This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-13-310 
entitled 'U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve 
Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance' which 
was released on March 20, 2013. 

[This report was revised on March 22, 2013, to correct a date
cited on pages 23 and 24] 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 



United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2013: 

U.S. Assistance to Yemen: 

Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess 
Security Assistance: 

GAO-13-310: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-310, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The terrorist group AQAP, one of the top threats to U.S. national 
security, is based in Yemen-—a country facing serious economic and 
social challenges and undergoing a difficult political transition 
following civil unrest in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and USAID have 
allocated over $1 billion in assistance to help Yemen counter AQAP and 
address other challenges. The three largest U.S. assistance programs 
in Yemen are USAID’s Food for Peace program, which has provided 
emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which 
have provided training and equipment to Yemeni security forces. 

In response to a Senate report that directed GAO to review U.S. 
assistance to Yemen, and following up on GAO’s February 2012 report 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R] on the types and 
amounts of such assistance, GAO examined (1) the extent of progress 
made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress 
made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and 
(3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed agency 
documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing 
partners in Washington, D.C., and Sana’a, Yemen. 

What GAO Found: 

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The 
Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and 
security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals 
(see figure below). Although some progress has been made since the 
civil unrest in 2011, obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For 
example, while there has been an orderly political transition to a new 
president, key milestones—such as convening a national dialogue to 
promote reconciliation—have been delayed. In addition, while Yemeni 
security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains 
unstable. 

Figure: U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance in 
Support: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Policy Objective: 
A successful democratic transition that promotes political, economic, 
and security sector reforms that will enable the government of Yemen 
to respond to the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people. 

Strategic Goals: 

Supporting government transition: 
State; 
USADI; 
DOD. 

Strengthening governance: 
State; 
USAID. 

Providing humanitarian relief: 
State; 
USAID. 

Encouraging economic development: 
State; 
USAID. 

Improving security and combating AQAP: 
State; 
DOD. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of 
its annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number 
of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, 
reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, 
accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With regard to the Section 1206 
and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an evaluation process to 
assess the programs’ effectiveness but has not conducted an evaluation 
in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited information 
exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these 
assistance programs and making future funding decisions. 

Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key 
challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. First, Yemen’s unstable 
security situation constrains U.S. training of Yemeni security forces, 
restricts oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangers 
Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For example, a Yemeni 
employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 2012, and other 
Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face threats. 
Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the 
Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made 
limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in 
support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemen’s security. 
However, according to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni 
government to replace key leaders of security force units and 
reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that USAID improve performance reporting on Food for 
Peace efforts in Yemen and that DOD collect and analyze data on the 
effectiveness of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen until 
security conditions permit an evaluation of these programs. USAID and 
DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-310]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 
or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed: 

Food for Peace Exceeded Targets, but Performance Reports Have 
Weaknesses; Section 1206 and 1207(n) Programs Lack Evaluation: 

Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge U.S. 
Assistance Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace (FFP) and Section 1206 
and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs to Yemen: 

Appendix III: Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through Section 
1206 and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Government 
Transition: 

Table 2: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Strengthening 
Governance: 

Table 3: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Humanitarian Relief: 

Table 4: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Economic Development: 

Table 5: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Improving Security 
and Combating AQAP: 

Table 6: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Efforts in Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Yemen: 

Figure 2: Timeline of Key Past and Projected Events Related to Yemen 
(2011-2014): 

Figure 3: U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance in 
Support: 

Figure 4: Total Allocations of U.S. Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 
2007-2012: 

Figure 5: Number of Beneficiaries in Yemen of FFP Food Donations Made 
Using Fiscal Years 2008-2011 Funds: 

Figure 6: Weapons Provided to MOI through DOD's Section 1207(n) 
Assistance Program: 

Figure 7: United States-Provided MOI Vehicle in Need of Spare Parts 
and Maintenance: 

Figure 8: FFP Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Figure 9: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 
2007-2012: 

Abbreviations: 

AQAP: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FFP: Food for Peace: 

MOD: Ministry of Defense: 

MOI: Ministry of Interior: 

State: Department of State: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

YSOF: Yemeni Special Operations Force: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 20, 2013: 

Congressional Committees: 

Yemen is an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a terrorist group based in Yemen that 
continues to plot against U.S. citizens and interests. Between 2009 
and 2012, AQAP members attempted to blow up several U.S.-bound 
airplanes using increasingly sophisticated techniques, from 
incorporating explosives into garments in 2009 and 2012 to shipping 
explosives disguised as printer cartridges on two U.S.-bound flights 
in 2010. Further, Yemen faces substantial economic and social 
challenges, such as a reported unemployment rate of nearly 40 percent 
and, according to the United Nations, a third of Yemenis suffering 
from acute hunger. Yemen is also undergoing a difficult political 
transition following mass protests in 2011 that culminated in the end 
of the 33-year rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This 
situation has fostered an attractive recruiting and training 
environment for AQAP. To assist in countering the AQAP threat and to 
address the various other challenges Yemen faces, the Departments of 
State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) have collectively allocated over $1 billion in 
assistance to Yemen since 2007. Nearly half of this assistance has 
funded USAID's Food for Peace (FFP) program, which has provided 
emergency food aid, and DOD's Section 1206[Footnote 1] and Section 
1207(n)[Footnote 2] programs, which have provided training and 
equipment to Yemeni security forces. 

Given the threats emanating from Yemen as well as the significant U.S. 
investment in assistance to Yemen, a Senate report directed the 
Comptroller General to, among other things, review U.S. assistance 
efforts in Yemen.[Footnote 3] Our report examines (1) the extent of 
progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of 
progress made by the FFP and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and 
(3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen. We did not 
evaluate any covert programs that the United States may fund in Yemen. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents related to 
U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen--including strategy and planning 
documents, fact sheets, progress reporting, and funding information--
as well as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the Yemeni government. We also discussed U.S. assistance efforts with 
State, DOD, USAID, National Security Staff, and intelligence community 
officials in the Washington, D.C., area. Additionally, we conducted 
fieldwork in Sana'a, Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with 
State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and 
representatives of the Yemeni Ministries of Interior (MOI), Defense 
(MOD), and Planning and International Cooperation. See appendix I for 
a complete description of our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Yemen is an important U.S. partner that faces significant 
humanitarian, economic, and security challenges. As figure 1 shows, 
Yemen is strategically located, sharing a land border with Saudi 
Arabia, a key U.S. ally, and a maritime border with a critical 
shipping lane connecting the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The most 
impoverished country in the Middle East and North Africa region, Yemen 
is experiencing a rapidly growing population, which is estimated at 
about 25 million; increasing scarcity of natural resources, including 
water, and its primary export--oil--in steady decline; extremely high 
unemployment; and dwindling revenues that decrease the government's 
ability to fund basic operations. Internal conflicts have displaced 
over 430,000 Yemenis from their communities, and a December 2012 
United Nations report found that nearly half of Yemen's population had 
limited or no access to sufficient food.[Footnote 4] Moreover, Yemen 
is a safe haven for the terrorist group AQAP, which the June 2011 
National Strategy for Countering Terrorism identifies as a sustained 
threat to the United States with both the intent and capability to 
plan attacks against the U.S. homeland and U.S. partners. 

Figure 1: Map of Yemen: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map] 

Source: Map Resources. 

[End of figure] 

Adding to these challenges, Yemen's history has been marked by serious 
political tensions, including civil war, secessionist movements, and 
conflict between the government and various tribes. As shown in figure 
2, in early 2011, mass protests began against the 33-year regime of 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh's government responded by cracking 
down on protestors and clashing with troops that had defected to side 
with the protest movement. As the Yemeni government focused on 
suppressing upheaval in the capital, AQAP was able to take advantage 
of the situation by seizing control of portions of southern Yemen. In 
late 2011, after months of political unrest, Saleh signed a Gulf 
Cooperation Council-proposed agreement outlining a transfer of power 
to his vice president, Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi.[Footnote 5] Hadi was 
elected president in February 2012, beginning a 2-year transition 
process that is intended to lay the groundwork for national elections 
in February 2014. 

Figure 2: Timeline of Key Past and Projected Events Related to Yemen 
(2011-2014): 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

2011: 

Events in Yemen: 

January: 
Mass protests against Saleh regime begin. 

April: 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) proposed agreement on power transition. 

May: 
Opposition coalition and ruling party members, with the exception of 
Saleh, sign the transition agreement. 

June: 
Assassination attempt on Saleh. 

November: 
Saleh sings the GCC agreement and steps down. 

Events outside Yemen: 

May: 
State orders family members and nonemergency personnel to depart Yemen. 

September: 
State lifts the Ordered Departure status for U.S. government employees 
at the U.S. Embassy. 

2012: 

Events in Yemen: 

January: 
Yemeni Parliament approves immunity from prosecution for Saleh and 
subordinates. 

[February 2012-February 2014: Transition government in place as 
envisioned by the GCC agreement] 

February: 
Former Vice President Hadi elected President of Yemen. 

May: 
Terrorist attack kills over 100 people in Sania'a. 

September: 
Attacks on U.S. Embassy. 

December: 
President Hadi issues decrees to reorganize Yemeni counterterrorism 
forces and remove former regime elements from power. 

Events outside Yemen: 

May 2012: 
U.S. Executive Order 13611 authorizes sanctions to be imposed on 
individuals and entities who threaten in political transition in Yemen. 

June: 
United Nations Security Council resolution (S/RES/2051(2012)) 
threatens sanctions against all actions undermining the Yemeni 
government. 

2013: 

Events in Yemen: 

March: 
National dialogue conference to begin. 

Summer/Fall: 
Constitutional committee to be created to formulate a new or revised 
constitution within 3 months. 

2014: 

Events in Yemen: 

February: 
Presidential elections to be held. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and other public information. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Goals for Yemen: 

According to State, the overarching objective of U.S. policy in Yemen 
is a successful democratic transition that promotes political, 
economic, and security sector reforms that will enable the Yemeni 
government to respond to the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni 
people. Following the November 2011 transition agreement, the U.S. 
government developed a comprehensive new strategy to support the U.S. 
policy objective for Yemen. U.S. agencies are using this strategy to 
guide assistance activities during the 2-year transition period (2012-
2014) outlined in the Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored transition 
agreement. The primary agencies providing assistance to Yemen in 
support of the U.S. strategy are State, DOD, and USAID. Figure 3 
illustrates the five strategic goals of the U.S. strategy and 
identifies which goals each agency is providing assistance to support. 

Figure 3: U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance in 
Support: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Policy Objective: 
A successful democratic transition that promotes political, economic, 
and security sector reforms that will enable the government of Yemen 
to respond to the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people. 

Strategic Goals: 

Supporting government transition: 
State; 
USADI; 
DOD. 

Strengthening governance: 
State; 
USAID. 

Providing humanitarian relief: 
State; 
USAID. 

Encouraging economic development: 
State; 
USAID. 

Improving security and combating AQAP: 
State; 
DOD. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Civilian and Security Assistance to Yemen: 

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, State, USAID, and DOD allocated 
more than $1 billion in assistance for Yemen. USAID and State have 
provided civilian assistance focused on addressing Yemen's 
humanitarian, economic, and political needs, while DOD and State have 
provided security assistance focused primarily on building Yemeni 
counterterrorism capacity. Overall, civilian assistance has 
constituted approximately 51 percent ($518 million) of the total $1.01 
billion in U.S. assistance, with security assistance constituting the 
remaining 49 percent ($497 million). As figure 4 shows, overall U.S. 
assistance funding increased annually between fiscal years 2008 and 
2010, declined significantly in fiscal year 2011 because of Yemen's 
political turmoil and insecure environment, and then rose again in 
fiscal year 2012. 

Figure 4: Total Allocations of U.S. Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 
2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Total civilian assistance: $22 million; 
Total security assistance: $40 million; 
Total assistance: $62 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Total civilian assistance: $19 million; 
Total security assistance: $8 million; 
Total assistance: $27 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Total civilian assistance: $53 million; 
Total security assistance: $79 million; 
Total assistance: $132 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Total civilian assistance: $124 million; 
Total security assistance: $181 million; 
Total assistance: $305 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Total civilian assistance: $133 million; 
Total security assistance: $32 million; 
Total assistance: $165 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Total civilian assistance: $167 million; 
Total security assistance: $158 million; 
Total assistance: $325 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD data. 

Note: Figures are current as of September 30, 2012. Security assistance 
totals do not add up to $497 million because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

The three U.S. assistance programs in Yemen receiving the largest 
amount of allocated funds over the last 6 fiscal years are USAID's FFP 
program, which provides emergency food aid, and DOD's Section 1206 and 
1207(n) programs, which provide Yemeni security forces with training 
and equipment for counterterrorism operations. From fiscal year 2007 
through 2012, USAID allocated $110 million for Yemen through the FFP 
program, while DOD allocated $361 million for its Section 1206 and 
1207(n) programs. Together, these programs account for 46 percent 
($471 million of $1.01 billion) of total U.S. assistance to Yemen over 
this period. See appendix II for further information on U.S. funds 
allocated to these programs. 

Other Donor Assistance: 

In addition to the United States, bilateral and multilateral donors 
have provided or pledged billions of dollars in assistance to Yemen. 
Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
show that between 2007 and 2011, more than 35 bilateral and 
multilateral donors disbursed about $2.7 billion in official 
development assistance for Yemen. Further, in 2012, donors pledged 
over $7 billion more in support of Yemen's transition and development. 
This included a pledge of about $3.3 billion from Saudi Arabia, which 
State officials identified as the single largest contributor of aid to 
Yemen.[Footnote 6] State officials also noted that Saudi Arabia 
provided Yemen with approximately $2 billion in petroleum products 
earlier in 2012 to help ease fuel shortages caused by attacks on key 
pipelines. 

Yemeni officials with whom we met stated that coordination of donor 
contributions is challenging but has improved over time. A senior 
Yemeni official explained that, of the various bilateral and 
multilateral donors providing assistance to Yemen, some coordinate and 
pool their resources with other donors before making contributions, 
but others do not. To address this, the Yemeni government has 
developed a mechanism to align donations with Yemen's priority needs 
and minimize overlap. Additionally, Yemeni officials stated that the 
government plans to reallocate its own resources to address needs 
unmet by donor contributions. 

Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed: 

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed, 
according to agency officials, agency documents, and international 
organizations. Specifically, in regard to the strategic goals: (1) the 
government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process; (2) 
although there have been some positive developments to strengthen 
governance, the Yemeni government's ability to provide basic services 
is limited; (3) the humanitarian situation remains unstable; (4) the 
economy has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces major challenges; 
and (5) the security situation has improved in some respects but 
remains volatile. 

Political Transition Progressing, but More Slowly than Intended: 

The government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process. As part 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered transition agreement signed 
in November 2011, the Yemeni government committed to hold early 
presidential elections within 90 days, convene an inclusive national 
dialogue conference, reform the constitution and electoral system, 
reorganize the military, and hold general elections within 2 years of 
inaugurating a new president--which took place in February 2012 with 
the inauguration of Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi has since 
passed several reforms to restructure Yemen's military and security 
institutions and removed many former regime elements from power. 
However, the national dialogue conference--a key step in the 
transition process--has been delayed from November 2012 to March 2013. 
This delay has affected other important steps in the transition 
process that are contingent upon the conference being held, such as 
the formation of a constitutional committee and the development of a 
new or revised constitution. Table 1 provides examples of U.S. 
assistance supporting the government transition in Yemen.[Footnote 7] 

Table 1: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Government 
Transition: 

Agency: USAID; 
Assistance activities: 
* Supports civic engagement activities to channel citizen input to the 
appropriate government bodies and into the public policy process; 
* Assists citizens with engaging the Yemeni government to obtain 
greater transparency in decision making and quality of service 
delivery; 
* Works with the Yemeni government to increase receptiveness and 
responsiveness to citizen concerns and recommendations. 

Agency: State; 
Assistance activities: 
* Works with Yemeni media and civil society organizations to increase 
the capacity to identify, address, and engage the public on social 
issues related to the rights of women and children. 

Agency: DOD; 
Assistance activities: 
* Meets periodically with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
reorganization planners to provide support as needed. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID, State, and DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Yemeni Government Capacity Remains Severely Limited: 

Although there have been some positive developments, the Yemeni 
government's ability to provide basic services remains limited. 
According to a 2012 Yemeni government report,[Footnote 8] there were 
acute weaknesses in the level of basic services available to Yemenis 
even prior to the political unrest in 2011, with only 42 percent of 
the population receiving electricity, 35 percent receiving security 
and legal services, 26 percent receiving water supplies, and 16 
percent receiving sanitation services. The political unrest 
contributed to further reductions in available government services. 
State noted that there continue to be severe strains on the Yemeni 
government's ability to provide public funds and government services 
throughout the country. For example, a United Nations report stated 
that the health of 1 million people has been compromised due to the 
dysfunctional health system in Yemen--700,000 children under 5 years 
of age and 300,000 pregnant mothers.[Footnote 9] USAID officials in 
Yemen noted that President Hadi has made commitments to respond to 
citizens' grievances. For example, in January 2013, he established two 
committees to address land disputes and resolve cases of early 
dismissal or retirement of civil, security, and military personnel in 
the southern provinces, where grievances have persisted since the 
civil war in 1994. Table 2 provides examples of U.S. assistance to 
strengthen governance in Yemen. 

Table 2: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Strengthening 
Governance: 

Agency: USAID; 
Assistance activities: 
* Works with key Yemeni agencies to promote accountability and 
strengthen government financial management; 
* Assists the Yemeni government in election management, to include 
advising officials on technical topics regarding security, media, and 
information sharing, and participating in a postelection review 
process to determine future needs; 
* Engages Yemeni youth to build youth capacity to create positive 
change through teaching youth life skills and job skills and 
encouraging participation in community service. 

Agency: State; 
Assistance activities: 
* Provides technical assistance, training, and equipment to Yemen's 
civilian law enforcement and judicial institutions; 
* Supports efforts to enhance policing and 
justice services that respond to citizens' crime and public safety 
concerns, particularly in underserved regions that combat the influence 
of AQAP. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[End of table] 

Humanitarian Situation Remains Unstable: 

The humanitarian situation in Yemen remains unstable as a result of 
armed conflict, civil unrest, reduction of basic social services, and 
rising cost of living. State reported in September 2012 that there 
were over 550,000 internally displaced persons in Yemen, an increase 
of nearly 150,000 from the previous year--in part a result of the 
large number of people fleeing areas experiencing an increase in armed 
conflict, such as the towns that AQAP had seized in the south. The 
number of internally displaced persons has since declined to about 
430,000 as a result of stabilizing conditions in parts of Yemen, but, 
according to United Nations officials we spoke with in Yemen, some of 
those returning home are finding that their property has been damaged 
and their homes demolished or booby-trapped. Additionally, a December 
2012 United Nations report found that over half the Yemeni population 
was without access to safe water, nearly half the population had 
limited or no access to sufficient food, and child malnutrition had 
increased almost 80 percent in 2 years to nearly 1 million children. 
[Footnote 10] Table 3 provides examples of U.S. assistance providing 
humanitarian relief in Yemen. 

Table 3: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Humanitarian Relief: 
Agency: USAID; 

Assistance activities: 
* Delivers health services and nutrition needs to vulnerable 
populations through mobile health teams, fixed health facilities, and 
the distribution of food or food vouchers; 
* Renovates remote health clinics, provides basic medical equipment, 
trains midwives and doctors in maternal and child health, and supports 
community health education; 
* Promotes hygiene and access to safe drinking water; 
* Pays for vocational training for rural families and work 
opportunities, such as rehabilitating key infrastructure sites and 
small-scale food processing initiatives. 

Agency: State; 
Assistance activities: 
* Provides protection services, basic assistance, and education to 
internally displaced persons, conflict victims, and refugees and 
migrants from the Horn of Africa who have fled to Yemen. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[End of table] 

Yemeni Economy Has Rebounded since 2011, but Major Challenges Remain: 

Yemen's economy has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces continuing 
challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund, economic 
activity in Yemen fell by 10 percent and inflation rose to 23 percent 
in 2011 as a result of the civil unrest, which limited the 
availability of basic commodities, bank financing, and imports. The 
International Monetary Fund subsequently reported in December 2012 
that the Yemeni economy had improved since 2011 and that the exchange 
rate had returned to levels experienced prior to the 2011 unrest. 
Additionally, according to the World Food Program, the inflation rate 
had dropped to less than 5.5 percent in December 2012. Also, USAID 
reported that some gains have been made in improving educational 
opportunities, increasing school enrollment rates, and decreasing 
dropout rates, though there is still a reported 50 percent adult 
literacy rate--73 percent for men and 35 percent for women. Other 
economic challenges include reduced government revenues and disrupted 
services due to continuing attacks on oil pipelines and electricity 
transmission lines, as well as the anticipated depletion of oil 
reserves--the source of 60 percent of the Yemeni government's revenue--
within a decade. Table 4 provides examples of U.S. assistance intended 
to support economic development in Yemen. 

Table 4: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Economic Development: 

Agency: USAID; 
Assistance activities: 
* Funds programs focusing on improving agriculture and increasing 
employment opportunities in highly vulnerable communities and 
especially for youth; 
* Provides teaching aid kits to schools, sets up school libraries and 
resource rooms, and improves infrastructure to enhance learning 
environments for Yemeni children. 

Agency: State and USAID; 
Assistance activities: 
* Support adult literacy, teacher professional development, and 
education policy reform and improve basic education opportunities. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[End of table] 

Security Situation in Yemen Remains Volatile: 

The security situation in Yemen has improved in some respects, but 
remains unstable. Specifically, State, DOD, and Yemeni officials 
stated that the new administration led by President Hadi has been more 
aggressive in countering AQAP than the previous administration. Of 
particular note, in June 2012, a Yemeni military offensive conducted 
in conjunction with tribal militias in southern Yemen removed AQAP 
from regions where it had seized control during the civil unrest in 
2011. However, DOD officials stated that AQAP continues to conduct 
attacks against the Yemeni government and remains a threat to the 
United States, and according to a senior Yemeni MOD official, AQAP's 
decision to change tactics from seizing and holding territory to 
conducting targeted assassinations of Yemeni government officials, 
including in Sana'a, constitutes a major security challenge. In 
addition to AQAP, other destabilizing elements are active in Yemen. 
For example, a senior Yemeni MOD official cited the Houthi tribe based 
in northern Yemen as another security challenge. Similarly, in January 
2013, the U.S. ambassador to Yemen stated that Iran was destabilizing 
the region by assisting secessionists in southern Yemen. As of 
November 2012, State described the threat level in Yemen as "extremely 
high" due to terrorist activities and civil unrest. As indicators of 
the continuing tenuous security environment in Yemen, State noted the 
mob attack on the U.S. embassy compound in September 2012, the murders 
of several U.S. citizens in 2012, a growing trend in violent crime, 
and continuing piracy near Yemen's shores. Table 5 provides examples 
of U.S. assistance supporting improvements to security and combating 
AQAP in Yemen. 

Table 5: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Improving Security 
and Combating AQAP: 

Agency: State; 
Assistance activities: 
* Helps Yemen's Air Force to sustain several aircraft; 
* Has provided Yemen's Coast Guard with fast-response boats; 
* Supplements training for Yemen's Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces. 

Agency: State and DOD; 
Assistance activities: 
* Provide training and equipment to fund Yemen's national military and 
maritime forces to conduct counterterrorism operations; support 
reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in Yemen; 
* Have provided specialized vehicles, helicopters, computers, 
training, surveillance cameras, spare parts, radios, weapons, 
ammunition, and body armor to the Yemeni government. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Food for Peace Exceeded Targets, but Performance Reports Have 
Weaknesses; Section 1206 and 1207(n) Programs Lack Evaluation: 

Although USAID data indicate that the FFP program in Yemen has 
generally exceeded annual performance targets, reporting to Congress 
regarding this program has various weaknesses, and DOD has not yet 
evaluated its Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance programs in Yemen. 
Nearly 50 percent--$471 million of $1.01 billion--of U.S. assistance 
to Yemen since 2007 has been allocated through FFP and Section 1206 
and 1207(n) programs. While USAID data indicate that, between fiscal 
years 2008 and 2011, FFP exceeded annual performance targets three 
times for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food 
donations, reports to Congress about the program have lacked 
timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency.[Footnote 11] With 
regard to Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has cited security 
concerns in Yemen as preventing it from evaluating the programs' 
progress in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. Consequently, 
limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting 
oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding 
decisions. 

USAID Data Indicate FFP Generally Exceeded Performance Targets, but 
Reports to Congress on FFP's Efforts Have Several Weaknesses: 

Data from USAID indicate that FFP--the largest U.S. civilian 
assistance effort in Yemen--has generally exceeded its targets; 
however, reports to Congress regarding FFP's efforts in Yemen have 
lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. As noted 
earlier, USAID allocated $110 million through FFP between fiscal years 
2007 and 2012--approximately one-fifth of the $518 million in total 
civilian assistance to Yemen over this period.[Footnote 12] Of this 
$110 million, USAID allocated approximately $90 million (about 81 
percent) to support donations of U.S. agricultural 
commodities.[Footnote 13] As shown in figure 5, data from FFP indicate 
that the program exceeded its annual target for the number of 
beneficiaries in Yemen of food donations funded in fiscal years 2008, 
2009, and 2011, while missing its target in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 
14] These data also show that the donations of food that FFP funded 
between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 reached a total of about 920,000 
beneficiaries in Yemen, exceeding the aggregate target of about 
887,000.[Footnote 15] However, we have reported that obtaining 
accurate food delivery data in some high-risk areas can be challenging 
because of security restrictions and limited resources to conduct 
monitoring.[Footnote 16] 

Figure 5: Number of Beneficiaries in Yemen of FFP Food Donations Made 
Using Fiscal Years 2008-2011 Funds: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2008; 
Targeted number of beneficiaries: 116,000; 
Actual number of beneficiaries: 135,000. 

Fiscal year 2009; 
Targeted number of beneficiaries: 36,000; 
Actual number of beneficiaries: 84,000. 

Fiscal year 2010; 
Targeted number of beneficiaries: 435,000; 
Actual number of beneficiaries: 317,000. 

Fiscal year 2011; 
Targeted number of beneficiaries: 300,000; 
Actual number of beneficiaries: 385,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

The Food for Peace Act mandates an annual report to Congress no later 
than April 1 of each year regarding each food donation activity 
carried out under the globally focused FFP program.[Footnote 17] USAID 
addresses this mandate through the annual International Food 
Assistance Report, which is the primary reporting mechanism for 
informing Congress of FFP progress made in Yemen.[Footnote 18] 
However, these reports lack timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and 
consistency. Such weaknesses provide Congress with limited information 
to assist in its oversight of FFP efforts. 

* Timeliness. The 2011 International Food Assistance Report, which was 
due to Congress on April 1, 2012, has yet to be delivered to Congress, 
though according to USAID officials they have provided a draft to the 
Department of Agriculture for final review. Additionally, as of 
February 2013, the 2012 report, which is due to Congress on April 1, 
2013, had not yet been drafted.[Footnote 19] 

* Accuracy. Some International Food Assistance Reports have not 
reported targets accurately. Following our request for data on FFP's 
performance in Yemen, FFP officials found that the International Food 
Assistance Reports for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 reported incorrect 
targets for Yemen. An FFP official attributed these misreported 
targets to a database error that resulted in the number of planned 
recipients being double-counted.[Footnote 20] While FFP provided us 
with corrected targets for use in our analysis of FFP's progress in 
Yemen, it has not yet reported the corrected figures to Congress. 

* Clarity. The International Food Assistance Report includes various 
types of data that are not clearly defined and could be 
misinterpreted. For instance, the report includes data on recipients 
without stating that these data reflect the number of planned 
recipients in Yemen for the reported year--a target--as opposed to the 
number of actual recipients. Additionally, although they appear 
directly next to the number of planned recipients, figures on metric 
tons of food delivered to Yemen and the associated cost represent 
actual values, not planned values, but are not marked as such. 

* Consistency. The International Food Assistance Report uses 
inconsistent measures for reporting planned and actual results. The 
report uses the number of planned recipients as targets but measures 
actual performance in metric tons and cost. This makes it impossible 
to draw an accurate comparison and prevents an evaluation of the 
extent of progress made in achieving the planned results.[Footnote 21] 

DOD Has Not Evaluated Progress of Its Section 1206 and 1207(n) 
Counterterrorism Assistance Programs in Yemen: 

Two DOD programs account for the vast majority of U.S. security 
assistance to Yemen; however, DOD has yet to evaluate their 
effectiveness in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. As noted 
earlier, of the $497 million in total security assistance allocated to 
Yemen between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, DOD allocated over 70 
percent ($361 million) to its Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs. DOD 
has used this funding to provide various types of equipment and 
training to Yemeni security forces. Specifically, through its Section 
1206 program, DOD has assisted several components of the Yemeni MOD. 
For example, DOD has provided vehicles, communications equipment, and 
other support to the Yemeni Border Security Force to enhance Yemen's 
capability to detect and detain terrorists along its borders; 
helicopters, maintenance, and surveillance cameras to Yemen's Air 
Force to support counterterrorism operations; and weapons, ammunition, 
and boats to Yemen's special operations forces to build their 
counterterrorism capacity. Similarly, DOD's Section 1207(n) program 
aims to enhance the ability of the Yemeni MOI to conduct 
counterterrorism activities, providing radios, vehicles, training, 
and, as shown in figure 6, weapons. See appendix III for a complete 
list of Section 1206 and 1207(n) efforts in Yemen by fiscal year. 

Figure 6: Weapons Provided to MOI through DOD's Section 1207(n) 
Assistance Program: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

According to federal internal control standards, agencies should have 
control activities in place, such as performance reviews, to ensure 
that government resources are achieving effective results.[Footnote 
22] In April 2010, we found that DOD had not evaluated the 
effectiveness of its global Section 1206 program and recommended that 
DOD develop a plan to monitor and evaluate Section 1206 project 
outcomes.[Footnote 23] In 2012, in response to our recommendation, DOD 
developed and validated an assessment process to determine the 
effectiveness of its Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance in building 
partner capacity. This process involves DOD sending officials and 
subject-matter experts from Washington, D.C., or the relevant 
geographic combatant command to the country under evaluation. 
According to DOD, a key element of the assessment process is observing 
and interviewing members of the individual units receiving Section 
1206 or 1207(n) assistance to determine the extent to which the 
assistance developed their capability. In fiscal year 2012, DOD 
piloted its assessment process in Georgia and the Philippines and 
conducted assessments in Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland.[Footnote 24] 

DOD recognizes that assessing Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance 
enables the U.S. government to make better decisions about the types 
of projects that bring the greatest return on investment in terms of 
accomplishing counterterrorism missions and achieving the capabilities 
and performance intended through the assistance. However, although 
Yemen has received more Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance than any 
other country, DOD has yet to evaluate these programs to determine 
their effectiveness in developing the counterterrorism capacity of the 
Yemeni security forces receiving assistance. DOD headquarters 
officials attributed this to safety and security concerns, explaining 
that, given the unstable security environment in Yemen, it is not 
feasible at this time to send officials to Yemen to observe or 
interview members of the individual units receiving Section 1206 or 
1207(n) assistance. DOD officials stated that once the security 
situation in Yemen improves, they plan to evaluate Section 1206 and 
1207(n) projects using their newly developed assessment process. 

Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge U.S. 
Assistance Efforts: 

U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen face two significant types of 
challenges.[Footnote 25] First, Yemen's high-threat security 
environment has complicated U.S. efforts to train and assess the 
capability of Yemeni security forces, restricted oversight of civilian 
assistance projects, and endangered Yemeni staff who play a key role 
in providing assistance. Second, because of political divisions within 
the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made 
limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in 
support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemen's security. 

Unstable Security Situation in Yemen Complicates U.S. Efforts to 
Provide and Oversee Assistance: 

Yemen's difficult security environment continues to challenge U.S. 
assistance efforts. Our February 2012 report noted that Yemen's 
deteriorating security situation caused DOD to suspend the majority of 
its security assistance activities in 2011 and restricted the ability 
of USAID program implementers to access remote sections of the 
country, thereby leading USAID to shift its focus to providing 
civilian assistance in large urban areas with a more secure and 
accessible working environment.[Footnote 26] According to U.S. and 
Yemeni officials and implementing partners we met with during our 
October 2012 fieldwork in Yemen, insecure conditions remain the 
primary impediment to U.S. assistance activities. U.S. officials cited 
several areas in which this challenge has affected U.S. efforts: 

* Constrained ability to train and assess capability of Yemeni 
security forces. We reported in February 2012 that DOD stopped the 
training component of its assistance in 2011 because it was no longer 
safe for U.S. instructors to be in Yemen.[Footnote 27] While security-
related constraints on providing training remain, DOD has taken steps 
to mitigate the effect of the security environment on its training 
activities by conducting training outside of Yemen. For example, DOD 
arranged for Yemeni personnel to receive helicopter training in Texas 
and plans to provide training on a fixed-wing aircraft in Spain in 
early 2013. DOD officials stated, however, that because of the 
unstable security environment, the level of DOD staffing in Yemen 
remains lower than it was prior to the unrest of 2011. As a result, 
there are currently too few DOD personnel present in Yemen to embed 
with Yemeni security forces, thereby limiting DOD's ability to assess 
the extent to which U.S. security assistance has improved the 
capability of these forces. DOD officials explained that before the 
unrest of 2011, DOD personnel were embedded with the Yemeni units 
receiving U.S. training and equipment, which facilitated their ability 
to collect real-time information on the units' capabilities. However, 
these officials stated that no DOD personnel have been embedded with 
Yemeni security forces since 2011. Similarly, as noted earlier, 
officials based in Washington, D.C., who manage DOD's Section 1206 and 
1207(n) programs stated that, because of security conditions in Yemen, 
they are currently unable to travel there to assess the extent to 
which this assistance has increased the units' capacity. 

* Oversight of civilian assistance programs restricted. In March 2011, 
the USAID Inspector General reported that security-related travel 
restrictions in Yemen had severely limited the monitoring and 
oversight of project activities.[Footnote 28] During our October 2012 
fieldwork in Yemen, USAID officials stated that the security situation 
continues to prevent USAID staff from accessing areas of the country 
outside of the capital to conduct monitoring and evaluation of 
civilian assistance activities. To address this challenge, USAID has 
employed a contractor that hires Yemeni staff to monitor assistance 
efforts in other urban areas that U.S. officials are unable to access. 
However, as noted below, Yemeni nationals are also subject to 
significant security risks, and as the USAID Inspector General 
reported in March 2011, the tribal affiliations of Yemeni staff may 
make it difficult for them to travel to parts of the country 
controlled by rival tribes.[Footnote 29] 

* Locally employed Yemeni staff endangered. According to senior 
officials at the U.S. embassy in Sana'a, locally employed Yemeni staff 
members play a critical role in embassy operations--including in U.S. 
assistance activities--and provide extremely valuable "institutional 
memory." However, these individuals face considerable risks as a 
result of their association with the U.S. government, as demonstrated 
by the October 2012 murder of a Yemeni national who was a longtime 
embassy employee and other instances of intimidation. Locally employed 
staff with whom we met during our October 2012 trip to Yemen expressed 
concerns about their safety, with several individuals citing the 
threats to them and their families as a serious disincentive to 
continuing their employment at the embassy. According to USAID, the 
embassy has since provided training in counter surveillance and 
personal security to several hundred locally employed staff. However, 
the embassy has deemed other steps proposed by locally employed staff, 
including telework and the option of working from implementing 
partners' offices, to be unsuitable. 

Leadership and Coordination Challenges in Yemeni Security Ministries 
Have Limited Use of Some U.S. Security Assistance: 

According to DOD, leadership and coordination challenges in Yemeni 
security ministries have led to limited use of some U.S. security 
assistance. DOD officials stated that, until recently, key recipients 
of U.S. equipment and training in Yemen had conducted few 
counterterrorism operations since the outbreak of political 
hostilities in Yemen in early 2011. DOD officials attributed this in 
part to opposition to the Hadi administration among some leaders at 
key Yemeni security ministries. Specifically, according to DOD, two 
counterterrorism units--one each within the Yemeni MOD and MOI--have 
been among the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance. 
However, DOD officials noted that MOI's counterterrorism unit played a 
limited role in attacking AQAP strongholds in southern Yemen, while 
MOD's counterterrorism unit did not make any contribution to those 
operations. DOD officials stated that this limited involvement was due 
in part to the nature of the conflict against AQAP--an effort to 
regain control of territory that was more suited to a response by 
conventional military forces. However, they added that the MOI and MOD 
counterterrorism units were under the leadership of the former 
president's supporters at the time of the operations against AQAP and 
were consequently unwilling to strongly support the new president's 
counterterrorism initiatives. 

Coordination challenges between MOD and MOI have further limited MOI's 
ability to participate in counterterrorism operations. DOD noted that 
MOI has had difficulty receiving replacement parts, equipment, and 
vehicles from the MOD logistics system, hindering its ability to 
conduct counterterrorism operations outside of the Yemeni capital. For 
example, although the United States has provided MOD with spare parts 
for Humvee vehicles to share with MOI, a senior MOI official stated 
that MOD has not done so, resulting in MOI's inability to maintain and 
use its U.S.-provided Humvees as intended, as shown in figure 7. 

Figure 7: United States-Provided MOI Vehicle in Need of Spare Parts 
and Maintenance: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Similarly, U.S. and Yemeni officials stated that although the United 
States has provided helicopters for both MOD and MOI to use in 
counterterrorism operations, MOD does not give MOI access to the 
helicopters in a timely fashion. Specifically, a senior MOI official 
stated that MOD takes approximately 3 months to respond to MOI 
requests for access to the helicopters, which are based at an MOD 
facility. The official explained that the length of time it takes MOD 
to approve MOI's requests is not conducive to conducting time-
sensitive counterterrorism operations. 

According to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government 
have addressed some of these challenges. In December 2012, President 
Hadi announced a number of decrees to, among other things, remove 
several key leaders of Yemeni security forces units--including the 
heads of the MOD and MOI counterterrorism units--from their current 
positions. DOD officials stated that, as of February 2013, a new 
official had taken command of the MOD counterterrorism unit, which had 
also increased its involvement in counterterrorism operations. In 
addition, the current head of the MOI counterterrorism unit had agreed 
to step down. President Hadi's decrees also called for further 
reorganization of the Yemeni security ministries--specifically, 
consolidating the MOD and MOI counterterrorism units under a newly 
created Yemeni special operations command under MOD. As of February 
2013, this new special operations command had been formed, according 
to DOD, and was overseeing the MOD counterterrorism unit, while 
planning was under way for the MOI counterterrorism unit to be 
absorbed under the new command. DOD noted that, as of February 2013, 
the Yemeni government had yet to develop a timeline to complete the 
consolidation. 

Conclusions: 

AQAP terrorists based in Yemen are a continuing national security 
threat to the United States--a threat exacerbated by Yemen's fragile 
economic, social, and political situation. In response, U.S. agencies 
have invested more than $1 billion in security and civilian assistance 
since 2007 in support of U.S. strategic goals for Yemen. While some 
progress has been made toward these goals, significant uncertainties 
remain regarding Yemen's future, underscoring the possibility that 
Yemen will need further U.S. assistance as it navigates a difficult 
transition process. However, USAID's reporting to Congress regarding 
FFP--the largest U.S. civilian assistance program--has been 
inaccurate, unclear, and inconsistent. Moreover, despite the $361 
million investment in Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance since 2007, 
DOD has not yet evaluated the progress these programs have made in 
building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity and, because of security 
conditions, has not established a time frame for completing such an 
evaluation. As a result, decision makers lack the information 
necessary to adequately assess the three largest U.S. assistance 
programs in Yemen. This limited information inhibits decision makers' 
ability to oversee these programs, assess their contribution to U.S. 
goals, and consider program performance when making future funding 
decisions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enable congressional and agency oversight of U.S. assistance 
programs in Yemen, inform future funding decisions, and enhance U.S. 
assistance efforts, we are making the following three recommendations: 

First, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID improve reporting 
to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, such as by improving the 
accuracy, clarity, and consistency of data reported. 

Second, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 1206 
program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense collect 
and analyze available data regarding the extent to which Section 1206 
assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces, such as 
information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or Yemeni government 
officials. 

Third, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 
1207(n) program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
collect and analyze available data regarding the extent to which 
Section 1207(n) assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security 
forces, such as information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or 
Yemeni government officials. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, USAID, the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, the National Security 
Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency for their review and comment. DOD and 
USAID provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes 
IV and V, respectively. DOD, USAID, State, and the National Security 
Staff also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency did not provide comments. 

DOD concurred with our recommendations to collect and analyze 
available data on the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n) 
assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces. DOD also 
noted its intent to develop baseline assessments to accompany its 
Section 1206 project proposals for fiscal year 2014. 

USAID concurred with our recommendation to improve reporting to 
Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, noting that it has already taken 
several steps to address the timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and 
consistency of the International Food Assistance Report. USAID added 
that it expects the International Food Assistance Report to remain 
limited in its usefulness for gauging progress in any specific 
country, stating that such country-specific issues will be addressed 
through periodic briefings and other updates to Congress. We maintain 
that any information USAID conveys to Congress on FFP efforts in 
Yemen, whether through the International Food Assistance Report or 
other means, should be timely, accurate, clear, and consistent. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, State, DOD, USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Justice, the National Security Staff, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In 
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs & Trade: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James M. Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Robert Menendez: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bob Corker: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ed Royce: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To determine the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals 
for Yemen, we reviewed relevant documents from the Departments of 
State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), including strategy and planning documents, fact 
sheets, and progress reporting. Additionally, we examined the Gulf 
Cooperation Council-negotiated transition agreement for Yemen, as well 
as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the United 
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
Yemeni government. We did not consider any covert programs that the 
United States may fund in Yemen. 

To assess the extent of progress made by USAID's Food for Peace (FFP) 
program and DOD's Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, we 
analyzed funding data on all U.S. assistance activities in Yemen to 
determine allocations for these civilian and security assistance 
programs in Yemen since fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 30] To assess FFP's 
progress in Yemen, we compared USAID data on the number of actual 
beneficiaries to the number of planned recipients as identified in 
annual reports jointly submitted to Congress by USAID and the 
Department of Agriculture regarding U.S. food assistance. Recipients 
and beneficiaries are related but distinct; specifically, recipients 
are individuals who receive food assistance rations, while 
beneficiaries are individuals who benefit from food assistance 
rations. For example, in a food-for-work program, only one person--the 
recipient--actually receives targeted food assistance, but other 
members of the recipient's family or community may benefit from that 
individual's participation in the program, making them all 
beneficiaries. Given the distinct meanings of the two terms, USAID 
cautioned that a comparison of actual beneficiaries and planned 
recipients is generally not advisable for FFP efforts. However, USAID 
noted that the nature of the FFP programs conducted in Yemen to date 
is such that the terms can be used interchangeably.[Footnote 31] To 
assess the extent of progress made by the Section 1206 and 1207(n) 
programs in Yemen, we reviewed DOD documents relevant to its new 
process for assessing Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and prior 
GAO reporting. 

To identify the key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen, we 
reviewed relevant documents from State, DOD, and USAID, including 
strategy and planning documents, fact sheets, cables, and progress 
reporting. We also examined several reports by the USAID Inspector 
General, including audits and a risk assessment of USAID activities in 
Yemen, as well as prior GAO reporting. 

Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, DOD, USAID, 
National Security Staff, and intelligence community officials in the 
Washington, D.C., area. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of 
U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen, we also conducted fieldwork in 
Sana'a, Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with State, DOD, 
and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and representatives 
of the Yemeni Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning and 
International Cooperation. 

To update data on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated 
obligations, and disbursements for the FFP and Section 1206 and 
1207(n) programs as reported in appendix II, we collected and analyzed 
relevant funding data from State and DOD. Differences between FFP 
funding totals shown in figure 8 of this report and the FFP funding 
information presented in our February 2012 report[Footnote 32] are due 
to the following factors: 

* Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for 
fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates. 

* Totals in this report include funds from the International Disaster 
Account that were programmed by FFP in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. 

Differences between Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding totals shown in 
figure 9 of this report and the Section 1206 funding information in 
our February 2012 report are due to the following factors: 

* Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for 
fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates. 

* Our February 2012 report included data current as of September 30, 
2011. Consequently, it did not include data on the Section 1207(n) 
program, which was not established until the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was enacted on December 31, 
2011. 

* DOD considers Section 1206 funding to be disbursed once it awards a 
contract. If the final cost of the contract at the time of completion 
is different than the expected cost of the contract at the time of 
award, the amount of funding that DOD considers disbursed changes 
accordingly. 

To determine the reliability of the data we collected on the amount of 
U.S. assistance to Yemen and the number of targeted recipients and 
actual beneficiaries of FFP assistance in Yemen, we compared and 
corroborated information from multiple sources; checked the data for 
reasonableness and completeness; and interviewed cognizant officials 
regarding the processes they use to collect and track the data. We did 
not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. 
On the basis of checks we performed and our discussions with agency 
officials, we determined that the data we collected on the amount of 
U.S. assistance to Yemen and the actual number of beneficiaries in 
Yemen of FFP assistance were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this engagement. With regard to the number of targeted recipients of 
FFP assistance in Yemen, we note in this report that annual reporting 
to Congress regarding FFP for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 did not 
accurately communicate FFP's targets for Yemen. Consequently, we 
collected corrected data on FFP's targets for Yemen to use in our 
assessment of the program's progress. We determined these corrected 
data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace (FFP) and Section 1206 
and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs to Yemen: 

From fiscal year 2007 through 2012, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) allocated $110 million for Yemen through its FFP 
program. Figure 8 shows the increase in annual FFP funding to Yemen 
over this period. 

Figure 8: FFP Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Allocated: $0; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Allocated: $2 million; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $2 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Allocated: $2 million; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $2 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Allocated: $13 million; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $13 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Allocated: $25 million; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $2 million; 
Disbursed: $23 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Allocated: $68 million; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $12 million; 
Disbursed: $55 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

Note: Totals for fiscal years 2011 and 2012 include funds from the 
International Disaster Assistance account that were disbursed through 
the FFP program. Figures in table may not sum correctly due to 
rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
allocated $361 million for Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance to 
Yemen. As shown in figure 9, funding for these programs has fluctuated 
over the years.[Footnote 33] For example, no Section 1206 allocation 
was made in fiscal year 2011 because of the political unrest that 
began in Yemen early that year. In contrast, the Section 1206 
allocation for fiscal year 2010 and the combined allocation of Section 
1206 and 1207(n) assistance in fiscal year 2012 each exceeded $100 
million. 

Figure 9: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 
2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Allocated: $26; 
Unobligated balance: $1; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $25. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Allocated: $0; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Allocated: $67 million; 
Unobligated balance: $1 million; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $66 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Allocated: $155 million; 
Unobligated balance: $13 million; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $142 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Allocated: $0; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $0 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Allocated: $112 million; 
Unobligated balance: $3 million; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $109 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Figures do not add up to $361 million in allocations due to 
rounding. According to DOD, unobligated balances represent the 
difference between the amount of funds notified to Congress for Yemen-
specific projects and the amount of funds obligated for contracts 
supporting those projects. Any funds not obligated return to the 
central accounts for Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and remain 
available for other projects until the end of the fiscal year. 

As contracts conclude, disbursement amounts are revised to reflect the 
final contract costs. As a result, the disbursement figures for fiscal 
years 2007, 2009, and 2010 above differ from those that we reported in 
February 2012. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through Section 
1206 and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs: 

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
allocated $361 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to 
Yemeni security forces through its Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 
security assistance programs. Table 6 below identifies the efforts 
that DOD undertook using Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding as well as 
the specific capabilities DOD planned to build through these efforts. 

Table 6: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Efforts in Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Section 1206 Efforts: 

Fiscal year 2007: 

Description: Counterterrorism Units and Mobile Training Teams: This 
effort was intended to enhance Yemen's border security capability. It 
included equipment such as cargo transport vehicles, infantry light 
armored vehicles, light tactical wheeled vehicles, spare parts, crisis 
action center equipment, and transportation; 
Value of defense articles and training: $26.0 million. 

Fiscal year 2009: 

Description: Aerial Surveillance Counterterrorism Initiative: This 
effort was designed to build the capacity of the Yemeni Air Force to 
conduct counterterrorism operations by providing aerial surveillance 
capability for internal stability and combating terrorism within and 
at its borders. It included helicopter spares and surveillance cameras; 
Value of defense articles and training: $5.9 million. 

Description: Counterterrorism Initiative for Increased Border 
Security: This effort was designed to provide the Yemeni Border 
Security Force with the capability to deter, detect, and detain 
terrorists along the Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman borders. It 
included trucks, radio systems, and operations/maintenance training; 
Value of defense articles and training: $25.4 million. 

Description: Coast Guard Patrol Maritime Security Counterterrorism 
Initiative: This effort was intended to enhance Yemeni Coast Guard 
capability to provide internal stability and counterterrorism within 
its territorial waters. It was intended to help build the capacity of 
Yemen's maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations by providing equipment and training to the Yemeni Coast 
Guard to improve its ability to identify, detain, and apprehend 
terrorists, and to respond to terrorist incidents within its area of 
responsibility; 
Value of defense articles and training: $30.1 million. 

Description: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Counterterrorism Initiative: 
This effort is intended to assist Yemen's Ministry of Defense in 
improving its improvised explosive device ordnance mitigation and 
response to counter resurgence in terrorist activity. Some training or 
deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $5.8 million. 

Fiscal year 2010: 

Description: Special Operations Force Counterterrorism Enhancement 
Package: This effort is designed to improve tactical effectiveness of 
the Yemeni Special Operations Force (YSOF). It is intended to build 
the capacity of Yemen's national military forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training to 
enhance the YSOF's mobility, situational awareness, survivability, 
communications, and tactical proficiency in support of YSOF's 
counterterrorism mission. It includes vehicles, weapons, ammunition, 
and night vision goggles. Some training or deliveries, or both, are 
still pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $34.5 million. 

Description: Rotary-Wing Medium Lift: This effort is intended to help 
build the capacity of Yemen's national military forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training to 
increase Yemen's rotary-wing medium-lift capability. It is intended to 
allow the Yemeni Air Force to transport small units at high altitude 
to participate in day-or night-time operations. It includes Huey II 
helicopters (4), spare parts, maintenance, and training; 
Value of defense articles and training: $82.8 million. 

Description: Fixed-Wing Tactical Heavy Lift: This effort is intended 
to provide equipment and training to improve the operational reach and 
reaction time of counterterrorism forces. It includes a CASA CN-235 
aircraft for 51 troops, parts, tools, and maintenance. Some training 
or deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $38.0 million. 

Fiscal year 2012: 

Description: Special Operations Forces Counterterrorism Enhancement: 
This effort is intended to help build the capacity of YSOF to conduct 
counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training. It 
includes small arms and accessories, ammunition, radios, night vision 
goggles, global positioning systems, rigid hull inflatable boats, 
combat rubber raiding craft, organizational clothing, and individual 
soldier equipment. Some training or deliveries, or both, are still 
pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $14.0 million. 

Description: Fixed-Wing Capability: This effort is intended to help 
build the capacity of Yemen's national military forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training to 
improve the operational reach and reaction time of Yemen's 
counterterrorism forces. It includes two short takeoff and landing 
aircraft, support, and training for CASA CN-235 aircraft. Some training 
or deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $23.4 million. 

Section 1207(n) Efforts: 

Fiscal year 2012: 

Description: Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Enhancement: This 
effort is intended to help enhance the ability of Yemen's Ministry of 
Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to conduct counterterrorism 
operations by providing equipment, minor military construction, and 
training. Through the provision of this assistance, it is intended 
that the government of Yemen will be able to grow and enhance its 
primary counterterrorism force and base elements of that force outside 
of Sana'a and closer to critical areas of operation. It includes night 
vision goggles, radios, vehicles, weapons and ammunition, RAVEN 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, minor military construction, and 
operational training. Some training or deliveries, or both, are still 
pending for this effort; 
Value of defense articles and training: $75.0 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The Section 1207(n) program was not established until fiscal year 
2012. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
International Security Affairs: 
Washington, DC 20301-2400: 

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs & Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GA0-13-310, "US Assistance 
to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid 
and Assess Security Assistance," dated February 19, 2013 (GAO Code 
320921). Detailed comments on the report's recommendations are 
enclosed. The Department also has three technical comments on the 
report: 

* DoD notes that Section 1207(n) of the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA), for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, which authorizes the Secretary 
of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide 
equipment, supplies, training, and minor military construction to 
Yemeni Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Forces, is a distinct 
authority from Section 1207 of the NDAA for FY 2012, which establishes 
the Global Security Contingency Fund that the Secretary of State and 
the Secretary of Defense may use to provide security sector assistance 
to national military and security forces, the government agencies 
responsible for overseeing these forces, the justice sector, rule of 
law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country designated by the 
Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. 
[See comment 1] 

* DoD notes although the report examines "the extent of progress made 
by ... Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) programs," at times the report 
does not distinguish between assistance provided to Yemen under 
Section 1206 or 1207(n) authorities and assistance provided to Yemen 
under an alternate security assistance authority, such as Foreign 
Military Financing, that is administered by a U.S. Government 
department other than DoD. For example, the report does not indicate 
that DoD did not provide equipment under Section 1206 or Section 
1207(n) authority to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Counterterrorism 
Unit until FY 2012. [See comment 2] 

* On page 19 of the report, GAO notes that "'the United States has 
provided MOD [Ministry of Defense] with spare parts for Humvees to 
share with MOI ..." His unclear whether this passage refers to 
assistance provide under Section 1206 authority or an alternate 
security assistance authority. Spare parts provided by DoD under 
Section 1206 authority are intended for the use of the recipient unit, 
not units in other ministries. [See comment 3] 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Brigadier General Mike Minahan: 
Principal Director for the Middle East: 

Enclosure: As Stated. 

GAO Draft Report Dated February 19, 2013: 
GA0-13-310 Engagement Code 320921: 

"U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of 
Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance" 

Department of Defense Comments to the GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 2: Until DoD is able to conduct an assessment of the 
Section 1206 program in Yemen, the GAO recommends that the Secretary 
of Defense collect and analyze available data regarding the extent to 
which Section 1206 assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni 
security forces, such as information from U.S. personnel posted in 
Yemen or Yemeni government officials. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs in the recommendation. In December 2012, DoD 
submitted to Congress a report describing the assessment process and 
framework that DoD is using to determine the effectiveness of Section 
1206 programs. In2012, DoD piloted the assessment in the Philippines 
and Georgia, and subsequently completed assessments in Djibouti, 
Tunisia, and Poland. A key requirement for each assessment is ensuring 
the assessment team has access to and time for direct engagement with 
the recipient units' commanders and staffs (below battalion and 
squadron levels), operators, and maintainers in an operational 
environment. As discussed in the GAO report, the security environment 
in Yemen does not presently allow for such access. DoD intends to 
conduct such an assessment once the security environment permits. In 
addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has requested 
that Combatant Commands submit baseline assessments with their Fiscal 
Year 2014 Section 1206 proposals. This will allow OSD to analyze and 
determine the effectiveness of the program in terms of the operational 
capability and performance of the recipient unit. 

Recommendation 3: Until DoD is able to conduct an assessment of the 
Section 1207(n) program in Yemen, the GAO recommends that the 
Secretary of Defense collect and analyze available data regarding the 
extent to which Section 1207(n) assistance has built the capacity of 
Yemeni security forces, such as information from U.S. personnel posted 
in Yemen or Yemeni government officials. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs in the recommendation. DoD will use lessons 
learned from the Section 1206 assessment process for conducting 
Section 1207(n) assessments. As with Section 1206, DoD intends to 
conduct a full assessment of Section 1207(n) programs once the 
security environment permits.
GAO Comments: 

1. We modified our report to remove all references to the Global 
Security Contingency Fund. 

2. We modified our report to clarify that the discussion of key 
challenges to U.S. assistance efforts is not specific to Section 1206 
or Section 1207(n) assistance but instead applies to all U.S. 
assistance efforts. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Note: GAO received comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development on March 13, 2013. 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

I am pleased to provide the formal response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled "LS. Assistance to 
Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and 
Assess Security Assistance" (GAO-13-310 for the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this 
letter as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Angelique M. Crumbly: 
Acting Assistant to the Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 

Enclosure: a/s. 

USAID Comments on GAO Draft Report No. GAO-13-310: 

USAID appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's draft report 
entitled "U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to improve 
Oversight of Emergency Food. Aid and Assess Security Assistance." The 
report provides a timely and useful overview of U.S. Government 
activities in Yemen. We would like to take this opportunity to clarify 
some statements made through the report. 

While the content and recommendations in the report focus on improved 
communication of activities and results of emergency Food assistance 
programming in Yemen, USAIAD is concerned that the phrasing of the 
title may give the impression that food assistance activities lack 
monitoring and/or oversight. the GAO found no evidence in their review 
of FFP-supported activities in Yemen that would indicate improper use 
of resources including any indication that terrorist organizations 
present in the country received any benefit from the FFP program. 

EFL' welcomes and agrees with the GAO's comments regarding the 
timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency of the International 
Food Assistance Report (WAR). USAID has taken several steps to address 
these issues. 

* Timeliness: The FY 2011 WAR will be delivered to Congress in March. 
Barring unanticipated delays, the FY 2012 WAR should be submitted to 
Congress by the April 1 deadline. 

* Accuracy: FFP acknowledges that data entry errors resulted in 
misstated beneficiary numbers for WFP programs, and has corrected this 
issue for future IFARs. FFP also plans to submit corrected tables from 
past WAR reports where errors occurred. FFP additionally developed 
internal guidance on beneficiary reporting to assure standardized 
entry of planned and actual figures throughout all office activities. 

* Clarity: FFP has adjusted WAR reporting to include actual 
beneficiaries as reported by awardees as wells as actual tonnage 
delivered. 

* Consistency: The use of actual beneficiaries as reported by awardees 
will ensure that all figures included in the "USAID Title II 
Development Activities" and "USAID Title II Emergency Activities" IFAR 
tables represent actual, rather than planned, values. Recently 
developed internal guidance on beneficiary reporting will improve the 
consistency of FFP communications on this issue across all platforms. 

Please note that the purpose of the IFAR is not to report on Yemen or 
any individual program performance in particular, but rather to 
provide an overview of international food assistance programs writ 
large in the previous fiscal year. Communication to Congress on 
country specific issues occurs through phone calls and/or briefings. 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Administrator of USAID improve 
reporting to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, such as by improving 
the accuracy, clarity, and consistency of data reported. 

USAID Response: FFP has taken several steps and will continue to 
explore improvements to the WAR in order to provide a timely, 
accurate, and clear overview of FIT activities worldwide. At this time 
it is anticipated that the usefulness of this document to gauge 
progress in any specific country will remain limited Oven its intended 
purpose. 

In addition, FFP will continue to engage with Congress on country 
specific issues, including ongoing food assistance activities in 
Yemen, through periodic briefings and humanitarian updates. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant 
Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Brandon Hunt, Kendal Robinson, Karen 
Deans, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Justin Fisher, Bruce Kutnick, 
Marie Mak, Mary Moutsos, and Jeremy Sebest made key contributions to 
this report. Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, Pub. L. 106-193, established this program, also known as 
the Global Train and Equip Program, which is used to build the 
capacity of foreign military forces through the provision of training, 
equipment, and small-scale military construction activities. 

[2] Section 1207(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, authorizes the Secretary of Defense, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide equipment, 
supplies, training, and assistance for minor military construction to 
Yemeni Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Forces. 

[3] Senate Report 111-201, related to the Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (Jan. 7, 2011), 
directed the Comptroller General to report on several issues 
pertaining to Yemen. We worked with the appropriate congressional 
committees to agree upon a two-phased reporting process. In the first 
phase, we assessed assistance strategies and plans, as well as amounts 
and types of assistance, and reported this information in GAO, 
Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to 
Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 
2012). This second report completes our efforts to address this 
mandate. 

[4] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2013 (New York, N.Y.: 
Dec. 13, 2012). 

[5] The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, or Gulf 
Cooperation Council, was established in 1981 between the countries of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. According to the council's charter, its objectives include 
effecting coordination, integration, and interconnection between 
member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
The council is a regional common market with a defense planning 
council as well. 

[6] According to State, Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen stems from 
various factors, including the serious threat Saudi Arabia faces from 
AQAP as well as the two nations' shared border. 

[7] According to agency officials, U.S. assistance activities may 
support more than one strategic goal. For example, an activity 
supporting government transition may also support efforts to 
strengthen governance. 

[8] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Transitional 
Program for Stabilization and Development, 2012-2014 (Sana'a, Yemen: 
July 2012). 

[9] United Nations, Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2013. 

[10] United Nations, Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2013. 

[11] Fiscal years cited for FFP refer to the years in which USAID 
allocated funds. Activities conducted using these funding allocations 
may span more than 1 fiscal year. 

[12] USAID did not allocate any funding to FFP for Yemen in fiscal 
year 2007. 

[13] The remaining $20 million in funding for FFP assistance to Yemen 
has supported four projects that provide Yemenis with vouchers to 
purchase food and one project that focuses on local procurement of 
basic food items. Because some of these projects were funded in fiscal 
year 2012 and were still ongoing as of March 2013, we do not include 
them in our assessment of FFP's progress in Yemen. 

[14] To assess the progress FFP made in Yemen in these years, we 
compared the number of actual beneficiaries to the number of planned 
recipients. Recipients and beneficiaries are related but distinct, as 
we previously reported in GAO, International Food Assistance: Improved 
Targeting Would Help Enable USAID to Reach Vulnerable Groups, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-862] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 24, 2012). USAID officials cautioned that a comparison of actual 
beneficiaries and planned recipients is generally not advisable for 
FFP efforts. However, they noted that, in the case of Yemen, the 
nature of the FFP programs conducted to date is such that the terms 
can be used interchangeably. USAID officials added that such a 
comparison may not be possible for future FFP assistance to Yemen. See 
app. I for additional information on the methodology for this analysis. 

[15] FFP has established a target of reaching approximately 720,000 
beneficiaries in Yemen with its fiscal year 2012 funding. This target 
includes planned beneficiaries of food donations as well as voucher 
projects. As noted earlier, some of these projects are still under 
way; consequently, complete data on the number of actual beneficiaries 
in Yemen of fiscal year 2012 FFP aid are not yet available. 

[16] GAO, World Food Program: Stronger Controls Needed in High-Risk 
Areas, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-790] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2012). 

[17] 7 U.S.C. 1736a(f). 

[18] USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture jointly prepare and 
submit this report. 

[19] USAID indicated in its comments on a draft of this report that, 
barring unanticipated delays, the 2012 International Food Assistance 
Report should be submitted to Congress by April 1, 2013. 

[20] According to this official, the same database error resulted in 
misreporting of targets for other countries as well. 

[21] Given that the International Food Assistance Report does not 
facilitate an assessment of FFP's progress in Yemen, our assessment is 
based on USAID data that are not reported to Congress. 

[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

[23] GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve 
Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 
and 1207 Assistance Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 
2010). 

[24] DOD officials plan to evaluate an additional 11 country programs 
using this validated assessment throughout fiscal year 2013, though 
not in Yemen, with the intent to eventually evaluate all programs in 
countries receiving Section 1206 assistance. 

[25] Though we focus on FFP and Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance 
earlier in this report, here we refer to all U.S. assistance efforts. 
For more detailed information on U.S. assistance efforts since 2007, 
see [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R]. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R]. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R]. 

[28] USAID Office of Inspector General, Risk Assessment of USAID/ 
Yemen's Major Activities, 6-279-11-001-S (Cairo, Egypt: Mar. 30, 2011). 

[29] USAID Office of Inspector General, Risk Assessment of USAID/ 
Yemen's Major Activities. 

[30] Although agencies allocated less funding for Yemen from the FFP 
account between fiscal years 2007 and 2012 than from the Economic 
Support Fund account, we selected FFP as the largest U.S. civilian 
assistance program in Yemen because its efforts in Yemen constitute a 
single program. By contrast, assistance from the Economic Support Fund 
has supported multiple programs--none of which has received as much 
funding as FFP. 

[31] USAID added, though, that this may not be true for future FFP 
assistance to Yemen if the nature of the programs conducted changes. 

[32] GAO, Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. 
Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 
2012). 

[33] Allocation amounts in figure 9 do not add up to $361 million 
because of rounding. 

[End of section] 

GAO’s Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO’s website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
“E-mail Updates.” 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]