements as needed. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

GAO is recommending that TSA take the following two actions. 

To ensure that TSA's planned testing yields reliable results, we 
recommend that the TSA Administrator take steps to ensure that TSA's 
planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres 
to established evaluation design practices. 

To ensure that TSA has accurate information by which to measure the 
performance of its expedited screening programs, we recommend that the 
TSA Administrator ensure that the expedited screening performance 
goals and measures align. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DHS with a copy of this report for review and comment. On 
November 19, 2014, DHS provided written comments, which are summarized 
below and reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred with our 
two recommendations and described actions under way or planned to 
address them. In addition, DHS provided written technical comments, 
which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

DHS concurred with our first recommendation that TSA take steps to 
ensure that its planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion 
process adheres to established evaluation practices. DHS stated that 
TSA plans to use a test and evaluation process--which calls for the 
preparation of test and evaluation framework documents including 
plans, analyses, and a final report describing the test results--for 
its planned effectiveness testing of Managed Inclusion. In addition, 
TSA has begun collaborating with National Institute of Standards and 
Technology statistical engineering staff who are to share their 
knowledge and experience with TSA as well as assist with the design, 
analysis, and reporting of the test and evaluation process. These 
actions, if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our 
recommendation. 

DHS concurred with our second recommendation that TSA ensure that the 
expedited screening performance goals and measure align. According to 
DHS, all measures are approved by DHS and the Office of Management and 
Budget, and changes must be approved by both agencies. In June 2014, 
TSA began working with both agencies to modify the measure to ensure 
that it aligned with the expedited screening goals. This action, once 
completed, should address the intention of our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate Congressional 
committees, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and 
other interested parties. In addition, this report will be made 
publicly available at no extra charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Jennifer A. Grover at 202-512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Key 
contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Jennifer A. Grover: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Congressional Requesters: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D. 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Richard L. Hudson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Cedric Richmond: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mike Rogers: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Listing of 118 Airports at Which Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) Offers Expedited Screening with Dedicated 
Screening Lanes as of April 2014: 

Airport code: ANC; 
State: AK; 
City: Anchorage. 

Airport code: FAI; 
State: AK; 
City: Fairbanks. 

Airport code: BHM; 
State: AL; 
City: Birmingham. 

Airport code: HSV; 
State: AL; 
City: Huntsville/Decatur. 

Airport code: LIT; 
State: AR; 
City: Little Rock. 

Airport code: PHX; 
State: AZ; 
City: Phoenix. 

Airport code: TUS; 
State: AZ; 
City: Tucson. 

Airport code: BUR; 
State: CA; 
City: Burbank. 

Airport code: FAT; 
State: CA; 
City: Fresno. 

Airport code: LGB; 
State: CA; 
City: Long Beach. 

Airport code: LAX; 
State: CA; 
City: Los Angeles. 

Airport code: OAK; 
State: CA; 
City: Oakland. 

Airport code: ONT; 
State: CA; 
City: Ontario. 

Airport code: PSP; 
State: CA; 
City: Palm Springs. 

Airport code: SMF; 
State: CA; 
City: Sacramento. 

Airport code: SAN; 
State: CA; 
City: San Diego. 

Airport code: SFO; 
State: CA; 
City: San Francisco. 

Airport code: SJC; 
State: CA; 
City: San Jose. 

Airport code: SNA; 
State: CA; 
City: Santa Ana. 

Airport code: SBA; 
State: CA; 
City: Santa Barbara. 

Airport code: ASE; 
State: CO; 
City: Aspen. 

Airport code: COS; 
State: CO; 
City: Colorado Springs. 

Airport code: DEN; 
State: CO; 
City: Denver. 

Airport code: MTJ; 
State: CO; 
City: Montrose. 

Airport code: BDL; 
State: CT; 
City: Hartford. 

Airport code: DCA; 
State: DC; 
City: Washington. 

Airport code: IAD; 
State: DC; 
City: Washington. 

Airport code: RSW; 
State: FL; 
City: Fort Myers. 

Airport code: FLL; 
State: FL; 
City: Ft Lauderdale. 

Airport code: JAX; 
State: FL; 
City: Jacksonville. 

Airport code: MIA; 
State: FL; 
City: Miami. 

Airport code: MCO; 
State: FL; 
City: Orlando. 

Airport code: PNS; 
State: FL; 
City: Pensacola. 

Airport code: SRQ; 
State: FL; 
City: Sarasota/Bradenton. 

Airport code: TPA; 
State: FL; 
City: Tampa. 

Airport code: PBI; 
State: FL; 
City: West Palm Beach. 

Airport code: ATL; 
State: GA; 
City: Atlanta. 

Airport code: SAV; 
State: GA; 
City: Savannah. 

Airport code: GUM; 
State: GU; 
City: Agana. 

Airport code: ITO; 
State: HI; 
City: Hilo. 

Airport code: HNL; 
State: HI; 
City: Honolulu. 

Airport code: OGG; 
State: HI; 
City: Kahului. 

Airport code: KOA; 
State: HI; 
City: Kona. 

Airport code: LIH; 
State: HI; 
City: Lihue. 

Airport code: DSM; 
State: IA; 
City: Des Moines. 

Airport code: BOI; 
State: ID; 
City: Boise. 

Airport code: MDW; 
State: IL; 
City: Chicago. 

Airport code: ORD; 
State: IL; 
City: Chicago. 

Airport code: IND; 
State: IN; 
City: Indianapolis. 

Airport code: SBN; 
State: IN; 
City: South Bend. 

Airport code: ICT; 
State: KS; 
City: Wichita. 

Airport code: SDF; 
State: KY; 
City: Louisville. 

Airport code: MSY; 
State: LA; 
City: New Orleans. 

Airport code: BOS; 
State: MA; 
City: Boston. 

Airport code: BWI; 
State: MD; 
City: Baltimore. 

Airport code: PWM; 
State: ME; 
City: Portland. 

Airport code: DTW; 
State: MI; 
City: Detroit. 

Airport code: GRR; 
State: MI; 
City: Grand Rapids. 

Airport code: MSP; 
State: MN; 
City: Minneapolis. 

Airport code: MCI; 
State: MO; 
City: Kansas City. 

Airport code: STL; 
State: MO; 
City: St Louis. 

Airport code: BZN; 
State: MT; 
City: Bozeman. 

Airport code: CLT; 
State: NC; 
City: Charlotte. 

Airport code: GSO; 
State: NC; 
City: Greensboro. 

Airport code: RDU; 
State: NC; 
City: Raleigh/Durham. 

Airport code: ILM; 
State: NC; 
City: Wilmington. 

Airport code: OMA; 
State: NE; 
City: Omaha. 

Airport code: MHT; 
State: NH; 
City: Manchester. 

Airport code: EWR; 
State: NJ; 
City: Newark. 

Airport code: ABQ; 
State: NM; 
City: Albuquerque. 

Airport code: LAS; 
State: NV; 
City: Las Vegas. 

Airport code: RNO; 
State: NV; 
City: Reno/Tahoe. 

Airport code: ALB; 
State: NY; 
City: Albany. 

Airport code: BUF; 
State: NY; 
City: Buffalo. 

Airport code: ISP; 
State: NY; 
City: Islip. 

Airport code: JFK; 
State: NY; 
City: New York. 

Airport code: LGA; 
State: NY; 
City: New York. 

Airport code: ROC; 
State: NY; 
City: Rochester. 

Airport code: SYR; 
State: NY; 
City: Syracuse. 

Airport code: HPN; 
State: NY; 
City: White Plains. 

Airport code: CAK; 
State: OH; 
City: Akron/Canton. 

Airport code: CVG; 
State: OH; 
City: Cincinnati. 

Airport code: CLE; 
State: OH; 
City: Cleveland. 

Airport code: CMH; 
State: OH; 
City: Columbus. 

Airport code: DAY; 
State: OH; 
City: Dayton. 

Airport code: OKC; 
State: OK; 
City: Oklahoma City. 

Airport code: TUL; 
State: OK; 
City: Tulsa. 

Airport code: PDX; 
State: OR; 
City: Portland. 

Airport code: MDT; 
State: PA; 
City: Harrisburg. 

Airport code: PHL; 
State: PA; 
City: Philadelphia. 

Airport code: PIT; 
State: PA; 
City: Pittsburgh. 

Airport code: SJU; 
State: PR; 
City: San Juan. 

Airport code: PVD; 
State: RI; 
City: Providence. 

Airport code: CHS; 
State: SC; 
City: Charleston. 

Airport code: CAE; 
State: SC; 
City: Columbia. 

Airport code: GSP; 
State: SC; 
City: Greenville. 

Airport code: MYR; 
State: SC; 
City: Myrtle Beach. 

Airport code: RAP; 
State: SD; 
City: Rapid City. 

Airport code: FSD; 
State: SD; 
City: Sioux Falls. 

Airport code: TYS; 
State: TN; 
City: Knoxville. 

Airport code: MEM; 
State: TN; 
City: Memphis. 

Airport code: BNA; 
State: TN; 
City: Nashville. 

Airport code: AUS; 
State: TX; 
City: Austin. 

Airport code: DAL; 
State: TX; 
City: Dallas. 

Airport code: DFW; 
State: TX; 
City: Dallas/Fort Worth. 

Airport code: ELP; 
State: TX; 
City: El Paso. 

Airport code: HOU; 
State: TX; 
City: Houston. 

Airport code: IAH; 
State: TX; 
City: Houston. 

Airport code: SAT; 
State: TX; 
City: San Antonio. 

Airport code: SLC; 
State: UT; 
City: Salt Lake City. 

Airport code: ORF; 
State: VA; 
City: Norfolk. 

Airport code: RIC; 
State: VA; 
City: Richmond. 

Airport code: BTV; 
State: VT; 
City: Burlington. 

Airport code: SEA; 
State: WA; 
City: Seattle. 

Airport code: GEG; 
State: WA; 
City: Spokane. 

Airport code: MSN; 
State: WI; 
City: Madison. 

Airport code: MKE; 
State: WI; 
City: Milwaukee. 

Airport code: JAC; 
State: WY; 
City: Jackson Hole. 

Airport code: Total; 
City: 118. 

Source: GAO Analysis of TSA data. GAO-15-150. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

November 19, 2014: 

Jennifer A. Grover: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-IS-150, "Aviation Security: Rapid Growth in 
Expedited Passenger Screening Highlights Need to Plan Effective Security
Assessments" 

Dear Ms. Grover: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

DHS also appreciates the professionalism and courtesy the entire GAO 
team demonstrated throughout the audit process while working to 
understand the scope of the Transportation Security Administration's 
(TSA) expedited passenger screening initiatives. This audit reinforces 
TSA's ongoing efforts to improve TSA PreCheck™, its value to the 
American people as a risk based screening tool, and its potential to
expedite screening while enhancing security. 

TSA PreCheck™ Changes the Passenger Experience: 

TSA PreCheck™ is the most visible risk-based security (RES) initiative 
resulting from a change away from a one-size-fits-all approach to a 
risk-based and intelligence-driven approach to transportation 
security. Implementing RES has required a re-examination of security 
technology, staffing, processes, and checkpoint configurations to 
develop a risk-based culture that is dynamic and proactive in 
addressing current and future threats to commercial aviation. This 
initiative has proven that it is possible to improve the travel 
experience for the majority of the 1.8 million passengers TSA 
processes each day at security checkpoints, while also improving the 
security effectiveness of the process as a whole. 

While travelers may remain largely unaware of the Secure Flight 
program prescreening and risk assessment activities, passengers are 
aware that TSA has positively changed the screening process and they 
appreciate the new procedures. 

Managed Inclusion Supports TSA PreCheck™: 

While TSA works to increase the number of travelers enrolled in 
trusted traveler programs or identified as low-risk for a given 
flight, Managed Inclusion will continue to identify passengers for 
screening in TSA PreCheck™ lanes to ensure efficiency of those lanes. 
As recently stated by TSA's Administrator, John Pistole, TSA intends 
to reduce the use of Managed Inclusion as a greater percentage of the 
raveling population enrolls in trusted traveler programs or otherwise 
are assessed to be low risk. However, Managed Inclusion will continue 
to serve as a risk assessment and process efficiency tool, and a 
structured evaluation of its effectiveness is important as identified 
in the audit report. 

Alignment of Performance Goals and Measures: 

The rapid and successful launch of TSA PreCheck™ expedited screening 
has presented the agency with opportunities and challenges. In such a 
dynamic environment, internal and external expectations have at times 
become formal goals. DRS agrees that performance goals should align 
with measures. 

The draft report contains two recommendations with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the TSA 
Administrator: 

Recommendation 1: Take steps to ensure that TSA's planned 
effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to 
established evaluation design practices. 

Response: Concur. TSA plans to use the established Test and Evaluation 
(T&E) process for the planned effectiveness evaluation of Managed 
Inclusion. The T&E process is commonly used by TSA's Operational Test 
Agent to support Acquisition Decision Event decisions regarding 
procurement of security technologies, and provides a good structure to 
evaluate Managed Inclusion. 

The T&E process provides for the preparation of test and evaluation 
framework documentation, including a System Evaluation Plan (SEP), 
Operational Test Plan (OTP), and System Evaluation Report (SER). The 
SEP describes the evaluation design and identifies the critical 
operational issues, the metrics, and the criteria that are used to 
evaluate these issues against user defined requirements. The SEP also
describes data analytical methods that will be used to analyze test 
data. Analytic statistical methods will adhere to sound mathematical 
practice. The OTP defines the design and logistical requirements of 
the test, identifies the data that will be collected and how much and 
where the data are collected. The OTP also defines how each of
the collected data elements is linked to the evaluation metrics in the 
SEP. The SER is the final analysis report for the T&E process. It 
describes the collected data, analyzes the data consistent with the 
methods defined in the SEP, and states analytical conclusions. 

As part of TSA's efforts to continually refine and improve the T&E 
process, the T&E team has embarked upon collaboration with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to embed NIST 
Statistical Engineering staff into the TSA T&E team to share knowledge 
and experience. Additionally, NIST will assist with the
design, analysis, and reporting of T&E programs. 

Historical effectiveness testing of Transportation Security Equipment 
has included the insertion of threat inject carriers in a covert 
manner in a live operational environment to assess the end-to-end 
system response. Operational testing usually takes place across a 
cross-section of aviation passenger screening environments. TSA 
anticipates using a similar design practice to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Managed Inclusion. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 
To Be Determined (TBD). 

Recommendation 2: Ensure that the expedited screening performance 
goals and measures align. 

Response: Concur. As noted in the draft report, TSA agrees that 
expedited screening performance goals and measures are not directly 
linked. Tracking actual screening data rather than eligibility data 
presents a more accurate picture of expedited screening program 
performance. 

The current Agency Priority Goal (APG) measure in the Fiscal Year 2014-
2015 measure set is the, "number of average daily passengers eligible 
to receive expedited physical screening based on assessed low risk". 
All measures were approved by DHS and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and changes must be approved through both offices. 

In June 2014, TSA proposed to modify the expedited screening APG and 
begin reporting the "percentage of average daily passengers receiving 
expedited physical screening based on assessed low risk" to better 
align TSA's performance goal and measurement as recommended. TSA will 
continue to work with DHS and OMB on changing the measure to better 
reflect TSA's progress toward meeting its goals. 

When approved, the change in performance reporting will also align 
with TSA's external messaging to the traveling public on expedited 
screening, which is reported as a percentage on the TSA website, in 
news articles, and in agency statements. ECD: TBD. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Contact: 

Jennifer A. Grover, 202-512-7141, GroverJ@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Glenn Davis (Assistant 
Director), Ellen Wolfe (Analyst-in-Charge), Chuck Bausell, Eric 
Hauswirth, Suling Homsy, Susan Hsu, Brendan Kretzschmar, Stanley 
Kostyla, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, and Jean Orland made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as 
the agency responsible for security in all modes of transportation, 
including civil aviation, and authorized it to establish requirements 
to implement trusted passenger programs and use available technologies 
to expedite the security screening of passengers who participate in 
such programs, thereby allowing security screening personnel to focus 
on those passengers who should be subject to enhanced screening. See 
Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 101, 109(a)(3), 115 Stat. 597, 597-604, 613 
(2001). 

[2] TSA uses canine teams and ETD devices as layers of security to 
help ensure that individuals selected for expedited screening at the 
airport have not handled explosive material prior to arriving at the 
airport. BDOs observe passenger behavior and seek to identify high-
risk passenger behaviors that may indicate that a passenger poses a 
higher risk to the aviation system. 

[3] In February 2014, the TSA Administrator announced the formation of 
the Office of the Chief Risk Officer from what was formerly known as 
the Office of Risk-Based Security. 

[4] See 49 U.S.C. § 114(r); 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520. 

[5] The Secure Flight system identifies those passengers who may pose 
security risks before boarding an aircraft so that TSA can prevent 
these passengers from boarding aircraft or subject them to enhanced 
airport security screening, as well as those passengers deemed low 
risk and eligible for expedited screening. Using the Performance 
Management Information System, TSA collects and reports performance 
measurement data from multiple sources and uses these reports to 
monitor progress toward operational goals. 

[6] FSDs are TSA officials that provide day-to-day operational 
direction for security operations at the airports within their 
jurisdiction. 

[7] Enplanements are the measure of the total number of passengers 
boarding an aircraft and can be a proxy for the number of passengers 
who travel though the airport. Federal Aviation Administration, 
"Enplanements at All Commercial Service Airports", September 2013. 

[8] We did not obtain views from all stakeholders regarding TSA's 
collaboration efforts when implementing and expanding Managed 
Inclusion because we expanded our scope to include Managed Inclusion 
after completing our work with 10 of the 16 stakeholders. 

[9] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for 
Behavior Detection Activities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-159] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 
2013), Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Screening Behavior 
Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen 
Validation and Address Operational Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-763] (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 
2010), and Advanced Imaging Technology: TSA Needs Additional 
Information before Procuring Next-Generation Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-357] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 
2014). 

[10] The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. 
L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), as updated by the GPRA 
Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011), 
establishes a framework for strategic planning and performance 
measurement in the federal government. Although GPRA's requirements 
apply at the agency level, we have previously reported that these 
requirements can serve as leading practices in lower levels within an 
organization, such as with individual programs or initiatives. See for 
example, GAO, Environmental Justice: The EPA Needs to Take Additional 
Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-77] (Washington, D.C., Oct. 6, 
2011). Other performance measurement best practices can be found at 
GAO, Agencies' Annual Performance Plans under the Results Act: An 
Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb.1,1998); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to 
Further Refine It's Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 22, 2002); and, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to 
Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
1998). 

[11] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular 
No. A-11, July 2013. 

[12] The Terrorist Screening Database is maintained by the Terrorist 
Screening Center, a multi-agency organization administered by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. For more information about the Secure 
Flight system, see GAO, Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional 
Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-531] (Washington, D.C., September 
9, 2014). 

[13] For more information see GAO, Transportation Security: Action 
Needed to Strengthen TSA's Security Threat Assessment Process, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-629], (Washington, 
D.C.: July 19, 2013). 

[14] The Known Crew Member program enables transportation security 
officers (TSO) to positively verify the identity and employment status 
of flight-crew members who have joined the program and provide 
expedited access to the sterile area of the airport for properly 
identified and verified, uniformed crewmembers. TSOs are responsible 
for screening passengers and their carry-on baggage at passenger 
checkpoints using X-ray equipment, magnetometers, advanced imaging 
technology, and other devices. For purposes of this report, references 
to TSOs include the employees of private companies performing 
screening activities at airports participating in TSA's Screening 
Partnership Program. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. The sterile area of an 
airport is the area beyond the security screening checkpoint that 
provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which access is 
generally controlled by TSA though the screening of persons and 
property. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5. 

[15] Certain frequent fliers of Delta Air Lines were provided 
expedited airport screening at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County 
Airport and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, and 
certain frequent fliers of American Airlines were provided expedited 
screening at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport and Miami 
International Airport. 

[16] TSA required that certain frequent fliers opt into the TSA PreCheck
™ program and did not automatically provide TSA PreCheck™ expedited 
screening to these frequent fliers. 

[17] To become a member of one of CBP's trusted traveler programs 
(NEXUS, SENTRI, and Global Entry) applicants submit to federal 
background checks to be approved as low-risk travelers eligible to 
receive expedited processing at ports of entry. CBP trusted traveler 
members submit their assigned trusted traveler number to be recognized 
as eligible for expedited screening by the Secure Flight system. 

[18] As of March 2014, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and 
Coast Guard branches of the U.S. armed forces, as well as Reserve and 
National Guard personnel, were eligible to participate in TSA PreCheck™
by virtue of their inclusion on a TSA PreCheck™ list. Also, 
individuals on these lists receive a Known Traveler Number that they 
must submit when making travel reservations to be identified as low-
risk. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining "known traveler number"). TSA 
also refers to these lists as Known Traveler lists. 

[19] See generally 78 Fed. Reg. 72,922 (Dec. 4, 2013). According to 
TSA officials, although the security threat assessment provisions 
applicable to industry stakeholders do not specifically apply to 
passengers, TSA applies the same principles when conducting its threat 
assessments of passengers. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.201-1540.209. For 
example, TSA would consider a passenger as posing a security threat if 
it determines that he or she is known to pose or is suspected of 
posing a threat to national security, to transportation security, or 
of terrorism more generally, and disqualification criteria and checks 
completed by TSA are consistent with such threat assessments. See §§ 
1540.201(c), 1540.205. Further, TSA also recognizes the comparability 
of checks completed by other government agencies and other means. See 
§ 1540.203(f). For example, TSA determined that the vetting process 
for individuals such as Members of Congress, International Association 
of Chiefs of Police, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Medal of 
Honor recipients, and Homeland Security Advisors, among others, is 
sufficiently comparable to the TSA threat assessment process as to 
support allowing them to be issued a known traveler number and 
participate in TSA PreCheck™. 

[20] The Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program is a 
TSA program that issues biometric security credentials to eligible 
personnel who require unescorted access to secure areas of facilities 
and vessels, and all mariners holding Coast Guard-issued credentials. 

[21] U.S. citizens who were members of the NEXUS and SENTRI CBP 
Trusted Traveler programs were also eligible for TSA PreCheck™ 
screening. In November 2012, Canadian citizens who were members of 
NEXUS were incorporated into TSA PreCheck™. 

[22] We have previously reported on the effectiveness of BDOs and 
discuss the results of that work later in this report. 

[23] For some populations, a security threat assessment includes a 
federal background check. A typical federal background check includes 
checks against law enforcement, immigration, and intelligence 
databases, including a fingerprint-based criminal history records 
check conducted through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 
results are used by TSA to decide if an individual poses a 
sufficiently low risk to transportation or national security to be 
issued a known traveler number. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining 
"known traveler number"). 

[24] Members of the list-based, low-risk populations who requested, or 
were otherwise deemed eligible, to participate in TSA PreCheck™ were 
provided a unique known traveler number. Their personal identifying 
information (name and date of birth) along with the known traveler 
number were included on lists used by Secure Flight for screening. To 
be recognized as low risk by the Secure Flight system, individuals on 
TSA PreCheck™ lists with known traveler numbers must submit these 
numbers when making a flight reservation. 

[25] We did not review the extent to which agencies are maintaining 
the lists. 

[26] The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the 
overarching approach for integrating the nation's critical 
infrastructure and key resources protection initiatives in a single 
effort. For more information, see the Department of Homeland Security, 
NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Washington, D.C.: 2013). 

[27] Assessing the effectiveness of the TSA PreCheck™ Risk Assessment 
algorithm was beyond the scope of our work because our work focused on 
the various methods TSA uses to assess risk and did not assess the 
effectiveness of each method. 

[28] Individuals included on a selectee list must undergo additional 
or enhanced security screening before being permitted to board an 
aircraft. 

[29] BDOs may be present and assessing both the standard and TSA 
PreCheck™ lanes regardless of whether Managed Inclusion is operational. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-159] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-763]. 

[31] We did not assess how TSA evaluated the security effectiveness of 
Managed Inclusion screening. 

[32] TSA's ability to use canines is limited by various factors, 
including the availability of canine teams at airports. 

[33] For more information see GAO, TSA Explosives Detection Canine 
Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are 
Effectively Utilized, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-239] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2013) and Explosives Detection Canines: TSA Has Taken Steps to Analyze 
Canine Team Data and Assess the Effectiveness of Passenger Screening 
Canines, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-695T] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2014). 

[34] Additionally, at airports with an explosives detection system, 
ETD devices are used in conjunction with these systems to screen 
checked baggage for explosives. At these airports, if an explosives 
detection system alarms--indicating that checked baggage may contain 
an explosive or explosive device that cannot be cleared--ETD devices 
are used as a secondary screening measure. In July 2011, we 
recommended that TSA develop a plan to ensure that screening devices 
or protocols are in place to resolve explosive detection system alarms 
if these systems are deployed. TSA has taken steps to address this 
recommendation. Specifically, in November 2013, TSA developed a plan 
that outlined a strategy to ensure that the explosives detection 
capability of ETD devices were consistent with the explosive detection 
systems. See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA has Enhanced Its Explosives 
Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening 
Actions Are Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2011). 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-159], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-763], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-239], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-695T], and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-740]. 

[36] See 72 Fed. Reg. 64,519 (Nov. 15, 2007). 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-357]. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-159]. 

[39] GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2012). This report addresses the logic of program evaluation design, 
presents generally accepted statistical principles, and describes 
different types of evaluations for answering varied questions about 
program performance, the process of designing evaluation studies, and 
key issues to consider toward ensuring overall study quality. This 
report is one of a series of papers whose purpose is to provide guides 
to various aspects of audit and evaluation methodology and indicate 
where more detailed information is available. It is based on GAO 
reports and program evaluation literature. To ensure the guide's 
competence and usefulness, drafts were reviewed by selected GAO, 
federal and state agency evaluators, and evaluation authors and 
practitioners from professional consulting firms. This publication 
supersedes Government Operations: Designing Evaluations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/PEMD-10.1.4] (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 
1991). 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G]. 

[41] In addition, TSA uses seven other measures to track other 
screening activities daily and reports the performance results of 
these measures to airport FSDs to keep them apprised of this progress. 
According to TSA officials, these additional measures are intended to 
be internal program measures and are not published outside of TSA. The 
daily report includes targets that FSDs are to meet daily for each of 
these measures, and if these targets are not met for a period of 4 
weeks, the FSD is to develop an action plan to show how the airport 
plans to work to meet the targets. 

[42] According to TSA officials, boarding pass scanners are required 
for an airport to offer expedited screening so TSA can determine 
expedited screening eligibility by scanning the information included 
in the boarding pass bar code. Some airports operate flights on a 
limited basis (i.e., flights do not occur daily) while others do not 
have boarding pass scanners available. 

[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143]. 

[44] See Pub. L. No. 113-76, Div. F, 128 Stat. 5, 253 (2014) 
(providing further that this report be submitted not later than April 
15, 2014), and the accompanying explanatory statement, 160 Cong. Rec. 
H931 (daily ed. Jan 15, 2014) (directing TSA to provide the Committees 
with semiannual reports, starting not later than April 15, 2014, on 
the resource implications of expedited passenger screening associated 
with risk-based security initiatives). To satisfy both of these 
requirements, TSA submitted its first semiannual report to the 
Committees in May 2014. 

[45] For example, TSA's estimated savings of $100 million for Fiscal 
Year 2015 did not account for the start-up costs associated with 
implementing its risk-based security initiatives. 

[46] OMB, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies: Fiscal 
Year 2014 Budget Guidance (May 18, 2014). 

[47] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular 
No. A-11. 

[End of section] 

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