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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

September 2013: 

Nuclear Power: 

Analysis of Regional Differences and Improved Access to Information 
Could Strengthen NRC Oversight: 

GAO-13-743: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-743, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2011 disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
demonstrated that unexpected nuclear accidents with extreme 
consequences can occur and, thus, heightened concerns about NRC’s 
ability to oversee the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power 
reactors. NRC oversees safety through multiple processes, such as 
physically inspecting reactors and also responding to signs of 
declining performance (i.e., findings) or violations of its 
requirements. 

GAO was asked to review NRC’s oversight of the U.S. nuclear power 
industry. This report examines (1) how NRC implements its processes 
for overseeing the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) 
the extent to which NRC consistently identifies and resolves findings 
through these processes; and (3) NRC’s methods for developing lessons 
learned to improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in 
doing so. GAO reviewed NRC policies and guidance; visited five nuclear 
power plants located in multiple NRC regions; analyzed NRC data on 
findings, violations, licensee performance, and inspection hours; 
interviewed NRC officials and industry representatives; and observed 
demonstrations of NRC’s database search tools. 

What GAO Found: 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relies on its staff’s 
professional judgment in implementing its processes for overseeing the 
safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. In implementing this 
oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and responsibilities to 
resident inspectors assigned to each plant, regional officials at one 
of four regional offices responsible for most oversight activities, 
headquarters officials, and the nuclear power industry. NRC also 
builds into its processes incentives for plant managers to identify 
concerns about reactor safety, report those concerns to NRC, and take 
prompt actions to correct them. NRC’s processes for identifying and 
assessing findings and violations are based on prescribed agency 
procedures and include several points where NRC staff must exercise 
their professional judgment, such as determining whether issues of 
concern identified during physical inspections constitute findings or 
violations and the risk significance of any findings or the severity 
of any violations, among other things. 

NRC is aware of differences across regional offices in identifying and 
resolving findings that result from physical inspections. GAO’s 
analysis of NRC’s data indicated that the number of escalated findings 
had fewer differences across regions than nonescalated findings, which 
are lower-risk findings and less severe violations. According to NRC 
officials, several factors, such as the hours spent on inspections, 
may explain the differences in nonescalated findings. However, GAO 
found that the regional office with the fewest reactors and the fewest 
inspection hours had the most nonescalated findings. NRC officials and 
industry representatives have raised concerns that the differences may 
also be due to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve 
findings. NRC has taken some steps to examine the consistency of its 
oversight. For example, in 2009, the four regional offices implemented 
an initiative to explore how the regional offices identify and assess 
inspection findings. However, NRC has not conducted a comprehensive 
analysis of the causes of the differences in the number of 
nonescalated findings across regions. Under federal standards for 
internal control, managers are to compare actual performance with 
planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze 
significant differences. Without such an analysis, NRC does not know 
whether its regional offices are applying regulations and guidance 
consistently. 

NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons 
learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide 
programs, annual and biennial assessments, and special initiatives. 
Informal methods include reaching out to peers and technical experts 
across the agency and accessing various agency databases. Although NRC 
guidance directs inspectors to use information in agency databases on 
past experiences to plan and conduct inspection activities, inspectors 
face challenges accessing this information, which may limit their 
ability to use it. For example, several NRC inspectors reported 
contacting other inspectors informally because NRC’s database search 
tools contain limited instructions and do not ensure thorough results. 
Without better search tools, inspectors may overly rely on information 
available through informal channels. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that NRC analyze the causes of 
differences in identifying and resolving findings across regional 
offices and address these differences, and that it improve its 
database search tools. NRC agreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-743]. For more 
information, contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

NRC Relies on Staff's Professional Judgment in Implementing Its 
Processes for Overseeing the Safety of Commercial Nuclear Reactors: 

Differences Exist across NRC Regions in Identifying and Resolving 
Findings, and NRC Has Taken Some Steps to Address Them: 

NRC Uses Numerous Methods to Develop Lessons Learned for Improving 
Oversight, but Challenges Remain in Accessing This Information: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Summary Information about Operating Nuclear Power 
Reactors in the United States: 

Appendix III: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Performance 
Indicators: 

Appendix IV: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Inspection Procedures: 

Appendix V: Examples of NRC Findings and Violations: 

Appendix VI: NRC Nonescalated Findings at Operating Nuclear Power 
Plants in the United States: 

Appendix VII: Summary of NRC Performance Assessments for Nuclear Power 
Reactors Operating from 2001 through 2012: 

Appendix VIII: Substantive Cross-cutting Issues Identified by NRC at 
Operating Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States: 

Appendix IX: NRC Escalated Findings at Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
in the United States: 

Appendix X: NRC Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations: 

Appendix XI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Strategic Areas and Cornerstones of NRC's Oversight: 

Table 2: NRC Categories of Performance Indicators: 

Table 3: NRC Categories of Risk Significance for Inspection Findings: 

Table 4: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix: 

Table 5: Nonescalated Findings per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-
2012: 

Table 6: Nonescalated Findings and Inspection Hours per NRC Region, 
Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Table 7: Nonescalated Findings and Amount of Time under Increased 
Oversight (per NRC's Action Matrix), Calendar Years 2001-2012: 

Table 8: Amount of Time Reactors per NRC Region Have Been in 
Commercial Operation: 

Table 9: Number of Reactors per NRC Region Associated with Licensee 
Fleets of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: 

Table 10: Number of Findings Assigned at Least One Cross-cutting 
Aspect per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Table 11: Types of Cross-cutting Aspects Assigned to Findings per NRC 
Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Table 12: Number of Nuclear Power Plants Assigned Substantive Cross-
cutting Issues by NRC Region, Calendar Years 2001-2012: 

Table 13: Escalated Findings per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Table 14: Summary Information about Operating Commercial Nuclear Power 
Reactors: 

Table 15: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Baseline Inspection 
Procedures: 

Table 16: NRC Supplemental Inspection Procedures: 

Table 17: NRC Reactive Inspection Procedures: 

Table 18: Select Examples of NRC Findings Illustrating Different Risk 
Significance Levels: 

Table 19: Select Examples of NRC Violations Illustrating Different 
Severity Levels: 

Table 20: NRC Nonescalated Findings (Green Inspection Findings and 
Severity Level IV Violations) per Operating Commercial Nuclear Power 
Plant, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Table 21: Highest Level of Oversight Applied by NRC to Operating 
Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors for One or More Quarters of Each 
Calendar Year, 2001-2012: 

Table 22: Substantive Cross-cutting Issues Identified by NRC at 
Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors for One or More Quarters 
of Each Calendar Year, 2001-2012: 

Table 23: NRC Escalated Findings (Greater-than-Green Inspection 
Findings and Severity Level I, II, and III Violations) per Operating 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plant, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United 
States: 

Figure 2: NRC's Processes for Identifying and Assessing Findings and 
Violations at Nuclear Power Reactors: 

Figure 3: Nonescalated Findings by NRC Region and by Year, Calendar 
Years 2000-2012: 

Abbreviations: 

ADAMS: Agencywide Documents Access and Management System: 

ALARA: as low as reasonably achievable: 

IG: Office of the Inspector General: 

INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations: 

NFPA: National Fire Protection Association: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

ROE: Reactor Operating Experience: 

ROP: Reactor Oversight Process: 

SERP: Significance and Enforcement Review Panel: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 27, 2013: 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Robert Menendez: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bernard Sanders: 
United States Senate: 

In March 2011, an earthquake off the Pacific coast of Japan triggered 
a tsunami that caused significant accidents at three reactors in the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex, demonstrating that low-
probability, high-consequence nuclear accidents can and do occur. 
[Footnote 1] According to the Japanese parliament's formal 
investigation, the damage to the Fukushima reactors could have been 
avoided and resulted, in part, from a failure of regulatory oversight 
in Japan. This event heightened concerns about the safety of 
commercial nuclear power plants worldwide and the ability of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)--the independent federal agency 
responsible for licensing and regulating U.S. civilian nuclear 
activities--to oversee the safe operation of commercial nuclear power 
reactors in the United States.[Footnote 2] In response to these 
concerns, NRC convened a Fukushima Near-Term Task Force, which in a 
July 2011 report concluded that a similar accident is unlikely to 
occur in the United States and identified many opportunities for 
improving NRC's oversight.[Footnote 3] 

NRC's mission is, in part, to ensure adequate protection of public 
health and safety from accidents involving commercial nuclear power 
reactors. In fiscal year 2012, the licensing and regulating of 
commercial reactors comprised over 75 percent--or approximately $800 
million--of NRC's budget, of which the vast majority (87 percent) is 
collected in the form of fees from industry. One of NRC's stated goals 
is to ensure that its oversight of reactor safety is objective, 
predictable, and understandable, and according to NRC's strategic 
plan, a key strategy in achieving its mission is to conduct this 
oversight openly to inform the public and maintain confidence in 
reactor safety. However, NRC's Office of the Inspector General (IG) 
reported in 2010, 2011, and 2012, that one of the most serious 
management and performance challenges facing NRC is the ability to 
effectively carry out its oversight responsibilities while responding 
to emerging demands associated with licensing and regulating new 
reactors.[Footnote 4] 

NRC's oversight will soon likely take on even greater importance as 
many commercial reactors in the United States are reaching or have 
reached the end of their initial 40-year operating period.[Footnote 5] 
Nuclear power's contribution to the nation's supply of electricity--
about 20 percent in 2012--will depend, in large part, on the continued 
operation of the nation's 100 operating commercial reactors. Most of 
these reactors have had their licenses renewed to operate for another 
20 years.[Footnote 6] However, as we recently reported,[Footnote 7] 
NRC's license renewal process primarily considers issues related to 
the negative effects of aging on reactors and their components. Other 
ongoing safety matters are not explicitly covered in the license 
renewal process because NRC considers its ongoing oversight processes 
as adequate to ensure that reactors are operated safely and will 
continue to be in the future. 

We and others have reported on NRC's oversight of reactor safety. In 
September 2006, we reported that NRC had taken several steps to 
improve its oversight of nuclear reactors but had been slow to act on 
needed improvements, in particular, in improving the agency's ability 
to identify and address early indications of declining safety 
performance.[Footnote 8] In 2008, NRC's IG found that NRC's regional 
offices were not consistently implementing the agency's enforcement 
program.[Footnote 9] Additionally, the National Academy of Sciences is 
conducting a study and preparing a report to NRC and Congress on 
lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving the 
safety and security of U.S. nuclear power plants. According to the 
National Academy of Sciences, this report is expected to be issued 
publicly by the summer of 2014. 

In this context, you asked us to review NRC's oversight of the U.S. 
commercial nuclear power industry. This report: (1) describes how NRC 
implements its processes for overseeing the safety of commercial 
nuclear power reactors; (2) evaluates the extent to which NRC 
consistently identifies and resolves findings through these processes; 
and (3) describes NRC's methods for developing lessons learned to 
improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, 
regulations, and agency guidance covering NRC's processes for 
overseeing reactor safety. In addition, we reviewed previous GAO and 
NRC IG reports that identified safety-related challenges or made 
recommendations to improve NRC oversight. We also reviewed NRC's 
efforts to update its oversight processes. We interviewed NRC 
headquarters officials, regional officials, and inspectors. We also 
visited a nonprobability sample of five selected nuclear power plants 
and conducted interviews with the NRC inspectors and plant managers 
and operators at the plants.[Footnote 10] To select the five plants we 
visited--Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in Maryland, Byron Station 
in Illinois, Palisades Nuclear Plant in Michigan, Cooper Nuclear 
Station in Nebraska, and Wolf Creek Generating Station in Kansas--we 
used multiple criteria, including whether a plant's performance (as 
determined by NRC) has changed (i.e., by improving or declining) in 
the past 2 years, and whether, collectively, plants were located in 
multiple NRC regions, operated by different companies that hold 
licenses to operate reactors (i.e., licensees), and included different 
reactor types. We also analyzed NRC performance data for all 65 plant 
sites from 2000 through 2012. To assess the reliability of NRC's data, 
we reviewed existing information about the data and the system that 
produced them and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the 
data. We found that these data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. Our review focuses on NRC's oversight of the 
safe operation of reactors; physical security of plants is outside the 
scope of this review. A detailed description of our objectives, scope, 
and methodology is presented in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to September 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

This background section describes NRC's role and its processes for 
overseeing reactor safety, specifically the Reactor Oversight Process 
and the Traditional Enforcement Process. 

Role of NRC: 

NRC is an independent agency of about 4,000 employees established by 
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to license and regulate U.S. 
civilian--that is, commercial, industrial, academic, and medical--use 
of nuclear materials. NRC is headed by a five-member Commission. The 
President appoints these Commission members, who are confirmed by the 
Senate, and designates one of them to serve as the Chair and official 
spokesperson. NRC seeks to carry out its mission of ensuring safe 
operation of the 100 commercial nuclear power reactors currently 
operating in the United States from its headquarters office in 
Rockville, Maryland, its four regional offices--in King of Prussia, 
Pennsylvania (Region I); Atlanta, Georgia (Region II); Lisle, Illinois 
(Region III); and Arlington, Texas (Region IV)--and resident (on-site) 
inspectors' offices located at 62 nuclear power plants in 31 states. 
[Footnote 11] (See figure 1.) Appendix II provides a complete list of 
the commercial nuclear power reactors operating in the United States 
and additional information about each one. 

Figure 1: NRC Regions and Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United 
States: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Map depicts locations of nuclear power plants as follows: 

Region 1: 

Nuclear power plant with one reactor: 
Massachusetts: 1; 
New Hampshire: 1; 
New Jersey: 2; 
New York: 2; 
Pennsylvania: 1; 
Vermont: 1. 

Nuclear power plant with two reactors: 
Connecticut: 1; 
Maryland: 1; 
New Jersey: 1; 
New York: 2; 
Pennsylvania: 4. 

Region 2: 

Nuclear power plant with one reactor: 
North Carolina: 1; 
South Carolina: 2; 
Tennessee: 1. 

Nuclear power plant with two reactors: 
Alabama: 1; 
Florida: 2; 
Georgia: 2; 
North Carolina: 2; 
South Carolina: 1; 
Tennessee: 1; 
Virginia: 2. 

Nuclear power plant with three reactors: 
Alabama: 1; 
South Carolina: 1. 

Region 3: 

Nuclear power plant with one reactor: 
Illinois: 1; 
Iowa: 1; 
Michigan: 2; 
Minnesota: 1; 
Ohio: 2. 

Nuclear power plant with two reactors: 
Illinois: 5; 
Michigan: 1; 
Minnesota: 1; 
Wisconsin: 1. 

Region 4: 

Nuclear power plant with one reactor: 
Kansas: 1; 
Louisiana: 2; 
Mississippi: 1; 
Missouri: 1; 
Nebraska: 2; 
Washington: 1. 

Nuclear power plant with two reactors: 
Arkansas: 1; 
California: 2; 
Texas: 2. 

Nuclear power plant with three reactors: 
Arizona: 1. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NRC information; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, NRC is responsible for 
issuing licenses to commercial nuclear reactors and conducting 
oversight of activities under such licenses to protect the health and 
safety of the public, among other things. NRC is authorized to conduct 
inspections and investigations, to enforce its requirements, such as 
by issuing orders and imposing civil (monetary) penalties, and to 
revoke licenses. To oversee the activities of licensed commercial 
reactors, NRC has established regulations, as well as guidance, 
including regulatory guides, standard review plans, and NRC's 
Inspection Manual. These regulations and guidance, along with plant-
specific licenses and technical specifications, form the basis by 
which NRC provides continuous oversight of reactor operations. 

NRC's oversight of commercial nuclear reactors includes monitoring 
their performance in three strategic areas: (1) reactor safety, that 
is, avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if 
they occur; (2) radiation safety, that is, ensuring safety from 
radiation for both plant workers and the public during routine 
operations; and (3) safeguards, that is, protecting of the plant 
against sabotage or other security threats. These areas comprise seven 
cornerstones of NRC's oversight (see table 1). According to NRC, 
reactors' satisfactory performance in these cornerstones provides 
reasonable assurance of safe operation. Our review focuses on NRC's 
oversight of the safe operation of reactors; therefore, the physical 
security of plants (Physical Protection cornerstone) is outside the 
scope of this review. 

Table 1: Strategic Areas and Cornerstones of NRC's Oversight: 

Strategic area: Reactor safety: 

Cornerstone: Initiating Events; 
Description: This cornerstone focuses on operations and events at a 
nuclear plant that could lead to a possible accident, if plant safety 
systems did not intervene. These events could include equipment 
failures leading to a plant shutdown, shutdowns with unexpected 
complications, or large changes in the plant's power output. 

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems; 
Description: This cornerstone measures the function of safety systems 
designed to prevent an accident or reduce the consequences of a 
possible accident. The equipment is checked by periodic testing and 
through actual performance. 

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity; 
Description: This cornerstone focuses on the physical barriers between 
the highly radioactive materials in fuel within the reactor and the 
public and the environment outside the plant. These barriers are the 
sealed rods containing the fuel pellets, the heavy steel reactor 
vessel and associated piping, and the reinforced concrete containment 
building surrounding the reactor. The integrity of the fuel rods, the 
vessel, and the piping is continuously checked for leakage, while the 
ability of the containment to prevent leakage is measured on a regular 
basis. 

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness; 
Description: This cornerstone measures the effectiveness of plant 
staff in carrying out emergency plans for responding to a possible 
accident. Such emergency plans are tested every two years during 
emergency exercises involving the plant staff and local, state, and, 
in some cases, federal agencies. 

Strategic area: Radiation safety: 

Cornerstone: Occupational radiation safety; 
Description: NRC regulations set a limit on radiation doses received 
by plant workers, and this cornerstone monitors the effectiveness of 
the plant's program to control and minimize those doses. 

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety; 
Description: This cornerstone measures the procedures and systems 
designed to minimize radioactive releases from a nuclear plant during 
normal operations and to keep those releases within federal limits. 

Strategic area: Safeguards; 
Cornerstone: Physical Protection; 
Description: Nuclear plants are required to have well-trained security 
personnel and a variety of protective systems to guard vital plant 
equipment, as well as programs to assure that employees are constantly 
fit for duty through drug and alcohol testing. This cornerstone 
measures the effectiveness of security and fitness-for-duty programs. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[End of table] 

NRC also looks for systemic problems by monitoring reactors' 
performance in three cross-cutting areas that extend across the 
cornerstones: 

* Problem identification and resolution. The licensee (1) ensures that 
issues potentially affecting nuclear safety are promptly identified, 
fully evaluated, and addressed in a timely manner; (2) uses operating 
experience information to support plant safety; and (3) conducts 
performance assessments to identify areas for improvement. 

* Human performance. The licensee (1) makes decisions demonstrating 
that nuclear safety is an overriding priority; (2) ensures that staff, 
equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate 
to assure nuclear safety; (3) plans and coordinates work activities 
consistent with nuclear safety; and (4) uses work practices that 
support human performance. 

* Safety-conscious work environment. The licensee maintains an 
environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, 
both to their management and to NRC, without fear of retaliation and 
where such concerns are promptly reviewed, properly prioritized, and 
appropriately resolved. 

The Reactor Oversight Process: 

The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) is the central component of NRC's 
oversight efforts. Under the ROP, NRC undertakes four key actions: (1) 
reviewing key indicators of licensees' performance; (2) physically 
inspecting reactors; (3) assessing whether any findings resulting from 
inspections are associated with any of the cross-cutting areas; and 
(4) determining what actions, if any, to take in response to signs of 
declining performance and any related violations of NRC requirements. 

Reviews of Performance Indicators: 

NRC technical specialists located at its regional offices review 
licensee performance using quantitative measures or indicators of that 
performance. According to NRC documents, performance indicators are 
designed to illustrate a long-term view of a licensee's performance--
over multiple quarters. Currently, NRC uses 17 performance indicators 
it developed collaboratively with the industry to measure licensee 
performance. Each performance indicator is designed to help gauge a 
licensee's performance within the different cornerstones outlined 
above. For example, a performance indicator under the "Initiating 
Events" cornerstone measures the number of unplanned reactor shutdowns 
during the previous four quarters. Appendix III provides a list of the 
safety-related (nonsecurity) performance indicators and related 
cornerstones. 

Each licensee voluntarily submits data quarterly for each performance 
indicator,[Footnote 12] and NRC measures licensee performance from 
these data against established numerical thresholds; assigning a 
color--green, white, yellow, or red--to reflect increasing risk to 
reactor safety based on these performance data. Specifically, a green 
indicator reflects performance within an expected range, but white, 
yellow, and red represent decreasing levels of a licensee's 
performance (see table 2). 

Table 2: NRC Categories of Performance Indicators: 

Performance indicator category: Green; 
Description: Indicates performance within an expected performance 
level where the associated cornerstone objectives are met. 

Performance indicator category: White; 
Description: Represents performance outside an expected range of 
nominal utility performance, but related cornerstone objectives are 
still being met. 

Performance indicator category: Yellow; 
Description: Indicates related cornerstone objectives are being met, 
but with a moderate reduction in the safety margin. 

Performance indicator category: Red; 
Description: Signals a significant reduction in safety margin in the 
area measured by the performance indicator. 

Source: NRC. 

[End of table] 

Physical Inspections: 

Physical inspections are one of the main tools NRC uses to oversee 
licensee performance. During these inspections, NRC inspectors are to 
verify the accuracy of the quarterly data for each performance 
indicator supplied by the licensee and to assess aspects of licensee 
performance that are not directly measured by the performance 
indicator data--for example, confirming that fire protection equipment 
is in place and that certain maintenance operations have occurred. 
These inspections cover a wide variety of major systems and technical 
areas of nuclear power reactors that NRC considers most critical to 
meeting the overall agency mission of ensuring nuclear power plant 
safety. NRC currently has 52 different inspection procedures, and they 
are divided into three broad types of inspections--baseline (46), 
supplemental (3), and reactive (3)--that vary by depth and objective. 
Appendix IV provides a list of inspection procedures. 

Baseline inspections. Baseline inspections are the minimum level of 
inspections performed at all nuclear power reactors, regardless of 
performance, and are designed to detect declining safety performance 
in each of the cornerstones and to review licensee effectiveness at 
identifying and resolving safety problems. NRC resident inspectors, 
who are located at each plant, and regional technical specialists, who 
travel to each plant from NRC regional offices, conduct 46 baseline 
inspection procedures both as needed and at intervals ranging from 
quarterly to triennially, involving physical observations of licensee 
activities and plant performance, reviewing and verifying licensee 
reports, and interviewing licensee personnel. Each of the baseline 
procedures specifies a range of sample activities to inspect. Within 
the scope and requirements of each procedure, inspectors select the 
type and number of activities to review on the basis of factors, such 
as the sample activities available; their risk significance; and the 
amount of time since a particular system or component was last 
inspected.[Footnote 13] NRC assesses any issues of concern and 
determines whether to elevate them to a finding based on certain 
criteria. To determine whether an issue of concern constitutes a 
finding, inspectors must first decide whether it is associated with a 
performance deficiency, which NRC guidance defines as "an issue that 
is the result of a licensee not meeting a requirement or standard 
where the cause was reasonably within the licensee's ability to 
foresee and correct, and therefore should have been prevented." NRC 
guidance defines a finding as an issue of concern associated with a 
performance deficiency that inspectors or regional officials then 
determine to be more than minor.[Footnote 14] NRC then assesses--
through its ROP Significance Determination Process--the finding's risk 
significance.[Footnote 15] Similar to performance indicators, NRC 
assigns the finding one of four colors to reflect increasing risk to 
reactor safety. Green findings--also called nonescalated findings--
equate to very low risk significance, while white, yellow, and red 
findings--considered to be escalated findings--represent increasing 
levels of risk (see table 3). Appendix V provides select examples of 
NRC findings and related information that illustrate the varying 
levels of risk significance. 

Table 3: NRC Categories of Risk Significance for Inspection Findings: 

Inspection finding category: Green; 
Risk significance: Very low safety significance; 
Description: Indicates that licensee performance is acceptable and 
cornerstone objectives are fully met with nominal risk and deviation. 

Inspection finding category: White; 
Risk significance: Low to moderate safety significance; 
Description: Indicates that licensee performance is acceptable, but 
outside the nominal risk range. Cornerstone objectives are met with 
minimal reduction in safety margin. 

Inspection finding category: Yellow; 
Risk significance: Substantial safety significance; 
Description: Indicates a decline in licensee performance that is still 
acceptable with cornerstone objectives met, but with significant 
reduction in safety margin. 

Inspection finding category: Red; 
Risk significance: High safety significance; 
Description: Indicates a decline in licensee performance that is 
associated with an unacceptable loss of safety margin. Sufficient 
safety margin still exists to prevent undue risk to public health and 
safety. 

Source: NRC. 

[End of table] 

Supplemental inspections. When NRC identifies one or more escalated 
findings or a performance indicator exceeding the green threshold at a 
reactor, regional officials conduct supplemental inspections, which 
expand the scope beyond baseline inspection procedures and focus on 
diagnosing the cause of the finding. There are three levels of 
supplemental inspections that increase in breadth and depth of 
analysis, depending on the number and type of performance problems 
identified. The first and lowest level of supplemental inspection 
assesses the licensee's corrective actions to ensure they were 
sufficient in both correcting the problem and addressing the root and 
contributing causes to prevent recurrence. The second level of 
supplemental inspection has an increased scope that includes 
independently assessing the extent of the condition for both the 
specific and any broader performance problems. The third and highest 
level of supplemental inspection is more comprehensive and includes 
determining whether the reactor can continue to operate and whether 
additional regulatory actions are necessary. The highest level of 
supplemental inspection is usually conducted by a multidisciplinary 
team of NRC inspectors and may take place over several months. Also, 
as a part of this inspection, NRC inspectors assess the adequacy of 
the licensee's overall programs for identifying, evaluating, and 
correcting performance issues. 

Reactive inspections. NRC conducts reactive inspections of licensee 
performance when specific events occur that are of particular interest 
to NRC because of their potential safety significance or because of 
potential generic safety concerns important to multiple licensees. 
Reactive inspections determine the cause of the event and assess the 
licensee's response to the event. Reactive inspections have three 
levels that are normally determined by an event's safety, or risk 
significance. According to NRC officials, recent reactive inspections 
have focused on issues such as an automatic reactor shutdown following 
a loss of offsite power, and a flaw discovered in a weld on a reactor 
component. To conduct reactive inspections, a team of experts is 
formed and an inspection charter issued that describes the scope of 
the inspection efforts. 

Assessments of Findings for Cross-cutting Areas: 

NRC inspectors assess all of the findings that result from physical 
inspections to determine if any of the three cross-cutting areas 
contributed to a performance problem. If regional officials determine 
that one of the cross-cutting areas contributed to a finding, NRC 
assigns what it calls a cross-cutting aspect within that area to the 
finding. More than one cross-cutting aspect may be assigned to a 
finding, but this does not occur often, according to NRC officials. 
Every 6 months, NRC regional officials analyze all findings issued at 
each plant during the prior 12-month assessment period. In general, if 
a nuclear plant has four findings with the same cross-cutting aspect 
assigned during the previous year, and NRC is concerned about the 
licensee's progress in addressing them, NRC determines that the 
nuclear plant has what NRC calls a substantive cross-cutting issue. 
[Footnote 16] According to NRC documents, the agency identifies 
substantive cross-cutting issues to inform the licensee that it has a 
concern with its performance and to further encourage it to take 
appropriate actions before more significant performance issues emerge. 

Response to Performance Indicators and Findings: 

NRC assesses its reviews of performance indicators and all findings 
that result from its physical inspections to determine what actions, 
if any, to take in response to signs of declining performance, 
including violations of NRC requirements.[Footnote 17] The 
significance of any violations associated with a finding is 
incorporated into the color coded risk assessment made during the 
Significance Determination Process. For enforcement of violations 
associated with nonescalated findings, NRC establishes a public record 
of the violations and requires the licensee to take steps to correct 
the violations, but it does not usually require the licensee to 
document its responses. For enforcement of violations associated with 
escalated findings, NRC issues written notices of violation (to which 
licensees are typically required to respond), civil penalties, or 
orders.[Footnote 18] 

Based on NRC's assessment of licensee performance under the ROP, NRC 
places each of the licensee's reactors into one of five performance 
categories on its action matrix, which corresponds to graded, or 
increasing, levels of oversight. The action matrix is NRC's formal 
method of determining how much additional oversight--mostly in the 
form of supplemental inspections--is required on the basis of the 
number and risk significance of performance indicators and inspection 
findings.[Footnote 19] NRC considers licensee performance to be 
acceptable until it reaches column 5 (see table 4). 

Table 4: NRC Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix: 

Oversight category: NRC's assessment of licensee performance by 
reactor; 
Licensee Response (Column 1): All green findings and performance 
indicators; 
Regulatory Response (Column 2): One white finding or performance 
indicator, or two white findings or performance indicators in 
different cornerstones; 
Degraded Cornerstone (Column 3): Two or more white findings or 
performance indicators in one cornerstone, or one yellow finding or 
performance indicator, or any three white findings or performance 
indicators; 
Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone (Column 4): Two white 
findings or performance indicators or one yellow finding or 
performance indicator in one cornerstone for five or more quarters, or 
multiple yellow or one red finding or performance indicator; 
Unacceptable Performance (Column 5): Overall unacceptable performance 
representing situations--such as multiple significant violations of a 
plant's license--in which NRC does not have reasonable assurance that 
the licensee can or will conduct its activities to ensure protection 
of public health and safety. In general, it is expected, but not 
required, that entry into column 4 will precede consideration of 
whether a plant is in column 5. 

Oversight category: NRC's oversight actions; 
Licensee Response (Column 1): Baseline inspections only; 
Regulatory Response (Column 2): Baseline inspections and first level 
of supplemental inspections; 
Degraded Cornerstone (Column 3): Baseline inspections and second level 
of supplemental inspections; 
Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone (Column 4): Baseline 
inspections and third level of supplemental inspections[A]; 
Unacceptable Performance (Column 5): Order to modify, suspend, or 
revoke licensed activities. 

Oversight category: NRC office responsible for oversight actions; 
Licensee Response (Column 1): Regional office; 
Regulatory Response (Column 2): Regional office; 
Degraded Cornerstone (Column 3): Regional office; 
Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone (Column 4): Agency[B]; 
Unacceptable Performance (Column 5): Agency[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

Note: In addition to the actions listed in this table, increasingly 
higher levels of NRC management will meet with a licensee as it moves 
to the right on the action matrix. 

[A] For reactors at this oversight level, at a minimum, the licensee 
and NRC are to document agreement on the corrective actions the 
licensee will take through a performance improvement plan. NRC may 
also take actions including making a demand to the licensee for 
information or issuing an order up to and including a plant shutdown. 

[B] Agency response involves senior management attention from both 
headquarters and regional offices. 

[End of table] 

On the basis of the results of the ROP, NRC provides licensees and the 
public with an overall assessment of each reactor's performance. At 
the end of each 6-month period, NRC issues an assessment letter to 
each plant to describe what level of oversight the plant's reactors 
will receive according to their placement on the action matrix, what 
actions NRC is expecting the licensee to take as a result of the 
performance issues identified, any specific enforcement actions NRC 
has taken, and any documented substantive cross-cutting issues. If a 
substantive cross-cutting issue is identified, the letter will 
describe what actions NRC intends to take to monitor the issue. If the 
issue persists, NRC can request a number of actions from the licensee, 
including a written response describing the corrective actions the 
licensee intends to take. NRC also holds an annual public meeting at 
or near each plant to review its performance and address questions 
from members of the public and other interested stakeholders. 
Additionally, NRC has other mechanisms to make available its oversight 
results, such as a website that provides summaries of each reactor's 
current overall performance.[Footnote 20] While it addresses most 
violations through the ROP, NRC also responds to some violations 
identified during the ROP under what it calls its Traditional 
Enforcement Process.[Footnote 21] 

NRC's Traditional Enforcement Process: 

NRC uses this process to assess and determine the enforcement actions, 
if any, to take in response to violations that, according to NRC 
guidance, cannot be addressed fully through the ROP. The process 
typically applies to violations that result in actual safety 
consequences, may impede NRC's oversight of licensed activities, or 
involve deliberate misconduct or discrimination matters, as well as 
certain technical violations involving specific areas, such as 
operator licensing and fuel storage. The Traditional Enforcement 
Process, including possible civil penalties, is managed outside the 
ROP action matrix.[Footnote 22] 

The Traditional Enforcement Process focuses on a violation's 
consequences and results in the assignment of a significance level 
ranging from Severity Level IV for the least significant to Severity 
Level I for the most significant concerns, according to NRC policy. 
NRC's response to Severity Level IV violations is considered 
"nonescalated enforcement," while its response to Severity Levels I, 
II, and III is considered "escalated enforcement." In assigning a 
Severity Level to the violation, NRC assesses the following: (1) the 
actual safety consequences; (2) the potential safety consequences; (3) 
the potential for impacting NRC's ability to perform its regulatory 
function (e.g., failure to provide complete and accurate information); 
and (4) any willful aspects of the violation. Severity Levels I and II 
violations generally involve actual or high potential consequences to 
public health and safety. Severity Level III violations are cause for 
significant concern, and Severity Level IV violations are less serious 
but are of more than minor concern. Appendix V provides select 
examples of violations that illustrate varying levels of severity. NRC 
includes results from the Traditional Enforcement Process in the 
overall semiannual assessment of each plant's performance that it 
provides to plant licensees and the public. 

NRC Relies on Staff's Professional Judgment in Implementing Its 
Processes for Overseeing the Safety of Commercial Nuclear Reactors: 

NRC relies on its staff's professional judgment in implementing its 
processes, which are largely prescribed in guidance, for overseeing 
the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors. In implementing its 
oversight programs, NRC allocates specific roles and responsibilities 
to resident inspectors, regional staff, headquarters officials, and 
the nuclear power industry. NRC also provides incentives for licensees 
to identify and report any concerns about reactor safety to NRC. NRC 
oversight relies on its staff's professional judgment in applying 
regulations and guidance, such as determining: (1) whether issues of 
concern identified in inspections constitute findings, (2) the risk 
significance of any findings, and (3) whether these findings have 
cross-cutting aspects, among other things. 

NRC Allocates Specific Oversight Roles and Responsibilities among 
Regional Officials, Resident Inspectors, Headquarters Officials, and 
the Nuclear Power Industry: 

To implement its oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and 
responsibilities to regional officials, resident inspectors, 
headquarters officials, and the nuclear power industry. According to 
NRC officials, doing so allows decisions to be made at the appropriate 
level within the agency, but it also necessitates open communication 
between the various offices to effectively share information and 
ensure policies and processes are implemented consistently across the 
agency. 

Regional Officials: 

Officials from NRC's four regional offices are responsible for 
implementing the ROP and the Traditional Enforcement Process and 
establish--consistent with agency guidelines--the region's procedures 
for assessing issues of concern and resolving most findings.[Footnote 
23] According to NRC documents, the inspection program is intended to 
provide regional administrators flexibility with the planning and 
application of inspection resources to deal with risk-significant 
issues and problems. According to NRC officials, regional branch 
chiefs supervise small groups of resident inspectors, facilitate 
information sharing among inspectors in their region, and manage 
specialized teams of inspectors that conduct periodic plant 
inspections focused on specific technical areas, such as fire safety. 
Further, NRC officials said that regional branch chiefs are largely 
responsible for deciding whether an issue of concern raised during 
physical inspections constitutes a finding. Agency guidance provides 
them with relative autonomy in determining when an issue constitutes a 
more-than-minor performance deficiency.[Footnote 24] 

Since NRC established the ROP in 2000, regional offices have been 
responsible for addressing all nonescalated findings and violations, 
which constituted about 90 percent of findings and violations, 
according to our analysis of NRC data. In addition, though subject to 
oversight by NRC headquarters, regional offices play a lead role when 
assessing and responding to escalated findings or violations, 
including requiring licensees to provide a written response describing 
the reasons for a performance deficiency, actual and proposed 
corrective actions, and the expected date of compliance. After 
assessing licensee performance based, in part, on the findings or 
violations, regional offices then conduct supplemental inspections as 
appropriate, according to NRC guidance. 

Resident Inspectors: 

NRC assigns resident inspectors to each nuclear power plant to conduct 
baseline inspections.[Footnote 25] According to NRC guidance, resident 
inspectors are responsible for routinely conducting plant status 
reviews that include observing control room activities; attending 
licensee meetings; and conducting walk-downs, or inspections, of 
various plant areas. In addition to these duties, resident inspectors 
are responsible for ensuring that plant representatives implement 
corrective actions within a "reasonable period of time" in response to 
nonescalated findings.[Footnote 26] 

Headquarters Officials: 

NRC headquarters officials play a key role in addressing escalated 
findings and violations, those assigned the highest categories of risk 
significance or severity levels. For example, NRC officials told us 
that, before findings are assessed as being escalated, NRC 
headquarters officials participate in meetings with regional officials 
and resident inspectors to ensure that the assessment is accurate and 
any proposed enforcement actions are justifiable. Moreover, according 
to NRC guidance, officials in NRC headquarters must approve all 
enforcement actions against licensees. Specifically, this includes the 
Director of NRC's Office of Enforcement, and, in certain cases, such 
as when responding to Severity Level I violations, the Deputy 
Executive Director, after consultation with the Commission. These 
actions can include anything from monetary penalties, to orders to 
take specific actions, to shutting down a plant. 

Nuclear Power Industry: 

In addition to NRC, the commercial nuclear power industry also plays a 
key role to ensure that nuclear plants operate safely and comply with 
regulations. According to NRC policy, licensees have the primary 
responsibility for safely operating their plants, as well as in 
accordance with their licenses and NRC regulations. Each plant has 
many physical structures, systems, and components, and licensees have 
numerous activities under way 24 hours a day to ensure that plants 
operate safely. These plants were designed according to a "defense-in-
depth" philosophy revolving around redundant, diverse, and reliable 
safety systems. For example, two or more key safety components are in 
place so that if one fails, another one is present to serve as a 
backup. These include safety components such as safety injection 
pumps, sources of power, and physical barriers to contain radiation. 

Furthermore, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)--the 
industry's self-regulator--is a nonprofit organization formed in 1979 
by the nuclear power industry in response to the accident at Three 
Mile Island.[Footnote 27] INPO has a key role in ensuring that plants 
operate safely by seeking to promote high levels of safety and 
reliability in the operation of nuclear power plants. According to its 
website, INPO sets performance objectives, criteria, and guidelines 
for the nuclear power industry, conducts evaluations of nuclear power 
plants, and communicates lessons learned and best practices throughout 
the nuclear power industry. According to INPO information, all 
organizations with direct responsibility to operate or construct 
commercial nuclear power plants in the United States have maintained 
continuous membership in INPO since its inception, and are primarily 
responsible for its funding. INPO provides a variety of services to 
the nuclear power industry, including personnel training for key 
positions at nuclear power plants, periodic evaluations and peer 
reviews of operating plants that are focused on plant safety and 
reliability, and assessments of plant performance across the industry 
to help licensees to understand issues that arise at other plants. 
According to INPO information, the organization has conducted nearly 
1,200 plant evaluations, inspecting each plant approximately every 2 
years, since 1980. Also, according to an INPO official, INPO uses peer 
pressure to influence plants to improve, and in an industry 
presentation, its president and chief executive officer stated that 
its policy of providing licensees with confidential evaluation reports 
allows it to have more open and candid discussions with plants about 
problems and areas for improvement. In addition, the industry's 
collective insurance company for operational losses--Nuclear Electric 
Insurance Limited--uses INPO ratings as a factor in setting insurance 
premiums for insuring for costs associated with certain long-term 
interruptions of electricity supply and damages to plants, among other 
things.[Footnote 28] According to INPO and NRC documents, INPO and NRC 
communicate on topics of mutual interest related to improving the 
performance of commercial nuclear power plants. 

NRC also builds into its processes incentives for licensees to 
identify concerns about reactor safety, discuss those concerns with 
NRC, and identify actions to correct them. According to NRC guidance, 
these concerns--known as licensee-identified findings--include any 
findings the licensee is already addressing through the plants' 
respective corrective action programs. If NRC's preliminary assessment 
of a licensee-identified finding indicates that the finding is green, 
NRC does not consider it when assessing licensee performance, does not 
consider it to count toward substantive cross-cutting issues, and does 
not apply additional oversight or require additional response from the 
licensee. According to NRC officials, licensee-identified findings 
demonstrate that the licensee is taking a proactive approach and can 
identify and correct problems before NRC identifies them; therefore 
NRC gives licensees credit for identifying potential problems during 
their own inspection processes. Regarding licensee-identified 
violations, according to NRC's enforcement policy, NRC should normally 
give the licensee "credit" when assessing for civil penalties--that 
is, the violation should be issued with no civil penalty--for 
identifying the violation and taking prompt and comprehensive 
corrective actions. On the other hand, the policy states that NRC 
should issue a civil penalty, regardless of whether the violation is 
licensee-identified, if NRC officials determine that the corrective 
actions have not been prompt and comprehensive. 

Conversely, according to its enforcement policy, NRC considers some 
findings and violations--whether identified by a licensee or an 
inspector--to be "self-revealing." For example, according to an agency 
official, a licensee may discover a pool of oil on the floor next to a 
diesel generator, indicating that something is wrong with the 
equipment. NRC may consider such a finding to be self-revealing, even 
if the licensee identified it. Under NRC's enforcement policy, it may 
give the licensee credit for such findings under certain 
circumstances, such as licensee effort in discovering the root cause 
of the finding. 

NRC Oversight Relies on Its Staff's Professional Judgment in Applying 
Regulations and Guidance: 

NRC's oversight processes are based in regulation, and its specific 
processes for identifying and assessing findings and violations are 
largely prescribed in guidance, but rely on several key points where 
NRC staff must exercise their professional judgment, such as 
determining (1) whether an issue of concern constitutes a finding or 
violation, (2) a finding's risk significance or a violation's 
severity, and (3) whether findings or violations have cross-cutting 
aspects, among other things. 

Determining What Constitutes a Finding: 

According to NRC documents and officials, NRC inspectors use their 
professional judgment and a combination of education, experience, and 
prescribed agency procedures to make initial assessments as to whether 
an issue of concern identified during an inspection constitutes a 
finding. NRC officials told us that performance deficiency was defined 
broadly to allow officials to use their professional judgment when 
assessing issues of concern. If NRC inspectors determine that there is 
a performance deficiency, they and regional staff then determine 
whether the performance deficiency is more than minor. In doing so, 
these officials have NRC-established questions and guidance and use 
their professional judgment in applying them. If inspectors and 
regional staff determine that a performance deficiency is not more 
than minor, then it is not considered a finding and the matter is not 
pursued any further under the ROP. To help in making these 
determinations, inspectors can request additional information from 
licensees and consult NRC inspectors assigned to other nuclear plants, 
according to NRC officials. If resident inspectors conclude they 
cannot adequately assess an issue of concern, they can seek assistance 
from their regional office or NRC headquarters--typically from 
technical specialists or branch chiefs who supervise resident 
inspectors at two to three plants--to help make a determination. As we 
previously reported,[Footnote 29] inspectors also select the type and 
number of activities to review during inspections, in part, on the 
basis of an inspector's professional judgment, which is based on 
information such as reviews of the licensee's corrective action 
program, allegations, or interviews with plant employees. 

Determining a Finding's Risk Significance and the Severity of a 
Violation: 

Professional judgment also plays a key role in regional officials' 
determining the risk significance of a finding and the severity of a 
violation. If NRC determines that a performance deficiency is more 
than minor, it is considered a finding, and NRC regional officials 
assess its significance using the Significance Determination Process, 
which also requires the staff to exercise their professional judgment, 
according to NRC officials. This process provides an initial screening 
to identify those nonescalated findings--that is, those findings that 
do not result in a significant increase in plant risk and thus need 
not be analyzed further. Remaining findings are subjected to 
additional reviews to determine their risk significance, using the 
next phase of the Significance Determination Process--the Significance 
and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP).[Footnote 30] According to NRC 
guidance, this more detailed assessment may involve NRC risk experts 
from the appropriate regional office or NRC headquarters and further 
review by the licensee's plant staff. The final outcome of the ROP 
review--evaluating whether the finding is green, white, yellow, or red-
-is used to determine NRC actions that may be needed. For any 
escalated violations identified during the ROP that are to go through 
the Traditional Enforcement Process, the severity level of violations 
is determined using a combination of NRC's enforcement policy, 
professional judgment, and information obtained from the licensee 
during a conference with them, if necessary. NRC officials initially 
determine enforcement actions during an enforcement panel, and then 
make a final determination during a meeting, or caucus, both of which 
loosely correspond to the SERP. 

Regarding violations, NRC's enforcement policy states that, because 
the regulation of nuclear activities does not lend itself to a 
mechanistic treatment in many cases, judgment and discretion must be 
exercised in determining the severity levels of violations and the 
appropriate enforcement sanctions. According to this policy, the use 
of judgment and discretion includes the decision to issue a notice of 
violation or to propose or impose a civil penalty and the amount of 
the penalty, after considering the general principles of NRC's 
enforcement policy and the significance of the violation, as well as 
the surrounding circumstances. According to its enforcement policy, 
NRC may choose to exercise discretion and either escalate or mitigate 
enforcement sanctions or otherwise refrain from taking enforcement 
action within the Commission's statutory authority. According to this 
policy, NRC may exercise judgment and discretion to determine the 
severity levels of violations and the appropriate enforcement 
sanctions to be taken. For example, NRC may refrain from issuing a 
notice of violation or a proposed civil penalty for a Severity Level 
II, III, or IV violation that is identified after NRC has taken 
enforcement action, if the violation is identified by the licensee as 
part of the corrective action for the previous enforcement action and 
the violation has the same or similar root cause as the violation for 
which enforcement action was previously taken, among other things. 

Determining Whether Findings Have Cross-cutting Aspects: 

In addition, according to NRC guidance, inspectors should also use 
their professional judgment when assessing whether a finding is 
associated with any cross-cutting aspects. For example, as we 
reported,[Footnote 31] in analyzing the failure of a valve to operate 
properly at one plant, NRC inspectors determined that plant employees 
had not followed the correct maintenance procedures; thus, the finding 
was associated with the human performance cross-cutting area. 

Both opening and closing a substantive cross-cutting issue requires 
the use of professional judgment. According to NRC guidance, before 
opening a substantive cross-cutting issue, regional officials must 
determine, among other things, whether the licensee is already taking 
actions to address the issue and, if so, whether these actions are 
timely, are commensurate with its significance, and will be effective 
in substantially mitigating it. Once a substantive cross-cutting issue 
has been opened, the regional office that opened it is responsible for 
establishing the criteria for closing it. These criteria may include 
having fewer findings with the same cross-cutting area in a subsequent 
assessment period or the regional staff's increased confidence in the 
licensee's ability to address the substantive cross-cutting issue. The 
decision to close a substantive cross-cutting issue is made by 
regional staff, including the senior resident inspector, branch chief, 
and other regional management, but NRC headquarters officials told us 
they also participate. 

NRC can require licensees to take several actions to close substantive 
cross-cutting issues. According to NRC guidance, after first issuing a 
letter identifying a substantive cross-cutting issue to a licensee, 
NRC staff may follow up on these issues in multiple ways, including 
semiannual evaluations or additional inspections. In the second 
consecutive assessment letter identifying the same substantive cross-
cutting issue, the regional office may consider requesting the 
licensee provide a response at a public meeting or provide a written 
response or hold a separate meeting. In the third consecutive letter, 
according to NRC guidance, the regional office would typically request 
that the licensee perform an independent assessment of safety culture, 
although the regional office could decide that a safety culture 
assessment is not necessary if the licensee has made reasonable 
progress addressing the issue. If the substantive cross-cutting issue 
continues beyond the third letter, the regional office may consider 
additional actions not prescribed by the action matrix developed in 
consultation with the Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation and its Executive Director of Operations.[Footnote 32] 

Figure 2 outlines NRC's processes for identifying and assessing 
findings and violations and key points where professional judgment 
plays a role. 

Figure 2: NRC's Processes for Identifying and Assessing Findings and 
Violations at Nuclear Power Reactors: 

[Refer to PDF for image: process map] 

Identification: 

1. Conducts inspections[D]. 

2. Issues of concern identified[B]. 

3. Traditional Enforcement or enforcement discretion applies?[B] 
Yes: follow both paths: Assessment under Traditional Enforcement 
Process; and Assessment under Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). 

Assessment under Traditional Enforcement Process: 

4. Severity Level IV or greater violation exists?[B] 
Yes: violation[E]; 
No: Minor or no violation; documents as necessary.[E] 

5. Severity Level III or greater violation exists?[B] 
Yes: continue; 
No: Severity Level IV violation; documents as necessary[E]. 

6. Conducts enforcement panel[D]: 

7. Notifies licensee[C]. 

8. Licensee conference or written response[C]. 

9. Caucus[D]. 

NRC response: (ROP or Traditional Enforcement Process): 

10. Notice of violation[E]. 

Assessment under Reactor Oversight Process (ROP): 

3. Traditional Enforcement or enforcement discretion applies?[B] 
Yes: continue; 
No: continue. 

4. Performance deficiency?[B] 
Yes: continue; 
No: No finding.[E] 

5. More than minor?[B] 
Yes: continue; 
No: No finding.[E] 

6. Finding.[E] 

7. Significance Determination Process.[C] 

8. Initial determination of green finding?[B] 
Yes: go to #14. 
No: continue. 

9. Conducts SERP or modified analysis reviews as appropriate.[D] 
Green, go to #12; 
Others: continue; 

10. White, yellow, red (escalated) (preliminary).[E] 

11. Identifies appropriate cross-cutting aspects, if any.[D] 
Go to #15. 

12. Green (nonescalated).[E] 

13. Identified by licensee?[A] 
Yes: continue; 
No: go to #11. 

14. If no violation, no further action needed.[E] 

15. Notifies licensee.[C] 

16. Licensee conference or written response.[C] 

17. Conducts Significance and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP).[D] 

18. Violation:[A] 
Yes: follow both paths, #19 and #20. 
No: go to #20. 

NRC response: (ROP or Traditional Enforcement Process): 

19. Notice of violation.[E] 

20. White, yellow, red (escalated) (final).[E] 

NRC response (ROP only): 

21. Increased oversight as specified by the action matrix.[E] 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[A] Decision point. 

[B] Decision point involving judgment. 

[C] Process. 

[D] Process involving judgment. 

[E] Result. 

[End of figure] 

Differences Exist across NRC Regions in Identifying and Resolving 
Findings, and NRC Has Taken Some Steps to Address Them: 

NRC is aware of differences across regions in identifying and 
resolving the findings that result from its oversight processes and 
has taken some steps to address them. In particular, the extent to 
which nonescalated findings, which equate to very low risk 
significance, have been identified differs across regions.[Footnote 
33] Several factors may explain these differences, but NRC officials 
and industry representatives have raised concerns that they may be 
due, in part, to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve 
findings. The four NRC regions also differed in the number of cross-
cutting aspects they assigned to findings. NRC has taken some steps to 
address these differences but has not undertaken a comprehensive 
review of them. The number of escalated findings, which equate to 
greater risk significance, were more similar across regions.[Footnote 
34] However, the information NRC makes publicly available about 
findings and how they are resolved is difficult to search and assess. 

Extent to Which Nonescalated Findings Have Been Identified Differs 
across NRC Regions: 

Some regions identify more nonescalated findings than others, even 
though they oversee fewer reactors. For example, as table 5 indicates, 
from 2000 through 2012, Region IV recorded more nonescalated findings 
than each of the other three regions, even though it oversaw the 
fewest number of reactors at the fewest number of plants. During the 
same period, Region II--the region with the greatest number of 
reactors and plants--recorded the fewest number of nonescalated 
findings. More specifically, Region IV recorded over 70 percent more 
nonescalated findings than Region II even though Region IV oversaw 
over one-third fewer reactors; resulting in an average number of 
nonescalated findings per reactor for Region IV to be over 2.6 times 
that of Region II. 

Table 5: Nonescalated Findings per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-
2012: 

Number of nonescalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of 
nonescalated findings; 
Region I (Northeast): 2,518; 
Region II (Southeast): 1,885; 
Region III (Midwest): 3,148; 
Region IV (West): 3,225; 
Total: 10,776. 

Number of nonescalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of 
plants; 
Region I (Northeast): 17; 
Region II (Southeast): 18; 
Region III (Midwest): 16; 
Region IV (West): 14; 
Total: 65. 

Number of nonescalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of 
reactors; 
Region I (Northeast): 26; 
Region II (Southeast): 33; 
Region III (Midwest): 24; 
Region IV (West): 21; 
Total: 104. 

Number of nonescalated findings, plants, and reactors: Average number 
of nonescalated findings per reactor; 
Region I (Northeast): 96.8; 
Region II (Southeast): 57.1; 
Region III (Midwest): 131.2; 
Region IV (West): 153.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

As figure 3 shows, from 2000 through 2012, the number of nonescalated 
findings identified differed across NRC's four regions, but Region IV 
recorded more nonescalated findings than any of the other three 
regions for 6 consecutive years--2007 through 2012. Appendix VI lists 
the number of nonescalated findings identified at each plant from 2000 
through 2012. 

Figure 3: Nonescalated Findings by NRC Region and by Year, Calendar 
Years 2000-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 2000; 
Region 1: 203; 
Region 2: 107; 
Region 3: 166; 
Region 4: 166. 

Year: 2001; 
Region 1: 274; 
Region 2: 135; 
Region 3: 178; 
Region 4: 177. 

Year: 2002; 
Region 1: 196; 
Region 2: 123; 
Region 3: 199; 
Region 4: 144. 

Year: 2003; 
Region 1: 229; 
Region 2: 120; 
Region 3: 252; 
Region 4: 193. 

Year: 2004; 
Region 1: 241; 
Region 2: 138; 
Region 3: 271; 
Region 4: 262. 

Year: 2005; 
Region 1: 189; 
Region 2: 152; 
Region 3: 303; 
Region 4: 245. 

Year: 2006; 
Region 1: 173; 
Region 2: 132; 
Region 3: 255; 
Region 4: 221. 

Year: 2007; 
Region 1: 190; 
Region 2: 158; 
Region 3: 290; 
Region 4: 293. 

Year: 2008; 
Region 1: 183; 
Region 2: 121; 
Region 3: 239; 
Region 4: 291. 

Year: 2009; 
Region 1: 172; 
Region 2: 164; 
Region 3: 231; 
Region 4: 301. 

Year: 2010; 
Region 1: 159; 
Region 2: 191; 
Region 3: 243; 
Region 4: 297. 

Year: 2011; 
Region 1: 158; 
Region 2: 170; 
Region 3: 295; 
Region 4: 333. 

Year: 2012; 
Region 1: 151; 
Region 2: 174; 
Region 3: 226; 
Region 4: 302. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: Region I oversees the Northeast; Region II oversees the 
Southeast; Region III oversees the Midwest; and Region IV oversees the 
West. 

[End of figure] 

Various Factors May Contribute to Differences in the Number of 
Findings Identified: 

NRC officials stated that various factors may contribute to 
differences in the number of nonescalated findings identified across 
regions, including differences in the (1) number of hours spent 
inspecting reactors; (2) amount of time reactors are under increased 
oversight as a result of performance deficiencies; (3) age of 
reactors; and (4) benefits from the combined resources of multiple 
plants owned or managed by one licensee. 

Differences in inspection hours. NRC officials stated that differences 
in the number of hours regions spent inspecting reactors may have 
contributed to the differences in the number of nonescalated findings 
across regions, because more inspection hours would lead to more 
findings. However, according to 2000 through 2012 NRC data, while the 
total number of inspection hours has varied across the regions, the 
number of inspection hours has been fairly consistent across regions 
when accounting for the number of reactors in each region. When 
comparing the number of nonescalated findings in each region to the 
number of inspection hours and accounting for the regional differences 
in the number of reactors, we found that the number of nonescalated 
findings per inspection hour varies widely. Specifically, Region II 
identified the least number of nonescalated findings per inspection 
hour per reactor, and Region IV identified the most, with more than 
3.5 times as many nonescalated findings per 1,000 inspection hours per 
reactor as Region II (see table 6). 

Table 6: Nonescalated Findings and Inspection Hours per NRC Region, 
Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: Number 
of nonescalated findings; 
Region I (Northeast): 2,518; 
Region II (Southeast): 1,885; 
Region III (Midwest): 3,148; 
Region IV (West): 3,225. 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: Number 
of inspection hours (thousands); 
Region I (Northeast): 562.8; 
Region II (Southeast): 532.2; 
Region III (Midwest): 505.3; 
Region IV (West): 396.1. 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: Number 
of reactors; 
Region I (Northeast): 26; 
Region II (Southeast): 33; 
Region III (Midwest): 24; 
Region IV (West): 21. 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: Number 
of inspection hours (thousands) per reactor; 
Region I (Northeast): 21.6; 
Region II (Southeast): 16.1; 
Region III (Midwest): 21.1; 
Region IV (West): 18.9. 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: Number 
of nonescalated findings per 1,000 inspection hours; 
Region I (Northeast): 4.5; 
Region II (Southeast): 3.5; 
Region III (Midwest): 6.2; 
Region IV (West): 8.1. 

Number of nonescalated findings, inspection hours, and reactors: 
Average number of nonescalated findings per 1,000 inspection hours per 
reactor; 
Region I (Northeast): 0.17; 
Region II (Southeast): 0.11; 
Region III (Midwest): 0.26; 
Region IV (West): 0.39. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

Differences in the amount of time reactors are under increased 
oversight. NRC officials stated that differences in the amount of time 
reactors are under increased oversight as a result of performance 
deficiencies--defined as being in column 2 or higher on NRC's action 
matrix--may contribute to differences in the number of nonescalated 
findings across regions, because increased oversight results in more 
scrutiny and more findings. However, according to 2001 through 2012 
NRC data, the number of quarters that reactors in each region were 
under increased oversight were fairly consistent across regions when 
accounting for the number of reactors in each region. When comparing 
the number of nonescalated findings in each region to the number of 
quarters that reactors in each region were under increased oversight, 
and accounting for the regional differences in the number of reactors, 
we found that the results varied widely. Specifically, Region II 
identified the least number of nonescalated findings per quarter under 
increased oversight, and Region IV recorded the most, with more than 4 
times as many nonescalated findings per quarter under increased 
oversight as Region II (see table 7). Furthermore, Region II had more 
reactors under increased oversight than Region IV for 36 of the 48 
quarters we reviewed. Appendix VII summarizes NRC's performance 
assessments for each reactor from 2001 through 2012. 

Table 7: Nonescalated Findings and Amount of Time under Increased 
Oversight (per NRC's Action Matrix), Calendar Years 2001-2012: 

Number of nonescalated findings, quarters under increased oversight, 
and reactors: Number of nonescalated findings; 
Region I (Northeast): 2,315; 
Region II (Southeast): 1,778; 
Region III (Midwest): 2,982; 
Region IV (West): 3,059. 

Number of nonescalated findings, quarters under increased oversight, 
and reactors: Number of quarters reactors were under increased 
oversight[A]; 
Region I (Northeast): 274; 
Region II (Southeast): 375; 
Region III (Midwest): 305; 
Region IV (West): 233. 

Number of nonescalated findings, quarters under increased oversight, 
and reactors: Number of reactors; 
Region I (Northeast): 26; 
Region II (Southeast): 33; 
Region III (Midwest): 24; 
Region IV (West): 21. 

Number of nonescalated findings, quarters under increased oversight, 
and reactors: Average number of nonescalated findings per number of 
quarters under increased oversight per reactor; 
Region I (Northeast): 0.32; 
Region II (Southeast): 0.14; 
Region III (Midwest): 0.41; 
Region IV (West): 0.63. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: Based on NRC's assessment of licensee performance under the 
ROP, NRC places each of the licensee's reactors into one of five 
performance categories on its action matrix, which corresponds to 
graded, or increasing levels of oversight. The action matrix is NRC's 
formal method of determining how much additional oversight--mostly in 
the form of supplemental inspections--is required on the basis of the 
number and risk significance of performance indicators and inspection 
findings. 

This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

According to NRC officials, the number of inspection hours allocated 
to supplemental inspections conducted under increased oversight can 
vary by a factor of 75. 

[A] The period of our review breaks down to 48 quarters. Not every 
reactor was under increased oversight for each quarter. 

[End of table] 

Differences in the age of reactors. NRC officials stated that 
differences in the age of reactors may contribute to the differences 
in the number of nonescalated findings across regions because 
nonescalated findings become more prevalent as reactors age. We 
analyzed the age of reactors across the regions and identified 
regional differences in their age. However, we found that reactors in 
Region II, which had the fewest nonescalated findings from 2000 
through 2012, have been in commercial operation, on average, more 
years than, and have collectively been in commercial operation for 
almost twice as long as, reactors in Region IV, which had the most 
nonescalated findings over that period (see table 8). 

Table 8: Amount of Time Reactors per NRC Region Have Been in 
Commercial Operation: 

Number of years and reactors: Average number of years in commercial 
operation; 
Region I (Northeast): 36.3; 
Region II (Southeast): 35.1; 
Region III (Midwest): 37.6; 
Region IV (West): 27.3. 

Number of years and reactors: Number of years reactors in each region 
have collectively been in commercial operation; 
Region I (Northeast): 882; 
Region II (Southeast): 1103; 
Region III (Midwest): 822; 
Region IV (West): 594. 

Number of years and reactors: Number of reactors; 
Region I (Northeast): 26; 
Region II (Southeast): 33; 
Region III (Midwest): 24; 
Region IV (West): 21. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

Differences in resources available to plants. NRC officials stated 
that, when one licensee owns or manages multiple plants (collectively 
referred to as a licensee's "fleet"), benefits derived from plants' 
combined resources may contribute to the differences in the number of 
nonescalated findings across regions, because some regions have more 
plants in fleets than others. For example, according to NRC officials, 
licensees often require all plants that they manage or own to make 
improvements in response to findings made at only one of their plants, 
which could lead all the plants in this fleet to experience fewer 
findings over time. NRC officials told us that plants associated with 
fleets typically perform better because the licensee holds all plants 
to the same performance levels and provides resources and shares what 
would otherwise be proprietary information to make that happen. Some 
independent plants--those not part of a fleet--share resources by 
forming alliances with other plants, entering into management 
contracts with larger companies, or both. However, NRC officials 
stated that independent plants are limited in how much information 
they can share because some information is considered to be 
proprietary. We analyzed whether individual plants were associated 
with licensee fleets and found that being associated with a fleet may 
be a factor in the number of nonescalated findings a region 
identifies. For example, Region II, which had the fewest nonescalated 
findings from 2000 through 2012, had the highest percentage of its 
reactors located at plants associated with fleets. Conversely, Region 
IV, which had the most nonescalated findings during the same period, 
had the lowest percentage of its reactors located at plants associated 
with fleets (see table 9). However, because NRC has not conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of several potential factors, it is not clear 
to the extent this factor influences the differences in the number of 
findings across regions. 

Table 9: Number of Reactors per NRC Region Associated with Licensee 
Fleets of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: 

NRC Region: I (Northeast); 
Number of reactors associated with a licensee's fleet[A]: 16; 
Total number of reactors in region: 26; 
Percentage: 62. 

NRC Region: II (Southeast); 
Number of reactors associated with a licensee's fleet[A]: 31; 
Total number of reactors in region: 33; 
Percentage: 94. 

NRC Region: III (Midwest); 
Number of reactors associated with a licensee's fleet[A]: 17; 
Total number of reactors in region: 24; 
Percentage: 71. 

NRC Region: IV (West); 
Number of reactors associated with a licensee's fleet[A]: 5; 
Total number of reactors in region: 21; 
Percentage: 24. 

NRC Region: Total; 
Number of reactors associated with a licensee's fleet[A]: 69; 
Total number of reactors in region: 104. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[A] For this report, a "fleet" is defined as reactors across two or 
more plants that are owned or managed by the same licensee. 

[End of table] 

In addition, NRC officials stated that the quality of reactor 
maintenance may contribute to the regional differences in the number 
of nonescalated findings. For example, the resident inspectors at a 
plant with a high number of findings in recent years told us that this 
was due, in part, to plant managers not fully addressing maintenance 
items for many years to save on costs. However, we could not analyze 
this factor because, according to NRC officials, the data are not 
readily available. 

NRC Officials and Industry Representatives Have Raised Concerns about 
Differences in the Number of Findings Identified across NRC Regions: 

NRC officials and industry representatives have raised concerns that 
differences in the number of findings NRC regions identify may be due, 
in part, to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve 
findings. NRC officials, including some resident inspectors in Region 
IV, told us that they believe Region IV identifies nonescalated 
findings more aggressively than other regional offices and that some 
regional branch chiefs differently interpret the criteria for 
assessing performance deficiencies and what constitutes more-than-
minor findings. Some NRC officials also noted that the regions have 
flexibility to combine issues into a single finding or to split them 
into multiple findings, which may also account for some of the 
regional variation in the number of findings identified. These 
officials told us that, in their view, this autonomy and discretion is 
a good and desirable part of the ROP. Nonetheless, in 2008, NRC's IG 
reported that NRC was inconsistently resolving findings across its 
regional offices due, in part, to not having clear and comprehensive 
guidance needed to facilitate consistency. 

NRC officials told us they survey industry annually as part of a ROP 
self-assessment process and have received feedback since the 
implementation of the ROP in 2000 about concerns from the appearance 
of differences in identifying and resolving findings across regions. 
They also stated that the Nuclear Energy Institute--the commercial 
nuclear trade organization--frequently raises these concerns with 
them. Plant managers we interviewed--several of whom have worked at 
plants across different regions--also raised concerns about these 
apparent differences. These plant managers told us that such 
differences could lead to several challenges, including focusing 
limited plant resources on a greater number of issues of very low risk 
significance (i.e., nonescalated findings). 

NRC officials also told us that another concern that is sometimes 
raised about its findings by industry is that findings at different 
plants that appear to be similar sometimes result in different risk 
assessments. NRC officials provided the example of two findings at two 
different plants that appeared similar but that led to different 
assessments. Specifically, both findings dealt with problems with 
certain components of auxiliary feedwater pumps that rendered the 
pumps inoperable. Even though these findings appeared similar, they 
resulted in different risk significance levels--one green and one 
white--because they affected the safety of the two plants differently. 
NRC officials told us the process of assessing the risk significance 
of a finding is inherently complex and includes several factors, such 
as: 

* design of the plant, including availability of backup equipment and 
whether the site uses cooling towers or lakes or rivers for its 
ultimate source of cooling water; 

* the effect that the finding had on the performance and availability 
of safety equipment; 

* the amount of time the equipment was inoperable; 

* criticality of the safety equipment associated with the finding; and: 

* historical reliability of the equipment in question for that plant 
design, among others. 

Once NRC accounts for these factors, similar findings may result in 
different assessments because the risk that a finding poses is plant-
specific, according to NRC officials. 

NRC Regions Also Differed in the Cross-cutting Aspects They Assigned 
to Findings: 

The four NRC regions also differed in the number of cross-cutting 
aspects they assigned to findings and the percentage of findings 
assigned cross-cutting aspects. For example, Regions III and IV had 
about twice as many findings assigned at least one cross-cutting 
aspect as Region II (see table 10). 

Table 10: Number of Findings Assigned at Least One Cross-cutting 
Aspect per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Region: I (Northeast); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Findings Not Assigned: 1,044; 
Findings Assigned at Least One: 1,666; 
Total: 2,710; 
Percent of Findings Assigned at Least One: 61. 

Region: II (Southeast); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Findings Not Assigned: 1,047; 
Findings Assigned at Least One: 1,046; 
Total: 2,093; 
Percent of Findings Assigned at Least One: 50. 

Region: III (Midwest); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Findings Not Assigned: 1,446; 
Findings Assigned at Least One: 1,936; 
Total: 3,382; 
Percent of Findings Assigned at Least One: 57. 

Region: IV (West); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Findings Not Assigned: 1,147; 
Findings Assigned at Least One: 2,192; 
Total: 3,339; 
Percent of Findings Assigned at Least One: 66. 

Region: Total; 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Findings Not Assigned: 4,684; 
Findings Assigned at Least One: 6,840; 
Total: 11,524; 
Percent of Findings Assigned at Least One: 59. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: If NRC officials determine that one of the cross-cutting areas--
human performance, safety-conscious work environment, and problem 
identification and resolution--contributed to a finding, NRC assigns a 
cross-cutting aspect within that area to the finding. More than one 
cross-cutting aspect may be assigned to a finding. 

NRC data did not include information about cross-cutting aspects for 
397 findings. 

This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

Table 11 shows the types of cross-cutting aspects assigned to findings 
across regions. 

Table 11: Types of Cross-cutting Aspects Assigned to Findings per NRC 
Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Region: I (Northeast); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Safety-conscious work environment: 3; 
Human performance: 878; 
Problem identification and resolution: 835; 
Total: 1,716; 
Percent Total: 25. 

Region: II (Southeast); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Safety-conscious work environment: 4; 
Human performance: 637; 
Problem identification and resolution: 415; 
Total: 1,056; 
Percent Total: 15. 

Region: III (Midwest); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Safety-conscious work environment: 3; 
Human performance: 1,254; 
Problem identification and resolution: 693; 
Total: 1,950; 
Percent Total: 28. 

Region: IV (West); 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Safety-conscious work environment: 4; 
Human performance: 1,389; 
Problem identification and resolution: 856; 
Total: 2,249; 
Percent Total: 32. 

Region: Total; 
Cross-Cutting Aspect: 
Safety-conscious work environment: 14; 
Human performance: 4,158; 
Problem identification and resolution: 2,799; 
Total: 6,971; 
Percent Total: 100. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: If NRC officials determine that one of the cross-cutting areas--
human performance, safety-conscious work environment, and problem 
identification and resolution--contributed to a finding, NRC assigns a 
cross-cutting aspect within that area to the finding. More than one 
cross-cutting aspect may be assigned to a finding. 

NRC data did not include information about cross-cutting aspects for 
397 findings. 

This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

According to NRC guidance, identifying cross-cutting aspects is NRC's 
primary means of identifying trends. The guidance states that a cross-
cutting aspect is a performance characteristic of a finding that is 
the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency. The 
guidance further states that the ROP was developed with the 
presumption that inspection findings with cross-cutting aspects would 
help them identify the plants with significant performance issues. 
Therefore, according to NRC officials, the greater the number of 
findings with cross-cutting aspects, the greater the chance that NRC 
could assign a substantive cross-cutting issue to the plant. Once NRC 
assigns a substantive cross-cutting issue to a plant, closing the 
issue requires additional efforts by the licensee and additional 
oversight from NRC. The number of plants assigned substantive cross-
cutting issues at some time during calendar years 2001 through 2012 
varied across the regions (see table 12). In Region II, less than half 
the plants were assigned a substantive cross-cutting issue, whereas a 
substantial majority of plants in other regions were assigned 
substantive cross-cutting issues. Appendix VIII summarizes the 
substantive cross-cutting issues assigned to plants from 2001 through 
2012. 

Table 12: Number of Nuclear Power Plants Assigned Substantive Cross-
cutting Issues by NRC Region, Calendar Years 2001-2012: 

Region: I (Northeast); 
Nuclear power plants assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 12; 
Total nuclear power plants: 17; 
Percent assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 71. 

Region: II (Southeast); 
Nuclear power plants assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 7; 
Total nuclear power plants: 18; 
Percent assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 39. 

Region: III (Midwest); 
Nuclear power plants assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 15; 
Total nuclear power plants: 16; 
Percent assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 94. 

Region: IV (West); 
Nuclear power plants assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 12; 
Total nuclear power plants: 14; 
Percent assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 86. 

Region: Total; 
Nuclear power plants assigned substantive cross-cutting issues: 46; 
Total nuclear power plants: 65. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: Every 6 months, NRC regional officials analyze all findings 
issued at each plant during the prior 12-month assessment period. In 
general, if a nuclear plant has four findings with the same cross-
cutting aspect assigned during the previous year, and NRC is concerned 
about the licensee's progress in addressing them, NRC determines that 
the nuclear plant has what NRC calls a substantive cross-cutting issue. 

This table includes data on the 65 commercial nuclear power plants 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear power plants in the United States from 65 to 62. 

[End of table] 

According to NRC officials, because the criteria for closing a 
substantive cross-cutting issue involve professional judgment, 
determining whether to close one is somewhat subjective. The relevant 
regional office considers whether to close a substantive cross-cutting 
issue in its semiannual or annual assessment letters to licensees. 
Industry officials told us that, because NRC only considers closing 
substantive cross-cutting issues in these 6-month increments, it is 
difficult to close a substantive cross-cutting issue in a timely 
fashion. 

Number of Escalated Findings Had Fewer Differences across NRC Regions: 

The number of escalated findings had fewer differences across regional 
offices. As shown in table 13, each region had between 46 and 93 
escalated findings from 2000 through 2012. Region III had more 
Severity Level III violations than the other regions, but otherwise, 
the number of escalated findings was largely consistent. Appendix IX 
lists the number of escalated findings identified at each plant from 
2000 through 2012. 

Table 13: Escalated Findings per NRC Region, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

Number of escalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of escalated 
findings; 
Region I (Northeast): 54; 
Region II (Southeast): 64; 
Region III (Midwest): 93; 
Region IV (West): 46. 

Number of escalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of plants; 

Region I (Northeast): 17; 
Region II (Southeast): 18; 
Region III (Midwest): 16; 
Region IV (West): 14. 

Number of escalated findings, plants, and reactors: Number of reactors; 

Region I (Northeast): 26; 
Region II (Southeast): 33; 
Region III (Midwest): 24; 
Region IV (West): 21. 

Number of escalated findings, plants, and reactors: Average number of 
escalated findings per reactor; 
Region I (Northeast): 2.1; 
Region II (Southeast): 1.9; 
Region III (Midwest): 3.9; 
Region IV (West): 2.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: The greater number of escalated findings in Region III over the 
other regions is due to the identification of more than three times as 
many Severity Level III violations. 

This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States through the end of calendar year 2012. 
In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in 
Florida permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
plant's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

NRC officials told us that escalated findings are identified and 
addressed more consistently than nonescalated findings because they 
receive a much higher level of review than do nonescalated findings. 
For example, according to NRC's enforcement policy, regional offices--
subject to oversight by NRC headquarters--typically require licensees 
to provide a written response to an escalated finding that describes 
the reasons for the identified deficiency, actual and proposed 
corrective actions, and the expected date of compliance. Regional 
offices then conduct supplemental inspections for most escalated 
findings. Supplemental inspections expand the scope of baseline 
inspections to review, in part (1) the extent of the problem, (2) the 
sufficiency of the licensee's evaluation of the root cause of the 
problem, and (3) the licensee's proposed corrective actions. In 
addition, NRC officials told us that headquarters officials 
participate in meetings with regional officials and inspectors to 
ensure that an escalated finding is accurately assessed and that any 
proposed enforcement actions are justifiable. Moreover, according to 
NRC guidance, the Director of NRC's Office of Enforcement (or 
designee)--located in headquarters--has to approve any enforcement 
actions against licensees in response to escalated findings. 

NRC Has Taken Some Steps to Reduce Differences across Regions 
Concerning Nonescalated Findings but Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive 
Analysis: 

NRC has taken some steps to reduce differences across the regions in 
the identification and resolution of nonescalated findings but has not 
conducted a comprehensive analysis of the differences to determine its 
consistency in handling findings or reasons for the differences. 

A key effort NRC has undertaken to reduce differences in how the 
regions implement the ROP is the ROP Reliability Initiative, which 
NRC's regional offices initiated in 2009. According to NRC officials, 
the initiative was intended to explore how the different regional 
offices identify and assess inspection findings. Some NRC officials 
said that the initiative examines issues related to consistency, such 
as how to control the subjectivity in making distinctions between 
minor and more-than-minor performance deficiencies and violations. 
Each region took the lead on one of the following specific efforts: 

* Enhanced inspection resource sharing among regions: This effort was 
a pilot program for sharing inspection resources across regional 
offices. Inspectors from different regions and resident inspectors 
from other plants participated on several types of team inspections. 
This initiative was led by Region IV and began in 2009. 

* Branch chief visits to other regions: This effort included each 
region designating one branch chief to visit each of the other regions 
to identify best practices and implementation differences across the 
regions. This effort was led by Region II and began in 2009. 

* Periodic discussion of reliability topics: This effort included 
quarterly videoconferences among regional officials to share insights 
on the application of ROP inspection guidance and gain insight into 
different regional decision making. This effort was led by Region I 
and began in 2009. 

* ROP self-assessments of inspection report quality: [Footnote 35] 
This effort included a team of staff from all regions that selected a 
cross-section of inspection reports from each region to assess their 
conformance with applicable guidance, identify key differences between 
regions, and identify any weaknesses. This effort was led by Region 
III and concluded in 2012. 

The ROP Reliability Initiative has not resulted in a formal report, 
and according to NRC officials, the sample of activities reviewed was 
not large enough to draw agencywide conclusions. In late 2011, NRC's 
regional offices decided to continue the ROP Reliability Initiative by 
applying the approach of the individual efforts to an in-depth review 
of a specific inspection area each fiscal year. For example, the first 
such review done in fiscal year 2012 resulted in an internal 
memorandum making 25 recommendations to provide additional guidance 
and training on limited aspects of NRC's efforts to inspect for 
weaknesses in licensees' corrective action programs. NRC officials 
told us that the overall initiative is still under way and that 
ongoing activities are intended to improve regions' consistency of 
actions adhering to the ROP guidance; however, agency officials said 
that, due to the ROP Enhancement Project (see below) and increased 
inspection activities following the Fukushima accident, the regional 
offices have not identified a specific inspection area to focus on for 
the fiscal year 2013 review. 

NRC has also conducted other efforts aimed at improving the 
consistency of its oversight processes: 

* Assessment of regional enforcement. According to NRC officials, in 
2011, NRC established an initiative aimed at improving consistency in 
how regional offices resolve inspection findings through enforcement 
activities. This initiative was conducted to address findings of 
enforcement inconsistency in the 2008 report by the NRC IG.[Footnote 
36] Officials stated that NRC recently completed four regional 
assessments that were intended to improve consistency of interpreting 
minor and more-than-minor thresholds for violations. According to NRC 
officials, this initiative resulted in a final report in May 2013 
recommending that regional enforcement staff conduct periodic audits 
of nonescalated enforcement actions. 

* "Minor" ROP realignment. According to NRC officials, in 2006, NRC 
undertook an internal review of substantive cross-cutting issues 
across regions. The review resulted, in part, from complaints from 
industry that some plants were assigned cross-cutting aspects more 
frequently than others, especially in Region IV. NRC officials stated 
that Region IV led the review, which found that, while each region was 
following guidance, it also had its own culture and exercised some 
subjective judgment. Therefore, the regions had some differences in 
interpretations, especially in their approaches to determining what 
constitutes a more-than-minor performance deficiency. In response, 
according to NRC officials, NRC conducted additional training but made 
no key changes to its ROP procedures. 

In addition, NRC officials said that several of the agency's formal 
ongoing reviews examine, to a limited extent, the consistency of its 
oversight processes: 

* ROP Enhancement Project. In January 2013, as part of its annual self-
assessment, NRC initiated the ROP Enhancement Project, which is 
intended as a long-term, strategic review of how it implements the 
ROP, among other things. NRC officials said that they expect this 
review to consider regional differences in the number of nonescalated 
findings, but according to an NRC status report, the assessment 
portion of the review has been delayed pending the outcome of an 
independent review of the ROP. NRC officials told us they expect 
procedural changes in response to the project to begin in 2014. 

* ROP realignment process. In 2009, NRC implemented the ROP 
realignment process, a biennial review of its ROP baseline inspection 
procedures and inspection hours per procedure to ensure the most 
effective overall applications of inspection resources. NRC officials 
told us that this effort also touches on the consistency of how NRC 
implements its oversight of safety. 

* Self-assessments. In 2001, NRC initiated annual self-assessments, 
which are to assess whether the ROP met its program goals and achieved 
its intended outcomes. NRC officials said that these self-assessments 
consider, to a limited extent, issues related to consistency, and 
according to NRC guidance, these self-assessments assess, in part, the 
extent to which NRC implements the ROP predictably. 

However, the biennial ROP realignment process evaluates specific 
inspection procedures agencywide to ensure the most effective 
application of inspection resources, and according to NRC guidance, 
the self-assessments are not intended to audit the performance of the 
regions in implementing the ROP. Thus even with taking these steps to 
examine the consistency of its oversight processes, agency officials 
told us that NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
causes of the differences in the number of nonescalated findings 
identified across regions. Under federal standards for internal 
control, managers at the functional or activity level are to compare 
actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the 
organization and analyze significant differences.[Footnote 37] Without 
conducting such an analysis, NRC (1) does not know whether its 
regional offices or individual inspectors are applying regulations and 
guidance consistently in handling findings; or (2) cannot identify 
other factors that may have led to the differences. 

Moreover, NRC's 2008 to 2013 strategic plan states that the agency 
will establish and maintain stable and predictable regulatory programs 
and policies, and other NRC guidance states that the agency should use 
an objective, understandable, and predictable process to ensure that 
licensees fulfill their responsibility for ensuring the safe operation 
of commercial nuclear reactors. In particular, the agency's 
enforcement manual emphasizes that staff should ensure that oversight 
efforts are objective and consistent. NRC is aware of differences 
across regions in identifying and resolving the findings that result 
from its oversight processes. However, without a comprehensive 
analysis of the causes of the differences in the number of 
nonescalated findings across regions, NRC cannot ensure that oversight 
efforts are objective and consistent, as specified in its enforcement 
manual, or know whether its regional offices or individual inspectors 
are applying regulations and guidance consistently. 

Records of Findings Are Difficult to Search and Assess: 

NRC maintains records of its identification of and response to both 
escalated and nonescalated findings; however, these records are 
difficult to search for several reasons, and limited our ability to 
assess the extent to which NRC followed its procedures and, thus, 
consistently identified and resolved findings. According to NRC's 
strategic plan, the agency's organizational values include openness in 
communication and decision making. Furthermore, NRC guidance states 
that the agency communicates ROP results to, in part, keep external 
stakeholders informed of licensee performance and to enhance 
confidence that NRC is accomplishing its mission. NRC's enforcement 
policy states that its mission includes promoting the transparency and 
openness of its enforcement program for all stakeholders. 

In reviewing NRC's findings data since the ROP's inception in 2000 
through 2012, we found that NRC has recorded approximately 12,000 
findings--about 2 percent of which were escalated. For 95 percent of 
the findings data we reviewed--including numerous escalated findings--
NRC did not include a case number for each finding, making it time-
consuming and difficult to locate all documents associated with a 
single finding. According to NRC officials, although nonescalated 
findings each have a unique identifier, only the case number is 
searchable in NRC's databases. NRC officials told us that, as a matter 
of policy, they do not assign case numbers to nonescalated findings; 
only to escalated findings. However, our review of NRC findings data 
also found 38 instances of escalated findings that had not been 
assigned a case number, during this period. 

The information NRC makes publicly available on its identification of 
and response to findings was also difficult to use. NRC communicates 
the results of much of its oversight process to the public through its 
ROP website. This website makes available inspection reports, 
assessment letters, and other general materials related to NRC's 
oversight process. NRC also provides a quarterly summary of every 
reactor's performance, consisting of its inspection findings, the 
color of each performance indicator, and the reactors' placement on 
the action matrix. However, to review this information, users must 
search a link for each plant on a quarterly basis. Since the ROP has 
been in place for more than 12 years, users may have to search dozens 
of links per plant and read many different documents to get complete 
information on individual findings. In addition, while descriptions in 
each document contain information about whether a finding was 
associated with a cross-cutting issue, the website itself does not 
provide information on those plants that had open substantive cross-
cutting issues prior to the most recent assessment period. This 
information can be found on the website by linking to each plant's 
individual assessment letters. NRC program officials acknowledged that 
it is difficult for users of the website to determine which plants had 
substantive cross-cutting issues open in the past. Therefore, it is 
difficult to identify, over time, those that NRC views as having 
potentially more significant problems. 

NRC also makes publicly available its official recordkeeping system, 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS 
contains more than 730,000 documents dating back to November 1999, 
[Footnote 38] and several hundred new documents on NRC's reactor 
oversight processes--as well as other NRC activities--are added each 
day. However, we found ADAMS difficult to navigate. For example, using 
an inspection report as our starting point, we tried to retrace the 
steps in NRC's response to the findings in the report using ADAMS; 
however, our searches resulted in numerous unrelated documents as well 
as documents with ambiguous names that had to be opened to determine 
whether they were related to the findings. Further, we had no way of 
determining whether our searches returned a complete set of results 
and had identified all the documents related to the findings. NRC 
officials acknowledged that, while ADAMS can be used to conduct 
searches on specific words or other criteria, such searches may 
produce a large number of unrelated documents, in addition to relevant 
documents. 

We asked NRC officials how we could track a finding through its 
resolution, and they told us that doing so is difficult because 
findings and enforcement actions are recorded in separate databases 
and that these databases are not linked. The officials told us that 
users with expertise in both databases' search capabilities could 
craft a data search that linked inspection and enforcement records. 
However, because external users cannot craft such a search, they 
cannot independently track NRC's identification and resolution of 
findings. NRC's Chairman reiterated the agency's support for 
transparency in prepared remarks before the annual NRC Regulatory 
Information Conference in March 2013, stating that the agency must 
have a continued commitment to openness and transparency and 
communicate with interested parties in ways they understand, and that 
clear, consistent communication is a principle of good regulation. 
However, because external users cannot independently track findings 
and their resolution, NRC cannot ensure that the public, Congress, and 
others are kept informed of licensee performance, as specified in 
guidance, to enhance confidence that NRC is accomplishing its mission 
and following its oversight processes. 

NRC Uses Numerous Methods to Develop Lessons Learned for Improving 
Oversight, but Challenges Remain in Accessing This Information: 

NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons 
learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide 
programs and annual assessments. Informal methods include reaching out 
to peer groups and technical experts throughout the agency and 
accessing various agency databases. Although NRC guidance directs 
inspectors to use information in agency databases on past experiences 
to plan and conduct future inspection activities, inspectors face 
challenges accessing this information, which may limit their ability 
to use it. 

NRC Has Formal Methods for Collecting and Analyzing Information to 
Develop Lessons Learned: 

NRC has ongoing, formal methods through which it collects and analyzes 
information to develop lessons learned for improving reactor 
oversight, including the following agencywide programs: 

* Operating Experience Program, which captures information on past 
experience based on inspection findings, events, and documents from 
industry, international nuclear agencies, and others to inform agency 
activities, including reactor inspections. 

* Generic Issues Program, which tracks the status and resolutions of 
certain issues involving public health and safety, among other things, 
that could affect multiple entities under NRC jurisdiction, such as 
multiple commercial nuclear plants. 

* ROP Feedback Program, which enables staff to submit comments and 
suggestions for improving the ROP based on their experiences; a 
central coordinator then directs these comments and suggestions to 
appropriate internal stakeholders for their review. 

* Industry Trends Program, which monitors trends in indicators of 
industry performance. NRC evaluates any adverse trends to determine 
whether regulatory action is appropriate, and reports statistically 
significant trends to Congress. 

* Monthly ROP working group meetings, which, according to NRC 
officials, NRC hosts and include the Nuclear Energy Institute, other 
industry representatives, and members of the public to discuss 
operating experience, inspection and performance assessment topics, 
potential changes and questions regarding performance indicator 
guidance, and other topics. 

Additionally, according to NRC documents, NRC identifies lessons 
learned during its annual self-assessments to determine whether the 
ROP met goals and during its biennial ROP realignment process. For 
example, the ROP realignment process assesses feedback from inspectors 
and other NRC officials submitted through the ROP Feedback Program. 

NRC has also undertaken special initiatives, such as the Fukushima 
Near-Term Task Force, to develop lessons learned from the accident at 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan that it could apply 
in its oversight of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. NRC 
convened the task force in 2011 to review its processes and 
regulations and determine whether lessons learned from the accident 
could inform its oversight processes. The task force concluded that a 
sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in 
the United States and that the continued operation of the nation's 
commercial nuclear reactors does not pose an imminent risk to public 
health and safety. In addition, in 2011 the task force made 12 
recommendations, such as for NRC to clarify its regulatory framework 
and to require licensees to reevaluate and upgrade seismic and 
flooding protection of reactors and related equipment, strengthen 
capabilities at all reactors to withstand loss of electrical power, 
and take other actions to better protect their plants for a low-
probability high-impact event. NRC accepted these recommendations and 
is in the process of implementing them (see appendix X). 

To follow up on the task force's recommendations, in 2011, NRC 
established the Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate--a group of 
over 20 NRC staff focused on implementing the lessons the task force 
identified. As part of this effort, NRC issued the following three 
orders to licensees in March 2012: 

* improve capability to reliably and remotely monitor a wider range of 
conditions in the pools that contain spent fuel;[Footnote 39] 

* install vent systems for certain types of reactors to help prevent 
an excess buildup of hydrogen gas in the reactor buildings; 

* enhance plants' capabilities to maintain or restore core cooling, 
containment, and spent fuel pool cooling in the case of external 
events, such as an earthquake, that exceeds plants' design 
capabilities. 

NRC has also undertaken special initiatives in response to other 
unique events. For example, following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, NRC issued orders to licensees to enhance security 
measures to protect their reactors against an increased terrorism 
threat. In addition, in 2002, after extensive degradation was 
discovered in the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 
Station in Ohio,[Footnote 40] NRC established a lessons learned task 
force and implemented many of its recommendations, including 
inspection procedure changes, enhancing its training program, and 
enhancing aspects of program management of the ROP. In May 2004, we 
made several recommendations to ensure that NRC addresses weaknesses 
that contributed to the Davis-Besse incident, which NRC has since 
implemented.[Footnote 41] 

NRC Also Has Informal Methods for Collecting and Analyzing Information 
to Develop Lessons Learned: 

NRC officials told us they also have more informal methods of 
collecting and analyzing information to develop lessons learned for 
improving reactor oversight. These informal means include reaching out 
to peers by telephone or e-mail, reaching out to regional or 
headquarters technical experts by telephone or e-mail, and informal 
gatherings during peer group meetings. For example, several resident 
inspectors told us they typically rely on a small group of fellow 
resident inspectors--often within the same branch overseeing a small 
number of plants--that they call periodically for updates on issues 
about which they are known to have prior experience. 

Inspectors told us that this type of outreach is especially important 
because it allows them to tap into other inspectors' different 
experiences performing inspections and unique engineering expertise, 
given that resident inspectors come from a variety of engineering 
backgrounds. They also told us that this form of outreach can have a 
large influence on an inspector's perspective about potential 
findings. Resident inspectors stated that they hold many informal 
discussions about lessons learned--including sharing findings and 
reviewing changes to guidance--during their semiannual conferences 
with peers from across their region and during periodic visits to 
plants in other regions. NRC uses e-mail to distribute updates 
agencywide to its guidance and other policy statements on how to 
respond to lessons learned from different plants; however, according 
to inspectors, individual inspectors are responsible for incorporating 
these lessons learned into their oversight activities. In addition, 
according to NRC officials, each region determines its policy for e-
mailing lessons learned from across the region or lessons learned with 
generic safety implications. 

Challenges Accessing Information on Past Experiences May Limit 
Inspectors' Ability to Benefit from It: 

Although NRC guidance directs inspectors to use information on past 
experiences to plan and conduct future inspection activities, 
inspectors reported facing challenges in accessing information on past 
experiences, which may limit their ability to benefit from it. Under 
NRC guidance, inspectors are to use information on past plant 
experiences to prepare for, conduct, and document inspection 
activities. According to several inspectors, this information can be 
important for helping them choose inspection samples. Some inspectors 
we interviewed also stated that complete access to lessons learned 
from past plant experience is important to help them understand how 
NRC identified and resolved similar findings at other plants. In 
addition, industry representatives have stated that information on 
past experiences is beneficial because the industry is mature and 
there is a robust body of information on past experiences to learn 
from. 

However, several NRC officials told us that the Reactor Operating 
Experience (ROE) Gateway--the agency's internal website for the 
Operating Experience Program--and its search tools are not user-
friendly. For example, they noted that the website provides links to 
more than a dozen search tools that all contain different information 
but does not explain how to use them. The officials said that 
providing instructions on how to use these tools would be helpful. 
Moreover, they told us that conducting a thorough search on a specific 
topic may require multiple keyword searches because different reactor 
equipment manufacturers use different terms to describe the same type 
of equipment. For example, one manufacturer of commercial nuclear 
reactors calls certain pumps Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, while another 
manufacturer calls them Emergency Feedwater Pumps, although both serve 
the same function--removing heat from the reactor core when the plant 
experiences a complete loss of electrical power. As a result, 
inspectors and other agency users--including officials in the 
Operating Experience Program and technical specialists in the regional 
offices--have to conduct searches on several possible keywords in each 
of the various search tools. NRC officials told us the various terms 
used to describe the same equipment are not officially documented so 
staff must learn about them through their own experiences. For 
example, if an NRC official encountered a problem at a plant with a 
particular type of pump, using ROE Gateway to search for past 
experiences with this pump would require the official to know that 
this piece of equipment had more than one name and to search on both 
names in each of the search tools. At least one of the search tools on 
ROE Gateway now uses drop-down lists to eliminate the need to conduct 
multiple keyword searches, but the remaining search tools do not have 
this capability. 

Given the challenges in navigating ROE Gateway, several resident 
inspectors told us they prefer contacting other inspectors informally 
or requesting assistance from NRC headquarters staff when trying to 
obtain information on past experience. They also told us they have 
developed informal "workarounds" to facilitate searches, such as 
creating and sharing slide presentations with one another on keyword 
searches for various common inquiries. We have previously reported 
that informal relationships could end once personnel move to their 
next assignments.[Footnote 42] Thus an informal workaround cannot 
substitute for a user-friendly, searchable system. Without better 
search tools, inspectors could overly rely on information available 
through informal channels rather than the more comprehensive 
information located in agency databases. NRC guidance states that the 
efficient retrieval of information on past experiences is a basic 
requirement for meeting agencywide objectives and that such 
information is necessary to improve safety assessments and NRC 
decisions. Further, NRC officials noted that inspectors have varied 
backgrounds--that is, some may have expertise in mechanical 
engineering, while others have expertise in electrical engineering--
therefore they depend on NRC's network of information to assess most 
issues and determine their importance. Past inspection results and 
related information are crucial parts of that network. NRC officials 
have acknowledged the difficulty of using ROE Gateway and noted at 
their most recent annual meeting in March 2013 that NRC has struggled 
to make information about past experiences accessible and distribute 
this information efficiently. 

Several resident inspectors also told us that e-mail updates on past 
experiences could be managed more effectively. For example, once 
resident inspectors receive an e-mail, it is their responsibility to 
incorporate the information on past experiences at their plant. 
However, these resident inspectors noted that not all e-mail updates 
apply to all plants; for example, an update may apply to a certain 
type of reactor that is not in use at all plants. Some resident 
inspectors stated that one way to improve this system would be to 
prioritize the e-mail notices and indicate the extent to which they 
are relevant to the inspectors. In addition, some resident inspectors 
noted that nonurgent e-mail updates should be compiled, whereas now 
they are included alongside all e-mail updates. 

Resident inspectors play an essential role in ensuring that reactors 
are operating safely because they have the opportunity and authority 
to, at any time, physically inspect plant equipment and operations, 
review plant records, and verify the accuracy of licensee-reported 
quantitative measures or indicators of plant performance. NRC 
officials told us that, because of their essential role in NRC's 
oversight, inspectors need complete and efficient access to all the 
information necessary to do their jobs effectively. In addition, 
information on past plant performance and oversight actions helps 
inspectors know where to begin looking for potential issues of 
concern, and NRC guidance states that inspectors should consider this 
information in preparing for, conducting, and documenting inspection 
activities. For example, prior to the reactor damage found at the 
Davis-Besse plant in 2002, inspectors did not regularly focus on 
identifying reactor vessel head corrosion; however, as a result of 
this incident, NRC inspectors now focus on this issue regularly. 

Conclusions: 

NRC oversees the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors using 
established, ongoing processes. NRC's oversight has taken on even 
greater importance as many commercial reactors in the United States 
are operating under renewed licenses that will allow them to operate 
beyond their initial 40-year operating periods. NRC is aware of 
differences across its regions in the identification and resolution of 
findings that result from its oversight processes and has taken some 
steps to address them, particularly in the differences of nonescalated 
findings. However, while NRC has undertaken these steps, NRC has not 
conducted a comprehensive analysis of these differences consistent 
with federal standards of internal control. Without a comprehensive 
analysis of the differences in the number of nonescalated findings 
across regions and their causes, NRC cannot ensure that oversight 
efforts are objective and consistent, as specified in its enforcement 
manual, or know whether its regional offices or individual inspectors 
are not applying regulations and guidance consistently. 

Furthermore, NRC policy states that the agency's mission includes 
promoting transparency and openness for all stakeholders. As part of 
such transparency, NRC makes publicly available its official 
recordkeeping system, which contains hundreds of thousands of 
documents on NRC's reactor oversight processes--as well as other NRC 
activities. However, we found this system difficult to navigate, and 
external users cannot use it to independently track findings, all 
documents related to the findings, and the findings' resolution. As a 
result, NRC cannot ensure that the public, Congress, and others are 
kept informed of licensee performance, as specified in agency 
guidance, to enhance public confidence that NRC is accomplishing its 
mission and following its oversight processes. 

Information about reactor operators' past experiences and NRC's 
responses to them also plays a key role in NRC's oversight processes. 
Although NRC guidance directs inspectors to use information on past 
experiences to plan and conduct future inspection activities, 
inspectors reported facing challenges in accessing information on past 
experiences, which may limit their ability to benefit from this 
information. Given the challenges in navigating ROE Gateway, several 
resident inspectors reported contacting other inspectors informally or 
requesting assistance from NRC headquarters staff when trying to 
obtain information on past experience. Without better search tools, 
inspectors could overly rely on information available through informal 
channels. NRC guidance states that the efficient retrieval of 
information on past experiences is a basic requirement for meeting 
agencywide objectives and that such information is necessary to 
improve safety assessments and NRC decisions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve NRC's oversight processes, we are making three 
recommendations to the NRC Commissioners: 

* To better meet its goal of implementing objective and consistent 
oversight, direct agency managers to conduct a comprehensive analysis 
of the causes of the differences in the identification and resolution 
of findings. 

* To improve transparency and better enable the public, Congress, and 
others to independently track findings, all documents related to the 
findings, and the findings' resolution, direct the agency to either 
modify NRC's publicly available recordkeeping system to do so or 
develop a publicly accessible tool that does so. 

* To help NRC staff more efficiently use past experiences in their 
oversight activities, direct agency officials to evaluate the 
challenges inspectors face in retrieving all relevant information on 
plant performance and previous oversight activities and improve its 
systems accordingly to address these challenges. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Executive Director for 
Operations of NRC for review and comment. In its written comments, 
reproduced in appendix XI, NRC generally agreed with our findings and 
recommendations. NRC also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated, as appropriate. 

To address our first recommendation, NRC stated that it will revisit 
its initiatives with respect to implementation of the ROP and the 
nonescalated enforcement process to identify potential enhancements. 
For our second recommendation, NRC stated that it will identify ways 
to improve transparency and track documents related to inspection 
findings through improved tools to facilitate public access to 
inspection information. To address our third recommendation, NRC 
stated that it will make plant performance and oversight information 
more readily searchable and available to inspection staff and other 
NRC personnel. 

In addition, in its comment letter, concerning regional differences, 
NRC stated that, although it believes adequate internal controls to 
ensure alignment between regions exist through program office 
oversight and audits, among other things, it agrees to seek 
enhancements in this area. NRC raised concerns about repeated 
references in the draft report to the use of professional judgment by 
NRC staff members in the ROP and Traditional Enforcement Process, 
stating that these references imply a high degree of subjectivity in 
the agency's implementation of its oversight processes and that its 
use of professional judgment is excessive or inconsistent. NRC stated 
that it believes its use of professional judgment is limited and 
controlled through its guidance. As stated in the report, we agree 
that NRC's oversight processes are largely prescribed in guidance. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, NRC, and other interested 
parties. In addition, this report also will be available at no charge 
on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix XII. 

Signed by: 

Frank Rusco: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) implements its processes for overseeing the safety of 
commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) evaluate the extent to which 
NRC consistently identifies and resolves findings through these 
processes; and (3) describe NRC's methods for developing lessons 
learned to improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in 
doing so. 

To describe how NRC implements its processes for overseeing the safety 
of commercial nuclear power reactors, we reviewed relevant federal 
laws, regulations, and guidance, including NRC's Enforcement Policy, 
Enforcement Manual, and Inspection Manual, among many other guidance 
documents. We also reviewed previous GAO and NRC Inspector General 
reports that identified safety-related challenges or made 
recommendations for improving NRC's oversight of reactor safety, and 
we reviewed documentation of NRC efforts to update its oversight 
processes. We interviewed NRC headquarters officials from the Offices 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory 
Research, and the Inspector General. We also conducted semistructured 
interviews with officials from all four NRC regions, as well as 
resident inspectors and plant representatives during site visits to 
five nuclear power plants (discussed further below). During these 
semistructured interviews, we asked NRC officials and plant 
representatives about (1) the implementation and consistency of NRC's 
oversight activities, (2) the extent to which NRC's oversight includes 
lessons learned from operating experience and safety-related findings, 
(3) the level of communication between NRC and plant representatives, 
(4) NRC actions taken to identify and resolve specific safety-related 
findings, and (5) site-specific considerations related to safety. In 
addition, we interviewed representatives from the Nuclear Energy 
Institute, the Union of Concerned Scientists, academic specialists, 
and other groups and individuals to discuss their views and gain 
additional insight into NRC's oversight of reactor safety. 

We made site visits to a nonprobability sample of five nuclear power 
plants. During these site visits, we held separate semistructured 
interviews with NRC resident inspectors and plant representatives, 
including licensee managers and plant operators, to obtain in-depth 
information about their experiences with NRC's oversight process. We 
also toured several of the sites with the resident inspectors and 
observed areas and equipment related to previous findings, in addition 
to current issues of concern being assessed for potential findings. 
Because this was a nonprobability sample, the information we gathered 
from these site visits is not generalizable to all U.S. nuclear power 
plants but provides important illustrative information for 
understanding the oversight of reactors at the selected plants. To 
select these sites, we applied the following criteria to capture a 
variety of characteristics: whether NRC's assessment of the plant's 
safety significance has changed in the past 2 years, and whether, 
collectively, they were located in multiple NRC regions, operated by 
different licensees, and included different reactor types. In Region 
I, we visited the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in Maryland. In 
Region III, we visited the Byron Station in Illinois and Palisades 
Nuclear Plant in Michigan. In Region IV, we visited the Cooper Nuclear 
Station in Nebraska and Wolf Creek Generating Station in Kansas. 

To evaluate the extent to which NRC consistently identifies and 
resolves findings through its processes for overseeing reactor safety, 
in addition to reviewing NRC guidance and interviewing NRC officials 
(as described above), we analyzed the nonsecurity findings and 
violations for all plants from the beginning of NRC's Reactor 
Oversight Process in 2000 through 2012.[Footnote 43] We obtained these 
data from NRC's Reactor Program System database. We also analyzed 
separate NRC data on (1) the number of inspection hours from 2000 
through 2012, (2) descriptive information about licensees, (3) 
substantive cross-cutting issues assigned to each plant from 2001 
through 2012, and (4) the quarterly action matrix assessment for each 
reactor from 2001 through 2012. In order to assess the reliability of 
the data we analyzed, we reviewed database documentation, interviewed 
NRC officials familiar with the data, and conducted electronic tests 
of the data, looking for missing values, outliers, or other anomalies. 
We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes. We also searched documents in NRC's publicly available, web-
based Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 
database, which is the official recordkeeping system for all NRC 
documents. 

To describe NRC's methods for developing lessons learned to improve 
its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so, in 
addition to reviewing NRC guidance and interviewing NRC officials (as 
described above), we observed NRC headquarters officials demonstrating 
the various computer-based tools they use for communicating and 
providing access to information on past experiences and lessons 
learned. We also observed resident inspectors, during our site visits 
to nuclear power plants, demonstrating how they access agency 
information on past experiences and lessons learned. In addition, we 
observed meetings where NRC staff updated the Commission and the 
public on the status of the development and implementation of lessons 
learned from the Fukushima disaster, among other safety-related 
concerns. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to September 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Summary Information about Operating Nuclear Power 
Reactors in the United States: 

This appendix provides summary information about the 104 commercial 
nuclear power reactors at 65 power plants for which we analyzed NRC 
data and that were operating in the United States through the end of 
calendar year 2012. For each reactor, table 14 lists the NRC region, 
state, date commercial operation began, and licensee. 

Table 14: Summary Information about Operating Commercial Nuclear Power 
Reactors: 

NRC Region I: 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Oct. 1976; 
Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov .1987; 
Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Maryland; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1975; 
Licensee: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Inc. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Maryland; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Apr. 1977; 
Licensee: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Inc. 

Reactor: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: New Jersey; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1986; 
Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 2; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1974; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1976; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1975; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Feb. 1986; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1990; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Connecticut; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1975; 
Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 3; 
State: Connecticut; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Apr. 1986; 
Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1969; 
Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1988; 
Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC. 

Reactor: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: New Jersey; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1969; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1974; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1974; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; 
State: Massachusetts; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec .1972; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; 
State: New York; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1970; 
Licensee: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: New Jersey; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1977; 
Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
State: New Jersey; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Oct. 1981; 
Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC. 

Reactor: Seabrook Station, Unit 1; 
State: New Hampshire; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1990; 
Licensee: FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1983; 
Licensee: PPL Susquehanna, LLC. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Feb. 1985; 
Licensee: PPL Susquehanna, LLC. 

Reactor: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: Pennsylvania; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1974; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Vermont; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov. 1972; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 

NRC Region II: 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Alabama; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1974; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Alabama; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1975; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3; 
State: Alabama; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1977; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1; 
State: North Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1977; 
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
State: North Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov. 1975; 
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1985; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1986; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3; 
State: Florida; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1977; 
Licensee: Florida Power Corp. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Georgia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1975; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Georgia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1979; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1971; 
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Alabama; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1977; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Alabama; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1981; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: North Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1981; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
State: North Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1984; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Virginia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1978; 
Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Co. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Virginia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1980; 
Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Co. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1973; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1974; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1974; 
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Tennessee; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1981; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Tennessee; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1982; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Reactor: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: North Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1987; 
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Florida; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1976; 
Licensee: Florida Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Florida; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1983; 
Licensee: Florida Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Virginia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1972; 
Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Co. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Virginia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1973; 
Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Co. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
State: Florida; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1972; 
Licensee: Florida Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 4; 
State: Florida; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1973; 
Licensee: Florida Power & Light Co. 

Reactor: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: South Carolina; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1984; 
Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Georgia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1987; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Georgia; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1989; 
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Tennessee; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1996; 
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

NRC Region III: 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 1; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1988; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 2; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Oct. 1988; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 1; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1985; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 2; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug 1987; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov. 1987; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Ohio; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1978; 
Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Michigan; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1975; 
Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Co. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Michigan; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1978; 
Licensee: Indiana Michigan Power Co. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1970; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov. 1971; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Duane Arnold Energy Center; 
State: Iowa; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Feb. 1975; 
Licensee: FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. 

Reactor: Fermi, Unit 2; 
State: Michigan; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1988; 
Licensee: The Detroit Edison Co. 

Reactor: Kewaunee Power Station; 
State: Wisconsin; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1974; 
Licensee: Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 1; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1984; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 2; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Oct. 1984; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Minnesota; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1971; 
Licensee: Northern States Power Company. 

Reactor: Palisades Nuclear Plant; 
State: Michigan; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1971; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Ohio; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Nov. 1987; 
Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Wisconsin; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1970; 
Licensee: FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Wisconsin; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Oct. 1972; 
Licensee: FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
State: Minnesota; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1973; 
Licensee: Northern States Power Co. Minnesota. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
State: Minnesota; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1974; 
Licensee: Northern States Power Co. Minnesota. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Feb. 1973; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
State: Illinois; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1973; 
Licensee: Exelon Generation Co., LLC. 

Region IV: 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; 
State: Arkansas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1974; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; 
State: Arkansas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1980; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Callaway Plant; 
State: Missouri; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1984; 
Licensee: Union Electric Co. 

Reactor: Columbia Generating Station, Unit 2; 
State: Washington; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Dec. 1984; 
Licensee: Energy Northwest. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
State: Texas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1990; 
Licensee: Luminant Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
State: Texas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1993; 
Licensee: Luminant Generation Co., LLC. 

Reactor: Cooper Nuclear Station; 
State: Nebraska; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1974; 
Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
State: California; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: May 1985; 
Licensee: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
State: California; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Mar. 1986; 
Licensee: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 

Reactor: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1; 
State: Nebraska; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1973; 
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District. 

Reactor: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
State: Mississippi; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: July 1985; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: Arizona; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1986; 
Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
State: Arizona; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1986; 
Licensee: Arizona Public 
Service Company.
Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
State: Arizona; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Jan. 1988; 
Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company. 

Reactor: River Bend Station, Unit 1; 
State: Louisiana; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1986; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
State: California; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1983; 
Licensee: Southern California Edison Co. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
State: California; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Apr. 1984; 
Licensee: Southern California Edison Co. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 1; 
State: Texas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Aug. 1988; 
Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 2; 
State: Texas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: June 1989; 
Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Co. 

Reactor: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; 
State: Louisiana; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1985; 
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 

Reactor: Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
State: Kansas; 
Date Commercial Operation Began: Sept. 1985; 
Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. 

Source: NRC. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear power 
reactors operating in the United States through the end of calendar 
year 2012. In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear 
Plant in Florida permanently shut down that site's reactor; in May 
2013, the owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently 
shut down that site's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San 
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down 
that site's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of 
operating commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States from 
104 to 100. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Performance 
Indicators: 

Initiating Events cornerstone - This cornerstone focuses on operations 
and events at a nuclear plant that could lead to a possible accident, 
if plant safety systems did not intervene. These events could include 
equipment failures leading to a plant shutdown, shutdowns with 
unexpected complications, or large changes in the plant's power 
output. (In this table, "scram" refers to automatic and manual reactor 
shutdowns.) 

Performance indicator: Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the number of unplanned 
scrams. It measures the rate of scrams per year of operation at power 
and provides an indication of initiating event frequency. The value of 
7,000 hours is used because it represents one year of reactor 
operation at 80 percent capacity. 

Performance indicator: Unplanned scrams with complications; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the subset of unplanned 
scrams while critical that require additional operator actions beyond 
that of the "normal" scram. Such events or conditions have the 
potential to present additional challenges to the plant operations 
staff and therefore, may be more risk-significant than uncomplicated 
scrams. 

Performance indicator: Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical 
hours; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the number of unplanned 
power changes (excluding scrams) that could have, under other plant 
conditions, challenged safety functions. It may provide leading 
indication of risk-significant events but is not itself risk-
significant. The indicator measures the number of plant power changes 
for a typical year of operation at power. 

Mitigating Systems cornerstone - This cornerstone measures the function 
of safety systems designed to prevent an accident or reduce the 
consequences of a possible accident. The equipment is checked by 
periodic testing and through actual performance. 

Performance indicator: Mitigating system performance index - emergency 
alternating current power systems; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the readiness of the 
emergency alternating current power systems to perform their safety 
functions in response to off-normal events or accidents. 

Performance indicator: Mitigating system performance index - high 
pressure injection systems; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the readiness of the 
high pressure injection systems to perform their safety functions in 
response to off-normal events or accidents. 

Performance indicator: Mitigating system performance index - heat 
removal systems; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the readiness of the 
heat removal systems to perform their safety functions in response to 
off-normal events or accidents. 

Performance indicator: Mitigating system performance index - residual 
heat removal systems; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the readiness of the 
residual heat removal systems to perform their safety functions in 
response to off-normal events or accidents. 

Performance indicator: Mitigating system performance index - cooling 
water systems; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the readiness of the 
cooling water support systems to perform their safety functions in 
response to off-normal events or accidents. 

Performance indicator: Safety system functional failures; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors events or conditions 
that alone prevented, or could have prevented, the fulfillment of the 
safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: shut down 
the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; remove 
residual heat; control the release of radioactive material; 
or mitigate the consequences of an accident. 

Barrier Integrity cornerstone - This cornerstone focuses on the 
physical barriers between the highly radioactive materials in fuel 
within the reactor and the public and the environment outside the 
plant. These barriers are the sealed rods containing the fuel pellets, 
the heavy steel reactor vessel and associated piping, and the 
reinforced concrete containment building surrounding the reactor. The 
integrity of the fuel rods, the vessel, and the piping is continuously 
checked for leakage, while the ability of the containment to prevent 
leakage is measured on a regular basis. 

Performance indicator: Reactor coolant system specific activity; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the integrity of the 
fuel cladding, the first of the three barriers to prevent the release 
of fission products. It measures the radioactivity in the reactor 
coolant system as an indication of functionality of the cladding. 

Performance indicator: Reactor coolant system leakage; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the integrity of the 
reactor coolant system pressure boundary, the second of the three 
barriers to prevent the release of fission products. It measures 
reactor coolant system identified leakage as a percentage of the 
technical specification allowable identified leakage to provide an 
indication of reactor coolant system integrity. 

Emergency Preparedness cornerstone -This cornerstone measures the 
effectiveness of plant staff in carrying out emergency plans for 
responding to a possible accident. Such emergency plans are tested 
every two years during emergency exercises involving the plant staff 
and local, state, and, in some cases, federal agencies. 

Performance indicator: Drill/exercise performance; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors timely and accurate 
licensee performance in drills and exercises when presented with 
opportunities for classification of emergencies, notification of 
offsite authorities, and development of protective action 
recommendations. It is the ratio, in percent, of timely and accurate 
performance of those actions to total opportunities. 

Performance indicator: Emergency response organization drill 
participation; 
Objective: This performance indicator tracks the participation of 
emergency response organization members assigned to fill key positions 
in performance enhancing experiences, and through linkage to the 
drill/exercise performance indicator ensures that the risk significant 
aspects of classification, notification, and protective action 
recommendations development are evaluated and included in the 
performance indicator process. This indicator measures the percentage 
of emergency response organization members assigned to fill key 
positions who have participated recently in performance-enhancing 
experiences such as drills, exercises, or in an actual event. 

Performance indicator: Alert and notification system reliability; 
Initiating Events 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the reliability of the 
offsite alert and notification system, a critical link for alerting 
and notifying the public of the need to take protective actions. It 
provides the percentage of the sirens that are capable of performing 
their safety function based on regularly scheduled tests. 

Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone - NRC regulations set a limit 
on radiation doses received by plant workers, and this cornerstone 
monitors the effectiveness of the plant's program to control and 
minimize those doses. 

Performance indicator: Occupational exposure control effectiveness; 
Objective: This performance indicator monitors the control of access 
to and work activities within radiologically-significant areas of the 
plant and occurrences involving degradation or failure of radiation 
safety barriers that result in readily-identifiable unintended dose. 

Public Radiation Safety cornerstone - This cornerstone measures the 
procedures and systems designed to minimize radioactive releases from a 
nuclear plant during normal operations and to keep those releases 
within federal limits. 

Performance indicator: "Radiological effluent technical 
specifications"/"offsite dose calculation manual" radiological 
effluent occurrence; 
Objective: This performance indicator assesses the performance of the 
program to control radiological effluent occurrences, which are 
radiological releases that exceed pre-set limits for liquid and 
gaseous releases. 

Physical Protection cornerstone[A] - Nuclear plants are required to 
have well-trained security personnel and a variety of protective 
systems to guard vital plant equipment, as well as programs to assure 
that employees are constantly fit for duty through drug and alcohol 
testing. This cornerstone measures the effectiveness of the security 
and fitness-for-duty programs. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC and Nuclear Energy Institute information. 

[A] The Physical Protection cornerstone consists of physical security 
issues. Our review focuses on NRC's oversight of the safe operation of 
reactors; therefore the physical security of plants and related 
performance indicators are outside the scope of this review. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Inspection Procedures: 

This appendix provides summary information about NRC's inspection 
procedures. Table 15 lists the safety cornerstone, title, and 
objective for each of the 36 safety-related (nonsecurity) baseline 
inspection procedures. Table 16 lists the title and objective for each 
of the 3 supplemental inspection procedures, and table 17 lists the 
title and objective for each of the 3 reactive inspection procedures. 

Table 15: NRC Safety Cornerstones and Related Baseline Inspection 
Procedures: 

Initiating Events cornerstone - This cornerstone focuses on operations 
and events at a nuclear plant that could lead to a possible accident, 
if plant safety systems did not intervene. These events could include 
equipment failures leading to a plant shutdown, shutdowns with 
unexpected complications, or large changes in the plant's power 
output. 

Mitigating Systems cornerstone - This cornerstone measures the 
function of safety systems designed to prevent an accident or reduce 
the consequences of a possible accident. The equipment is checked by 
periodic testing and through actual performance. 

Barrier Integrity cornerstone - This cornerstone focuses on the 
physical barriers between the highly radioactive materials in fuel 
within the reactor and the public and the environment outside the 
plant. These barriers are the sealed rods containing the fuel pellets, 
the heavy steel reactor vessel and associated piping, and the 
reinforced concrete containment building surrounding the reactor. The 
integrity of the fuel rods, the vessel, and the piping is continuously 
checked for leakage, while the ability of the containment to prevent 
leakage is measured on a regular basis. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.01; 
Title: Adverse weather protection; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that the design 
features and implementation of the licensee's procedures protect 
mitigating systems from adverse weather effects. Adverse weather 
includes events such as high winds, hurricanes, electrical storms, 
tornadoes, and extreme high or low temperatures. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.04; 
Title: Equipment alignment; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying equipment alignment, 
identifying any discrepancies that impact the function(s) of the 
system, and verifying that the licensee has properly identified and 
resolved equipment alignment problems. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.05AQ; 
Title: Fire Protection (Annual/Quarterly); 
Objective: This inspection focuses on evaluating the licensee's fire 
protection program, including assessing the performance of the fire 
brigade and verifying the adequacy of its fire detection and 
suppression capability, controls for combustibles and ignition sources 
within the plant, among other things. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.05T; 
Title: Fire Protection (Triennial)[A]; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on evaluating the design, 
operational status, and material condition of the licensee's fire 
protection program. In addition, inspection teams verify that certain 
mitigating strategies are feasible in light of operator training, 
maintenance of necessary equipment, and any plant modifications. This 
inspection is designed to complement Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.05XT; 
Title: Fire Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial)[B]; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on evaluating the design, 
installation, operational status, testing, and material condition of 
the licensee's fire protection program for plants, as well as the 
plant's capability to meet requirements of the NRC-approved fire 
protection program, and goals, objectives, and criteria for fire 
safety of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. In 
addition, inspection teams verify that certain mitigating strategies 
are feasible in light of operator training, maintenance of necessary 
equipment, and any plant modifications. This inspection is designed to 
complement Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.06; 
Title: Flood Protection Measures; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that the licensee's 
flooding mitigation plans and equipment are consistent with the 
licensee's design requirements and the risk analysis assumptions. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.07; 
Title: Heat Sink Performance; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that (1) potential 
heat exchanger deficiencies which could mask degraded performance are 
identified; (2) potential heat sink performance problems that have the 
potential to increase risk are identified; and (3) the licensee has 
adequately resolved them. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.08; 
Title: Inservice Inspection Activities; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on assessing the effectiveness of 
the licensee's program for monitoring degradation of reactor coolant 
system boundary, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and the 
containment boundary. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.11; 
Title: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator 
Performance; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on evaluating licensed operator 
performance during facility-administered requalification examinations, 
other examinations, facility training exercises, and during selected 
evolutions conducted in the actual plant/main control room. This 
inspection also reviews the licensee's ability to identify and correct 
problems associated with licensed operator performance. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.12; 
Title: Maintenance Effectiveness; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on supplementing performance 
indicators by providing for independent oversight of licensee 
maintenance effectiveness. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.13; 
Title: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying the performance and 
adequacy of risk assessments for planned or emergent maintenance 
activities, among other activities. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.15; 
Title: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on reviewing the operability or 
functionality assessments for certain components or systems to ensure 
that they remain capable of performing their design functions. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.17T; 
Title: Evaluations of Changes, Tests and Experiments and Permanent 
Plant Modifications; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that modifications to 
the plant have been adequately implemented, and that procedures and 
other documentation affected by the modifications have been adequately 
updated. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.18; 
Title: Plant Modifications; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that modifications to 
the plant have not affected the safety functions of important safety 
systems, have not degraded certain structures, systems, and 
components, and have not placed the plant in an unsafe condition. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.19; 
Title: Post-Maintenance Testing; 
This inspection focuses on 
verifying that post-maintenance test procedures and test activities are 
adequate to verify system operability, and functional capability. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.20; 
Title: Refueling and Other Outage Activities; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on evaluating licensee outage 
activities, including verifying that the licensee considered risk in 
developing outage schedules and adhered to certain risk reduction 
methodologies. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.21; 
Title: Component Design Bases Inspection; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on obtaining reasonable assurance 
that risk significant structures, systems, and components can 
adequately perform their design basis function. 

Inspection procedure: 71111.22; 
Title: Surveillance Testing; 
Objective: This inspection focuses on verifying that surveillance 
testing of risk-significant structures, systems, and components are 
capable of performing their intended safety functions and assessing 
their operational readiness. 

Emergency Preparedness cornerstone -This cornerstone measures the 
effectiveness of plant staff in carrying out emergency plans for 
responding to a possible accident. Such emergency plans are tested 
every two years during emergency exercises involving the plant staff 
and local, state, and, in some cases, federal agencies. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.01; 
Title: Exercise Evaluation; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating the adequacy of the 
licensee's conduct of each plant's biennial exercise, which each plant 
is required to complete to demonstrate their capability to adequately 
perform key skills in certain functional areas to protect public 
health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.02; 
Title: Alert and Notification System Testing; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating the licensee's 
compliance with the testing and maintenance requirements for alert and 
notification systems. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.03; 
Title: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation 
System; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating whether the 
licensee's on-shift and augmentation staffing levels meet emergency 
response commitments. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.04; 
Title: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing whether any changes 
to the licensee's emergency action level scheme have decreased the 
effectiveness of their emergency plan, and verifying that other 
emergency plan changes did not decrease its effectiveness. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.05; 
Title: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating the efficacy of 
licensee efforts to maintain their emergency preparedness programs. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.06; 
Title: Drill Evaluation; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating the licensee's 
assessment of performance to identify weaknesses in emergency 
preparedness in selected drills and training evolutions and use of its 
corrective action program to correct these weaknesses. 

Inspection procedure: 71114.07; 
Title: Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action Event; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating the adequacy of the 
licensee's ability to implement mitigative measures in response to a 
simulated attack at the plant, coordinate required actions to 
successfully respond to and mitigate plant damage, as well as its 
capability to assess performance in order to identify and correct 
weaknesses. 

Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone - NRC regulations set a limit 
on radiation doses received by plant workers, and this cornerstone 
monitors the effectiveness of the plant's program to control and 
minimize those doses. 
Public Radiation Safety cornerstone - This cornerstone measures the 
procedures and systems designed to minimize radioactive releases from 
a nuclear plant during normal operations and to keep those releases 
within federal limits. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.01; 
Title: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing licensee performance 
in assessing the radiological hazards in the workplace and in 
implementing of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control 
measures. In addition, this inspection focuses on verifying that the 
licensee is properly identifying and reporting performance indicators 
for the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.02; 
Title: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing licensee performance 
in maintaining radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable 
(ALARA). This inspection will determine whether the licensee's ALARA 
program is effective. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.03; 
Title: In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation; 
Description: This inspection focuses on verifying that in-plant 
airborne concentrations of radioactivity are as low as reasonably 
achievable to the extent necessary to validate plant operations and to 
verify that the practices and use of respiratory protection devices on 
site do not pose an undue risk to the wearer. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.04; 
Title: Occupational Dose Assessment; 
Description: This inspection focuses on determining the accuracy and 
operability of licensee's personal radiation monitoring equipment, the 
accuracy and effectiveness of their methods in calculating and 
monitoring radiological exposure to workers. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.05; 
Title: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; 
Description: This inspection focuses on verifying that the licensee is 
ensuring the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring 
instruments that are used to monitor areas, materials, and workers to 
ensure a radiologically safe work environment, among other things. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.06; 
Title: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment; 
Description: This inspection focuses on ensuring that gaseous and 
liquid effluent processing systems are maintained so that radiological 
discharges are properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with 
regard to public exposure. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.07; 
Title: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program; 
Description: This inspection focuses on verifying that the licensee 
quantifies the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the 
environment, that it sufficiently validates the integrity of its 
program that monitors radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release, 
and that it implements this program consistently. 

Inspection procedure: 71124.08; 
Title: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material 
Handling, Storage, and Transportation; 
Description: This inspection focuses on verifying the effectiveness of 
the licensee's programs for processing, handling, storage, and 
transportation of radioactive material. 

Physical Protection cornerstone[C] - Nuclear plants are required to 
have well-trained security personnel and a variety of protective 
systems to guard vital plant equipment, as well as programs to assure 
that employees are constantly fit for duty through drug and alcohol 
testing. This cornerstone measures the effectiveness of the security 
and fitness-for-duty programs. 

Other Baseline Procedures: 

Inspection procedure: 71151; 
Title: Performance Indicator Verification; 
Description: This inspection focuses on performing a periodic review 
of performance indicator data to determine their accuracy and 
completeness. 

Inspection procedure: 71152; 
Title: Problem Identification and Resolution; 
Description: This inspection focuses on (1) providing an early warning 
of potential performance issues that could result in crossing 
thresholds in the action matrix of NRC's Reactor Oversight Process, 
(2) helping gauge NRC's response when these thresholds are crossed, 
and (3) providing insights into whether licensees have established a 
safety conscious work environment, among other things. 

Inspection procedure: 71153; 
Title: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion; 
Description: This inspection focuses on evaluating licensee events and 
degraded conditions for plant status and mitigating actions to help 
determine the need for additional inspections. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[A] Traditionally, commercial nuclear power plants have followed a 
deterministic fire safety approach where plant operators are required 
to ensure that at least one system of electric cables and equipment is 
available to safely shut down a reactor if a fire occurs. 

[B] In 2004 NRC issued a regulation permitting plants to voluntarily 
transition from a deterministic fire safety approach to risk-informed 
fire protection requirements. Under this approach, a licensee adopts 
performance goals, objectives, and criteria for fire safety that are 
defined by the fire protection standard--NFPA-805--issued by the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), an international 
nonprofit organization that develops, publishes, and disseminates fire 
prevention and safety standards. 

[C] This review focuses on NRC's oversight of the safe operation of 
reactors; therefore the physical security of plants (Physical 
Protection cornerstone) is outside the scope of this review. 

[End of table] 

Table 16: NRC Supplemental Inspection Procedures: 

Inspection procedure: 95001; 
Title: Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a 
Strategic Performance Area; 
Description: This inspection focuses on (1) providing assurance that 
the root causes and contributing causes of risk-significant 
performance issues are understood, (2) that the extent of condition 
and extent of cause of risk-significant performance issues are 
identified, and (3) that the licensee's corrective actions for risk-
significant performance issues are sufficient to address them. 

Inspection procedure: 95002; 
Title: Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or any 
Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area; 
Description: This inspection focuses on (1) providing assurance that 
the cause(s) of risk-significant performance issues are understood, 
(2) independently assessing that the extent of the condition and 
extent of cause of risk-significant performance issues are identified, 
(3) independently determining if safety culture components caused or 
contributed to these performance issues, and (4) that the licensee's 
corrective actions are sufficient to prevent recurrence. 

Inspection procedure: 95003; 
Title: Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, 
Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red 
Input; 
Description: This inspection focuses on providing the NRC additional 
information to be used in deciding whether the continued operation of 
the plant is acceptable and whether additional regulatory actions are 
necessary to stop the decline of a plant's performance. In addition, 
it focuses on providing an independent assessment of the extent of 
risk significant issues to determine whether an unacceptable margin of 
safety or security exists, among other things. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[End of table] 

Table 17: NRC Reactive Inspection Procedures: 

Inspection procedure: 93812; 
Title: Special Inspection; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing a significant 
operational event and its causes with a special inspection team, 
including collecting, analyzing, and documenting information and 
evidence about the event, and evaluating the adequacy of the 
licensee's response to the event. The team conducting the inspection 
is comprised of technical experts from the region in which the event 
took place. The special inspection team reports directly to the 
appropriate regional administrator. 

Inspection procedure: 93800; 
Title: Augmented Inspection Team; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing a significant 
operational event and its causes with an augmented inspection team, 
including collecting, analyzing, and documenting information and 
evidence about the event, and evaluating the adequacy of the licensee's 
response to the event. It is similar to an inspection performed by a 
special inspection team except that the team conducting an augmented 
inspection consists of technical experts from the region in which the 
event took place and is augmented by personnel from headquarters or 
other regions or by contractors. The augmented inspection team reports 
directly to the appropriate regional administrator. 

Inspection procedure: [A]; 
Title: Incident Investigation Team; 
Description: This inspection focuses on assessing a significant 
operational event and its causes within an incident investigation team, 
including collecting, analyzing, and documenting information and 
evidence about the event. The team conducting the inspection consists 
of technical experts who, to the extent practicable, do not have, and 
have not had, previous significant involvement with licensing and 
inspection activities at the affected plant. The incident investigation 
team reports directly to the Executive Director for Operations and is 
independent of regional and headquarters office management. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

Note: A significant operational event is any radiological, safeguards, 
or other safety-related operational event at an NRC-licensed facility 
that poses an actual or a potential hazard to public health and 
safety, property, or the environment. A significant operational event 
also may be referred to as "an event" or "an incident." 

[A] An incident investigation does not have an inspection procedure, 
according to an NRC official. Instead, it is described in NRC 
Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Examples of NRC Findings and Violations: 

This appendix provides summary information about select examples of 
NRC findings and violations. Table 18 provides a brief description, 
nuclear power plant location, and date recorded for select examples of 
NRC findings illustrating different risk significance levels. Table 19 
provides a brief description, nuclear power plant location, and date 
recorded for select examples of NRC violations illustrating different 
severity levels. 

Table 18: Select Examples of NRC Findings Illustrating Different Risk 
Significance Levels: 

Risk Significance: Green Finding[A]; 
Description: Licensee did not verify the impact that High-Energy Line 
Breaks in the turbine building could have on safety-related electrical 
equipment. Determined to be of very low safety significance because it 
was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of 
operability. Entered in corrective action plan; 
Nuclear power plant: Indian Point Nuclear Generating; 
Date recorded: Nov. 2012. 

Risk Significance: Green Finding[A]; 
Description: Licensee failed to establish and perform adequate 
preventive maintenance on a certain transformer; 
Nuclear power plant: Limerick Generating Station; 
Date recorded: Sept. 2012. 

Risk Significance: White Finding[B]; 
Description: Failure to establish and maintain emergency diesel 
generator maintenance procedures as required by regulation; 
Nuclear power plant: North Anna Power Station; 
Date recorded: Dec. 2011. 

Description: Flange on diesel generator failed, causing significant oil 
leak, and was required to be shutdown; 
Nuclear power plant: Byron Station; 
Date recorded: Feb. 2011. 

Risk Significance: Yellow Finding[C]; 
Description: Licensee failed to provide adequate oversight of 
contractor during maintenance of a startup transformer. Contractor 
replaced wires without necessary insulation, causing the wires to 
touch during operation, which caused a loss of offsite power to 
equipment; 
Nuclear power plant: Wolf Creek Generating Station; 
Date recorded: Jan. 2012. 

Risk Significance: Yellow Finding[C]; 
Description: Failure to maintain external flood procedures--procedures 
that would protect intake structures and auxiliary building during 
external floods. The procedure to stack sandbags at certain height over 
floodgates deemed insufficient; 
Nuclear power plant: Fort Calhoun Station; 
Date recorded: June 2010. 

Risk Significance: Red Finding[D]; 
Description: Failure to ensure that 
design requirements for electrical power distribution system were 
properly implemented and maintained. Led to catastrophic fire that 
affected the plant's ability to shut down safety; 
Nuclear power plant: Fort Calhoun Station; 
Date recorded: Apr. 2012. 

Risk Significance: Red Finding[D]; 
Description: Failure to restore a heat removal system to operating 
status within the required time; 
Nuclear power plant: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant; 
Date recorded: Oct. 2010. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[A] Green findings are denoted as very low safety significance; they 
indicate that licensee performance is acceptable and cornerstone 
objectives are fully met with nominal risk and deviation. 

[B] White findings are denoted as low to moderate safety significance; 
they indicate that licensee performance is acceptable, but outside the 
nominal risk range. Cornerstone objectives are met with minimal 
reduction in safety margin. 

[C] Yellow findings are denoted as substantial safety significance; 
they indicate a decline in licensee performance that is still 
acceptable with cornerstone objectives met, but with significant 
reduction in safety margin. 

[D] Red findings are denoted as high safety significance; they 
indicate a decline in licensee performance that is associated with an 
unacceptable loss of safety margin. Sufficient safety margin still 
exists to prevent undue risk to public health and safety. 

[End of table] 

Table 19: Select Examples of NRC Violations Illustrating Different 
Severity Levels: 

Severity Level: Severity Level I[A]; 
Description: Licensee submitted incomplete and inaccurate information 
related to completed corrective actions. Specifically, licensee did 
not remove accumulated boron deposits in certain areas; 
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; 
Date recorded: Aug. 2002. 

Severity Level: Severity Level II[B]; 
Description: Failure to determine cause of having boric acid on 
reactor head and taking steps to preclude repetition; 
Nuclear power plant: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; 
Date recorded: Aug. 2002. 

Severity Level: Severity Level II[B]; 
Description: Licensee did not select a former employee to a competitive 
position due, in part, to the employee's engagement in protected 
activities. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board upheld NRC finding 
that licensee discriminated against its former employee; 
Nuclear power plant: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant; 
Date recorded: June 2001. 

Severity Level: Severity Level III[C]; 
Description: A senior reactor operator performed licensed activities 
while license was inactive and was on temporary medical hold; 
Nuclear power plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; 
Date recorded: Apr. 2011. 

Severity Level: Severity Level III[C]; 
Description: Failure to provide complete and accurate information to 
NRC which impacted a licensing decision; 
Nuclear power plant: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant; 
Date recorded: Oct. 2006. 

Severity Level: Severity Level IV[D]; 
Description: Failure to submit Licensee Event Report per 10 CFR 
50.73(a)(2)(vii); 
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood Station; 
Date recorded: Dec. 2011. 

Severity Level: Severity Level IV[D]; 
Description: Failure to obtain license amendment prior to implementing 
a proposed change to auxiliary feedwater system (as required by 10 CFR 
50.59); 
Nuclear power plant: Braidwood Station; 
Date recorded: Sept. 2011. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC information. 

[A] Severity Level I violations are violations that resulted in or 
could have resulted in serious safety consequences (e.g., violations 
that created the substantial potential for serious safety consequences 
or violations that involved systems failing when actually called on to 
prevent or mitigate a serious safety event). 

[B] Severity Level II violations are violations that resulted in or 
could have resulted in significant safety consequences (e.g., 
violations that created the potential for substantial safety 
consequences or violations that involved systems not being capable, 
for an extended period, of preventing or mitigating a serious safety 
event). 

[C] Severity Level III violations are violations that resulted in or 
could have resulted in moderate safety consequences (e.g., violations 
that created a potential for moderate safety consequences or 
violations that involved systems not being capable, for a relatively 
short period, of preventing or mitigating a serious safety event). 

[D] Severity Level IV violations are violations that are less serious, 
but are of more than minor concern, that resulted in no or relatively 
inappreciable potential safety consequences (e.g., violations that 
created the potential of more than minor safety consequences). 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: NRC Nonescalated Findings at Operating Nuclear Power 
Plants in the United States: 

This appendix provides performance information about the 104 
commercial nuclear power reactors at 65 power plants for which we 
analyzed NRC data and that were operating in the United States through 
the end of calendar year 2012. Table 20 lists the number of 
nonescalated findings identified at each plant from 2000 through 2012. 

Table 20: NRC Nonescalated Findings (Green Inspection Findings and 
Severity Level IV Violations) per Operating Commercial Nuclear Power 
Plant, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

NRC Region I: 

Plant[A]: Beaver Valley Power Station; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 10; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 9; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 9; 
2009: 7; 
2009: 5; 
2010: 5; 
2010: 9; 
2012: 9; 
Total: 113. 

Plant[A]: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 6; 
2001: 18; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 19; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 8; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 12; 
2009: 15; 
2010: 13; 
2011: 9; 
2012: 10; 
Total: 140. 

Plant[A]: Hope Creek Generating Station; 
2000: 13; 
2001: 18; 
2002: 24; 
2003: 19; 
2004: 25; 
2005: 17; 
2006: 13; 
2007: 18; 
2008: 4; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 9; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 3; 
Total: 176. 

Plant[A]: Indian Point Nuclear Generating[B]; 
2000: 27; 
2001: 57; 
2002: 24; 
2003: 34; 
2004: 31; 
2005: 24; 
2006: 30; 
2007: 34; 
2008: 27; 
2009: 26; 
2010: 26; 
2011: 20; 
2012: 20; 
Total: 380. 

Plant[A]: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 28; 
2001: 12; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 8; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 5; 
Total: 115. 

Plant[A]: Limerick Generating Station; 
2000: 8; 
2001: 15; 
2002: 11; 
2003: 16; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 4; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 9; 
2012: 10; 
Total: 110. 

Plant[A]: Millstone Power Station; 
2000: 17; 
2001: 20; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 8; 
2004: 12; 
2005: 17; 
2006: 17; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 12; 
2010: 13; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 9; 
Total: 173. 

Plant[A]: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station; 
2000: 8; 
2001: 16; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 15; 
2004: 19; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 13; 
2009: 12; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 11; 
Total: 140. 

Plant[A]: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 10; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 12; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 15; 
2005: 13; 
2006: 16; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 9; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 15; 
2011: 10; 
2012: 8; 
Total: 153. 

Plant[A]: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; 
2000: 10; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 20; 
2004: 7; 
2005: 9; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 12; 
2009: 13; 
2010: 4; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 5; 
Total: 131. 

Plant[A]: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 10; 
2001: 7; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 9; 
2004: 6; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 5; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 9; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 17; 
2012: 7; 
Total: 108. 

Plant[A]: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 7; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 11; 
2003: 14; 
2004: 9; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 12; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 11; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 111. 

Plant[A]: Salem Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 7; 
2001: 17; 
2002: 14; 
2003: 26; 
2004: 25; 
2005: 25; 
2006: 13; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 16; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 4; 
2011: 11; 
2012: 5; 
Total: 179. 

Plant[A]: Seabrook Station; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 10; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 10; 
2004: 9; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 10; 
2007: 6; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 7; 
2012: 7; 
Total: 85. 

Plant[A]: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 20; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 17; 
2003: 11; 
2004: 14; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 11; 
2008: 11; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 17; 
2011: 19; 
2012: 18; 
Total: 175. 

Plant[A]: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station; 
2000: 7; 
2001: 19; 
2002: 8; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 14; 
2005: 13; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 7; 
2009: 7; 
2010: 9; 
2011: 4; 
2012: 12; 
Total: 126. 

Plant[A]: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 9; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 9; 
2004: 15; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 5; 
2007: 6; 
2008: 12; 
2009: 5; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 103. 

Plant[A]: 2012 (NRC Region I); 
2000: 203; 
2001: 274; 
2002: 196; 
2003: 229; 
2004: 241; 
2005: 189; 
2006: 173; 
2007: 190; 
2008: 183; 
2009: 172; 
2010: 159; 
2011: 158; 
2012: 151; 
Total: 2,518. 

NRC Region II: 

Plant[A]: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant[C]; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 5; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 10; 
2007: 19; 
2008: 7; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 15; 
2012: 14; 
Total: 135. 

Plant[A]: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 6; 
2005: 9; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 9; 
2009: 16; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 9; 
2012: 10; 
Total: 93. 

Plant[A]: Catawba Nuclear Station; 
2000: 9; 
2001: 10; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 14; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 5; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 4; 
2012: 8; 
Total: 98. 

Plant[A]: Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 6; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 5; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 60. 

Plant[A]: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 8; 
2002: 5; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 11; 
2006: 6; 
2007: 5; 
2008: 6; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 11; 
2011: 10; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 96. 

Plant[A]: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 8; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 6; 
2007: 6; 
2008: 4; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 16; 
Total: 87. 

Plant[A]: McGuire Nuclear Station; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 8; 
2004: 17; 
2005: 11; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 9; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 8; 
Total: 119. 

Plant[A]: North Anna Power Station; 
2000: 6; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 9; 
2005: 12; 
2006: 10; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 7; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 19; 
2011: 11; 
2012: 10; 
Total: 115. 

Plant[A]: Oconee Nuclear Station; 
2000: 18; 
2001: 16; 
2002: 12; 
2003: 13; 
2004: 11; 
2005: 21; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 12; 
2011: 18; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 163. 

Plant[A]: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 5; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 7; 
2012: 12; 
Total: 72. 

Plant[A]: St Lucie Plant; 
2000: 2; 
2001: 13; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 7; 
2009: 12; 
2010: 12; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 14; 
Total: 117. 

Plant[A]: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 14; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 16; 
2003: 9; 
2004: 7; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 8; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 6; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 11; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 123. 

Plant[A]: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 8; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 5; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 6; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 6; 
2009: 5; 
2010: 11; 
2011: 15; 
2012: 8; 
Total: 90. 

Plant[A]: Surry Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 4; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 5; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 5; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 12; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 8; 
2012: 8; 
Total: 92. 

Plant[A]: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating; 
2000: 4; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 9; 
2004: 13; 
2005: 9; 
2006: 8; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 9; 
2010: 9; 
2011: 9; 
2012: 7; 
Total: 106. 

Plant[A]: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; 
2000: 9; 
2001: 13; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 10; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 9; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 5; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 12; 
2012: 12; 
Total: 114. 

Plant[A]: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 8; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 5; 
2009: 7; 
2010: 6; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 9; 
Total: 75. 

Plant[A]: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 10; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 8; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 9; 
2009: 7; 
2010: 22; 
2011: 13; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 130. 

Plant[A]: 2012 (NRC Region II); 
2000: 107; 
2001: 135; 
2002: 123; 
2003: 120; 
2004: 138; 
2005: 152; 
2006: 132; 
2007: 158; 
2008: 121; 
2009: 164; 
2010: 191; 
2011: 170; 
2012: 174; 
Total: 1,885. 

NRC Region III: 

Plant[A]: Braidwood Station; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 12; 
2002: 12; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 17; 
2010: 22; 
2011: 33; 
2012: 22; 
Total: 178. 

Plant[A]: Byron Station; 
2000: 6; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 17; 
2004: 14; 
2005: 20; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 19; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 15; 
2011: 22; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 182. 

Plant[A]: Clinton Power Station; 
2000: 12; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 16; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 6; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 8; 
2010: 17; 
2011: 22; 
2012: 9; 
Total: 149. 

Plant[A]: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 16; 
2003: 25; 
2004: 52; 
2005: 13; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 15; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 9; 
2010: 13; 
2011: 14; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 201. 

Plant[A]: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 14; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 27; 
2003: 25; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 17; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 11; 
2008: 9; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 5; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 15; 
Total: 168. 

Plant[A]: Dresden Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 18; 
2001: 20; 
2002: 19; 
2003: 22; 
2004: 26; 
2005: 13; 
2006: 22; 
2007: 17; 
2008: 10; 
2009: 22; 
2010: 19; 
2011: 23; 
2012: 10; 
Total: 241. 

Plant[A]: Duane Arnold Energy Center; 
2000: 2; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 22; 
2004: 12; 
2005: 20; 
2006: 13; 
2007: 21; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 13; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 11; 
2012: 14; 
Total: 162. 

Plant[A]: Fermi, Unit 2; 
2000: 7; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 12; 
2004: 14; 
2005: 22; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 24; 
2008: 16; 
2009: 7; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 11; 
2012: 11; 
Total: 160. 

Plant[A]: Kewaunee Power Station; 
2000: 17; 
2001: 12; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 17; 
2004: 24; 
2005: 25; 
2006: 25; 
2007: 39; 
2008: 8; 
2009: 23; 
2010: 19; 
2011: 20; 
2012: 18; 
Total: 256. 

Plant[A]: Lasalle County Station; 
2000: 6; 
2001: 9; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 12; 
2005: 21; 
2006: 6; 
2007: 18; 
2008: 5; 
2009: 5; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 16; 
2012: 11; 
Total: 136. 

Plant[A]: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 17; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 12; 
2004: 13; 
2005: 11; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 17; 
2009: 12; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 17; 
2012: 14; 
Total: 154. 

Plant[A]: Palisades Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 4; 
2001: 23; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 13; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 8; 
2006: 28; 
2007: 25; 
2008: 27; 
2009: 14; 
2010: 17; 
2011: 31; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 226. 

Plant[A]: Perry Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 7; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 19; 
2004: 16; 
2005: 61; 
2006: 16; 
2007: 16; 
2008: 26; 
2009: 26; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 20; 
2012: 16; 
Total: 256. 

Plant[A]: Point Beach Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 15; 
2002: 10; 
2003: 30; 
2004: 25; 
2005: 27; 
2006: 25; 
2007: 28; 
2008: 34; 
2009: 16; 
2010: 21; 
2011: 13; 
2012: 21; 
Total: 276. 

Plant[A]: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 10; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 5; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 16; 
2006: 13; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 27; 
2010: 25; 
2011: 24; 
2012: 21; 
Total: 186. 

Plant[A]: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 35; 
2001: 7; 
2002: 21; 
2003: 15; 
2004: 14; 
2005: 11; 
2006: 32; 
2007: 18; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 16; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 15; 
2012: 12; 
Total: 217. 

Plant[A]: 2012 (NRC Region III); 
2000: 166; 
2001: 178; 
2002: 199; 
2003: 252; 
2004: 271; 
2005: 303; 
2006: 255; 
2007: 290; 
2008: 239; 
2009: 231; 
2010: 243; 
2011: 295; 
2012: 226; 
Total: 3,148. 

NRC Region IV: 

Plant[A]: Arkansas Nuclear One; 
2000: 5; 
2001: 13; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 17; 
2004: 23; 
2005: 22; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 27; 
2008: 21; 
2009: 25; 
2010: 25; 
2011: 19; 
2012: 17; 
Total: 234. 

Plant[A]: Callaway Plant; 
2000: 15; 
2001: 17; 
2002: 11; 
2003: 15; 
2004: 17; 
2005: 17; 
2006: 22; 
2007: 19; 
2008: 19; 
2009: 18; 
2010: 16; 
2011: 28; 
2012: 11; 
Total: 225. 

Plant[A]: Columbia Generating Station; 
2000: 10; 
2001: 12; 
2002: 5; 
2003: 21; 
2004: 17; 
2005: 10; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 17; 
2008: 13; 
2009: 17; 
2010: 11; 
2011: 18; 
2012: 23; 
Total: 183. 

Plant[A]: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 7; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 13; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 11; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 7; 
2008: 19; 
2009: 15; 
2010: 16; 
2011: 28; 
2012: 11; 
Total: 157. 

Plant[A]: Cooper Nuclear Station; 
2000: 27; 
2001: 32; 
2002: 23; 
2003: 29; 
2004: 23; 
2005: 34; 
2006: 20; 
2007: 24; 
2008: 15; 
2009: 31; 
2010: 20; 
2011: 39; 
2012: 46; 
Total: 363. 

Plant[A]: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 14; 
2003: 22; 
2004: 25; 
2005: 24; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 15; 
2009: 17; 
2010: 37; 
2011: 16; 
2012: 14; 
Total: 228. 

Plant[A]: Fort Calhoun Station; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 7; 
2002: 18; 
2003: 12; 
2004: 15; 
2005: 21; 
2006: 18; 
2007: 18; 
2008: 19; 
2009: 13; 
2010: 23; 
2011: 15; 
2012: 29; 
Total: 219. 

Plant[A]: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station; 
2000: 4; 
2001: 15; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 10; 
2005: 12; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 29; 
2008: 28; 
2009: 21; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 26; 
2012: 27; 
Total: 219. 

Plant[A]: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 4; 
2001: 16; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 49; 
2005: 32; 
2006: 39; 
2007: 43; 
2008: 22; 
2009: 29; 
2010: 14; 
2011: 18; 
2012: 26; 
Total: 299. 

Plant[A]: River Bend Station; 
2000: 23; 
2001: 19; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 17; 
2004: 18; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 22; 
2007: 26; 
2008: 17; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 22; 
2012: 35; 
Total: 240. 

Plant[A]: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 19; 
2001: 5; 

2002: 9; 
2003: 10; 
2004: 16; 
2005: 18; 
2006: 12; 
2007: 22; 
2008: 32; 
2009: 33; 
2010: 44; 
2011: 22; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 255. 

Plant[A]: South Texas Project; 
2000: 11; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 15; 
2004: 13; 
2005: 14; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 10; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 17; 
2012: 9; 
Total: 151. 

Plant[A]: Waterford Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 13; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 14; 
2003: 15; 
2004: 17; 
2005: 16; 
2006: 7; 
2007: 16; 
2008: 14; 
2009: 18; 
2010: 7; 
2011: 27; 
2012: 17; 
Total: 186. 

Plant[A]: Wolf Creek Generating Station; 
2000: 6; 
2001: 5; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 7; 
2004: 9; 
2005: 7; 
2006: 15; 
2007: 27; 
2008: 43; 
2009: 44; 
2010: 38; 
2011: 38; 
2012: 24; 
Total: 266. 

Plant[A]: 2012 (NRC Region IV); 
2000: 166; 
2001: 177; 
2002: 144; 
2003: 193; 
2004: 262; 
2005: 245; 
2006: 221; 
2007: 293; 
2008: 291; 
2009: 301; 
2010: 297; 
2011: 333; 
2012: 302; 
Total: 3,225. 

Plant[A]: 2012 (all regions); 
2000: 642; 
2001: 764; 
2002: 662; 
2003: 794; 
2004: 912; 
2005: 889; 
2006: 781; 
2007: 931; 
2008: 834; 
2009: 868; 
2010: 890; 
2011: 956; 
2012: 853; 
Total: 10,776. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear power 
reactors operating in the United States through the end of calendar 
year 2012. In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear 
Plant in Florida permanently shut down that site's reactor; in May 
2013, the owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently 
shut down that site's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San 
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down 
that site's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of 
operating commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States from 
104 to 100. 

Green inspection findings are denoted as very low safety significance; 
they indicate that licensee performance is acceptable and cornerstone 
objectives are fully met with nominal risk and deviation. 

Severity Level IV violations are violations that are less serious, but 
are of more than minor concern, that resulted in no or relatively 
inappreciable potential safety consequences (e.g., violations that 
created the potential of more than minor safety consequences). 

[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power plant as opposed to by 
individual reactor. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 reactors located at 
each plant. Therefore, data for all 104 reactors are included here, 
but at the plant level. 

[B] Although NRC tracks findings at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 
separately, they are physically located at the same plant. 

[C] One of the Browns Ferry reactors (Unit 1) was shut down from March 
1985 until May 2007 to address performance and management issues. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Summary of NRC Performance Assessments for Nuclear Power 
Reactors Operating from 2001 through 2012: 

This appendix provides performance information about the 104 
commercial nuclear power reactors at 65 power plants for which we 
analyzed NRC data and that were operating in the United States through 
the end of calendar year 2012. Based on NRC's assessment of licensee 
performance under the ROP, NRC places each of the licensee's reactors 
into one of five performance categories on its action matrix, which 
corresponds to increased levels of oversight. The action matrix is 
NRC's formal method of determining how much additional oversight--
mostly in the form of supplemental inspections--is required on the 
basis of the number and risk significance of performance indicators 
and inspection findings. The level of oversight reported here 
corresponds to the highest level the plant received during the year, 
even if it was only a portion of the year. Thus, if a plant was placed 
into a different category each quarter, the highest category in which 
it was placed is reported here. (See table 21.) 

Table 21: Highest Level of Oversight Applied by NRC to Operating 
Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors for One or More Quarters of Each 
Calendar Year, 2001-2012: 

Key: 
1. Action Matrix column 1: Licensee Response. 
2. Action Matrix column 2: Regulatory Response. 
3. Action Matrix column 3: Degraded Cornerstone. 
4. Action Matrix column 4: Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone. 
5. Action Matrix column 5: Unacceptable Performance. 
6. Removed from Action Matrix: IMC 0350 process. 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 4; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Seabrook Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

NRC Region II: 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1[A]; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: [A]; 
2002: [A]; 
2003: [A]; 
2004: [A]; 
2005: [A]; 
2006: [A]; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 4; 
2011: 4; 
2012: 4. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 4; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

NRC Region III: 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1[B]; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 6; 
2003: 6; 
2004: 6; 
2005: 6; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 6; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 6; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 3; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Duane Arnold Energy Center; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Fermi, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Kewaunee Power Station; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Palisades Nuclear Plant; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 4; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

NRC Region IV: 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Callaway Plant; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Columbia Generating Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 3. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Cooper Nuclear Station; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 3; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1]; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1[C]; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 6. 

Reactor: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 3; 
2006: 4; 
2007: 4; 
2008: 4; 
2009: 4; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: River Bend Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 2; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 2; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1. 

Reactor: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 2. 

Reactor: Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
Highest level of oversight (action matrix column assigned) during at 
least some portion of the year: 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 3. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant 
in Florida permanently shut down that site's reactor; in May 2013, the 
owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down 
that site's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down that 
site's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating 
commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States from 104 to 
100, and they reduced the number of operating nuclear power plant 
sites from 65 to 62. 

NRC periodically removes plants from oversight under the action 
matrix--due to significant performance or operational concerns 
regarding plants that are shut down--through a prescribed process that 
it refers to as the IMC 0350 process, which is named after the NRC 
Inspection Manual chapter providing guidance for this level of 
oversight. Upon implementation of this process, the appropriate 
regional administrator establishes an oversight panel--typically 
comprised of officials from both headquarters and regional offices, 
including senior management--that determines the oversight activities 
necessary to authorize the restart of the plant's reactors. See NRC 
Inspection Manual chapter 0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a 
Shutdown Condition due to Significant Performance and/or Operational 
Concerns." 

[A] One of the Browns Ferry reactors (Unit 1) was shut down from March 
1985 until May 2007 to address performance and management issues. 

[B] NRC removed the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station from oversight 
under the action matrix and placed it under the IMC 0350 process from 
2002 through 2005 due to an incident with the reactor's vessel head 
that occurred in 2002. 

[C] NRC removed the Fort Calhoun Station from oversight under the 
action matrix and placed it under the IMC 0350 process in 2011 due to 
performance issues, as well as issues associated with the Missouri 
River flooding that affected the plant that year. As of July 2013, 
this plant has not been reinstated for oversight under the action 
matrix. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Substantive Cross-cutting Issues Identified by NRC at 
Operating Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States: 

This appendix provides performance information about the 104 
commercial nuclear power reactors at 65 power plants for which we 
analyzed NRC data and that were operating in the United States through 
the end of calendar year 2012. Table 22 lists the substantive cross-
cutting issues assigned to each reactor from 2001 through 2012. 

Table 22: Substantive Cross-cutting Issues Identified by NRC at 
Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors for One or More Quarters 
of Each Calendar Year, 2001-2012: 

Key: 
HU: human performance. 
PIR: problem identification and resolution. 
SC: safety conscious work environment. 

NRC Region I: 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; SC; 
2005: PIR; SC; 
2006: SC; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; HU; 
2003: PIR; HU; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Millstone Power Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: HU; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: HU; 
2007: HU; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; SC; 
2005: PIR; SC; 
2006: SC; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; SC; 
2005: PIR; SC;
2006: SC; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Seabrook Station, Unit 1; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: HU; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: HU; PIR. 

Reactor: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: HU; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: HU; PIR. 

Reactor: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

NRC Region II: 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1[A]; 
2001: [A]; 
2002: [A]; 
2003: [A]; 
2004: [A]; 
2005: [A]; 
2006: [A]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; 
2009: PIR; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: PIR. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; 
2009: PIR; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: PIR. 

Reactor: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; 
2009: PIR; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: PIR. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: HU; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: North Anna Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: HU; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: HU; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: HU; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Surry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: PIR; 
2008: PIR; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 4; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: PIR; 
2008: PIR; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

NRC Region III: 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: HU; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Braidwood Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: HU; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: HU; 
2006: HU; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Byron Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: HU; 
2006: HU; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: HU; 
2005: HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: HU; 
2005: HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Duane Arnold Energy Center; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: HU; 
2006: HU; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Fermi, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: HU; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Kewaunee Power Station; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: PIR; HU; 
2007: PIR; HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: HU; 
2005: HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: LaSalle County Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: HU; 
2005: HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Palisades Nuclear Plant; 
2001: PIR; HU; 
2002: PIR; HU; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: PIR; 
2008: HU; 
2009: HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: PIR; HU; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: PIR; HU; 
2011: HU; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: PIR; HU; 
2004: PIR; HU; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: PIR; HU; 
2004: PIR; HU; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: HU; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: HU; 
2010: HU; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: HU; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: HU; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

NRC Region IV: 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Callaway Plant; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: PIR; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: HU; 
2006: HU; 
2007: PIR; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Columbia Generating Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: HU; 
2003: HU; 
2004: PIR; 
2005: HU; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: HU. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Cooper Nuclear Station; 
2001: PIR; 
2002: PIR; HU; 
2003: PIR; HU; 
2004: PIR; HU; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: HU; 
2011: HU; 
2012: PIR; HU. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: HU; 
2004: PIR; HU; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: HU; 
2004: PIR; HU; 
2005: PIR; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: HU; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: HU; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: PIR; HU; 
2007: PIR; HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: PIR; HU; 
2007: PIR; HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: PIR; HU; 
2006: PIR; HU; 
2007: PIR; HU; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: River Bend Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: PIR; 
2007: PIR; HU; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: PIR; HU; 
2011: HU; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: PIR; HU; 
2011: HU; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: South Texas Project, Unit 2; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: PIR; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]. 

Reactor: Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1; 
2001: [Empty]; 
2002: [Empty]; 
2003: [Empty]; 
2004: [Empty]; 
2005: [Empty]; 
2006: [Empty]; 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: PIR; HU; 
2009: PIR; HU; 
2010: PIR; 
2011: PIR; HU; 
2012: PIR; HU. 

Source: NRC. 

Note: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear power 
reactors operating in the United States through the end of calendar 
year 2012. In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear 
Plant in Florida permanently shut down that site's reactor; in May 
2013, the owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently 
shut down that site's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San 
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down 
that site's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of 
operating commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States from 
104 to 100. 

[A] One of the Browns Ferry reactors (Unit 1) was shut down from March 
1985 until May 2007 to address performance and management issues. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: NRC Escalated Findings at Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
in the United States: 

This appendix provides performance information about the 104 
commercial nuclear power reactors at 65 power plants for which we 
analyzed NRC data and that were operating in the United States through 
the end of calendar year 2012. Table 23 lists the number of escalated 
findings identified at each plant from 2000 through 2012. 

Table 23: NRC Escalated Findings (Greater-than-Green Inspection 
Findings and Severity Level I, II, and III Violations) per Operating 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plant, Calendar Years 2000-2012: 

NRC Region I: 

Plant[A]: Beaver Valley Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 7. 

Plant[A]: Hope Creek Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Indian Point Nuclear Generating[B]; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Limerick Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 3; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Millstone Power Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Salem Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Seabrook Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 5. 

Plant[A]: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Total (NRC Region I); 
2000: 3; 
2001: 11; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 4; 
2004: 7; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 6; 
2010: 2; 
2011: 4; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 54. 

NRC Region II: 

Plant[A]: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant[C]; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 6. 

Plant[A]: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 5. 

Plant[A]: Catawba Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: McGuire Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: North Anna Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Oconee Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 14. 

Plant[A]: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: St Lucie Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Surry Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 2; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 5. 

Plant[A]: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Total (NRC Region II); 
2000: 3; 
2001: 8; 
2002: 4; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 5; 
2006: 6; 
2007: 4; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 9; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 3; 
Total: 64. 

NRC Region III: 

Plant[A]: Braidwood Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Byron Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Clinton Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 7; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 14. 

Plant[A]: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 6; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 11. 

Plant[A]: Dresden Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Duane Arnold Energy Center; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Fermi; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Kewaunee Power Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 9. 

Plant[A]: Lasalle County Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Palisades Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 8. 

Plant[A]: Perry Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 8. 

Plant[A]: Point Beach Nuclear Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 3; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 2; 
Total: 13. 

Plant[A]: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 7. 

Plant[A]: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Total (NRC Region III); 
2000: 3; 
2001: 10; 
2002: 15; 
2003: 12; 
2004: 5; 
2005: 12; 
2006: 9; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 4; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 5; 
Total: 93. 

NRC Region IV: 

Plant[A]: Arkansas Nuclear One; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Callaway Plant; 
2000: 3; 
2001: 2; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 7. 

Plant[A]: Columbia Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 2; 
Total: 4. 

Plant[A]: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: Cooper Nuclear Station; 
2000: 1; 
2001: 1; 
2002: 3; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 2; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 2; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 11. 

Plant[A]: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 0. 

Plant[A]: Fort Calhoun Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 1; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 2; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 8. 

Plant[A]: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 0. 

Plant[A]: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 2; 
2005: 1; 
2006: 2; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 5. 

Plant[A]: River Bend Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 2; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 2. 

Plant[A]: South Texas Project; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 0. 

Plant[A]: Waterford Steam Electric Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 1; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 1; 
2012: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Plant[A]: Wolf Creek Generating Station; 
2000: 0; 
2001: 0; 
2002: 0; 
2003: 0; 
2004: 0; 
2005: 0; 
2006: 0; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 0; 
2009: 0; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
Total: 1. 

Plant[A]: Total (NRC Region IV); 
2000: 4; 
2001: 6; 
2002: 9; 
2003: 1; 
2004: 4; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 3; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 1; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 4; 
Total: 46. 

Plant[A]: Total (all regions); 
2000: 13; 
2001: 35; 
2002: 35; 
2003: 18; 
2004: 21; 
2005: 23; 
2006: 21; 
2007: 9; 
2008: 11; 
2009: 26; 
2010: 12; 
2011: 20; 
2012: 13; 
Total: 257. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

Notes: This table includes data on the 104 commercial nuclear power 
reactors operating in the United States through the end of calendar 
year 2012. In February 2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear 
Plant in Florida permanently shut down that site's reactor; in May 
2013, the owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently 
shut down that site's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San 
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently shut down 
that site's two reactors. These actions reduced the number of 
operating commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States from 
104 to 100. 

Greater-than-green findings refer to white, yellow, and red findings. 
White findings are denoted as low to moderate safety significance; 
they indicate that licensee performance is acceptable, but outside the 
nominal risk range. Cornerstone objectives are met with minimal 
reduction in safety margin. Yellow findings are denoted as substantial 
safety significance; they indicate a decline in licensee performance 
that is still acceptable with cornerstone objectives met, but with 
significant reduction in safety margin. Red findings are denoted as 
high safety significance; they indicate a decline in licensee 
performance that is associated with an unacceptable loss of safety 
margin. Sufficient safety margin still exists to prevent undue risk to 
public health and safety. 

Severity Level I violations are violations that resulted in or could 
have resulted in serious safety consequences (e.g., violations that 
created the substantial potential for safety consequences or 
violations that involved systems failing when actually called on to 
prevent or mitigate a serious safety event). Severity Level II 
violations are violations that resulted in or could have resulted in 
significant safety consequences (e.g., violations that created the 
potential for substantial safety consequences or violations that 
involved systems not being capable, for an extended period, of 
preventing or mitigating a serious safety event). Severity Level III 
violations are violations that resulted in or could have resulted in 
moderate safety consequences (e.g., violations that created a 
potential for moderate safety consequences or violations that involved 
systems not being capable, for a relatively short period, of 
preventing or mitigating a serious safety event). 

[A] NRC reports these data by nuclear power plant as opposed to by 
individual reactor. Oftentimes, there are 2 or 3 reactors located at 
each plant. Therefore, data for all 104 reactors are included here, 
but at the plant level. 

[B] Although NRC tracks findings at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 
separately, they are physically located at the same plant. 

[C] One of the Browns Ferry reactors (Unit 1) was shut down from March 
1985 until May 2007 to address performance and management issues. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix X: NRC Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations: 

NRC convened the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force to review its 
processes and regulations and determine whether its oversight could be 
informed by lessons learned from the March 2011 disaster at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. The task force 
concluded that a sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is 
unlikely to occur in the United States and that the continued 
operation of the nation's commercial nuclear reactors does not pose an 
imminent risk to public health and safety. To improve NRC's oversight, 
the task force recommended: 

1. Establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory 
framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-
in-depth and risk considerations. 

2. NRC require licensees to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the 
design-basis seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, 
and components for each operating reactor. 

3. As part of the longer term review, that NRC evaluate potential 
enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically 
induced fires and floods. 

4. NRC strengthen station blackout mitigation capability at all 
operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis 
external events. 

5. Requiring reliable hardened vent designs in boiling water reactor 
facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments. 

6. As part of the longer term review, that NRC identify insights about 
hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other 
buildings as additional information is revealed through further study 
of the Fukushima Daichi accident. 

7. Enhancing spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation for 
the spent fuel pool. 

8. Strengthening and integrating onsite emergency response 
capabilities such as emergency operating procedures, severe accident 
management guidelines, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines. 

9. NRC require that facility emergency plans address prolonged station 
blackout and multiunit events. 

10. As part of the longer term review, that NRC pursue additional 
emergency preparedness topics related to multiunit events and 
prolonged station blackout. 

11. As part of the longer term review, that NRC should pursue 
emergency preparedness topics related to decisionmaking, radiation 
monitoring, and public education. 

12. NRC strengthen regulatory oversight of licensee safety performance 
(i.e., the Reactor Oversight Process) by focusing more attention on 
defense-in-depth requirements consistent with the recommended defense-
in-depth framework. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

September 12, 2013: 

Mr. Ned Woodard, Assistant Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment Team: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Woodard: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit 
comments on the draft of your agency's report GAO-13-743, "Nuclear 
Power: Analysis of Regional Differences and Improved Access to 
Information Could Strengthen NRC Oversight," which the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) received on August 15, 2013. The NRC 
appreciates the time and effort that you and your staff have taken to 
review this topic. 

The agency acknowledges the importance of the continued safe operation 
of nuclear reactors and of the NRC's role in ensuring the continued 
protection of public health and safety following license renewal. The 
NRC has adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure 
continued reactor safety, and it continues to implement effective 
oversight of reactor operations during the period of extended 
operation. 

In part, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
addresses differences that the GAO has observed among the four NRC 
regional offices in identifying and resolving nonescalated findings 
and violations. The NRC agrees with the GAO finding that these 
differences are mainly associated with lower-risk and less significant 
violations. The report acknowledges that the NRC was aware of these 
regional differences and it has taken steps to address them. However, 
the GAO maintains that, while the NRC has undertaken these steps, the 
NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of these differences 
consistent with Federal standards of internal control. Although the 
NRC believes adequate internal controls to ensure alignment between 
regions exist through program office oversight, audits, regional 
counterpart calls and meetings, and procedural criterion specified in 
the Enforcement Policy, Enforcement Manual, and Reactor Oversight 
Process (ROP) implementing procedures, the agency agrees to seek
enhancements, particularly as they relate to less significant findings 
and violations. The NRC's comments are listed below. 

Overall, the GAO provided three recommendations: 

* GAO Recommendation: To better meet its goal of implementing 
objective and consistent oversight, direct agency managers to conduct 
a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the differences in the 
identification and resolution of findings. 

* NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this recommendation regarding the 
conduct of an analysis of differences in the identification and 
resolution of findings and non-escalated violations. The NRC's 
Enforcement Policy, Enforcement Manual, and ROP provide tools to
inspect and assess licensee performance, with the goal of being 
objective, predictable, and risk informed. In addition, the NRC 
emphasizes inspector training, internal self-assessments, staff 
knowledge transfer, and use of operating experience to further enhance
objective and consistent oversight. The NRC believes that the 
available guidance has been effective in providing the agency with an 
objective assessment of its licensees' performance. Notwithstanding, 
the NRC will revisit its initiatives with respect to implementation of 
the ROP and the non-escalated enforcement process to identify 
potential enhancements. 

* GAO Recommendation: To improve transparency and better enable the 
public, Congress, and others to independently track findings, all 
documents related to the findings, and the finding's resolution, 
direct the agency to either modify NRC's publicly available 
recordkeeping system to do so or develop a publicly accessible tool 
that does so. 

* NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this recommendation. The NRC's 
official recordkeeping system is the Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS). All retained NRC documents, related 
findings, and their resolution, as applicable, are stored in ADAMS and 
made publicly available, with the exception of sensitive or protected 
information. As part of the ROP enhancement project, the NRC is 
working on ways to improve communication. The NRC will identify ways 
to improve transparency, and effectively and efficiently track 
documents related to inspection findings through improved tools to 
facilitate public access to inspection information. 

* GAO Recommendation: To help NRC staff more efficiently use past 
experiences in their oversight activities, direct agency officials to 
evaluate the challenges inspectors face in retrieving all relevant 
information on plant performance and previous oversight activities, and
improve its systems accordingly to address these challenges. 

* NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this recommendation to evaluate 
the challenges inspectors face in retrieving all relevant information 
on plant performance and previous oversight activities and improve its 
systems accordingly. The NRC will make plant performance and oversight 
information more readily searchable and available to NRC inspection 
staff and other NRC personnel. 

The NRC will continue to evaluate its processes and policies 
associated with identifying and resolving findings, improving the 
agency's database applications in the support of public transparency, 
and making plant performance and oversight information more easily 
accessible to NRC inspection staff. 

The GAO report refers to the use of "professional judgment by NRC 
staff members in the ROP and Traditional Enforcement process. While 
the NRC acknowledges there is use of "professional judgment" within 
the ROP and Traditional Enforcement processes, the repeated reference 
in the draft report implies there is a high degree of subjectivity 
when implementing the ROP and Traditional Enforcement processes, and 
that professional judgment is used in an excessive or inconsistent 
manner. The NRC does not share this perspective. The agency believes 
that the use of professional judgment is limited and controlled 
through detailed guidance in the Enforcement Policy, Enforcement 
Manual, and Inspection Manual Chapters. NRC staff members must apply 
very specific criteria when determining the risk significance of a
finding or violation. Additionally, the NRC performs a management 
review of each proposed finding or violation to ensure that criteria 
have been met for determining whether a performance deficiency or 
violation is more than minor, and that each finding or violation has 
been assigned the appropriate risk significance. 

The enclosed NRC comments provide additional perspective related to 
the conclusions and recommendations contained in the draft GAO report. 
Should you have any questions about these comments, please contact 
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at 301-415-1785. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Mark A. Satorius: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Frank Rusco, (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Ned Woodward (Assistant 
Director), John Barrett, Elizabeth Beardsley, John Delicath, R. Scott 
Fletcher, Kimberly Gianopoulos, Cindy Gilbert, Chad M. Gorman, 
Catherine Hurley, Jonathan Kucskar, Alison O'Neill, Dan Royer, Carol 
Herrnstadt Shulman, and Michelle R. Wong made key contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Low-probability, high-consequence events are accidents that are 
unexpected, with few similar historical events; however, when they do 
happen, the impact is extreme. Such events include natural disasters, 
terrorism, nuclear power plant accidents, and chemical plant 
explosions. 

[2] In this report, when we use the term nuclear power plant, we are 
referring to an entire site that uses one or more nuclear power 
reactors to generate electricity. 

[3] NRC, Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st 
Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (July 12, 2011). 

[4] NRC, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation Report: Inspector 
General's Assessment of the Most Serious Management and Performance 
Challenges Facing NRC, OIG-13-A-01 (Oct. 1, 2012); Evaluation Report: 
Inspector General's Assessment of the Most Serious Management and 
Performance Challenges Facing NRC, OIG-12-A-01 (Oct. 3, 2011); and 
Evaluation Report: Inspector General's Assessment of the Most Serious 
Management and Performance Challenges Facing NRC, OIG-11-A-01 (Oct. 1, 
2010). 

[5] NRC issues licenses for commercial nuclear power reactors to 
operate for up to 40 years and allows these licenses to be renewed for 
up to an additional 20 years. There is no set limit on the number of 
times a reactor's operating license can be renewed. 

[6] Most of the nation's operating commercial nuclear power reactors 
received their initial operating licenses in the 1970s and 1980s. By 
the end of 2013, 62 reactors will have held an operating license for 
at least 30 years, and of these reactors, 20 will have held an 
operating license for 40 years or more. As a result, many reactors are 
reaching or have reached the end of their initial 40-year operating 
period. As of May 2013, NRC had renewed 73 reactor licenses and was 
reviewing license renewal applications for 14 reactors. However, in 
May 2013, the owner of the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin 
permanently shut down that site's reactor, and in June 2013, the owner 
of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California permanently 
shut down that site's two reactors. The Kewaunee reactor was one of 
the 73 reactors with an operating license renewed by NRC, but the San 
Onofre reactors were not. As a result, as of July 2013, there are 72 
commercial nuclear power reactors with renewed operating licenses 
operating in the United States. 

[7] GAO, Nuclear Reactor License Renewal: NRC Generally Follows 
Documented Procedures, but Its Revisions to Environmental Review 
Guidance Have Not Been Timely, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-493] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 
2013). 

[8] GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power 
Plant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1029] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2006). 

[9] NRC, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of NRC's Enforcement 
Program, OIG-08-A-17 (Sept. 26, 2008). 

[10] Because this was a nonprobability sample, the information we 
gathered from these visits to these plants is not generalizable to all 
65 U.S. nuclear power plant sites but provides important illustrative 
information for understanding the oversight of reactors at the 
selected plants. 

[11] In this report, we use "operating" to describe those commercial 
nuclear power reactors and plants currently licensed by NRC to operate 
in the United States, regardless of whether they may be temporarily 
shut down (outages) for refueling, maintenance, inspection, emergency, 
or other nonpermanent purposes. Licensees must submit formal 
notification to NRC to permanently shut down a reactor. In February 
2013, the owner of the Crystal River Nuclear Plant in Florida 
permanently shut down that plant's reactor; in May 2013, the owner of 
the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin permanently shut down that 
plant's reactor; and in June 2013, the owner of the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station in California permanently shut down that plant's 
two reactors. These actions reduced the number of operating commercial 
nuclear reactors in the United States from 104 to 100, and they 
reduced the number of operating nuclear power plants from 65 to 62. 

[12] According to NRC documents, licensees voluntarily submit 
performance indicator data electronically to NRC on a per-reactor 
basis under a program of the Nuclear Energy Institute (the commercial 
nuclear trade organization). The Nuclear Energy Institute develops--
with input from NRC staff--and publishes the guidance for licensees to 
collect and report performance indicator data. According to NRC 
officials, NRC formally endorses the Nuclear Energy Institute's 
proposals. 

[13] These inspections are focused on activities and systems that, if 
they fail, have the potential to trigger--or increase the consequences 
of--an accident, along with activities and systems that could mitigate 
the effects of such an accident. 

[14] "Minor issues" are defined by NRC as those that have little 
actual safety consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, 
little impact on the regulatory process, and no willfulness. For 
example, if a licensee missed providing an hourly update to a state 
agency during an event that resulted in no actual safety consequences, 
it would be considered minor if it did not detract significantly from 
the state agency's ability to function during the emergency. 

[15] The measures used for the characterization of risk are risk of 
damage to the reactor core and risk of release of radiation. In some 
situations, risk calculations cannot be made using these measures, 
such as in the case of measuring the risk for emergency preparedness 
inspection findings. In these cases, thresholds were determined by 
panels of experts on the basis of operating experience and a 
determination of the appropriate response. 

[16] NRC assigns substantive cross-cutting issues on a per-plant--
rather than a per-reactor--basis. 

[17] In some cases, NRC may determine that a finding poses a safety 
risk even if it does not violate a regulatory or other requirement. In 
other cases, a licensee's performance may violate a regulatory or 
other requirement, but NRC does not consider the issue to be a finding 
and therefore does not assign it a risk significance level (i.e., 
green, white, yellow, red) either because NRC has determined that the 
issue is a minor performance deficiency (i.e., less than very low 
safety significance), is not a performance deficiency (i.e., is not 
reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct), or 
the safety risk cannot be quantified. 

[18] Orders can be issued to modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to 
cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or take such other 
action as may be proper. 

[19] NRC periodically removes plants from oversight under the action 
matrix--due to significant performance or operational concerns 
regarding plants that are shut down--through a prescribed process that 
it refers to as the IMC 0350 process, which is named after the NRC 
Inspection Manual chapter providing guidance for this level of 
oversight. Upon implementation of this process, the appropriate 
regional administrator establishes an oversight panel--typically 
comprised of officials from both headquarters and regional offices, 
including senior management--that determines the oversight activities 
necessary to authorize the restart of the plant's reactors. 

[20] [hyperlink, 
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/actionmatrix_summary.html]. 
Accessed July 15, 2013. 

[21] These are violations that resulted in actual safety or security 
consequences, including but not limited to violations resulting in 
radiation exposures to the public or plant personnel above regulatory 
limits; any violation during an actual general emergency that prevents 
offsite response organizations from implementing protective actions, 
under their emergency plans, to protect the public health or safety, 
and violations resulting in substantial releases of radioactive 
material; violations that may impact the ability of the NRC to perform 
its regulatory oversight function; violations involving willfulness; 
violations of NRC requirements for which there are no associated 
Significance Determination Process performance deficiencies. 

[22] All violations are subject to consideration for civil penalties, 
but according to NRC policy, violations assessed under the ROP--unlike 
those assessed under the Traditional Enforcement Process--are not 
typically considered for civil penalties unless they involve actual 
consequences. 

[23] According to NRC officials, each region has its own guidance for 
implementing NRC's policies. 

[24] Issues determined to be minor performance deficiencies do not 
meet the criteria for an inspection finding. 

[25] According to NRC officials, NRC rotates its resident inspectors 
among plants every 7 years. 

[26] According to NRC's enforcement policy, a "reasonable period of 
time" is commensurate with the severity of the violation. 

[27] A reactor at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in 
southeastern Pennsylvania partially melted down on March 28, 1979. 
This was the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plant operating history. In response to this accident, NRC implemented 
several changes to increase oversight of nuclear plants. These changes 
include expanding NRC's resident inspector program--first authorized 
in 1977--to have at least two inspectors live nearby and work 
exclusively at each plant in the United States to provide daily 
surveillance of licensee adherence to NRC regulations; and integrating 
NRC observations, findings, and conclusions about licensee performance 
and management effectiveness into periodic, public reports. 

[28] NRC, in implementing requirements of the Price-Anderson Act as 
amended, requires all licensees of nuclear power plants to have 
financial protection including liability insurance to ensure that 
funds would be available in the event of a nuclear accident at a U.S. 
nuclear power plant. American Nuclear Insurers--an insurance pool 
comprised of various insurance companies in the United States--
provides liability insurance for nuclear power plants. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1029]. 

[30] According to NRC's Inspection Manual, the SERP provides a 
management review of the preliminary significance characterization and 
basis of findings that are potentially white, yellow, red, or greater 
than green. When necessary, based on the results of a Regulatory 
Conference or written response provided by the licensee, the SERP 
provides the management review of the final significance 
characterization and the basis of findings that are white, yellow, or 
red. No official agency preliminary significance determination of 
white, yellow, red, or greater than green is to be made without a SERP 
review. During the SERP, panel members will discuss the merits of the 
finding and reach consensus on (1) the statement of deficient licensee 
performance on which the inspection finding is based; (2) the safety 
significance of the finding, including assignment of preliminary or 
final color; and (3) the apparent violation and the regulatory 
requirements that should be cited. 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1029]. 

[32] According to NRC's website, the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation is responsible for accomplishing key components of NRC's 
nuclear reactor safety mission. As such, the office conducts a broad 
range of regulatory activities in the four primary program areas of 
rulemaking, licensing, oversight, and incident response for commercial 
nuclear power reactors, and test and research reactors to protect the 
public health, safety, and the environment. The office works with the 
NRC regions and other offices to accomplish its mission and contribute 
to the agency mission. 

[33] In our analysis, we use "nonescalated findings" to refer to 
combined NRC data for (1) green findings identified through the ROP 
(i.e., equating to very low risk significance) and (2) Severity Level 
IV violations identified through the Traditional Enforcement Process 
(i.e., violations that are less serious, but are of more than minor 
concern resulting in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety 
consequences). 

[34] In our analysis, we use "escalated findings" to refer to combined 
NRC data for (1) greater than green (i.e., white, yellow, and red) 
findings identified through the ROP and (2) escalated violations 
(i.e., Severity Levels III, II, and I) identified through the 
Traditional Enforcement Process. 

[35] NRC requires inspectors to document details supporting each 
finding or violation in an inspection report. 

[36] NRC, OIG-08-A-17. 

[37] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov.1999). 

[38] According to NRC officials, ADAMS contains some documents dating 
from before November 1999. 

[39] According to NRC information, every reactor site has at least one 
spent fuel pool into which fuel is placed for storage when it is 
removed from the reactor. Spent nuclear fuel refers to the bundles of 
uranium pellets encased in metal rods that have been used to power a 
nuclear reactor. Nuclear fuel loses efficiency over time and becomes 
unable to keep a nuclear reaction going. Periodically, about one-third 
of the fuel assemblies in a reactor are replaced. The nuclear reaction 
is stopped before the spent fuel is removed. But spent fuel still 
produces a lot of radiation and heat that must be managed to protect 
workers, the environment, and the public. 

[40] In March 2002, the most serious safety issue confronting the 
nation's commercial nuclear power industry since Three Mile Island in 
1979 was identified at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio. After NRC 
allowed Davis-Besse to delay shutting down to inspect its reactor 
vessel for cracked tubing, the plant found that leakage from these 
tubes had caused extensive corrosion on the vessel head--a vital 
barrier preventing a radioactive release. 

[41] GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and 
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear 
Power Plant's Shutdown, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-415] (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2004). 

[42] GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to 
Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-822T] (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 
2010). 

[43] We did not analyze security findings because they are outside the 
scope of this review, which focuses on NRC's oversight of reactor 
safety, not security. 

[End of section] 

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