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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

May 2014: 

Trusted Travelers: 

Programs Provide Benefits, but Enrollment Processes Could Be 
Strengthened: 

GAO-14-483: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-483, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Nearly 1 million people and $1.5 billion of trade entered the United 
States through 328 POEs on an average day in fiscal year 2013. CBP, 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has four trusted 
traveler programs—-Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, and Free and Secure 
Trade (FAST)—-to provide for expedited travel through dedicated lanes 
and kiosks at POEs. GAO was asked to review these programs. This 
report addresses (1) trends in enrollment and program use over the 
past 5 fiscal years, (2) the extent to which CBP has designed and 
implemented processes to help ensure consistent and efficient 
enrollment of applicants, and (3) the impacts of the programs on 
travelers and CBP. GAO analyzed data on enrollment and POE operations 
from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, reviewed documents, and visited 
nine POEs selected based on traveler volume and location. While 
information from these POEs cannot be generalized, the visits provided 
insights on program operations. 

What GAO Found: 

As of January 2014, there were about 2.5 million people enrolled in 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) four trusted traveler 
programs—which provide expedited travel for preapproved, low-risk 
travelers and cargo—and enrollments more than quadrupled over the past 
5 fiscal years. About 43 percent of trusted travelers were enrolled in 
Global Entry, operating at select air ports of entry (POE) and about 
38 percent were enrolled in NEXUS, operating at northern border POEs. 
Trusted traveler entries into the United States increased from fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013. For example, entries through lanes for the 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) 
program, operating at southern border POEs, increased from 5.9 million 
to 12.6 million vehicles. 

CBP has designed and implemented trusted traveler enrollment 
processes, but could improve key areas to enhance and assess 
consistency and efficiency in those processes. U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals seek to enroll in CBP's trusted traveler programs 
through an application vetted by CBP and an in-person interview. CBP 
has taken steps to improve the efficiency of the application-vetting 
process by, for example, automating background checks. However, CBP 
has not assessed the feasibility of various other practices for 
improving efficiency in enrollment processes, such as conducting group 
briefings for applicants on the programs. As of August 2013, CBP had a 
backlog of pending applications, as there were about 90,000 
applications pending CBP vetting, and another 33,000 applicants who 
had not scheduled an interview. Assessing the feasibility of various 
practices, consistent with program management standards, could better 
position CBP to improve application-processing times. Further, CBP has 
designed some processes for the trusted traveler applicant interview 
process to help ensure consistency across enrollment centers; however, 
GAO identified variations in interviews and application denial rates, 
indicating that interviews may not be conducted consistently across 
enrollment centers. For example, GAO observed interviews that did not 
consistently follow procedures laid out in CBP guidance at 2 of the 3 
centers where GAO observed interviews. Establishing a mechanism for 
CBP officers to document the kinds of questions asked and the nature 
of the applicants' responses could better position CBP to help ensure 
that interviews are conducted consistently. In addition, CBP has 
implemented trusted traveler programs that allow participating low-
risk citizens from nine countries to use Global Entry kiosks at select 
air POEs. CBP has discussed information about other countries' 
operational procedures for sharing applicant-vetting results, but has 
not documented this information for seven of the countries, consistent 
with internal control standards. Without such documentation, there is 
no institutional record that those countries' procedures for vetting 
applicants help to ensure that only low-risk applicants are enrolled. 

Trusted travelers generally experience shorter wait times than regular 
travelers, and CBP spends less time inspecting trusted travelers at 
POEs than regular travelers. GAO's analysis of CBP data showed that 
primary inspections took about twice as long or longer on average for 
regular travelers than for trusted travelers at 11 of 14 SENTRI 
crossings and 12 of 18 NEXUS crossings in fiscal year 2013. GAO's 
analysis of CBP data also indicates that trusted travelers commit 
fewer border violations, such as smuggling, than regular travelers. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP assess the feasibility of 
practices to improve application processing times, establish a 
mechanism to document types of interview questions asked, and document 
information on foreign countries' procedures. DHS concurred with all 
recommendations but one to establish a mechanism to document interview 
questions asked because, among other reasons, DHS does not believe it 
should use scripted interview questions. As discussed in this report, 
GAO continues to believe in the need for such a mechanism. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-483]. For more 
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or 
gamblerr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Enrollment in Trusted Traveler Programs Has Increased in the Past 5 
Fiscal Years; Use Differs by Program and POE: 

CBP Has Designed and Implemented Enrollment Processes, but 
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Efficiency and Consistency: 

CBP Moves Trusted Travelers through POEs More Quickly than Other 
Travelers, Allowing CBP to Focus Its Resources on Travelers It Knows 
Less About: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Ombudsman Reconsideration Process: 

Appendix II: Ports of Entry with Dedicated Trusted Traveler Lanes and 
Kiosks: 

Appendix III: Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates and 
Revocations: 

Appendix IV: Number and Percentage of Trusted Traveler Entries at 
Ports of Entry That Have Trusted Traveler Lanes, by Program, Fiscal 
Years 2009 through 2013: 

Appendix V: CBP Efforts to Address Wait Time Data Limitations: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler 
Programs: 

Table 2: Ports of Entry (POE) and Specific Crossings for Trusted 
Traveler Programs at Land Borders: 

Table 3: U.S. Airports with Global Entry Kiosks: 

Table 4: Number and Percentage of Vehicle Entries through Crossings 
with Dedicated Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid 
Inspection (SENTRI) Lanes That Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013A: 

Table 5: Number and Percentage of Vehicle Entries through Crossings 
with Dedicated NEXUS Lanes That Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013A: 

Table 6: Number and Percentage of Passenger Entries through Airports 
for Global Entry Kiosks, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2013: 

Table 7: Number and Percentage of Commercial Vehicle Entries through 
Ports of Entry with Dedicated Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Lanes That 
Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler 
Enrollment Process: 

Figure 2: Trusted Traveler Ports of Entry (POEs) by Program: 

Figure 3: Trusted Traveler Enrollments, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Figure 4: Trusted Traveler Membership by Program, as of January 2014: 

Figure 5: Trends in the Use of Trusted Traveler Lanes and Kiosks, 
Including the Number of Entries and Percentage of Entries That Were 
Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

Figure 6: Average Trusted Traveler Initial Application Vetting Time, 
Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

Figure 7: Range of Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates at 
Enrollment Centers: 

Figure 8: Number of Border Crossings with Differences in Wait Times 
for Trusted and Regular Travelers by Program, Fiscal Year 2013: 

Figure 9: Detroit Port of Entry Choke Point at Which Trusted Traveler 
Traffic May Wait with Regular Traffic: 

Figure 10: Reconsideration Cases Reviewed by the Ombudsman, Fiscal 
Years 2009-2013: 

Figure 11: Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates for Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013: 

Figure 12: Trusted Traveler Revocations as of January 2014: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CBSA: Canadian Border Services Agency: 

C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

FAST: Free and Secure Trade: 

GES: Global Enrollment System: 

GOES: Global Online Enrollment System: 

OFO: Office of Field Operations: 

POE: port of entry: 

SENTRI: Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

WHTI: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 30, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

On a typical day in fiscal year 2013, nearly 1 million passengers and 
pedestrians and over 67,000 truck, rail, and sea containers worth 
approximately $1.5 billion entered the United States through 328 U.S. 
land, sea, and air ports of entry (POE), according to U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP).[Footnote 1] Within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), CBP is the lead federal agency charged with a dual 
mission of keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their 
contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country while also 
facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade at the nation's 
borders. CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for 
cargo-and passenger-processing activities related to security, trade, 
immigration, and agricultural inspection at POEs. 

CBP's focus has historically been on security; however, CBP has 
undertaken specific efforts to facilitate legitimate travel and trade. 
A key part of these efforts is CBP's development of four trusted 
traveler programs to expedite the travel of low-risk passengers and 
screened shipments across the border. More specifically, trusted 
traveler programs provide for expedited travel for preapproved, low-
risk travelers--including U.S. citizens and foreign nationals--and 
cargo through dedicated lanes and kiosks at POEs. Individuals can 
apply for membership in all four of the trusted traveler programs 
online and, if conditionally approved, schedule an appointment with a 
CBP officer to undergo an enrollment interview, where applicants can 
be approved or denied membership in the programs. The four CBP trusted 
traveler programs are Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid 
Inspection (SENTRI), NEXUS, Global Entry, and Free and Secure Trade 
(FAST). SENTRI offers expedited processing to approved low-risk 
travelers at southern land borders, while NEXUS primarily offers 
expedited processing to approved, low-risk travelers at the northern 
land border. Global Entry offers low-risk aviation passengers 
expedited processing at select aviation POEs. FAST allows low-risk 
commercial truckers expedited access at select commercial POEs at the 
northern (FAST North) and southern (FAST South) land borders. 

You asked us to review CBP's trusted traveler programs to determine 
the extent to which the programs have improved the facilitation of 
legitimate travel and trade, including the efficiency of the 
application processes and the potential impacts on security. This 
report addresses the following questions: 

1. What are the trends in enrollment and use of the trusted traveler 
programs over the past 5 fiscal years? 

2. To what extent has CBP designed and implemented processes to help 
ensure the consistent and efficient enrollment of applicants in the 
trusted traveler programs? 

3. What do data collected at POEs indicate about the impacts of the 
trusted traveler programs for travelers and CBP? 

To inform our analysis of all three objectives, we visited nine POEs, 
including airports and land POEs, along or near the northern and 
southern borders. We selected the POEs in these locations on the basis 
of the locations having (1) higher than average traffic and 
participation in trusted traveler programs, (2) multiple POEs in 
geographic proximity to one another that participate in two or more 
trusted traveler programs, (3) enrollment centers--where applicants 
undergo an interview process when applying to be a trusted traveler--
that collectively cover all four trusted traveler programs (SENTRI, 
NEXUS, Global Entry, and FAST), and (4) geographic dispersion to cover 
the southern and northern borders. The POEs we visited were Los 
Angeles International Airport; San Ysidro, California; Otay Mesa, 
California; Seattle-Tacoma International Airport; Blaine, Washington; 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport; Detroit, Michigan; and San Antonio 
International Airport and Laredo, Texas. While information we obtained 
from these visits cannot be generalized to all POEs, the visits 
provided us with insights into the operation of the trusted traveler 
programs. 

To determine the trends in the enrollment and use of the trusted 
traveler programs over the past 5 fiscal years, we analyzed enrollment 
data from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and selected membership and 
enrollment data as of January 2014. We met with CBP officials 
responsible for managing the enrollment system data to discuss data 
reliability, reviewed system documentation, and electronically tested 
the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this report. We also met with officials responsible 
for overseeing or conducting the enrollment interviews at all 12 
enrollment centers at the locations we visited to gain a better 
understanding of the applicant interview process. We reviewed CBP data 
related to the numbers of trusted and regular travelers crossing the 
northern and southern land border crossings with dedicated trusted 
traveler lanes and through airports with Global Entry kiosks for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013. To assess the reliability of these 
data, we reviewed documentation about CBP's data systems; interviewed 
agency officials responsible for managing, assessing, and using the 
data and the relevant systems; and electronically tested the data. We 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. 

To determine the extent to which CBP has designed and implemented 
processes to help ensure the consistent and efficient enrollment of 
applicants in the trusted traveler programs, we reviewed the policies, 
procedures, and guidelines governing the trusted traveler enrollment 
process, such as the Trusted Traveler Handbook, policy memorandums, 
and bilateral arrangements with other countries.[Footnote 2] To 
determine the extent to which the enrollment process resulted in 
consistent outcomes, we analyzed enrollment data from fiscal years 
2009 through 2013 described above. When possible, we observed 
enrollment interviews and examined any locally developed guidance for 
conducting the enrollment interviews. We also reviewed and analyzed 
selected daily reports summarizing interview appointment availability 
from fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Additionally, we met with officials 
at CBP's Vetting Center and Ombudsman's office who manage the 
processes of vetting trusted traveler applications and reviewing cases 
where a person believes that his or her denial or revocation for 
participation in a program should be reconsidered. Further, we met 
with officials from CBP to discuss the procedures for developing 
bilateral arrangements and implementing joint trusted traveler 
programs with other countries. We observed enrollment center 
operations, interviewed CBP officials, and reviewed CBP documentation 
to assess the extent to which these enrollment processes were 
consistent with CBP guidelines, Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, Office of Management and Budget guidance on 
performance measures, and program management standards.[Footnote 3] We 
also interviewed representatives from three associations, which we 
selected based on their representation of members of the travel or 
trade industries, to obtain their perspectives on the trusted traveler 
enrollment process. The perspectives of these associations are not 
generalizable to all of the travel and trade industries, but provided 
insights on the enrollment process and impacts of the trusted traveler 
programs. 

To determine what data collected at POEs indicate about the impacts of 
the trusted traveler programs on travelers and CBP, we reviewed CBP 
data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 related to the use of trusted 
traveler programs at POEs. These data include (1) the numbers and 
types of violations committed by trusted and regular travelers and (2) 
the differences in wait times and inspection times for trusted and 
regular travelers at crossings with trusted traveler lanes and kiosks. 
We reviewed CBP policies and guidance, such as the Trusted Traveler 
Handbook, memos describing accepted methodologies for calculating wait 
times, and CBP self-inspection reports. We interviewed CBP field 
officials at the nine POEs we visited about the operational impacts of 
the program related to security, traveler wait times, and the time it 
takes CBP to inspect travelers, and observed these impacts, including 
differences in infrastructure across POEs. We also interviewed CBP 
headquarters officials about the reliability of trusted and regular 
traveler wait time data, steps CBP is taking to improve the 
reliability of these data, and the extent to which CBP measures the 
impacts of the programs. In addition, we reviewed documentation and 
electronically tested the data in order to assess their reliability. 
We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. However, we limited the scope of our work on 
wait times data, as CBP is currently taking steps to improve the 
reliability of the data. Data reliability considerations are discussed 
later in this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

CBP's Four Trusted Traveler Programs: 

CBP's four trusted traveler programs are designed to allow for 
expedited travel for preapproved, low-risk travelers and cargo through 
dedicated lanes and kiosks at select POEs throughout the nation. The 
four trusted traveler programs are predicated on the vetting of 
travelers who have voluntarily applied for membership, paid a fee, and 
provided personal data to CBP. Travelers who are granted trusted 
traveler status are considered lower risk than other travelers because 
of the vetting CBP conducts both when the travelers apply for program 
participation and after they become members. The programs, according 
to CBP officials, are part of the agency's risk-based security 
approach to focus resources, such as CBP officers, at the POEs on 
passengers and cargo that have not been identified as low risk. Table 
1 provides information on each of CBP's trusted traveler programs. 

Table 1: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler 
Programs: 

Trusted traveler program: Secure Electronic Network for Travelers 
Rapid Inspection (SENTRI); 
Port of entry (POE) locations: 10 southern border POEs; 
Primary port of entry environment: Land; 
Year begun: 1995; 
Eligible countries and citizenship: Any. 

Trusted traveler program: NEXUS; 
Port of entry (POE) locations: 12 northern border POEs; 
Primary port of entry environment: Land, air, and sea; 
Year begun: 2002; 
Eligible countries and citizenship: Citizens or legal permanent 
residents of the United States or Canada. 

Trusted traveler program: Free and Secure Trade (FAST); 
Port of entry (POE) locations: 8 southern and 4 northern border POEs; 
Primary port of entry environment: Commercial trucking; 
Year begun: 2002; 
Eligible countries and citizenship: Citizens or legal permanent 
residents of the United States, Canada, or Mexico. 

Trusted traveler program: Global Entry; 
Port of entry (POE) locations: 31 airports in the United States with 
incoming international flights and 10 airports in Canada and Ireland 
that clear passengers on outbound flights for entry into the United 
States; 
Primary port of entry environment: Air; 
Year begun: 2012[A]; 
Eligible countries and citizenship: Citizens or legal permanent 
residents of the United States, citizens of Germany, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Panama, or the United 
Kingdom[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

[A] Global Entry began as a pilot program in 2008 and became a 
permanent program in March 2012. 

[B] Citizens from these countries are eligible to participate in 
Global Entry. As of March 2014, CBP considers arrangements with four 
of the seven countries to be in the pilot phase (Germany, Qatar, 
Panama, and the United Kingdom). In addition, CBP has completed 
bilateral arrangements with Israel and Saudi Arabia for participation 
in Global Entry; however, these pilots have not begun or have begun on 
a limited basis. According to CBP officials, CBP plans to expand the 
pilot with Saudi Arabia in the future. CBP has signed bilateral 
arrangements with Australia and New Zealand, but according to CBP 
officials, these countries have not established programs to allow 
their citizens to participate in Global Entry. 

[End of table] 

Processes for Enrolling in the Trusted Traveler Programs: 

To enroll in a trusted traveler program, applicants from the United 
States and other eligible countries must submit an initial 
application, pay a fee, have their information vetted by CBP, and 
undergo an in-person interview. Applicants apply for each of the four 
trusted traveler programs through CBP's Global Online Enrollment 
System (GOES). When applying, individuals submit information in GOES, 
including their name, address, date of birth, country of citizenship, 
and other pertinent information, such as which trusted traveler 
program they are applying for and payment information. Applicants also 
must answer questions included in the application on such topics as 
travel history, place of birth, and employment, among others. In 
addition, applicants must submit a nonrefundable payment for the 
processing of their applications.[Footnote 4] 

Once a completed application is certified by the applicant and the 
nonrefundable payment is successfully processed, CBP officers are to 
review the application at CBP's Vetting Center to determine whether to 
conditionally approve the applicant. As part of this vetting process, 
CBP officers at the Vetting Center are to determine applicants' 
nationality and admissibility, and assess any potential risk factors. 
In particular, applicants' information is to be vetted against a 
number of criminal and terrorist data sets to determine the extent to 
which applicants may present a risk to the security and safety of the 
United States. In addition, applicants' information is to be vetted 
against CBP's TECS to determine what, if any, border violations 
applicants may have committed in the past that could make them 
ineligible for participation in a trusted traveler program.[Footnote 
5] Depending on the results of the vetting process, CBP is to 
conditionally approve or deny applications at the Vetting Center. For 
applications that are conditionally approved, CBP officers are to 
update CBP's Global Enrollment System (GES),[Footnote 6] and 
applicants are to be notified to schedule an appointment for an 
interview at a trusted traveler enrollment center.[Footnote 7] 
Applicants whose applications are denied are to be notified via e-mail 
of the denial. Denied applicants can reapply for a trusted traveler 
program or request reconsideration of the denial to the trusted 
traveler Ombudsman.[Footnote 8] If an applicant's reconsideration 
request is successful, his or her application can be "conditionally 
approved" and referred to the Vetting Center or an enrollment center 
and include additional information, such as an applicant's request for 
reconsideration, for CBP officers to review. For additional 
information on the Ombudsman reconsideration process, see appendix I. 
Figure 1 depicts the enrollment process for CBP's trusted traveler 
programs. 

Figure 1: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler 
Enrollment Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration] 

Traveler: 

1. Applies through Global Online Enrollment System. 

2. Customs and Border Protection Vetting Center review: 
* Conditional approval: continue; 
* Denial: 
- Reapply; or: 
- Request reconsideration from ombudsman: 
-- Refer back to vetting center; or; 
-- Deny; or: 
-- Conditional approval. 

3. Global Enrollment System updated. 

4. Interview at Trusted Traveler Enrollment Center: 
* Approval; or: 
* Denial: 
- Reapply; or: 
- Request reconsideration from ombudsman: 
-- Refer back to vetting center or enrollment center; or; 
-- Deny; or: 
-- Approval. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection information. 

[End of figure] 

The applicant-vetting process is similar for all four trusted traveler 
programs; however, there are some differences in the programs' 
enrollment processes. For example, according to CBP officials, SENTRI 
applicants from Mexico are required to provide a U.S. address and 
point of contact, while NEXUS applicants from Canada are not required 
to provide similar information. CBP officials stated that the 
requirements are different because, in part, NEXUS applicants from 
Canada are vetted by their home country and by the United States 
against a Canadian criminal database, while SENTRI applicants from 
Mexico are not vetted by their home country. According to CBP 
officials, Canada sends a "pass" or "fail" notification to CBP 
following adjudication of an application. If Canada "fails" an 
application, the United States is to deny the application in all 
cases. If Canada "passes" an application, the United States is to 
continue the vetting process and rely on its own determination. These, 
among other differences, result in the collection of different data 
for various programs and, according to CBP officials, can have an 
impact on the amount of time and resources needed to vet individual 
applicants. More specifically, CBP officers at the Vetting Center told 
us that it may take more time to review the additional information--
U.S. address and point of contact--that is required for SENTRI 
applicants. This information is used to help CBP determine and assess 
any potential relationships that could result in the applicant being 
considered a potential security risk. 

In addition, CBP has differences in the rules that govern how CBP 
officers determine the eligibility of an applicant for each of the 
trusted traveler programs. For example, CBP uses a different standard 
when adjudicating--determining eligibility for--a FAST applicant than 
is used for the other programs.[Footnote 9] However, CBP officials 
noted that the commercial environment is different from the passenger 
environment. More specifically, CBP officials stated that in order to 
use trusted traveler benefits at a commercial POE, the shipper and 
carrier have to be Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) approved in addition to the driver being a FAST member, a 
condition that provides an additional layer of security by helping to 
ensure the shipment is legitimate trade.[Footnote 10] In addition, 
there are other variations in the eligibility standards amongst the 
four programs. For example, a felony conviction disqualifies 
applicants from joining any of the four trusted traveler programs; 
however, applicants with misdemeanors may be considered for inclusion 
in some cases, depending on how recent the convictions were, the 
overall number of misdemeanor convictions, and the applicant's 
nationality. For instance, according to CBP officials, FAST applicants 
may be allowed to enroll in the program with more than one misdemeanor 
conviction. In addition, CBP honors other countries' and U.S. states' 
determinations for what crimes constitute a felony, a misdemeanor, or 
an infraction. For example, a "driving under the influence" charge in 
one state may be considered an infraction, while in another state it 
may be considered a misdemeanor. 

Once an applicant is conditionally approved, the Vetting Center is to 
notify the applicant to schedule an interview at an enrollment center. 
Enrollment centers are located at POEs that have dedicated lanes for 
trusted travelers, airports with Global Entry kiosks, and other select 
locations.[Footnote 11] The interview process requires applicants to 
meet with a CBP officer at an enrollment center to confirm the 
accuracy and validity of the information they submitted in their GOES 
application, provide proof of a valid travel document that is 
compliant with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), submit 
biometric information to CBP, answer any questions from a CBP officer, 
and receive a briefing on the trusted traveler programs.[Footnote 12] 
In addition, some NEXUS applicants also have to meet with a Canadian 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) official. During the interview with CBP, 
applicants are to submit a 10-finger fingerprint that is to be vetted 
against Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal records, which 
provide a response within minutes. In addition, applicants' photos are 
to be taken. As with the vetting and adjudication processes, there are 
differences in the interview processes for each program. For example, 
SENTRI applicants who plan to drive across the border must register a 
vehicle and undergo a vehicle inspection during the interview. 

Pending the results of the interview and fingerprint scan at the 
enrollment center, applicants are approved or denied. If they are 
approved, CBP is to mail applicants their WHTI-approved trusted 
traveler card. If denied, applicants have the option to reapply or 
request reconsideration of the decision through the trusted traveler 
Ombudsman office. The Ombudsman can uphold a denial or reverse the 
decision based on the review of an applicant's reconsideration request 
so that the Vetting Center or enrollment center may consider new or 
additional information for additional consideration. Once approved, 
each trusted traveler is to be vetted daily through a "24-hour 
vetting" process. Under this process, a trusted traveler's information 
is to be vetted against various databases, including TECS and 
terrorist data sets, on a daily basis to help ensure that trusted 
travelers remain low-risk travelers. The 24-hour vetting process that 
trusted travelers undergo provides an additional layer of screening 
that regular travelers are not subject to. If a trusted traveler is 
found to match information in one of the databases CBP screens against 
during the 24-hour vetting process, the Vetting Center is to review 
the case and make a determination as to whether the traveler should be 
allowed to remain in the trusted traveler program. 

Trusted Travelers at POEs: 

When entering the United States through a POE, regular travelers and 
trusted travelers are generally inspected by a CBP officer at a 
primary inspection booth.[Footnote 13] Following the primary 
inspection, travelers are either permitted to enter the country or 
referred for additional inspection. Trusted travelers are to receive 
expedited processing at POEs and use dedicated lanes at POEs. Trusted 
traveler POE locations that have dedicated lanes for SENTRI, NEXUS, 
Global Entry, and FAST are shown in figure 2. Of the 328 United States 
POEs, 65 have dedicated lanes or kiosks for trusted travelers. For a 
list of POEs with dedicated lanes or kiosks for trusted travelers, see 
appendix II. 

Figure 2: Trusted Traveler Ports of Entry (POEs) by Program: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

FAST North: 
Alexandria Bay, NY; 
Blaine, WA; 
Buffalo/Niagara Falls, NY; 
Champlain, NY; 
Detroit, MI; 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport; 
Highgate Springs, VT; 
Port Huron, MI; 
Sumas, WA. 

FAST South: 
Brownsville, TX; 
Calexico, CA; 
El Paso, TX; 
Hidalgo, TX; 
Laredo, TX; 
Nogales, AZ; 
Otay Mesa, CA; 
Santa Teresa, NM. 

Global Entry[A]: 
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport; 
Boston-Logan International Airport; 
Charlotte-Douglas International Airport; 
Chicago O'Hare International Airport; 
Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport; 
Denver International Airport; 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport; 
Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport; 
George Bush Intercontinental Airport; 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport; 
Honolulu International Airport; 
John F. Kennedy International Airport; 
John Wayne Airport; 
Los Angeles International Airport; 
McCarran International Airport; 
Miami International Airport; 
Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport; 
Newark Liberty International Airport; 
Orlando-Sanford International Airport; 
Philadelphia International Airport; 
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport; 
Portland International Airport; 
Raleigh-Durham International Airport; 
Salt Lake City International Airport; 
San Diego International Airport; 
San Francisco International Airport; 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport; 
Tampa International Airport; 
Washington-Dulles International Airport. 

NEXUS: 
Blaine, WA; 
Calais, ME; 
Champlain, NY; 
Detroit, MI; 
Highgate Springs, VT; 
Houlton, ME; 
Pembina, ND; 
Port Huron, MI; 
Sault St. Marie, MI; 
Sumas, WA. 

SENTRI: 
Brownsville, TX; 
Calexico, CA; 
Douglas, AZ; 
El Paso, TX; 
Hidalgo, TX; 
Laredo, TX; 
Nogales, AZ; 
Otay Mesa, CA; 
San Luis, AZ; 
San Ysidro, CA. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[End of figure] 

Typically, trusted travelers go through the same inspection process as 
a regular traveler; however, according to CBP officials, trusted 
travelers have radio-frequency-identification-enabled trusted traveler 
cards that are WHTI compliant and automatically populate a CBP 
officer's computer system at the primary inspection booth. In 
addition, according to CBP guidance, any trusted traveler that is 
referred to secondary inspection--when crossing the border--by the CBP 
officer at the primary inspection booth is to be given "front of line" 
privileges during his or her secondary inspection. Secondary 
inspections at land borders generally involve an additional interview 
with a CBP officer and, if a vehicle is involved, an inspection of the 
vehicle that can include the use of various inspection methods, such 
as X-rays and canine inspections. At an airport, secondary inspections 
can entail additional questioning by a CBP officer and the search of 
luggage and other items a traveler has with him or her. At commercial 
trucking POEs, secondary inspection can include referrals to have the 
truck and its cargo X-rayed, additional questioning, and removal and 
inspection of cargo. 

CBP employs a technique called active lane management to help ensure 
that trusted travelers' wait times remain lower than those of regular 
travelers at POEs. More specifically, according to CBP officials, 
active lane management is used to switch regular traffic lanes to 
trusted traveler lanes when wait times become too long for trusted 
travelers, or switch trusted traveler lanes back to regular lanes when 
the number of trusted travelers coming through the POE requires fewer 
lanes. CBP officials define wait time as the amount of time it takes a 
passenger or vehicle to reach the primary inspection booth at the POE 
from the back of the line. CBP defines inspection time as the amount 
of time it takes a CBP officer to inspect and release a passenger at 
the primary inspection booth. 

In addition, at Global Entry POEs, trusted travelers scan their 
passports at a kiosk that allows them to progress past the primary 
inspection booth without being interviewed by a CBP officer. The kiosk 
requires travelers to submit their passports, answer a series of 
questions, have their photos taken, and submit their fingerprints to 
verify their identities. The answers to the questions and traveler's 
photo are printed on a receipt. The kiosk also informs the travelers 
that they have been cleared to enter the country or refers them to 
secondary inspection. If cleared to enter the country, the trusted 
traveler has to show a CBP officer his or her passport and the receipt 
from the kiosk to ensure that the receipt is valid and matches the 
passenger. At this point, the passenger is allowed to enter the 
country. If a passenger is referred to secondary inspection, the 
receipt is to be issued with a large X on it. 

Enrollment in Trusted Traveler Programs Has Increased in the Past 5 
Fiscal Years; Use Differs by Program and POE: 

Enrollment in Trusted Traveler Programs Has Increased, Largely because 
of Growth in Global Entry: 

As of January 2014, there were about 2.5 million people enrolled in 
CBP's four trusted traveler programs, and the number of people 
enrolling in trusted traveler programs has more than quadrupled over 
the past 5 fiscal years.[Footnote 14] As shown in figure 3, the number 
of individuals enrolling in trusted traveler programs has increased 
from 209,117 in fiscal year 2009 to 857,529 in fiscal year 2013. The 
growth in enrollments has been largely due to the growth of Global 
Entry enrollments. CBP officials told us that they believe that the 
February 2012 announcement that Global Entry members could receive the 
benefits of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pre-
Check Program, which provides for expedited screening at select TSA 
checkpoints, contributed to the increase in Global Entry applications. 
They explained that enrolling in a CBP trusted traveler program was 
one of the only ways an individual could obtain the Pre-Check benefit 
from February 2012 through December 2013, since there was not a public 
application process for Pre-Check prior to December 2013.[Footnote 15] 

Figure 3: Trusted Traveler Enrollments, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Number of enrollments: 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
40,903; 
NEXUS: 131,169; 
Global Entry: 19,673; 
FAST South: 3,702; 
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 13,670. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
52,646; 
NEXUS: 129,658; 
Global Entry: 54,897; 
FAST South: 2,969; 
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 20,697. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
78,441; 
NEXUS: 150,578; 
Global Entry: 129,56; 
FAST South: 2,093; 
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 9,061. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
82,84; 
NEXUS: 180,788; 
Global Entry: 231,381; 
FAST South: 2,633; 
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 10,465. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
91,216; 
NEXUS: 247,786; 
Global Entry: 506,67; 
FAST South: 1,793; 
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 10,064. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: The number of enrollments includes approved first-time 
applications, renewal applications, and "reapplications"--the 
applications of individuals who applied one or more times previously. 
CBP officials noted that one person may apply to more than one trusted 
traveler program, so the number of approved applications exceeds the 
number of trusted travelers. 

[End of figure] 

As of January 2014, most trusted travelers were enrolled in either 
Global Entry (about 43 percent of all trusted travelers) or NEXUS 
(about 38 percent of all trusted travelers), as shown in figure 4. The 
citizenship of trusted travelers varied by program (also shown in 
figure 4), with U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
accounting for the largest share of Global Entry and SENTRI 
memberships, Canadian citizens accounting for the largest share of 
FAST North and NEXUS memberships, and Mexican citizens accounting for 
the largest share of FAST South memberships. 

Figure 4: Trusted Traveler Membership by Program, as of January 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and 5 sub-charts] 

Free and Secure Trade (FAST) North: 3%; 65,205 members: 
16%: U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; 
79%: Canadian citizens; 
5%: Other. 

FAST South: 1%; 13,209 members: 
2%: U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; 
98%: Mexican citizens
Less than 1%: Other. 

Global Entry: 43%; 1,070,142 members
96%: U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; 
4%: Mexican citizens; 
1%: Other. 

NEXUS: 38%; 950,393 members; 
23%: U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; 
76%: Canadian citizens; 
1%: Other. 

Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI): 
15%; 369,745 members; 
69%: U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; 
31: Mexican citizens; 
1%: Other. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: Membership numbers are as of January 23, 2014. Percentages may 
not add to 100 because of rounding. The "other" citizenship category 
for FAST South, Global Entry, and SENTRI includes Canadian citizens, 
among others. The "other" citizenship category for FAST North and 
NEXUS includes Mexican citizens, among others. For all programs, the 
"other" citizenship category may include legal residents of Canada and 
Mexico who are not citizens of those countries. 

[End of figure] 

CBP officials provided insights on this variation, stating that they 
have observed that many Canadian citizens live near the border and 
enroll in NEXUS because they enjoy the benefits of cross-border travel 
and commerce. They also explained that many Canadians enroll in NEXUS 
because membership makes them eligible for expedited screening for 
domestic Canadian flights as well as international flights entering 
Canada. In addition, they stated that many Mexican and U.S. citizens 
enroll in SENTRI because they commute across the border for work or to 
attend school. Further, they said that more Canadian and Mexican truck 
drivers have enrolled in FAST than have U.S. truck drivers because 
U.S. truck drivers have opportunities to drive domestic routes, which 
do not require drivers to cross the border. See appendix III for 
additional information on trusted traveler application denial rates 
and revocations from the programs. 

Use of Trusted Traveler Programs Has Increased, but Differs by Program 
and POE: 

The number of trusted traveler entries increased for all four trusted 
traveler programs, but the amount of the increase varied by trusted 
traveler program for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.[Footnote 16] 
Border-crossing locations with dedicated SENTRI lanes had the greatest 
increase in the total number of trusted traveler vehicles entering the 
United States, increasing from 5.9 million vehicles entering in fiscal 
year 2009 to 12.6 million vehicles entering in fiscal year 2013. 
Border-crossing locations with dedicated NEXUS lanes, however, had the 
greatest growth in terms of percentage increase, with nearly two and a 
half times as many vehicles entering through dedicated NEXUS lanes in 
fiscal year 2013 compared with fiscal year 2009 (1.7 million entries 
in fiscal year 2009 compared with 4 million entries in fiscal year 
2013). Global Entry, the newest program, nearly doubled in use from 
fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2013 (1.1 million entries through 
Global Entry kiosks in fiscal year 2012 compared with 1.9 million 
entries in fiscal year 2013).[Footnote 17] 

The percentage of entries into the United States that were trusted 
travelers also differed by program, but was less than 30 percent for 
all trusted traveler programs. For example, during fiscal year 2013, 3 
percent of all travelers that entered through airports that have 
Global Entry kiosks (1.9 million out of 77 million total entries) were 
trusted travelers, while 29 percent of all vehicles entering the 
United States through crossings with SENTRI lanes (12.6 million of 
42.9 million total vehicles entries at those crossings) were trusted 
traveler vehicles. According to CBP officials, SENTRI is the most 
heavily used trusted traveler program because many SENTRI members 
cross the southern border frequently, for example, if they live in 
Mexico but work or attend school in the United States. Figure 5 shows 
the trends in trusted traveler entries and the percentage of all 
entries that were trusted traveler entries by program for fiscal years 
2009 through 2013. 

Figure 5: Trends in the Use of Trusted Traveler Lanes and Kiosks, 
Including the Number of Entries and Percentage of Entries That Were 
Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 combined vertical bar and line graphs] 

Secure Electronic Network for Traveler Rapid Inspection vehicle 
traffic[A]: 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Vehicles: 5.9 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 17%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Vehicles: 9.5 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 24%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Vehicles: 10.4 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 26%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Vehicles: 11.6 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 29%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Vehicles: 12.6 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 29%. 

NEXUS vehicle traffic[B]: 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Vehicles: 1.7 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 12%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Vehicles: 2.4 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 13%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Vehicles: 2.7 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 13%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Vehicles: 3.6 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 16%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Vehicles: 4.0 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 18%. 

Free and Secure Trade vehicle traffic[C]: 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Vehicles: 0.7 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 9%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Vehicles: 0.9 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 11%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Vehicles: 1.1 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 15%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Vehicles: 1.2 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 15%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Vehicles: 1.3 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 15%. 

Global Entry traffic[D]: 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Vehicles: 1.1 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 1%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Vehicles: 1.9 million; 
Percentage of entries that were trusted travelers: 3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[A] SENTRI data include only vehicle entries, and do not include 
travelers entering through pedestrian lanes. 

[B] NEXUS data include only NEXUS vehicle entries, and do not include 
travelers entering through NEXUS air crossings or pedestrians through 
NEXUS land crossings. 

[C] FAST data include entries through dedicated lanes. Drivers who 
participate in FAST can use their benefits for expedited processing at 
any crossing. 

[D] Global Entry data include the 31 airports in the United States 
that have Global Entry kiosks available for passengers on inbound 
international flights. Certain airports in Canada and Ireland have 
global entry kiosks used by passengers on outbound flights for 
preclearance for entry into the United States. According to CBP 
officials, the Canadian preclearance kiosks are used primarily by 
NEXUS members. 

[End of figure] 

Within each of the programs, the percentage of travelers entering 
through trusted traveler lanes varied by individual crossing as well. 
For example, the percentage of travelers with trusted traveler 
benefits at crossings with both SENTRI and regular lanes ranged from 
0.1 percent to 40 percent in fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 18] For 
crossings with both NEXUS and regular lanes, the percentage of 
travelers with trusted traveler benefits ranged from 0.1 percent at 
the crossing with the fewest trusted travelers to 34 percent at the 
crossing with the most trusted travelers in fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 
19] For information on the number of trusted travelers entering the 
country at each crossing and the percentage of travelers who were 
trusted travelers in each year, see appendix IV. 

CBP Has Designed and Implemented Enrollment Processes, but 
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Efficiency and Consistency: 

CBP Could Strengthen Key Areas to Improve the Efficiency of the 
Application Process: 

CBP has reported in its trusted traveler guidance the importance of 
having a reasonable applicant-processing time, and the agency has 
taken steps to help realize this objective; however, CBP could 
strengthen three key areas to enhance the efficiency of the 
application process. These three areas include (1) lack of a 
performance target for how long it should take to vet an application, 
(2) limited interview appointment availability at NEXUS and SENTRI 
enrollment centers, and (3) lack of systematic data collection on 
interview appointment availability. 

Lack of an application-vetting performance target: CBP did not have a 
performance target for completing application vetting, as of January 
2014. As shown in figure 6, the amount of time between when an initial 
trusted traveler application is submitted and when the Vetting Center 
has completed its vetting has varied by program and year, with some 
programs experiencing vetting times that are longer than others. 
Notably, the average vetting times for SENTRI applications increased 
to over 70 days and NEXUS applications increased to about 42 days in 
fiscal year 2012. In the first 9 months of fiscal year 2013, the 
vetting times for SENTRI and NEXUS applications decreased, but 
averaged from 25 through 29 days, or about twice as long as Global 
Entry applications and three times as long as FAST applications. 
[Footnote 20] 

Figure 6: Average Trusted Traveler Initial Application Vetting Time, 
Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
FAST North: 17.6 days; 
FAST South: 8.2 days; 
Global Entry: 5.5 days; 
Nexus: 11.5 days; 
SENTRI: 5.6 days. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
FAST North: 14.8 days; 
FAST South: 16.3 days; 
Global Entry: 11.4 days; 
Nexus: 12.5 days; 
SENTRI: 11.8 days. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
FAST North: 20.4 days; 
FAST South: 19.0 days; 
Global Entry: 12.8 days; 
Nexus: 21.9 days; 
SENTRI: 25.9 days. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
FAST North: 21.4 days; 
FAST South: 17.7 days; 
Global Entry: 7 days; 
Nexus: 42 days; 
SENTRI: 70.3 days. 

Fiscal year: 2013[A]; 
FAST North: 8.2 days; 
FAST South: 4.7 days; 
Global Entry: 12.5 days; 
Nexus: 25.8 days; 
SENTRI: 29.6 days. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Notes: The average annual vetting times are for initial applications 
in which the applicant did not provide information on a vehicle. We 
reviewed the average vetting times for applications in which the 
applicant provided information on a vehicle and found they were 
similar to those in this figure. Applications with information on a 
vehicle accounted for about 13.8 percent of initial applications from 
fiscal year 2009 through June 2013. 

[A] Fiscal year 2013 data are from October 2012 through June 2013. 

[End of figure] 

In July 2007, CBP established a performance target of having all 
applications vetted by the CBP Vetting Center within 14 days of 
receipt. According to a July 2007 memorandum to OFO staff, CBP 
established this target of 14 days because it recognized the agency 
should have a plan in place to efficiently process applicants and 
ensure a reasonable applicant-processing time to meet the expected 
growth in demand for the trusted traveler programs. However, CBP 
officials told us that the agency no longer uses the 14-day 
performance target, as it is not a reasonable target given the current 
conditions of a high volume of applications and the backlog in 
interview appointment availability at enrollment centers, which we 
discuss in more detail later in this report. CBP officials also stated 
that the agency does not plan to establish a new performance target 
because it plans to adjust vetting times as needed to take account of 
current conditions. 

While CBP plans to adjust vetting times as needed, without a 
performance target or targets for how long vetting should take, CBP is 
not well positioned to assess how any adjustments in vetting time 
affect application process times overall or assess progress made in 
reducing vetting time frames against a target or baseline. Office of 
Management and Budget guidance states that performance measures should 
incorporate targets and time frames to help track a program's progress 
toward reaching its outcome goals--in this case, for example, a 
reasonable applicant-processing time.[Footnote 21] In addition, 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 
managers should compare actual performance against a planned target 
and analyze significant differences and that performance measures 
should be monitored and reviewed to validate their propriety.[Footnote 
22] Given changes in the numbers of applications for the different 
trusted traveler programs over time, setting a performance target for 
vetting the applications could help better position CBP to assess its 
processes and timeliness in vetting applications and help make 
resource allocation decisions. Given the growth of the trusted 
traveler programs, establishing an updated vetting target and a 
process for modifying the target as needed, based on factors such as 
changes in the numbers of applications being filed for the different 
trusted traveler programs and available resources, consistent with 
internal control standards, could provide an accountability mechanism 
to help CBP ensure timely application vetting. 

Limited interview appointment availability: CBP's Vetting Center has 
taken steps to improve the efficiency of the application-vetting 
process; however, officials in the Vetting Center told us that the 
limited interview appointment availability for SENTRI and NEXUS 
applicants has caused the Vetting Center to delay vetting of SENTRI 
and NEXUS applications. 

According to CBP officials, one factor that has affected the Vetting 
Center's ability to complete vetting of trusted travelers in a timely 
manner is the growth in trusted traveler applications. The number of 
applications has more than tripled, from 233,833 in fiscal year 2009 
to 895,830 in fiscal year 2013, while the number of CBP officers who 
vet applications on a full-time basis has slightly increased over that 
same time period.[Footnote 23] In fiscal year 2009, there was an 
average of 23.6 officers vetting applications, and in fiscal year 2013 
there was an average of 30.0 officers. Officials stated that the 
Vetting Center has taken a number of steps over the past 2 years to 
make the vetting process more efficient and productive. For example, 
CBP has automated immigration, criminal history, and other background 
checks and eliminated the need to run manual database queries, 
provided additional training that reduced the number of supervisor 
reviews of applications needed, and augmented the Vetting Center 
workforce by training CBP officers at 24 POEs to vet applications when 
local traffic allows. As a result of these efforts, Vetting Center 
officials reported that they have been able to increase the average 
number of applications vetted per day from 836.9 in fiscal year 2009 
to 3,345.1 in fiscal year 2013 and increase the average number of 
applications each officer vetted per hour from 13.3 in July 2012 to 
15.1 in July 2013. 

However, despite these productivity gains, the vetting time frames for 
SENTRI and NEXUS applications have remained relatively long in 
comparison with vetting time frames for FAST and Global Entry 
applications. CBP officials stated that the Vetting Center prioritizes 
Global Entry and FAST applications because of the high volume of 
Global Entry applications and the importance of FAST membership for 
trade. Further, Vetting Center officials said that they delay vetting 
SENTRI and NEXUS applications since they know that SENTRI and NEXUS 
applicants will not be able to be interviewed in a timely manner 
because of limited appointment availability at those enrollment 
centers. NEXUS and SENTRI interviews must be conducted at 1 of the 24 
NEXUS enrollment centers or 9 SENTRI enrollment centers because 
specific enrollment requirements of these programs can be performed 
only at these locations (i.e., NEXUS applicants must be interviewed by 
a CBSA officer, and SENTRI applicants must have their cars inspected 
in order to drive the vehicles in the dedicated lanes). In contrast, 
Global Entry applicants can schedule an interview at any of the NEXUS 
and SENTRI enrollment centers or at 1 of the 40 Global Entry 
enrollment centers. Vetting Center officials explained that the 
vetting should occur close to the time of the interview so that the 
vetting results remain current when the enrollment center makes the 
final decision to approve or deny an application.[Footnote 24] CBP 
officials at the Vetting Center told us that as of November 2013, the 
Vetting Center was vetting SENTRI applications an average of 55 days 
after they were submitted and NEXUS applications an average of 40 days 
after they were submitted. In comparison, the officials said that 
Global Entry applications were vetted 6 days after they were submitted 
and FAST applications were vetted the same day they were submitted. 

In August 2013, there were nearly 33,000 trusted traveler applicants 
who had not scheduled an interview and another 90,000 applications 
that were pending vetting at that time. In an effort to streamline the 
enrollment process and help address this backlog, CBP issued a 
memorandum in August 2013 instructing enrollment centers to limit the 
interview to 15 minutes.[Footnote 25] Prior to this memorandum, 
interviews were to be no longer than 20 minutes. In addition to this 
memorandum, CBP officials told us in January 2014 that they eliminated 
the need for renewal enrollment interviews for current trusted 
travelers who do not have any derogatory application-vetting results. 
However, CBP officials at the POEs we visited discussed additional 
practices they had implemented, or would like to implement, to further 
improve the efficiency of the interview process, and these officials 
noted that such practices could be helpful in improving the interview 
process at other POEs. For example: 

* Officials from one POE we visited recommended that CBP eliminate the 
vehicle examination from the SENTRI enrollment interview and instead 
inspect the vehicle one of the first few times it crosses the 
border.[Footnote 26] This could reduce the interview time and also 
allow SENTRI applicants to schedule an interview at any of CBP's 
enrollment centers. 

* One enrollment center we visited conducted group briefings on the 
trusted traveler programs instead of having the CBP officer provide 
the briefing as part of the one-on-one interview. This allowed some of 
the CBP officers to start new interviews while another officer briefed 
all of the approved applicants. 

* One enrollment center we visited conducted concurrent CBP-CBSA 
interviews for NEXUS applicants. According to officials, this reduced 
the overall interview time because both CBP and CBSA officers ask many 
of the same questions during the interviews, and by conducting the 
interview concurrently, the applicant does not have to repeat 
responses to the same questions. 

Standards for program management call for program managers to assess 
programs on an ongoing basis--taking into account external factors 
that affect the program, such as growth and resources--to help ensure 
continued success.[Footnote 27] According to standards for program 
management, feasibility studies are one tool program managers can use 
to determine whether implementing program changes could help mitigate 
any negative impacts of external factors and achieve organizational 
goals. Assessing the feasibility could include assessing potential 
trade-offs, associated costs and benefits, and other factors 
influencing the ability of enrollment centers to implement additional 
practices to improve the efficiency of the interview process. CBP 
officials stated that the agency has continued to delay the vetting of 
SENTRI and NEXUS applications because of agency priorities and limited 
appointment availability at enrollment centers and has not assessed 
the feasibility of implementing additional practices to enhance 
efficiency, but recognized that there may be opportunities to do so. 
Given the backlog in enrollment interviews, conducting an assessment 
of the feasibility of practices implemented or suggested by CBP 
officials at the POEs we visited, as well as other methods for 
improving appointment availability, could better position CBP to 
determine what, if any, additional practices the agency could 
implement to expedite the interview process. Implementing feasible 
practices could also better position CBP to achieve its goal of 
ensuring a reasonable applicant-processing time. 

Lack of data on appointment availability over time: CBP monitors 
appointment availability at each of the enrollment centers on a daily 
basis, but it does not track appointment availability over time 
because its enrollment system does not currently have this 
functionality. As previously discussed, the amount of time it takes 
for applicants to schedule an interview has an impact on the overall 
time it takes for applicants to be enrolled in a trusted traveler 
program. CBP has established a target of having sufficient appointment 
availability so that every applicant has the potential to be 
interviewed within 30 days of being conditionally approved by the 
Vetting Center. However, because CBP does not track data on 
appointment availability over time, it was not able to provide data on 
the extent to which it has met this performance target over the past 5 
fiscal years. 

CBP's daily reports showed that many enrollment centers did not have 
any available interview appointments in the next 30 days, and some did 
not have any appointments within the next 90 days. For example, CBP's 
daily report from March 19, 2013, showed that 21 of the 65 enrollment 
centers where data were available (about 32 percent) did not have any 
interview appointments available in the next 30 days, and 99 percent 
of the interview appointments in that 30-day period were already 
booked at another 9 enrollment centers (about 14 percent).[Footnote 
28] On that same date, 11 enrollment centers (about 17 percent) did 
not have any appointments available within the next 90 days, and 
another 2 enrollment centers had 99 percent of their appointments in 
that 90-day period booked. At 1 enrollment center, the next available 
appointment was over 5 months away. 

A daily report from January 23, 2014, showed that there may have been 
some improvement in appointment availability; however, without data on 
appointment availability over time, CBP cannot determine if this is 
indicative of a trend or a temporary change in appointment 
availability. On January 23, 2014, 9 of the 79 enrollment centers 
where data were available (about 11 percent) did not have any 
appointments available in the next 30 days, and another 19 enrollment 
centers (about 24 percent) had 99 percent of their appointments booked 
in that 30-day period.[Footnote 29] According to available data, 
trusted traveler applicants could find it difficult to schedule an 
interview for the next month at roughly 35 percent of the trusted 
traveler enrollment centers. Also, on January 23, 2014, 3 enrollment 
centers (about 4 percent) did not have any appointments available 
within the next 90 days, and another 9 enrollment centers (about 11 
percent) had 99 percent of their appointments booked in that 90-day 
period. According to available data, trusted traveler applicants could 
find it difficult to schedule an interview for the next 3 months at 
roughly 15 percent of the trusted traveler enrollment centers. 
Depending on where an applicant lives, the lack of appointment 
availability at specific enrollment centers could result in delaying 
enrollment for months. On both dates, at least half of the enrollment 
centers with limited appointment availability for the next 3 months 
were enrollment centers that process NEXUS applications. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for 
agency management to track and compare actual performance against 
goals.[Footnote 30] Developing a mechanism to track interview 
appointment availability data over time--rather than on a daily basis-
-could help CBP determine the extent to which it is meeting its 
performance target and help it ensure it is taking necessary actions 
to provide applicants with timely interviews. Further, a mechanism to 
track appointment availability data could help CBP determine if the 
steps it has taken to improve the efficiency of the interview process 
are effective. 

CBP Has Processes for Applicant Interviews, but Could Better Ensure 
They Are Consistently Implemented at Enrollment Centers: 

CBP has designed some processes for the trusted traveler applicant 
interview process to help ensure consistency across enrollment 
centers; however, we found variations in enrollment center interviews 
and application denial rates, indicating that interviews may not be 
conducted consistently across enrollment centers. During the 
enrollment center interview, CBP officers are to collect biometrics, 
verify documents, and ask applicants questions to help verify the 
information the applicant provided and determine if the applicant is 
admissible to the United States and is low risk, based on factors such 
as criminality and financial solvency, among others. If the Vetting 
Center has identified derogatory information, then the interviewing 
CBP officer generally is to ask the applicant to address the issue and 
then document how this issue was resolved. These processes, as well as 
a list of suggested interview questions, are documented in CBP's 
Trusted Traveler Handbook. In addition, CBP provides supervisory 
review of aspects of the interview process conducted at enrollment 
centers. For example, CBP supervisors are to review all denied 
applications at enrollment centers, and CBP officials stated that CBP 
is to conduct a headquarters-level review of all approved applications 
with derogatory criminal background information. In addition, CBP 
operates a Self Inspection Program, in which POEs with enrollment 
centers are to review a sample of interviews to determine if a CBP 
officer interviewed all applicants, regardless of citizenship or 
residency; asked the relevant questions; resolved all issues 
identified by the Vetting Center; and verified the required documents. 
[Footnote 31] Further, the Self Inspection Program requires CBP 
managers to identify and implement corrective actions to address any 
deficiencies discovered during the assessment. According to CBP, the 
Self Inspection Program allows CBP leadership to measure the level of 
compliance with critical operational policies and procedures and 
examine the issues or underlying causes of noncompliance. 

While these processes are designed to help CBP provide oversight of 
the interview process at its enrollment centers, we identified 
potential inconsistencies in enrollment centers' interview processes. 
In particular, during our visits, we observed interviews that did not 
follow procedures laid out in the Trusted Traveler Handbook. For 
example, we observed interviews at 3 of the 12 enrollment centers we 
visited, and identified deficiencies with the interviews at 2 of the 3 
enrollment centers.[Footnote 32] Specifically, at 1 NEXUS enrollment 
center, the CBP officer did not ask any of the interview questions; 
instead, the applicant was interviewed by a CBSA officer, who is not 
responsible for establishing admissibility to the United States, and 
did not ask one of the CBP-suggested questions that are intended to 
help establish the applicant's admissibility to the United States. At 
another enrollment center, a CBP officer approved an applicant's 
enrollment even though the applicant did not have a valid travel 
document compliant with WHTI, one of the requirements for joining a 
trusted traveler program. We also reviewed locally developed interview 
question lists that were used to facilitate the trusted traveler 
enrollment interviews at 3 enrollment centers that had established 
such lists and found that they varied and that none of the 3 included 
all of the suggested interview questions in the Trusted Traveler 
Handbook, which are designed to help establish the applicant's 
identity, admissibility, and risk level.[Footnote 33] Specifically, 
all three lists did not include suggested questions designed to help 
establish applicants' criminal history, and two of the lists did not 
include suggested questions designed to help establish applicants' 
financial solvency. CBP officials noted that while there is not a set 
list of mandatory questions CBP officers must ask during enrollment 
interviews, they should ask questions that would allow them to verify 
the person's identity, admission classification, and risk level. The 
observations of enrollment interviews and review of locally developed 
interview question lists from select enrollment centers are not 
generalizable to all enrollment centers; however, they provided 
insights and raise questions about the consistency of the interview 
process across enrollment centers. 

Moreover, our analysis of trusted traveler enrollment data from fiscal 
years 2011 through 2013 indicates that the rate at which trusted 
traveler applications were denied varied across enrollment centers, as 
shown in figure 7.[Footnote 34] Although differences in denial rates 
across enrollment centers cannot be directly attributed to differences 
in how centers conduct applicant interviews, data on denial rates can 
help provide insight into and across the operations of various 
enrollment centers. 

Figure 7: Range of Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates at 
Enrollment Centers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Approximate percentage denied: 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Overall enrollment center denial rate: 
FAST North: 5%; 
FAST South: 3%; 
Global Entry: 1%; 
NEXUS: 1%; 
SENTRI: 6%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Overall enrollment center denial rate: 
FAST North: 6%; 
FAST South: 3%; 
Global Entry: 2%; 
NEXUS: 1%; 
SENTRI: 6%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Overall enrollment center denial rate: 
FAST North: 6%; 
FAST South: 3%; 
Global Entry: 2%; 
NEXUS: 1%; 
SENTRI: 6%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: The range of trusted traveler denial rates includes enrollment 
centers that adjudicated 100 initial applications or more for that 
program in the fiscal year. The overall enrollment center denial rate 
was calculated by dividing the number of initial applications denied 
at all enrollment centers by the total number of initial applications 
adjudicated by enrollment centers. 

[End of figure] 

Our analysis of trusted traveler enrollment data shows that the denial 
rates for FAST North, for example, varied significantly in fiscal year 
2013, with 1 enrollment center denying about 16.9 percent of the 537 
applicants interviewed at the center, while another enrollment center 
denied 0.9 percent of the 235 applicants it interviewed. In some 
years, the denial rates for FAST South, Global Entry, NEXUS, and 
SENTRI applications also varied significantly. For example, 

* the FAST South application denial rate ranged from 0.4 percent of 
the 489 applications adjudicated at 1 enrollment center to 12.8 
percent of the 257 applications adjudicated at another enrollment 
center in fiscal year 2012, 

* the Global Entry application denial rate ranged from 0.1 percent of 
the 2,767 applications adjudicated at 1 enrollment center to 5.6 
percent of the 2,156 applications adjudicated at another enrollment 
center in fiscal year 2013, 

* the NEXUS application denial rate ranged from 0 percent of the 148 
applications adjudicated at 1 enrollment center to 6.1 percent of the 
343 applications adjudicated at another enrollment center in fiscal 
year 2011, and: 

* the SENTRI application denial rate ranged from 0.2 percent of the 
1,639 applications adjudicated at 1 enrollment center to 13.6 percent 
of the 6,350 applications adjudicated at another enrollment center in 
fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 35] 

Furthermore, 7 enrollment centers had the highest or lowest denial 
rates in more than 1 fiscal year. For example, from fiscal years 2011 
through 2013,1 enrollment center consistently had the highest FAST 
South denial rates, and 1 enrollment center consistently had the 
lowest FAST South denial rates. In addition, 1 enrollment center had 
the lowest NEXUS denial rates from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. 

We recognize that differences in denial rates across enrollment 
centers can be attributable to various factors. For example, according 
to CBP officials, differences in the applicant populations that go to 
certain enrollment centers or differences in the experience levels of 
the CBP officers conducting interviews may have contributed to 
differences across enrollment centers. However, given that denials are 
based at least in part on interviews conducted at enrollment centers, 
the variation in denial rates could indicate that the interview 
process may result in different outcomes across enrollment centers. 

While CBP has processes to help provide oversight of the interview 
process at enrollment centers, including supervisory reviews and a 
Self Inspection Program, CBP's GES, the trusted traveler system of 
record, does not document the questions CBP officers ask or the 
applicants' responses, hindering the level of oversight provided 
through CBP's existing processes. For example, according to CBP 
officials, the headquarters-level review helps to ensure that the 
background checks for a select number of approved applicants did not 
find potentially disqualifying information, but it does not take into 
account admissibility issues or all risk factors discussed during the 
interview, as these may not be documented.[Footnote 36] Similarly, 
since interview questions and responses are not documented, the 
supervisory review of denied applications does not provide supervisors 
with full information on the applicant or allow supervisors to help 
ensure that CBP officers are asking all relevant questions. Moreover, 
neither of these processes provides oversight over the majority of 
applications, which are approved and do not have the type of 
derogatory background investigation findings that would trigger a 
headquarters-level review. CBP's internal inspection process requires 
a review of a random sampling of applications, which could help CBP 
monitor the implementation of the interview process across enrollment 
centers and potentially review both approved and denied applications. 
However, because GES does not document the questions CBP officers ask 
or the applicants' responses to these questions, it would be difficult 
for CBP, as a part of its internal self-inspection, to determine 
whether the questions asked were sufficient to determine whether the 
applicant was low risk or whether the applicant's responses support 
the final adjudication decision. 

Standards for Internal Control in Federal Government calls for 
agencies to clearly document internal control transactions so that 
managers can examine and use the information to make decisions and 
monitor programs.[Footnote 37] CBP officials stated that they did not 
want to include a set list of questions in GES and require CBP 
officers to document responses to these questions because they want 
CBP officers to be able to cater the interview questions to the 
specific applicant. We recognize that there is value in allowing CBP 
officers to vary the questions they ask based on the applicant and 
that documenting all interview questions and responses could require 
use of more resources at enrollment centers. However, establishing a 
mechanism or mechanisms in GES so that CBP officers could efficiently 
document the kinds of questions they asked and the nature of the 
applicants' responses where appropriate, for example, by using check 
boxes to indicate which of a prepopulated set of questions and 
responses apply, could help minimize any resource impacts. 
Furthermore, such a mechanism or mechanisms could better position CBP 
to monitor the interview process through its other existing processes, 
such as the Self Inspection Program, to help ensure that interviews 
are being conducted consistently and in accordance with its policies 
at enrollment centers. 

CBP Could Better Ensure That Foreign Adjudication Procedures Are 
Documented: 

CBP has implemented bilateral arrangements with 9 countries, and DHS 
has signed bilateral arrangements with 3 additional countries that 
document the countries' intent to explore implementing joint trusted 
traveler programs.[Footnote 38] The bilateral arrangements allow 
foreign citizens from these respective countries to enroll in the 
Global Entry program and enter the United States through expedited 
lanes at aviation POEs.[Footnote 39] CBP has documented operating 
procedures for vetting or sharing information on applicant-vetting 
results for 2 of these 12 countries and CBP officials have stated that 
the agency plans to add separate appendixes on each country when 
updating its Global Entry standard operating procedures. However, CBP 
officials told us that these appendixes will provide general 
statements about operating procedures, and as CBP is in the process of 
updating the standard operating procedures, it is too early to tell 
what information will be included in the country-specific appendixes. 

The bilateral arrangements with 8 of the remaining 10 countries that 
do not have documented operational procedures state that CBP and the 
partner country plan to work together to develop and document 
operational procedures. As an example, the bilateral arrangement with 
one country that was signed by both countries in April 2011 states 
that "additional Initiative requirements and qualifications, 
procedures for communication and vetting, and other operational 
details concerning the implementation of the Initiative are expected 
to be set forth in a written joint operational program plan." However, 
according to CBP officials, documenting foreign countries' operational 
plans or procedures would be burdensome and would not add value, as 
these plans would not be legally binding. Further, officials stated 
that the language in the bilateral arrangements does not necessarily 
indicate a standard operating procedure would be documented. 

However, CBP has recognized the importance of understanding the 
foreign countries' procedures. CBP officials told us that during the 
meetings that lead up to the bilateral arrangements, DHS or CBP 
communicates the trusted traveler eligibility criteria and discusses 
the kinds of information that the other country is to review as part 
of its vetting process to help ensure that partner countries apply the 
same standards that the United States does when vetting applicants. 
Furthermore, after an arrangement is signed, CBP officials stated that 
there are numerous follow-up conversations between CBP and the foreign 
country to determine which individuals will be eligible to apply, how 
those applications will be submitted, and how a foreign country will 
communicate its vetting of applicants. CBP officials noted that 
because each country has different laws, databases, and resources, 
there are some differences in how the trusted traveler programs are 
implemented in each country. For example, CBP revets trusted travelers 
every 24 hours to help ensure their continued eligibility, while, 
according to CBP officials, other countries may choose to revet their 
citizens on an annual basis. Additionally, CBP stated that it holds 
regular meetings with partner countries to help ensure the integrity 
of the program and that operations are running appropriately. However, 
CBP has not documented the results of these discussions, and thus the 
knowledge of the other countries' operational procedures is maintained 
by those CBP and DHS officials who participated in the meetings. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 
detailed and appropriate documentation is a key component of internal 
controls and allows stakeholders to make effective decisions about 
programs or operations.[Footnote 40] While CBP officials have stated 
that conducting additional meetings with each partner country to 
jointly develop bilateral operational plans and procedures is overly 
burdensome, CBP could document the operational procedures it has 
already discussed with each partner country in its planned update of 
the Global Entry standard operating procedures, or elsewhere. Such 
operational procedures may include the databases or types of 
information the foreign country will use to vet applicants, how often 
the foreign country will revet trusted travelers to ensure continued 
eligibility, and how information on applicants' and trusted travelers' 
eligibility will be shared, for example. Without such documentation, 
there is no institutional record that those countries' procedures for 
vetting applicants help to ensure that only low-risk applicants are 
enrolled. 

CBP Moves Trusted Travelers through POEs More Quickly than Other 
Travelers, Allowing CBP to Focus Its Resources on Travelers It Knows 
Less About: 

Trusted Traveler Wait Times Are Shorter than Wait Times for Regular 
Travelers and Differ by Program and Port of Entry: 

Trusted travelers generally experience shorter average wait times for 
primary inspections than regular traffic at crossings for all four 
trusted traveler programs.[Footnote 41] Our analysis of CBP data 
indicates that passenger vehicles crossing the southern border 
generally experience the greatest benefits from the trusted traveler 
programs; however, concerns about the reliability of wait time data 
prevented us from directly comparing average wait times from crossing 
to crossing.[Footnote 42] According to CBP officials, wait times are 
generally longer along the southern border than along the northern 
border. Our analysis of CBP wait time data showed that at 11 out of 14 
crossings with SENTRI lanes, regular traveler vehicles waited at least 
15 minutes longer on average than trusted traveler vehicles in fiscal 
year 2013.[Footnote 43] At 5 of those 11 crossings, vehicles in 
regular traffic lanes waited at least 30 minutes longer on average 
than vehicles in trusted traveler lanes. The crossing with a SENTRI 
lane with the greatest difference in wait times had an estimated 
difference between the average trusted traveler wait time and the 
average regular traffic wait time of over 1 hour.[Footnote 44] Along 
the northern land border, crossings with NEXUS lanes generally had 
more similar wait times for trusted and regular travelers.[Footnote 
45] Specifically, our analysis of CBP wait time data showed that at 15 
of 18 crossings with NEXUS lanes, regular travelers waited less than 
15 minutes longer than trusted travelers on average in fiscal year 
2013.[Footnote 46] Trusted travelers also experienced somewhat shorter 
wait times in airports on average. Our analysis of CBP wait time data 
showed that regular travelers waited an estimated 10 to 27 minutes 
longer on average than trusted travelers at the 31 airports in the 
United States with Global Entry kiosks in fiscal year 2013. 

Among commercial traffic, our analysis of CBP data showed FAST 
participants generally experienced slightly shorter wait times than 
regular traffic on average. FAST participants spent less time waiting 
on average than regular commercial traffic at 12 of 15 crossings with 
FAST lanes in fiscal year 2013; however, this difference was less than 
15 minutes on average at all but one of these crossings. For the other 
3 crossings with FAST lanes, the average wait time for FAST lanes was 
between about 30 seconds and 8 minutes longer than for regular lanes. 
Some crossings with FAST lanes report longer estimated average wait 
times for FAST traffic because of the high number of program members 
and factors unique to specific crossings. For example, during our 
visit to one FAST North crossing, CBP officials told us that they had 
a pilot project in which Canada was prescreening FAST trucks, which 
was causing delays in the FAST lane. In addition, according to CBP 
officials, infrastructure constraints at certain POEs can lead to 
increased wait times for FAST members. For example, at some POEs, the 
dedicated FAST lanes are separated by barriers from regular lanes, and 
drivers must commit to either FAST lanes or regular lanes before they 
can see which set of lanes has a shorter queue. CBP officials told us 
that most of the benefits derived from being a FAST member are 
realized during the secondary inspection process, which provides FAST 
members "front of line" privileges when referred for additional 
inspection. 

Figure 8 shows our analysis of the number of crossings by program with 
different categories of wait time differences for trusted and regular 
travelers in fiscal year 2013. 

Figure 8: Number of Border Crossings with Differences in Wait Times 
for Trusted and Regular Travelers by Program, Fiscal Year 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Additional average wait times for regular travelers in minutes: 0-15; 
Fast[A]: 11; 
Global Entry: 13; 
NEXUS[B]: 14; 
SENTRI[C]: 2. 

Additional average wait times for regular travelers in minutes: 16-30; 
Fast[A]: 1; 
Global Entry: 18; 
NEXUS[B]: 2; 
SENTRI[C]: 6. 

Additional average wait times for regular travelers in minutes: 31-45; 
Fast[A]: 0; 
Global Entry: 0; 
NEXUS[B]: 0; 
SENTRI[C]: 3. 

Additional average wait times for regular travelers in minutes: More 
than 46; 
Fast[A]: 0; 
Global Entry: 0; 
NEXUS[B]: 0; 
SENTRI[C]: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[A] At 3 FAST crossings, trusted travelers waited longer on average 
than regular travelers. 

[B] One NEXUS crossing has only trusted traveler lanes, and is 
therefore not included in the figure. 

[C] One SENTRI crossing had only regular lanes in fiscal year 2013 and 
another had only trusted traveler lanes. These 2 crossings are not 
included in the figure. 

[End of figure] 

CBP manages lanes operating as dedicated lanes at land crossings with 
trusted traveler lanes in order to keep trusted traveler wait times as 
low as possible. At airports, trusted travelers undergo primary 
inspection through kiosks rather than with a CBP officer. CBP 
officials told us that they can use wait times for Global Entry kiosks 
to help them prioritize decisions as to where they should deploy 
additional Global Entry kiosks. 

According to CBP officials, CBP has a goal of keeping trusted traveler 
wait times to less than 15 minutes at crossings with SENTRI or NEXUS 
lanes, and uses active lane management to switch regular traffic lanes 
to trusted traveler lanes when wait times become too long for trusted 
travelers. Infrastructure variations at some POEs, however, limit 
CBP's ability to reduce wait times for trusted travelers because 
passenger and commercial trusted traveler vehicles may have to wait in 
regular traffic lanes before they are able to access dedicated lanes. 
For example, according to CBP officials, at one northern border 
vehicle crossing, NEXUS members are not able to enter NEXUS lanes 
until after a choke point, and if the regular traffic line is backed 
up past that choke point, NEXUS members have to wait with the regular 
traffic until they are able to access the NEXUS lanes. Commercial 
traffic faces the same types of infrastructure variations. At one 
northern vehicle crossing, FAST members have to wait with regular 
passenger traffic until they are able to access the FAST lanes. CBP 
has undertaken efforts to expand infrastructure at specific POEs in an 
effort to mitigate these concerns. For example, CBP began expanding 
the San Ysidro, California, POE, which is the busiest passenger POE in 
the nation. 

Figure 9 shows the choke point at the Detroit POE, where trusted 
traveler traffic, including NEXUS and FAST traffic, may have to wait 
with regular traffic before being allowed to access the NEXUS and FAST 
lanes. 

Figure 9: Detroit Port of Entry Choke Point at Which Trusted Traveler 
Traffic May Wait with Regular Traffic: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information] 

The Ambassador Bridge has a choke point at which all traffic, 
including trusted traveler vehicles and regular traveler vehicles, is 
grouped together when crossing the bridge to enter the United States 
through the Detroit Port of Entry. 

Trusted traveler vehicles can separate from regular traveler vehicles 
and access dedicated lanes (i.e., NEXUS lanes). In addition, once free 
from any traffic created by the choke point, commercial vehicles can 
access commercial traffic lanes, including the Free and Secure Trade 
(FAST) lanes. 

Depicted on photograph: 

All traffic: 

To commercial vehicle inspection lanes. 

NEXUS primary inspection booth. 

Regular traffic primary inspection booths. 

Commercial vehicle primary inspection booths. 

FAST traffic. 

FAST primary inspection booth. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials' 
statements and photograph. 

[End of figure] 

Trusted Travelers Are Inspected More Quickly and Commit Fewer 
Violations than Regular Travelers, Allowing CBP to Focus Its Resources 
on Other Travelers: 

Inspections of trusted travelers at the primary inspection booths are 
generally shorter than inspections of regular travelers, and according 
to the Trusted Traveler Handbook, the average primary inspection per 
passenger vehicle in dedicated lanes should not exceed 30 seconds per 
vehicle. Our analysis of CBP data showed that CBP met this goal at 12 
of 14 crossings with SENTRI lanes and 12 of 18 crossings with NEXUS 
lanes in fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 47] In regular traffic lanes, the 
average inspection time was longer. Our analysis of CBP data showed 
that primary inspections took about twice as long or longer on average 
for regular travelers than for trusted travelers at 11 of 14 crossings 
with SENTRI lanes and 11 of 18 crossings with NEXUS lanes in fiscal 
year 2013.[Footnote 48] On average, CBP officers spent up to five 
times as long inspecting regular travelers at crossings with SENTRI 
lanes and up to three times as long inspecting regular travelers at 
crossings with NEXUS lanes. These inspection times ranged from 48 
seconds to 97 seconds at crossings with SENTRI lanes and 23 seconds to 
64 seconds at crossings with NEXUS lanes in that same year, according 
to CBP data. Trusted travelers are prescreened against multiple 
databases as part of their enrollment in the program; therefore, 
according to CBP officials, the agency can inspect them more 
efficiently at crossings, which allows CBP officers to focus more 
resources on travelers they know less about. For example, at the 
busiest crossing with SENTRI lanes, the average inspection time was 25 
seconds for trusted travelers and 68 seconds for regular travelers in 
fiscal year 2013. At that crossing, a single CBP officer could inspect 
up to 53 regular vehicles in 1 hour; however, that same CBP officer 
could inspect up to 144 SENTRI vehicles in the same amount of time. 
According to CBP officials, prioritizing resources is one of the goals 
of the trusted traveler program. According to CBP data, the four 
trusted traveler programs saved over 270,000 CBP officer hours at 
primary inspection booths at POEs in fiscal year 2013. According to 
CBP data, this savings in CBP officer time equates to approximately 
$15.5 million in avoided costs. 

In addition to determining that trusted travelers take less time to 
inspect than regular travelers, our analysis of CBP data indicates 
that trusted travelers commit fewer border violations, such as 
smuggling, than regular travelers. Our analysis of CBP data shows that 
the majority of violations result from CBP seizing illegal goods such 
as drugs, excess currency, or undeclared merchandise; however, some 
violations result from nonseizure arrests such as if a person with a 
warrant for a non-border-related crime attempts to enter the country. 
CBP identifies violations after sending travelers from primary 
inspection to secondary inspection, either randomly or based on the 
suspicion of the CBP officer at the primary inspection booth. CBP uses 
algorithms to determine which travelers are randomly sent for 
secondary inspection, as well as changing criteria that are used to 
randomly select travelers for secondary inspections. For example, CBP 
can target vehicles or travelers based on specific categories or 
criteria, such as age, that are then relayed to CBP officers at the 
primary inspection booths with little to no notice. CBP officers can 
also use their professional discretion to refer any travelers to 
secondary inspection that they may deem to be potential risks. Both 
trusted and regular travelers are subject to secondary inspection 
based on suspicion and random referral, and CBP calculated the rate at 
which travelers commit violations by calculating the percentage of 
people who are sent to secondary inspection that are found to have 
committed violations. Our analysis of CBP data indicates that trusted 
travelers commit violations at a lower rate than general travelers, 
and while these rates are not directly comparable because of 
differences in the secondary referral processes for trusted and 
regular travelers, the variation in the rates is notable. 
Specifically, our analysis of CBP data showed that of those travelers 
sent for secondary inspection, approximately 1 out of every 140 
regular travelers was found to have committed a violation; whereas 
less than 1 out of every 3,000 trusted travelers was found to have 
committed a violation in fiscal year 2013. 

Trusted travelers at land POEs had been randomly referred to secondary 
inspection at a higher rate than regular travelers, according to CBP 
officials; however, CBP took steps in 2013 to reduce the likelihood of 
trusted travelers at land POEs being referred to secondary inspection 
more often than regular travelers. The random referral rate of trusted 
travelers is based on a set of rules specific to trusted travelers 
that targets both individuals and vehicles. For regular travelers, CBP 
uses a program called Compliance Examination (COMPEX), which randomly 
selects regular travelers entering the country for more detailed 
inspections. CBP officers at land POEs we visited told us that their 
POEs used both the trusted traveler random referral system and COMPEX 
in lanes dedicated for SENTRI or NEXUS. CBP officials told us that 
they have adjusted this and now use COMPEX only in the regular 
traveler lanes. The removal of COMPEX in trusted traveler lanes at 
land POEs should reduce the rate at which trusted travelers entering 
the country through a dedicated trusted traveler lane are referred to 
secondary inspection. However, CBP officers at two POEs we visited 
along the southern border (San Ysidro and Otay Mesa) told us that most 
trusted travelers who are sent to secondary inspection spend less time 
getting through the port than a regular traveler using a regular lane 
who is not referred to secondary inspection. 

When travelers, including trusted travelers, are caught committing 
violations, CBP has a goal to prosecute offenders to the full extent 
of the law. For all instances of participants caught smuggling in 
dedicated lanes, CBP disseminates a press release, unless doing so 
would compromise an ongoing investigation. For example, on January 22, 
2014, CBP issued a press release regarding a trusted traveler who had 
failed to truthfully declare approximately $6,000 worth of 
merchandise, and was assessed a $6,000 penalty. According to the 
Trusted Traveler Handbook, CBP is to inform applicants of the 
consequences of a border violation by a trusted traveler during his or 
her enrollment. CBP officials noted that the potential loss of the 
benefit is one of the most effective deterrents to such activity. CBP 
identifies trusted traveler border violations during the daily vetting 
process and uses this information to determine whether a trusted 
traveler should be allowed to remain in the program or whether the 
traveler should have the benefit revoked. 

Conclusions: 

Trusted traveler programs are a key component of CBP's risk-based 
approach to facilitate travel and trade coming through U.S. POEs while 
keeping out terrorists and their weapons and enforcing U.S. laws and 
regulations, including those that prevent the illegal entry of persons 
and contraband. According to CBP, its trusted traveler programs help 
it achieve this dual mission by allowing it to focus resources at the 
POEs on passengers and cargo that have not been identified as low 
risk. CBP has recognized the importance of processing trusted traveler 
applications in a reasonable time frame and has taken some steps to 
help improve the efficiency of the enrollment process. CBP could 
better ensure the timeliness of its enrollment process by establishing 
an updated performance target for vetting applications and a process 
to modify the target as needed based on factors such as application 
volume and resources, assessing the feasibility of practices to 
expedite the interview process and implementing feasible practices, 
and developing a mechanism to track interview appointment availability 
data over time. Further, the success of the trusted traveler programs 
is predicated on enrolling low-risk travelers, allowing CBP to focus 
its resources on travelers it knows less about. CBP has established 
processes to interview applicants; however, establishing mechanisms 
for CBP officers to efficiently document the types of questions they 
asked and the nature of applicants' responses, when appropriate, in 
GES could allow CBP to better monitor the interview process through 
its other existing processes, such as the Self Inspection Program. 
This could help ensure that the interview process is being conducted 
consistently and in accordance with CBP policies across enrollment 
centers. Furthermore, without documentation on all partner countries' 
vetting procedures--such as the databases or types of information the 
foreign country will use to vet applicants, how often the foreign 
country will revet trusted travelers, and how information on 
applicants' and trusted travelers' eligibility will be shared--there 
is no institutional record that those countries' procedures for 
vetting applicants help to ensure that only low-risk applicants are 
enrolled. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help assess and improve the timeliness of the trusted traveler 
application adjudication process, we recommend that the Commissioner 
of CBP take the following three actions: 

* establish an updated performance target for completing application 
vetting and a process to modify that target, as needed, based on 
factors such as changes in the number of trusted traveler program 
applications and available resources; 

* assess the feasibility of practices to expedite the interview 
process, which could include assessing the potential trade-offs, 
costs, and benefits associated with any proposed practices, such as 
those currently proposed or implemented at specific enrollment 
centers, and implement those practices CBP determines to be feasible; 
and: 

* develop a mechanism to track enrollment interview appointment 
availability data over time. 

To better ensure that the trusted traveler eligibility criteria and 
applicant adjudication processes are consistently implemented in 
accordance with CBP policy at all enrollment centers and by partner 
countries, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the 
following two actions: 

* establish a mechanism or mechanisms in GES to allow CBP officers to 
efficiently document the types of interview questions asked and the 
nature of applicant responses, when appropriate, and then use this 
information to monitor the implementation of the interview process, 
and: 

* document information CBP has obtained on the operational procedures, 
such as those used to vet and share information on applicants, of 
foreign countries that have signed bilateral arrangements with the 
United States to participate in trusted traveler programs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS 
provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced 
in full in appendix VI, and technical comments, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. DHS concurred with four of the five recommendations in 
the report and described actions underway or planned to address them. 
DHS did not concur with one recommendation in the report. 

With regard to the first recommendation, that CBP establish an updated 
performance target for completing application vetting, DHS concurred 
and stated that CBP OFO will work with the trusted traveler Vetting 
Center to establish an updated performance target, identify factors 
that may impact the target, and identify the process to modify the 
target based on these factors. DHS stated that its initial assessment 
is to be completed by August 2014 and provided a final completion date 
of October 2014. These planned actions, if fully implemented, should 
address the intent of the recommendation. 

With regard to the second recommendation, that CBP assess the 
feasibility of practices to expedite the interview process and 
implement those practices CBP determines to be feasible, DHS concurred 
and stated that CBP OFO plans to conduct site visits at 5 to 10 
enrollment centers to identify best practices, test and evaluate those 
practices in other enrollment centers, and then implement relevant 
practices at other enrollment centers, as appropriate. DHS provided an 
estimated completion date of November 2014. These planned actions, if 
fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. 

With regard to the third recommendation, that CBP develop a mechanism 
to track enrollment interview appointment data availability over time, 
DHS concurred and stated that by August 2014, CBP OFO will determine 
the modifications that would need to be made to GOES to implement this 
recommendation. DHS stated that subsequent milestones for 
implementation and completion dates will be finalized, as appropriate, 
with a final estimated completion date of December 2014. If fully 
implemented, these actions should address the intent of the 
recommendation. 

With regard to the fourth recommendation, that CBP establish a 
mechanism in GES to allow CBP officers to efficiently document the 
types of interview questions asked and the nature of applicant 
responses, when appropriate, and use this information to monitor the 
implementation of the interview process, DHS did not concur. DHS 
stated that the interview process for trusted traveler programs is 
equivalent to a border crossing inspection. During the interview, as 
well as an inspection, DHS stated that CBP officers must make a 
determination of an applicant's identity, nationality, and 
admissibility. DHS stated that the burden of proof is on the applicant 
to establish that he or she is not inadmissible to the United States, 
and the criterion at the end of the interaction is that the applicant 
has overcome the burden of proof and the CBP officer is satisfied that 
the applicant is admissible. Further, DHS stated that there are no 
scripted questions that must be asked and that when a CBP officer 
approves an applicant, it is implicit that the officer was satisfied 
as to the identity, nationality, and admissibility of the applicant. 
DHS also stated that creating a measure for this process would force a 
line of questioning and additional steps that may not be relevant for 
most applicants and the additional step to "capture" this information 
would add to the time required to complete the interview. DHS noted 
that questions and answers relating to the risk and eligibility of a 
trusted traveler, beyond those in the inspection process, can already 
be documented in the comments section of GES. 

We continue to believe that CBP should establish a mechanism in GES to 
allow CBP officers to efficiently document the types of interview 
questions asked and the nature of applicant responses, when 
appropriate, and use this information to monitor the implementation of 
the interview process. The intent of the trusted traveler programs is 
to provide expedited travel for preapproved, low risk travelers 
through dedicated lanes and kiosks. Through the application vetting 
and interview process, CBP officers are to ensure that the applicants 
are low-risk, in addition to making a determination about an 
applicant's identity, nationality, and admissibility. As noted in the 
report, we identified potential inconsistencies in enrollment centers' 
interview processes, including instances where CBP officers did not 
follow procedures laid out in the Trusted Traveler Handbook. For 
example, we observed interviews at 3 of the 12 enrollment centers we 
visited, and identified deficiencies with the interviews at 2 of the 3 
enrollment centers. Specifically, we observed one interview where a 
CBP officer did not ask any of the interview questions suggested in 
the Trusted Traveler Handbook; rather, the applicant was interviewed 
separately by a CBSA officer who was not responsible for establishing 
an applicant's admissibility to the United States. We also found that 
3 enrollment centers had established lists of questions that were used 
by CBP officers at those centers during the interview process and that 
the three interview question lists were different and that none of the 
three included all of the suggested interview questions in the Trusted 
Traveler Handbook, which are designed to help establish the 
applicant's identity, admissibility, and risk level. In addition, we 
found significant variation in denial rates across enrollment centers. 
As noted in our report, while differences in denial rates across 
enrollment centers can be attributable to various factors, given that 
denials are based at least in part on interviews conducted at 
enrollment centers, the variation in denial rates could indicate that 
the interview process may result in different outcomes across 
enrollment centers. 

Further, this recommendation is not intended to imply that CBP should 
develop a set of scripted questions for trusted traveler program 
interviews or add more time to the interview process. Rather, as 
stated in the report, we recognize that there is value in allowing CBP 
officers to vary the questions they ask based on the applicant and 
that documenting all interview questions and responses could require 
use of more resources at enrollment centers. However, as we stated in 
the report, we believe that establishing a mechanism or mechanisms in 
GES so that CBP officers could efficiently document the kinds of 
questions they asked and the nature of the applicants' responses where 
appropriate, could help minimize any resource impacts. CBP officers 
are not required to use the comments sections in GES to consistently 
record the types of questions asked and the nature of applicant 
responses in those comments. Further, allowing comments to be entered 
into GES does not place a control over the interview process to ensure 
that CBP officers are asking questions pertaining to an applicant's 
identity, nationality, and admissibility, and to ensure the 
applicant's low-risk status. CBP could accomplish this by, for 
example, using check boxes to indicate which of a prepopulated set of 
questions and responses apply, as we noted in the report. Moreover, a 
mechanism or mechanisms to efficiently document the kinds of questions 
asked and the nature of responses could better position CBP to monitor 
the interview process through its other existing processes, such as 
the Self Inspection Program, to help ensure that interviews are being 
conducted consistently and in accordance with its policies at 
enrollment centers. For example, CBP's Self Inspection Program 
requires POEs with enrollment centers to report whether a CBP officer 
"asked the mandatory questions" during the interview process. However, 
as noted in the report, because GES does not document the questions 
CBP officers ask or the applicants' responses to these questions, it 
would be difficult for CBP, as a part of its internal self-inspection, 
to determine whether the questions asked were sufficient to determine 
whether the applicant was low risk or whether the applicant's 
responses support the final adjudication decision. When appropriate, 
documenting the types of questions--for example, pertaining to the 
applicant's identity, nationality, admissibility, and risk factors--
that were asked during the interview and the nature of applicant 
responses--for example, confirmation that the identity, nationality, 
admissibility, and low-risk status were verified by the CBP officer--
could help provide CBP with assurances that CBP officers are following 
the procedures and guidelines laid out in the Trusted Traveler 
Handbook. Thus, we continue to believe that this recommendation is 
valid and CBP should take action to fully implement it. 

With regard to the fifth recommendation, that CBP document information 
CBP has obtained on the operational procedures, such as those used to 
vet and share information on applicants, of foreign countries that 
have signed bilateral agreements with the United States to participate 
in trusted traveler programs, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP OFO 
has drafted an update to the Global Entry Standard Operating Procedure 
that is currently under review and is expected to address the 
operational procedures of foreign countries that have signed bilateral 
arrangements with the United States. DHS stated that the estimated 
completion date is August 2014. This planned action should address the 
intent of the recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and interested congressional committees and members. The 
report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 
512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Candice Miller: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bill Keating: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Ombudsman Reconsideration Process: 

Individuals that are denied enrollment in a trusted traveler program 
or revoked from a program have the option to request reconsideration 
of the decision through the trusted traveler Ombudsman office. The 
Ombudsman may consider additional information and can uphold a denial 
or revocation or reverse the decision. From fiscal year 2009 through 
2013, the Ombudsman reviewed 24,363 cases and overturned denials or 
revocations in approximately 43 percent of the cases. As shown in 
figure 10, the number of cases the Ombudsman reviewed nearly tripled 
from 2,596 in fiscal year 2009 to 7,449 in fiscal year 2013. 

Figure 10: Reconsideration Cases Reviewed by the Ombudsman, Fiscal 
Years 2009-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Cases reviewed: 2,596. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Cases reviewed: 3,305. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Cases reviewed: 4,583. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Cases reviewed: 6,430. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Cases reviewed: 7,449. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[End of figure] 

The Ombudsman told us that the significant increase in the number of 
reconsideration requests and cumbersome manual processes contribute to 
delays in completing reconsideration cases. At the time of our visit 
to the Ombudsman in November 2013, applicants that requested 
reconsideration of a denial or revocation from a trusted traveler 
program had to wait about 5 months to learn the outcome of the 
Ombudsman review. The Ombudsman's office has limited staff who must 
review every case using manual processes that, according to the 
Ombudsman, add an additional 1 to 5 days to the review time for each 
case. For example, at the time of our visit in November 2013, when 
reviewing a case, the Ombudsman could not document decisions to 
overturn a denial or revocation directly in the Global Enrollment 
System (GES)--the trusted travel program's system of record. Instead 
the Ombudsman sent daily lists of overturned revocations and denials 
to two different U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters 
units for them to unlock these applicants' GES records so that the 
Ombudsman could later document the outcome of the review and 
conditionally approve or reinstate the person in GES. 

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector 
General recognized the inefficiencies with the Ombudsman review 
process and in February 2014 recommended that CBP automate the process 
and provide adequate staffing to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness.[Footnote 49] CBP concurred with the Inspector General's 
recommendations and stated that the agency plans to determine the 
scope and timeline for automating the Ombudsman review process by July 
2014. CBP officials told us that they have modified GES to allow the 
Ombudsman to directly reinstate those who have been revoked within the 
past year and are considering different options to allow the Ombudsman 
to document reviews of denials directly in the system. In addition, in 
March 2014, CBP officials stated they plan to add more staff to 
address the increase in the requests for reconsideration. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Ports of Entry with Dedicated Trusted Traveler Lanes and 
Kiosks: 

CBP has dedicated trusted traveler lanes for passenger and commercial 
traffic at ports of entry along the northern and southern land borders 
and kiosks for trusted travelers at select international airports in 
the United States. Table 2 lists ports of entry and specific crossings 
for the three trusted traveler programs with dedicated lanes at land 
borders--Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection 
(SENTRI), NEXUS, and Free and Secure Trade (FAST). 

Table 2: Ports of Entry (POE) and Specific Crossings for Trusted 
Traveler Programs at Land Borders: 

Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)--
passenger vehicles and pedestrians along the southern land border: 

Port of entry: Brownsville, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Veterans International. 

Port of entry: Calexico, California; 
Crossings: 
* Calexico East; 
* Calexico West. 

Port of entry: Douglas, Arizona; 
Crossings: 
* Douglas. 

Port of entry: El Paso, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Stanton Street; 
* Ysleta. 

Port of entry: Hidalgo, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Anzalduas; 
* Hidalgo; 
* Pharr. 

Port of entry: Laredo, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Lincoln-Juarez. 

Port of entry: Nogales, Arizona; 
Crossings: 
* Deconcini. 

Port of entry: Otay Mesa, California; 
Crossings: 
* Otay Mesa. 

Port of entry: San Luis, Arizona; 
Crossings: 
* San Luis. 

Port of entry: San Ysidro, California; 
Crossings: 
* San Ysidro. 

NEXUS--passenger vehicles along the northern land border, and at some 
Canadian air and seaports for pre-clearance into the United States: 

Port of entry: Alexandria Bay, New York; 
Crossings: 
* Thousand Island Bridge. 

Port of entry: Blaine, Washington; 
Crossings: 
* Pacific Highway; 
* Peace Arch; 
* Point Roberts. 

Port of entry: Buffalo-Niagara Falls, New York; 
Crossings: 
* Lewiston Bridge; 
* Peace Bridge; 
* Rainbow Bridge; 
* Whirlpool Bridge. 

Port of entry: Calais, Maine; 
Crossings: 
* International Avenue. 

Port of entry: Champlain-Rouses Point, New York; 
Crossings: 
* Champlain. 

Port of entry: Detroit, Michigan; 
Crossings: 
* Ambassador Bridge; 
* Windsor Tunnel. 

Port of entry: Highgate Springs, Vermont; 
Crossings: 
* Highgate Springs. 

Port of entry: Houlton, Maine; 
Crossings: 
* Houlton. 

Port of entry: Pembina, North Dakota; 
Crossings: 
* Pembina. 

Port of entry: Port Huron, Michigan; 
Crossings: 
* Blue Water Bridge. 

Port of entry: Sault Saint Marie, Michigan; 
Crossings: 
* International Bridge. 

Port of entry: Sumas, Washington; 
Crossings: 
* Sumas. 

Free and Secure Trade (FAST) South--commercial vehicles along the 
southern border: 

Port of entry: Brownsville, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Los Tomates; 
* Los Indios. 

Port of entry: Calexico East, California; 
Crossings: 
* Calexico East. 

Port of entry: El Paso, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Bota; 
* Ysleta. 

Port of entry: Hidalgo, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Pharr. 

Port of entry: Laredo, Texas; 
Crossings: 
* Laredo Bridge #4; 
* Columbia. 

Port of entry: Nogales, Arizona; 
Crossings: 
* Nogales. 

Port of entry: Otay Mesa, California; 
Crossings: 
* Otay Mesa. 

Port of entry: Santa Teresa, New Mexico; 
Crossings: 
* Santa Teresa. 

FAST North--commercial vehicles along the northern land border: 

Port of entry: Blaine, Washington; 
Crossings: 
* Blaine. 

Port of entry: Champlain-Rouses Point, New York; 
Crossings: 
* Champlain. 

Port of entry: Detroit, Michigan; 
Crossings: 
* Ambassador Bridge. 

Port of entry: Port Huron, Michigan; 
Crossings: 
* Blue Water Bridge. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[End of table] 

Table 3 lists airports within the United States with Global Entry 
kiosks. 

Table 3: U.S. Airports with Global Entry Kiosks: 

Airport: 

1. Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport. 

2. Boston-Logan International Airport. 

3. Charlotte-Douglas International Airport. 

4. Chicago O'Hare International Airport. 

5. Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport. 

6. Denver International Airport. 

7. Detroit Metropolitan Airport. 

8. Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport. 

9. George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston. 

10. Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. 

11. Honolulu International Airport. 

12. John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York. 

13. John Wayne Airport, Santa Ana. 

14. Los Angeles International Airport. 

15. McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas. 

16. Miami International Airport. 

17. Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport. 

18. Newark Liberty International Airport. 

19. Orlando International Airport. 

20. Orlando-Sanford International Airport. 

21. Philadelphia International Airport. 

22. Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. 

23. Portland International Airport,. 

24. Raleigh-Durham International Airport. 

25. Salt Lake City International Airport. 

26. San Antonio International Airport. 

27. San Diego International Airport. 

28. San Francisco International Airport. 

29. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport-SeaTac. 

30. Tampa International Airport. 

31. Washington-Dulles International Airport. 

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates and 
Revocations: 

The rates at which applicants were denied membership varied by the 
trusted traveler program and the type of application--whether it was 
an initial application, a renewal application, or a 
reapplication.[Footnote 50] As shown in figure 11, Global Entry and 
NEXUS had the lowest denial rates for initial applications (4.4 
percent and 4.6 percent, respectively) and renewal applications (0.4 
percent and 1.0 percent, respectively) from fiscal years 2009 through 
2013. For all programs, the denial rates for renewal applications were 
lowest and the denial rates for reapplications were highest, with the 
initial application rate being somewhere in between. CBP officials 
noted that renewal application denial rates are generally low because 
these applicants have already been approved to participate in a 
trusted traveler program and have also been subject to ongoing 24-hour 
vetting. In contrast, CBP officials said that the denial rates for 
reapplications are higher because these applicants have previously 
applied for and been denied enrollment in a trusted traveler program 
and the reason their previous applications were denied may still 
disqualify them. 

Figure 11: Trusted Traveler Application Denial Rates for Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Initial applications: Percentage denied; 
FAST North: 23.9%; 
FAST South: 10.8%; 
Global Entry: 4.4%; 
NEXUS: 4.6%; 
SENTRI: 13.1%. 
	
Renewal applications: Percentage denied; 
FAST North: 2.8%; 
FAST South: 4.2%; 
Global Entry: 0.4%; 
NEXUS: 1%; 
SENTRI: 4%. 

Reapplications: Percentage denied; 
FAST North: 43.5%; 
FAST South: 42.8%; 
Global Entry: 49.6%; 
NEXUS: 22.7%; 
SENTRI: 44.3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: Denial rates were calculated by dividing the number of denied 
applications by the total number of applications adjudicated from 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013. CBP officials noted that in fiscal 
year 2009 and part of fiscal year 2010, applications that were 
abandoned (i.e., the applicant did not schedule an interview or did 
not show up for his or her scheduled interview) were counted as 
denials. In fiscal years 2011 through 2013, abandoned applications 
were not included in the number of denied applications as a result of 
changes to the Global Enrollment System that allowed CBP to better 
track abandoned applications. 

[End of figure] 

There have been 52,489 trusted traveler revocations as of January 23, 
2014, and the number of revocations varied by program, as shown in 
figure 12. In particular, there have been more members revoked from 
SENTRI than from any other program, because, CBP officials explained, 
the southern border is a higher-risk environment than the northern 
border. Moreover, CBP officials noted that the number of revocations 
is relative to the total number of memberships over the lifetime of 
each program. For example, there are more SENTRI and NEXUS revocations 
than there are FAST North or FAST South revocations, as SENTRI and 
NEXUS account for a larger proportion of trusted traveler memberships 
and have been operating for just as long as or longer than either FAST 
North or FAST South. Further, while Global Entry accounted for the 
largest proportion of trusted traveler memberships in January 2014, 
the number of revocations is relatively low; CBP officials noted it 
was the most recently implemented trusted traveler program and that 
the number of revocations has increased as membership has grown. 

Figure 12: Trusted Traveler Revocations as of January 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Revocations: 

FAST North: 7,793; 
FAST South: 1,183; 
Global Entry: 2,909; 
NEXUS: 13,236; 
SENTRI: 27,368. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Number and Percentage of Trusted Traveler Entries at 
Ports of Entry That Have Trusted Traveler Lanes, by Program, Fiscal 
Years 2009 through 2013: 

Tables 4 through 7 show the number of trusted traveler entries at all 
crossings with dedicated lanes or kiosks, and the percentage of all 
entries at those crossings that were trusted travelers, by program, 
for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The Global Entry table includes 
only fiscal years 2012 and 2013 because Global Entry was a pilot 
program until 2012. 

Table 4: Number and Percentage of Vehicle Entries through Crossings 
with Dedicated Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid 
Inspection (SENTRI) Lanes That Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013A: 

Crossing: Brownsville, TX-Los Tomates (Veterans International); 
2009: 
Number: 326,963; 
Percent: 27; 
2010: 
Number: 474,050; 
Percent: 33; 
2011: 
Number: 457,017; 
Percent: 35; 
2012: 
Number: 405,357; 
Percent: 31; 
2013: 
Number: 389,959; 
Percent: 32. 

Crossing: Calexico, CA-Calexico West Port of Entry; 
2009: 
Number: 641,121; 
Percent: 18; 
2010: 
Number: 1,139,149; 
Percent: 27; 
2011: 
Number: 1,171,867; 
Percent: 29; 
2012: 
Number: 1,350,604; 
Percent: 33; 
2013: 
Number: 1,467,916; 
Percent: 36. 

Crossing: Calexico, CA-Calexico East Port of Entry; 
2009: 
Number: N/A[B]; 
Percent: N//A; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: 236,988; 
Percent: 9; 
2012: 
Number: 434,413; 
Percent: 15; 
2013: 
Number: 496,054; 
Percent: 16. 

Crossing: Douglas, AZ-Douglas; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2012: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2013: 
Number: 1,995; 
Percent: less than 1. 

Crossing: El Paso, TX-Ysleta; 
2009: 
Number: 388,937; 
Percent: 18; 
2010: 
Number: 675,955; 
Percent: 26; 
2011: 
Number: 650,589; 
Percent: 27; 
2012: 
Number: 668,660; 
Percent: 26; 
2013: 
Number: 717,120; 
Percent: 25. 

Crossing: El Paso, TX-Stanton Street; 
2009: 
Number: 835,536; 
Percent: 88; 
2010: 
Number: 1,196,014; 
Percent: 98; 
2011: 
Percent: 1,070,032; 
Percent: 95; 
2012: 
Percent: 1,095,821; 
Percent: 98; 
2013: 
Percent: 1,098,444; 
Percent: 98. 

Crossing: Hidalgo, TX-Anzalduas; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: 20,315; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: 40,189; 
Percent: 4; 
2012: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2013: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A. 

Crossing: Hidalgo, TX-International Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 196,504; 
Percent: 6; 
2010: 
Number: 320,132; 
Percent: 10; 
2011: 
Number: 322,671; 
Percent: 12; 
2012: 
Number: 365,589; 
Percent: 15; 
2013: 
Number: 407,996; 
Percent: 18. 

Crossing: Hidalgo, TX-Pharr; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: 5,302; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2011: 
Number: 47,936; 
Percent: 4; 
2012: 
Number: 45,216; 
Percent: 4; 
2013: 
Number: 38,593; 
Percent: 3. 

Crossing: Laredo, TX-Lincoln Juarez Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 587,052; 
Percent: 20; 
2010: 
Number: 1,089,813; 
Percent: 31; 
2011: 
Number: 1,084,706; 
Percent: 33; 
2012: 
Number: 1,076,292; 
Percent: 32; 
2013: 
Number: 1,096,582; 
Percent: 31. 

Crossing: Nogales, AZ-Nogales; 
2009: 
Number: 399,281; 
Percent: 23; 
2010: 
Number: 532,775; 
Percent: 29; 
2011: 
Number: 542,358; 
Percent: 30; 
2012: 
Number: 597,625; 
Percent: 32; 
2013: 
Number: 614,254; 
Percent: 30. 

Crossing: Otay Mesa, CA-Otay Mesa; 
2009: 
Number: 601,542; 
Percent: 17; 
2010: 
Number: 805,640; 
Percent: 20; 
2011: 
Number: 910,023; 
Percent: 22; 
2012: 
Number: 1,042,229; 
Percent: 20; 
2013: 
Number: 1,256,539; 
Percent: 21. 

Crossing: San Luis-San Luis; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: 190,357; 
Percent: 9; 
2012: 
Number: 428,982; 
Percent: 18; 
2013: 
Number: 487,646; 
Percent: 18. 

Crossing: San Ysidro, CA-San Ysidro; 
2009: 
Number: 1,951,525; 
Percent: 18; 
2010: 
Number: 3,214,311; 
Percent: 24; 
2011: 
Number: 3,643,708; 
Percent: 29; 
2012: 
Number: 4,079,803; 
Percent: 35; 
2013: 
Number: 4,502,544; 
Percent: 40. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[A] Table entries represent the total number of vehicles entering the 
United States through dedicated SENTRI lanes, and do not account for 
SENTRI members entering through regular lanes, or multiple SENTRI 
members traveling in the same vehicle. 

[B] Entries listed as N/A indicate that the listed crossing did not 
have dedicated SENTRI lanes in that year. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: Number and Percentage of Vehicle Entries through Crossings 
with Dedicated NEXUS Lanes That Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 
2009 through 2013A: 

Crossing: Alexandria Bay, NY-Thousand Island Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: N/A[B]; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: 1,191; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2011: 
Number: 1,959; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: 9,849; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 8,635; 
Percent: 1. 

Crossing: Blaine, WA-Pacific Highway; 
2009: 
Number: 149,898; 
Percent: 15; 
2010: 
Number: 224,558; 
Percent: 17; 
2011: 
Number: 309,858; 
Percent: 20; 
2012: 
Number: 443,620; 
Percent: 25; 
2013: 
Number: 580,835; 
Percent: 32. 

Crossing: Blaine, WA-Peace Arch Crossing; 
2009: 
Number: 370,095; 
Percent: 34; 
2010: 
Number: 380,170; 
Percent: 22; 
2011: 
Number: 464,820; 
Percent: 20; 
2012: 
Number: 861,680; 
Percent: 31; 
2013: 
Number: 1,002,724; 
Percent: 34. 

Crossing: Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY-Peace Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 281,950; 
Percent: 14; 
2010: 
Number: 350,965; 
Percent: 15; 
2011: 
Number: 377,801; 
Percent: 16; 
2012: 
Number: 402,363; 
Percent: 17; 
2013: 
Number: 415,057; 
Percent: 18. 

Crossing: Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY-Queenstown Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 2; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: less than 1; 
Number: 6,126; 
2013: 
Percent: less than 1. 

Crossing: Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY-Rainbow Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 55,183; 
Percent: 5; 
2010: 
Number: 71,329; 
Percent: 5; 
2011: 
Number: 68,051; 
Percent: 4; 
2012: 
Number: 70,399; 
Percent: 4; 
2013: 
Number: 37,559; 
Percent: 2.7. 

Crossing: Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY-Whirlpool Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 128,429; 
Percent: 97; 
2010: 
Number: 189,396; 
Percent: 99; 
2011: 
Number: 224,479; 
Percent: 93; 
2012: 
Number: 287,670; 
Percent: 98; 
2013: 
Number: 367,190; 
Percent: 98. 

Crossing: Calais, ME-International Avenue; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2012: 
Number: 516; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 1,625; 
Percent: 1. 

Crossing: Champlain-Rouses Point-Champlain; 
2009: 
Number: 19,818; 
Percent: 4; 
2010: 
Number: 39,402; 
Percent: 6; 
2011: 
Number: 45,621; 
Percent: 6; 
2012: 
Number: 54,321; 
Percent: 6; 
2013: 
Number: 60,323; 
Percent: 7. 

Crossing: Detroit, MI-Ambassador Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 275,385; 
Percent: 15; 
2010: 
Number: 397,550; 
Percent: 17; 
2011: 
Number: 387,911; 
Percent: 17; 
2012: 
Number: 439,326; 
Percent: 20; 
2013: 
Number: 444,678; 
Percent: 20. 

Crossing: Detroit, MI-Windsor Tunnel; 
2009: 
Number: 158,778; 
Percent: 10; 
2010: 
Number: 244,613; 
Percent: 15; 
2011: 
Number: 248,166; 
Percent: 14; 
2012: 
Number: 271,773; 
Percent: 14; 
2013: 
Number: 299,347; 
Percent: 15. 

Crossing: Highgate Springs, VT-Highgate Springs; 
2009: 
Number: 326; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2010: 
Number: 1,394; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2011: 
Number: 852; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: 2,928; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 3,775; 
Percent: 1. 

Crossing: Houlton, ME-Houlton; 
2009: 
Number: 1,088; 
Percent: 1; 
2010: 
Number: 1,593; 
Percent: 1; 
2011: 
Number: 3,253; 
Percent: 1; 
2012: 
Number: 3,632; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 4,729; 
Percent: 2. 

Crossing: Pembina, ND-Pembina; 
2009: 
Number: 440; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2010: 
Number: 488; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2011: 
Number: 217; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: 219; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 280; 
Percent: 0. 

Crossing: Point Roberts, WA-Point Roberts; 
2009: 
Number: 104,950; 
Percent: 19; 
2010: 
Number: 191,296; 
Percent: 24; 
2011: 
Number: 180,609; 
Percent: 18; 
2012: 
Number: 352,088; 
Percent: 32; 
2013: 
Number: 385,363; 
Percent: 34. 

Crossing: Port Huron, MI-Blue Water Bridge; 
2009: Number: 123,315; 
2010: Percent: 10; 
2010: 
Number: 277,656; 
Percent: 17; 
2011: 
Number: 346,012; 
Percent: 19; 
2012: 
Number: 339,816; 
Percent: 18; 
2013: 
Number: 338,091; 
Percent: 17. 

Crossing: Sault Saint Marie, MI-International Bridge; 
2009: 
Number: 980; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2010: 
Number: 1,990; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2011: 
Number: 2,419; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: 2,982; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 2,681; 
Percent: less than 1. 

Crossing: Sumas, WA-Sumas; 
2009: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2010: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2011: 
Number: N/A; 
Percent: N/A; 
2012: 
Number: 15,172; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 32,069; 
Percent: 3. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

[A] Table entries represent the total number of vehicles entering the 
United States through dedicated NEXUS lanes, and do not account for 
NEXUS members entering through regular lanes, or multiple NEXUS 
members traveling in the same vehicle. 

[B] Entries listed as N/A indicate that the listed crossing did not 
have dedicated NEXUS lanes in that year. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Number and Percentage of Passenger Entries through Airports 
for Global Entry Kiosks, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2013: 

Airport: Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport; 
2012: Number: 349; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 2,642; 
Percent: 1. 

Airport: Boston-Logan International Airport; 
2012: Number: 27,371; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 50,579; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Charlotte-Douglas International Airport; 
2012: Number: 5,183; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 19,586; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Chicago O'Hare International Airport; 
2012: Number: 94,287; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 165,720; 
Percent: 4. 

Airport: Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport; 
2012: Number: 66,739; 
Percent: 3; 
2013: 
Number: 116,250; 
Percent: 4. 

Airport: Denver International Airport; 
2012: Number: 5,004; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 21,851; 
Percent: 4. 

Airport: Detroit Metropolitan Airport; 
2012: Number: 30,527; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 46,915; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport; 
2012: Number: 9,997; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 20,334; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston; 
2012: Number: 128,270; 
Percent: 3; 
2013: 
Number: 201,163; 
Percent: 5. 

Airport: Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport; 
2012: Number: 81,494; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 127,063; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Honolulu International Airport; 
2012: Number: 2,930; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 6,324; 
Percent: less than 1. 

Airport: John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York; 
2012: Number: 140,908; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 235,360; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: John Wayne Airport, Santa Ana; 
2012: Number: 189; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 1,224; 
Percent: 1. 

Airport: Los Angeles International Airport; 
2012: Number: 78,300; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 135,198; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas; 
2012: Number: 4,547; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 15,432; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Miami International Airport; 
2012: Number: 116,944; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 206,542; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport; 
2012: Number: 7,501; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 26,596; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR); 
2012: Number: 119,448; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 198,283; 
Percent: 4. 

Airport: Orlando International Airport; 
2012: Number: 5,718; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 11,867; 
Percent: 1. 

Airport: Orlando-Sanford International Airport; 
2012: Number: 51; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 83; 
Percent: less than 1. 

Airport: Philadelphia International Airport; 
2012: Number: 15,115; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 32,561; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport; 
2012: Number: 4,125; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 21,805; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Portland International Airport; 
2012: Number: 988; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 3,299; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Raleigh-Durham International Airport; 
2012: Number: 612; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 2,975; 
Percent: 5. 

Airport: Salt Lake City International Airport; 
2012: Number: 691; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 3,650; 
Percent: 4. 

Airport: San Antonio International Airport; 
2012: Number: 216; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 5,110; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: San Diego International Airport; 
2012: Number: 1,073; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 6,841; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: San Francisco International Airport; 
2012: Number: 51,127; 
Percent: 1; 
2013: 
Number: 102,521; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport-SeaTac; 
2012: Number: 18,560; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 36,530; 
Percent: 3. 

Airport: Tampa International Airport; 
2012: Number: 400; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 3,231; 
Percent: 2. 

Airport: Washington-Dulles International Airport; 
2012: Number: 71,216; 
Percent: 2; 
2013: 
Number: 117,544; 
Percent: 4. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: Prior to fiscal year 2012, Global Entry was a pilot program. The 
Global Entry program was expanded to all airports in fiscal year 2012. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: Number and Percentage of Commercial Vehicle Entries through 
Ports of Entry with Dedicated Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Lanes That 
Were Trusted Travelers, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

FAST South: 

Port of entry: Brownsville; 
2009: 
Number: 5,567; 
Percent: 3; 
2010: 
Number: 7,756; 
Percent: 4; 
2011: 
Number: 12,167; 
Percent: 6; 
2012: 
Number: 11,183; 
Percent: 5; 
2013: 
Number: 11,657; 
Percent: 6. 

Port of entry: Calexico; 
2009: 
Number: 20,098; 
Percent: 7; 
2010: 
Number: 44,170; 
Percent: 13; 
2011: 
Number: 52,192; 
Percent: 17; 
2012: 
Number: 61,507; 
Percent: 19; 
2013: 
Number: 75,443; 
Percent: 23. 

Port of entry: El Paso; 
2009: 
Number: 51,736; 
Percent: 7; 
2010: 
Number: 11,493; 
Percent: 2; 
2011: 
Number: 152,729; 
Percent: 21; 
2012: 
Number: 159,457; 
Percent: 22; 
2013: 
Number: 159,325; 
Percent: 22. 

Port of entry: Hidalgo; 
2009: 
Number: 17,393; 
Percent: 4; 
2010: 
Number: 37,895; 
Percent: 8; 
2011: 
Number: 41,264; 
Percent: 9; 
2012: 
Number: 44,142; 
Percent: 9; 
2013: 
Number: 46,114; 
Percent: 9. 

Port of entry: Laredo; 
2009: 
Number: 34,748; 
Percent: 2; 
2010: 
Number: 79,290; 
Percent: 5; 
2011: 
Number: 142,354; 
Percent: 8; 
2012: 
Number: 160,656; 
Percent: 9; 
2013: 
Number: 181,790; 
Percent: 10. 

Port of entry: Nogales; 
2009: 
Number: 12,927; 
Percent: 5; 
2010: 
Number: 23,920; 
Percent: 7; 
2011: 
Number: 34,249; 
Percent: 12; 
2012: 
Number: 41,445; 
Percent: 14; 
2013: 
Number: 42,207; 
Percent: 14. 

Port of entry: Otay Mesa; 
2009: 
Number: 67,573; 
Percent: 9; 
2010: 
Number: 126,138; 
Percent: 15; 
2011: 
Number: 135,377; 
Percent: 18; 
2012: 
Number: 149,094; 
Percent: 19; 
2013: 
Number: 164,553; 
Percent: 21. 

Port of entry: Santa Teresa; 
2009: 
Number: 357; 
Percent: 1; 
2010: 
Number: 444; 
Percent: 1; 
2011: 
Number: 73; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2012: 
Number: 118; 
Percent: less than 1; 
2013: 
Number: 290; 
Percent: less than 1. 

FAST North: 

Port of entry: Blaine; 
2009: 
Number: 20,518; 
Percent: 6; 
2010: 
Number: 22,261; 
Percent: 7; 
2011: 
Number: 25,781; 
Percent: 7; 
2012: 
Number: 26,294; 
Percent: 8; 
2013: 
Number: 77,931; 
Percent: 8. 

Port of entry: Champlain-Rouses Point; 
2009: 
Number: 74,223; 
Percent: 20; 
2010: 
Number: 97,466; 
Percent: 25; 
2011: 
Number: 105,817; 
Percent: 37; 
2012: 
Number: 99,205; 
Percent: 35; 
2013: 
Number: 104,082; 
Percent: 37. 

Port of entry: Detroit; 
2009: 
Number: 230,798; 
Percent: 16; 
2010: 
Number: 288,632; 
Percent: 17; 
2011: 
Number: 280,235; 
Percent: 19; 
2012: 
Number: 307,406; 
Percent: 20; 
2013: 
Number: 307,824; 
Percent: 20. 

Port of entry: Buffalo-Niagara Falls; 
2009: 
Number: 118,856; 
Percent: 12; 
2010: 
Number: 130,876; 
Percent: 13; 
2011: 
Number: 130,791; 
Percent: 14; 
2012: 
Number: 135,711; 
Percent: 14; 
2013: 
Number: 146,583; 
Percent: 16. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note: Table entries represent the total number of commercial vehicles 
entering the United States through dedicated FAST lanes, and do not 
account for FAST members entering through regular lanes, or multiple 
FAST members traveling in the same vehicle. 

[End of table] 

[End of section 

Appendix V: CBP Efforts to Address: 

Wait Time Data Limitations: 

CBP faces limitations using vehicle wait time data for public 
reporting of the wait times themselves and for CBP management 
decisions across border crossings. In July 2013, we reported on CBP's 
processes for calculating wait times for commercial vehicles at 
southwest border land POEs. Specifically, in that report we found that 
wait times for commercial vehicles along the southern border were 
unreliable because CBP officers inconsistently implemented one 
methodology used to calculate wait times, another methodology--driver 
surveys--was inherently unreliable, and CBP officials used different 
methodologies to calculate wait times across land border 
crossings.[Footnote 51] We recommended that CBP assess the feasibility 
of replacing current methodologies with automated methods, as well as 
three other recommendations. CBP concurred with our recommendations. 
According to CBP officials, CBP uses these same methods to measure 
wait times for vehicle crossings at all land border POEs for passenger 
and commercial vehicles, including those with trusted traveler lanes. 
Therefore, these same limitations apply at all land POEs. In July 
2013, we recommended that CBP officials assess the feasibility of 
replacing current manual wait time calculation methodologies with 
automated methods.[Footnote 52] According to CBP officials, reliable 
passenger wait time data are important at both tactical and strategic 
levels, and they are working with the private sector to develop 
different automated wait time technologies. CBP implemented an 
automated wait time technology using cellular-based technology at the 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls crossing along the northern border in 2012, and 
plans to expand the use of the technology. CBP uses the technology by 
providing select vehicles at the end of the queue with devices that 
send a wireless signal that are then read by receivers as the cars 
pass certain checkpoints. In February 2008, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation Federal Highway Administration initiated pilot projects 
to develop automated wait time data collection methods at select 
southwest border crossings that rely on radio-frequency identification 
readers to read unique signals from passing vehicles at several points 
along the border-crossing route. As of March 2013, pilot projects to 
automate wait times were under way or completed at eight locations 
along the southern border.[Footnote 53] The results of these pilots 
could help CBP determine what, if any, method to employ to automate 
the collection of wait time data. Wait times for Global Entry are 
already automated, as each passenger receives a time stamp when his or 
her flight lands and when clearing primary inspection. 

[End of section 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

May 23, 2014: 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-483, "Trusted Travelers: Programs Provide 
Benefits, but Enrollment Processes Could Be Strengthened" 

Dear Ms. Gambler: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft 
report referenced above. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) appreciates the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) 
work in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. 

We appreciate GAO's acknowledgment of Customs and Border Protection's 
(CBP) actions to improve the efficiency of the Trusted Traveler 
enrollment process, including increasingly successful efforts to 
process trusted traveler passenger vehicles in less than 30 seconds.
Specifically in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the average inspection time was 
25 seconds for trusted travelers at the busiest crossing equipped with 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection lanes. In FY 
2013 alone, the four trusted traveler programs have saved CBP more
than 270,000 CBP Officer (CBPO) hours at primary inspection booths at 
Ports of Entry, equaling approximately $15.5 million in avoided costs. 

The draft report contained five recommendations, four with which the 
Department concurs (Recommendations 1,2,3, and 5) and one with which 
it non-concurs (Recommendation 4). Specifically, GAO recommended that 
the Commissioner of CBP: 

Recommendation 1: Establish an updated performance target for 
completing application vetting and a process to modify that target, as 
needed, based on factors such as changes in the number of trusted 
traveler program applications and available resources. 

Response: Concur. CBPs Office of Field Operations (OFO) will work with 
the Vetting Center management (under the Boston Field Office area of 
responsibility) to gauge current performance targets, establish an 
updated performance target, identify factors that may impact the 
target, and identify the process to modify based on these factors in 
the future. The initial assessment to be completed within three months 
(August 31 2014) in order for CBP to gauge the current performance 
targets with development of an additional framework to follow by 
October 31, 2014. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): October 31,2014. 

Recommendation 2: Assess the feasibility of practices to expedite the 
interview process, which could include assessing the potential trade-
offs, costs, and benefits associated with any proposed practices, such 
as those currently proposed or implemented at specific enrollment 
centers, and implement those practices CBP determines to be feasible. 

Response: Concur. CBPs OFO will conduct field visits to Enrollment 
Centers (ECs) across the programs/regions to review the current work 
flow and observe current practices. These site visits will provide a 
basis for identifying best practices that can be implemented and other 
areas that can be streamlined for more efficient and effective 
interview processes. A best practice for one environment may not 
necessarily translate to a best practice in a different environment.
These would need to be tested and evaluated in the various EC 
locations to achieve the maximum impact. Site visits to be conducted 
at a minimum of five to ten locations during the next six months, 
based upon funding and resource constraints. Best practices will then be
identified and implemented, as appropriate. ECD: November 30, 2014. 

Recommendation 3: Develop a mechanism to track enrollment interview 
appointment availability data over time. 

Response: Concur. An enrollment interview tracking mechanism would 
require programing modifications to the current Global Online 
Enrollment System (GOES) Scheduling System. CBP's OFO will hold an 
initial scoping meeting with the CBP's Office of Information and
Technology (OIT) to determine the degree of modification required to 
implement such a mechanism by August 30, 2014. Once the initial 
meeting has been held, subsequent milestones for implementation and 
completion dates will be finalized, as appropriate. ECD: December 31, 
2014. 

Recommendation 4: Establish a mechanism or mechanisms in GES [Global 
Enrollment System] to allow CBP Officers to efficiently document the 
types of interview questions asked and the nature of applicant 
responses, when appropriate, and then use this information to monitor
the implementation of the interview process. 

Response: Non-concur. CBP's interview process for Trusted Traveler 
Programs is, by regulation, the substantial equivalent to a border 
crossing inspection. During the interview/inspection, the CBPOs must 
make a determination of the applicant's identity, alienage 
(nationality) and admissibility. Act 235 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Section 235.1 also provides that the burden of proof is upon the 
applicant for admission and that the applicant must establish that he 
or she is not inadmissible under any provision of Act 291 of the INA. 
There are no set or scripted questions that must be asked. The 
criterion is that at the end of the interaction, the applicant has 
overcome their burden of proof and the CBPO is satisfied that the 
applicant is admissible. In the case of a U.S. citizen, presentation 
of a U.S. passport by the applicant could establish, to the 
satisfaction of the CBPO, an applicant's identity, alienage 
(nationality) and admissibility. When a CBPO approves an applicant, it 
is implicit that the officer was satisfied as to the identity, 
alienage and admissibility of the applicant, or else that person would 
not have been approved in the program. 

Creating a measure for this process would force a line of questioning 
and additional steps that may not be relevant for most applicants. 
Additionally, each additional step to "capture" this information will 
only add to time required to complete the interview which does not 
align with our efforts to implement Recommendation 2 of this report. 
Questions and answers relating to risk and eligibility as a trusted 
traveler, beyond those in the inspection process, can already be
documented in the comments section. Accordingly, CBP requests that GAO 
consider this recommendation resolved and closed. 

Recommendation 5: Document information CBP has obtained on the 
operational procedures, such as those used to vet and share 
information on applicants, of foreign countries that have signed 
bilateral arrangements with the United States to participate in 
trusted traveler programs. 

Response: Concur. CBP's OFO has drafted an update to the Global Entry 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP, currently in the review 
process, addresses the operational procedures of foreign countries 
that have signed bilateral arrangements with the U.S. ECD: August 30, 
2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on 
this draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester (Assistant 
Director), Frances Cook, Michele Fejfar, Allyson Goldstein, Eric 
Hauswirth, Robert Herring, Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, Mitch Karpman, 
Heather May, Linda Miller, Octavia Parks, Meghan Squires, Vanessa 
Taylor, and Jeff Tessin made significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Ports of entry are the facilities that provide for the controlled 
entry into or departure from the United States for persons and 
materials. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated 
location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where Department 
of Homeland Security officers or employees are assigned to clear 
passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws. 
A single land port of entry may be composed of one or more crossings. 
For example, the Port of Laredo, Texas, headed by a port director, 
oversees operations at four separate border crossings, one rail 
crossing, and one airport. 

[2] The United States has bilateral arrangements with other countries 
that provide the framework for those countries' participation in 
Global Entry. The United States also has an arrangement with Canada 
regarding management of the NEXUS and FAST programs. 

[3] See Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management©, Third Edition, (Newton Square, Pennsylvania: 2013); 
Office of Management and Budget, Performance Measurement Challenges 
and Strategies (Washington, D.C.: June 2003); and GAO, Internal 
Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[4] SENTRI applicants must pay a $25 application fee when they apply; 
the total application fee is $122.25, which also includes fees for 
processing fingerprints and to support the system of dedicated SENTRI 
lanes. NEXUS and FAST applicants must pay a $50 application fee. 
Global Entry applicants must pay a $100 application fee. 

[5] TECS is designed to be a comprehensive enforcement and 
communications system that enables CBP and other agencies to create or 
access lookout data when (1) processing persons and vehicles entering 
the United States; (2) communicating with other computer systems, such 
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information 
Center; and (3) storing case data and other enforcement reports. 

[6] GES is used by CBP to collect and maintain records on individuals 
who voluntarily provide personally identifiable information for the 
purpose of enrolling in a trusted traveler program that makes them 
eligible for expedited processing at designated U.S. POEs. 

[7] Trusted traveler applicants can schedule interviews at select 
enrollment centers; however, some enrollment centers interview 
applicants only for specific programs. For example, FAST enrollment 
centers typically do not conduct interviews for the other trusted 
traveler programs. In addition, SENTRI enrollment centers require a 
vehicle to be inspected and registered; therefore other trusted 
traveler enrollment centers cannot finalize the interview process 
because they do not conduct vehicle inspections. Enrollment centers 
are generally located at POEs that offer dedicated lanes for trusted 
travelers. 

[8] The trusted traveler Ombudsman reviews cases where an individual 
has requested reconsideration of a CBP decision after his or her 
application was denied or membership was revoked. 

[9] CBP officials noted that they encountered a higher percentage of 
FAST applicants with criminal convictions and made the decision to 
modify the standards for FAST applicants to ensure that multiple 
misdemeanor convictions do not automatically result in the denial of 
an application. 

[10] C-TPAT is a voluntary program in which CBP officials work with 
private companies, referred to as partners, to review the security of 
their international supply chains and improve the security of their 
shipments to the United States. In return, C-TPAT partners receive 
various incentives to facilitate the flow of legitimate cargo, such as 
reduced scrutiny of their shipments. In October 2006, the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 established a statutory 
framework for the C-TPAT program, codified its existing membership 
processes, and added new components--such as time frames for 
certifying, validating, and revalidating members' security practices. 
6 U.S.C. §§ 961-973. 

[11] Most trusted traveler enrollment centers are located at a POE; 
however, CBP also has an enrollment center in Washington, D.C., and 
has also used mobile enrollment centers. 

[12] WHTI implements a statutory mandate to require all travelers to 
present a passport or other document that denotes identity and 
citizenship when entering the United States. See Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209, 
118. Stat. 3638, 3823, as amended. The goal of WHTI is to facilitate 
entry for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign visitors while 
strengthening U.S. border security by providing standardized 
documentation that enables CBP to quickly and reliably identify a 
traveler. WHTI-approved documents include valid U.S. passports, 
passport cards, trusted traveler program cards, and others. 

[13] Primary inspection booths are where individuals present 
themselves for inspection to CBP officers for a preliminary screening 
procedure used to process those individuals who can be readily 
identified as admissible. Persons whose admissibility cannot be 
readily determined and persons selected as part of a random selection 
process are subjected to a more detailed review called a secondary 
inspection. 

[14] Trusted traveler members include both U.S. citizens and citizens 
from other countries. See figure 4 for additional information on the 
citizenship of trusted travelers. 

[15] We are currently reviewing TSA's Pre-Check program and plan to 
issue a report on the subject later this year. 

[16] The number of crossings for SENTRI, NEXUS, and FAST indicates the 
number of vehicles entering through those programs, regardless of the 
number of passengers in each vehicle, and does not include pedestrian 
entries. The number of crossings for Global Entry includes the number 
of individual people entering the United States through the program. 
For all four programs, individual travelers and vehicles are counted 
each time they entered the country, and therefore an individual 
traveler or vehicle could account for more than one crossing. 

[17] Prior to fiscal year 2012, Global Entry was a pilot program. 

[18] One crossing along the southern border had only SENTRI lanes. 

[19] One crossing along the northern border had only NEXUS lanes. 

[20] Fiscal year 2013 data are from October 2012 through June 2013. 

[21] Office of Management and Budget, Performance Measurement 
Challenges and Strategies (Washington, D.C.: June 2003). 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[23] The number of applications includes first-time applications, 
renewal applications, and "reapplications"--applications from 
applicants who have applied for the program one or more times 
previously. In addition to its responsibility to vet these types of 
applications, the Vetting Center conducts ongoing vetting of current 
members and may also have to revet members when they update their 
personal information. 

[24] CBP officials noted that applicants who have been conditionally 
approved by the Vetting Center but have not yet completed the 
enrollment interview are subject to 24-hour vetting. 

[25] CBP officials stated that they observed many interviews and came 
to the conclusion that the interview process could be completed in a 
15-minute time frame. 

[26] In February 2014, the DHS Office of the Inspector General 
recommended that CBP pursue eliminating the vehicle inspection during 
the initial SENTRI enrollment interview. See DHS Office of Inspector 
General, Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's Secure Electronic Network for 
Travelers Rapid Inspection Program, OIG-14-32 (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2014). In March 2014, CBP officials told us they were 
considering options to revise the SENTRI vehicle examination 
requirement in response to this recommendation. 

[27] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management©, Third Edition. 

[28] The daily report from March 19, 2013, lists 68 enrollment 
centers, but the data indicate that 3 of the enrollment centers were 
not scheduling interviews, so we omitted these from the total number 
of enrollment centers. Additional enrollment centers opened over the 
time period we reviewed for this report--fiscal year 2009 through 
January 2014--so the total number of enrollment centers will vary by 
date. 

[29] The daily report from January 23, 2014, lists 83 enrollment 
centers, but the data indicate that 4 of the enrollment centers were 
not scheduling interviews, so we omitted these from the total number 
of enrollment centers. Additional enrollment centers opened over the 
time period we reviewed for this report--fiscal year 2009 through 
January 2014--so the total number of enrollment centers will vary by 
date. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[31] CBP's Self Inspection Program covers operational requirements 
other than those of the trusted traveler programs. 

[32] A CBP daily report from January 23, 2014, lists a total of 83 
enrollment centers, but the data indicate that 4 of the enrollment 
centers were not scheduling interviews. 

[33] The other 9 enrollment centers we visited did not have locally 
developed trusted traveler interview question lists. 

[34] We analyzed the denial rates at those enrollment centers that 
adjudicated 100 initial applications or more for a particular program 
in that fiscal year to facilitate comparison, since percentages for 
data from relatively small populations can change greatly with minor 
changes in the data. Our analysis covers fiscal years 2011 through 
2013 because CBP officials noted that in fiscal year 2009 and part of 
fiscal year 2010, applications that were abandoned (i.e., the 
applicant did not schedule an interview or did not show up for the 
scheduled interview) were counted as denials. 

[35] A statistical analysis we conducted found that these differences 
were significant, that is, there was less than a 0.001 percent chance 
that each of these differences was equal to zero. Specifically, we 
estimated t-statistics for the difference between each pair of denial 
rates, assuming unequal variances, and then calculated the associated 
two-tailed p-value. We limited our statistical analysis to the largest 
denial rate range for each program among enrollment centers with at 
least 100 applications. 

[36] CBP officials noted that most applicants are U.S. citizens and 
thus there would not be any admissibility concerns for these 
applicants. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[38] The nine countries with operational joint trusted traveler 
programs with the United States as of March 2014 are Canada, Germany, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Panama, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Kingdom. DHS has signed joint statements with 
Australia, Israel, and New Zealand to explore implementing joint 
trusted traveler programs in the future. The bilateral arrangements 
are nonbinding and may be discontinued by either country, according to 
CBP. 

[39] Canadian citizens may enroll in NEXUS and use the Global Entry 
kiosks when entering the United States through aviation POEs. 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[41] CBP weights its calculations for average wait times at land 
borders using vehicle volumes in order to account for differences in 
traffic flow at different times of day and on different days, 
according to CBP officials. 

[42] We have previously reported that CBP wait time data are 
unreliable because CBP officers inconsistently implemented an approved 
data collection methodology, and the methodologies used vary by 
crossing. GAO, U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait 
Time Data and Measure Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-603] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 24, 2013). For this reason, we determined that we could not 
reliably compare specific wait times across crossings. At each 
individual crossing, however, CBP uses the same methodology to 
estimate average wait times for trusted and regular travelers. We are 
therefore reporting estimated differences in the average wait times 
for trusted and regular travelers at individual crossings. For more 
information about the reliability of CBP's wait time data, see 
appendix V. 

[43] At one of the other 3 crossings with SENTRI lanes, regular 
travelers waited less than 15 minutes longer than trusted travelers on 
average. Another converted its SENTRI lanes to regular lanes in fiscal 
year 2012, and the third had only SENTRI lanes in fiscal year 2013. 

[44] Pedestrian crossers of the northern and southern land borders are 
eligible for NEXUS and SENTRI, but as the majority of users of these 
programs are drivers and vehicle passengers, we are limiting this 
analysis to vehicle traffic across the borders. 

[45] The differences in wait times are based on the reported average 
wait times for all regular travelers and for trusted travelers from 
the point at which they are able to enter dedicated lanes. According 
to CBP officials, at some POEs, particularly along the northern 
border, infrastructure constraints such as bridges cause trusted 
travelers to wait with regular travelers until they are able to reach 
dedicated lanes. 

[46] At 2 of the other northern border crossings with NEXUS lanes, 
regular travelers waited an estimated 16 minutes longer than regular 
travelers on average. The third had only NEXUS lanes. 

[47] One of the other crossings with a SENTRI lane converted its 
SENTRI lane to a regular lane in fiscal year 2012 and therefore did 
not have SENTRI inspections in fiscal year 2013. For the other, which 
first opened its trusted traveler lanes in 2013, the average 
inspection time was 47 seconds. Inspection times at the other 6 
crossings with NEXUS lanes ranged from 31 seconds to 66 seconds on 
average in fiscal year 2013. 

[48] CBP defines inspection time as the time a traveler spends with a 
CBP officer. Because Global Entry primary screening is conducted 
through kiosks, CBP does not calculate an average inspection time for 
Global Entry primary screenings. At the 3 other crossings with SENTRI 
lanes, 2 had either only trusted or only regular traveler lanes, and 
at the other, the average inspection time was nearly the same for 
trusted and regular travelers. At the other 7 crossings with NEXUS 
lanes, 5 had slightly longer average inspection times for regular 
travelers, which ranged from 9 to 16 seconds longer than the average 
inspection times for trusted travelers, 1 had a longer inspection time 
for trusted travelers, and the last had only NEXUS lanes and therefore 
did not report inspection times for regular traffic. 

[49] DHS Office of Inspector General, Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program, OIG-
14-32 (Washington, D.C.: February 2014). 

[50] A reapplication is the application of someone who has applied for 
a trusted traveler program one or more times previously and has been 
denied. 

[51] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-603]. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-603]. 

[53] The completed pilot project was at Otay Mesa (Otay Mesa, 
California,) and the ongoing projects were at Pharr (Pharr, Texas), 
Bridge of the Americas (El Paso, Texas), Ysleta (El Paso, Texas), 
World Trade Bridge (Laredo, Texas), Columbia Solidarity Bridge 
(Laredo, Texas), Veterans (Brownsville, Texas), and Mariposa (Nogales, 
Arizona). 

[End of section] 

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